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This study is concerned with the Administration of Philip 111-of 
Spainpand suggests that it was with that Administration rather 
than with the Duke of Lerma that real power lay. Lerma himself is 
seen as a courtiargooncerned to enrich himself and his family and 
quite unconcerned with affairs Of state - save where they impinged 
upon his own cupidity or upon his relationship with the King. It is 
therefore argued that he had no faction and hardly any interest in 
policymaking. The councils themselves are seen as being COMp3sed of 
independent9properly professional menjandthe study is particularly 
concerned to analyse the councils of StatepWar and Finance; attendance 
registers for these councils are used here. 
Philip himself is described as a man at once reliant personally 
upon the superficially brilliant Lerma and alsotand more profoundly, 
as a man who needed and valued enormously the advice of his councils* 
He separated Court and Governmentgrelaxing with Lerma while leaving 
the business of government to the councils. Such policy as he had 
beyond this is generally described as being belligerent. 
iv 
My debt to my wife and mother is profound; they provided the time. 
Professor John Lynch of University College, Londonghas given much 
expert guidancepand has done so with great patience; I owe him a 
great deal. 
Mr. J. G. Miles has read and corrected the proofs; he has excised many 
errors and suggested many improvements. 
I am grateful to the Central Research Fund of the University of 
London for its generous grants for archival researches in Spain. 
Her Excellency the Duchess of Lerma allowed me complete and 
privileged access to her forbear's papers; I am therefore uniquely I 
grateful to her and to her staff. 
Mr. J. W. Tobias and Mr. John Conroy have given much encouragement over 
the yearspand I thank them for it here. 
Since a second volume is providod, I have included the list or 
contentslabbreviationalbibliographica1 notes etc, in that second 
volume; they may therefore be more conveniently used in conjunction 
with the text. 
loIntroductions 
2 
LThe Transference of PawerP1598 -' 1603. 
At the moment of his accession - some said even before it - 
the young Philip 111 granted a councillorship of State to Francisco 
Gomez do Sandoval v RojasqMarquis of Dania 
2 
; he thereby apparently 
confirmed the worst fears his father had entertained as to the 
3anc probable nature of his governmentp I symbolioally inaugurated for 
History the effete era of the privanza in which the kings of Spain 
successively abandoned their kingship into the hands of their 
fav3urites. Denia himselfilater Duke of Lermavhas become in this 
view a man at once avaricious for personal wealth while also a 
politico intent on dominating the Governmentgand initially achieving 
this by appointing his own favourites and relatives to major offices 
at the expense of dismissing the servants of the old Kingoin pursuit. 
of policies that are usually described as pacific. 
In factpPhilip eventually belied every expectation by 
giving Spain a properly conciliar governmentj as he reformed the 
machine he had inherited almost beyond recognition. Casual t lazy and 
diffident9he was to prove in this respect wiser than his father; h: 6 
learned how to delegate. He did so painfully and in peculiarly fitful 
A slightly shorter version or this chapter is to be published in 
The English Historical Review. 
2 Francesco SaranzooVenetian ambassador in Spaingto Doge and 
Senate or Venicet14 SOP't-l598, Cal. Ven. 
_, 
lXP736. 
3 IAlasqDon Crist&balpl am arraid'they will govern him'-Cited by 
J-H-ElliOtttImP6rial Spaintl469-1716p(1970)PP. 301. 
3 
mannergas the deficiencies that led him to rely personally on LerMa 
led him also to rely on a fully autonomous Administration. That in 
turn became vastly more Professionalised and competent than it had 
beentat least latterlylunder Philip 111, and it was dominated not by 
Lerma but by the man of Philip ll. philip, s first major actin 1598-91 
was to reorganise the Council of Wargand if he did so chiefly only 
because he wanted it to give him a great victory with which to 
celebrate the opening of his reign, 13, e did so thoroughly; in 1597, War 
had sat 61 timesvin 1599 it sat 13O. At firstýPhilip tried to govern 
his foreign affairs by relying chiefly on informal advice from within 
his Court9but in 16001still in quest of his great victaryphe 
reorganised his Council of State; m3ribund and of no real consequence 
in Philip 11's last yearspit sat 43 times in 160O. The same wanful. 
superficiality initially characterised his management of financial 
affairs until in 1602 he finally reformed the Council of Finance; in 
1597 it had sat 74 timesgin 1603 it met 94. 
Denials future and ambitions lay rooted in the degrading 
poverty of his past and were almost wholly uncomplicated by political 
considerations. Since his accession to the estates in 1575 he had been 
concerned with only the m3st rudimentary financial survival. In 1579 
he had abased himself before Philip 11 - #it is certain that I do not 
know a man who finds himself in greater poverty' - but won only a 
taken awardpand then only sixteen months later! 3. v 1583 he was begging 
Dania to Philip 11928 May 1579 915-M. Add. 2893419f. 352. Ke repeated the request in 1580 and was paid for his guard duties at the Yonzon Cortes. Same to same220 SePt-15PO and anonymous and undated 
4 
the royal confessor to help save him from the indignity of selling all 
his goods, even his marital bedyand taking his starving family into a 
charitable Home. Nothing materialised and only three months laterp 
stripped of all honourphe was writing again to the King - '.. I return 
again to throw myself at (Your I. Iajesty's)feetlimpressing upon Tour 
Majesty that if for my sins you do not help me ... (I will be)in such 
dire hardship as to be unable to afford a crust of bread or to pay 
anything of what I owe' -2 Denia was learning how to influence a Court. 
He finally struck the right chard when his letter of October 1584 
found its way to Mateo Va"zquez. 
3MOved to a 'great compassion' by a 
poverty 'rarely seen in one of his qualitylythe Secreta3-7 recommended 
4 
a grantgand in his own time - four years later - Philip complied. 
The value of the award is not recordedybut any improvement it effected 
was doubtless nullified by the penal honour granted Denia in 1592 of 
appointment to the viceroyalty of Valencia. 
5 In 1583 his Castilian 
rents had been worth c-99493 ducats annuallypbut by 1598, together 
with all his incomes9they brought in only 8p027 ducats. 
6 For this mang 
note authorising payment, 3.11. Add. 28 342, ff. 122 and 177. 
1- Baze to Fr. Diego do Chaves98 Jun-1563P]B-M-Add-280449f. 122. 
2 -'Same to Philip lls23 SePt-15839ibid. 9f. 250. 
3- Same to samGP2O Oct- 1584P35-M. Aa-d* 27T3459fo 211- 
J# 4- Vazquez to Philip 11912 Jan. 15859B. 14. Add. 28,3749f*274. 
5 On the conditions under which such men servedlbelowtpP. 
6- The 1583 f igurep converted from maravedfs9frOm Dania to Chavespov. 
cit., 'and the 1598 from Inventories of Lormals goods, 1598-1625 9 
A. D. L-549no fol* 
an unpaid c3uncillorship of State was of only symbolic imp3rtance; over 
the next twýnty years he w3uld attend only 22 of 739 meetings of the 
COuncil-His real interests lay elsewhere; bv 16259after the 
03nfiscations of Philip 1V and after nearly seven years ýeyqnd the 
royal favourphis Castilian rents and incomes would be w3rth 932pO73 
I 
ducats annually. 
1 To amass and protect this fortunsohe systematically 
set about controlling the Courtyand did so with remarkable suocessy 
but in order that he might enjoy it properly he was quite prepared to 
allow the Administration to cope with the drudgery of los Papeles-He 
had better things to doe 
State itself hacl had only nominal iMp3rtance in the 1590sq 
meeting rarely and being concerned with only minor matters - with 
widows asking for ayudasythe Organisation of the postal system and 
the likeAýhibiting a sublime indifference to the possibility of 
death that alarmed an& astonished his Court and nearly wrecked, his 
GovernmentsPhilip 11 had glanced in its direction only reluctantly 
and only at his own moments of physical crisis. 
3 As early as 1591 a 
great historian had echoed a general and increasing fear - 'If His 
Majesty should tire of working - as at present - and 'want to take 
some day for himselflor if illness should so oblige himpthe whole 
1- Inventories of Lermagibid. 
2- The consultas for 1590-7 are incorporated in A. G. S. E-2741t 
unfoliated; the material in this and the following paragraphs on 
State and the Junta is based on this and on Letters and Minutes Of 
Christoval de"Moura9l594-15589'B. M. Add. 2893799pass: im II/1 
3- ]For a remarkable compendium of his illnessespGil GonzLez Davilay 
Xistori! $ de ... Don Peli e 1110published ih-Salazar de Mendozaq To--Farqujaýxaý. R- -L'V--j.. qV0 -. 23-vpP-475; 
machine (of government) is brought to a standstill' - and had urged 
as 'the most natural remedy' that life be breathed into the Council 
of State. 
1 In 1592 Philip's advisers were forced to make practical 
provisions for a Minority, 
2 
and in 1593 - at roughly the point at 
which he finally abandoned his insistence on writing personally any 
comments an state papers other than those of the C3uncil of War3 _ 
even el Prudente began to take the point; in Marchprumours began to 
circulate that he was considering remodelling and expanding the 
Council of State 'so that in case of any accident, his son may find 
support adequate to the burden which will fall upon himi. 
4 Neither 
disaster materialisedland no. t until 1596 - when the Court again gave 
him up for dead5 - did he take practical aotionpturning his attention 
not only to the Council of State but more generally to the nature of 
his governmental institutions and to the quality of the men who 
staffed thea. It would beleven for himpa sobering spectacle; hewould 
67 
find Finance corruptq Castile structurally inadequatep and Indies 
1- Lufs Cabrera de CordobapFelipe SegundogMadrid9l876-77tiv9p. 475- 
2 --; -The Constable of Castile being sent-away from Court because of 
his 
pretensions to influence in the event of a Hinority. Thomas 
Coritarini 9 Venetian ambassadorpto Doge and Senatdr12 MAT. '15929Madrid 
Cal. Ven. PlX943.3 - On Warvbelowjp-9pn-2- 
4 Francesco VendramingVenatian anb6ssadorlto Doge'and Senatey26 Mar. 
1593PCal-Ven 91X, 143.5 - jbid-, 418,422P528 and 
(an 1597)610. 
6 The"'visita'*f Lic. Laguna's commission found over half thd-býfficials 
guilty of misAemeanours. 2f some kindpand levelled fines totalling 
c. 63P856 ducatson them. In 'additiongseven men were dismissedpthree 
Fost their offices withou-t being formally deprived and another six 
word traniferred to other posts, Copy of the report92O Feb. 1596p 
B. B'- 3827 9 f. 254. 
7 In February 1598, Philip published a radical reform Of the 
Council 
7'1ý 
riven by intemal rivalries. 
1 He began with State; from 9 JulY 1596P 
roughly at monthly intervalsphis son sat as President of the Council. 
It waspeven nowpa charade. The Executive effectively 
consisted by 1596 of Crist6v-aa de Moura and Juan do IdiSquez, who 
received all despatches and consultas a comun and took them to the 
royal sickbed. By 1598va comLpthe rum Ip of the Junta de Nochaphad 
become virtually an institution of statepthe Perfect Master's final 
answer to the problems of ruling. The body on which the Prince sat 
was more or less the old Junta; with him, it sat as the Founcil of 
Statepwithout him as a Junta responsible to Moura and Idiaquez-Its 
jurisdictional scope was limitedtits executive powers non-existentp 
but it sat for the remainder of the reignpearnestly considering its 
trivia and teaching the Prince how to rule. 
2 It did not of course do 
that - he was not even allowed to write his own comments - but it 
taught him what a Council of State was not for. and afforded him a 
close look at his father's senior advisers. A training-school for the 
of Castile p dividing it in two by ordering the establishment of a 
S21a de Gobierno. Copy of the cedulaq14 Feb. 1598; B. M. Ege3329f. 247- TAI. Merriman charadteriiied 'Castile in'1598 as 'being "Igo hope'lesslyn 
ill-oigania6d and overloaded 'with work, particularly on: theý -- 
judicial sidepthat efficiency in action was impossiblel. The Rise 
of the 'Spanish Empir6 in the Old World and the- New'pvoleivqpP-4l5- 
419-On the hisU17 of the, decredt below'vppý' . 14p, 76-7. 
1- Id''his' Ilast days' yPhilip set up j'jtint 'to 'investigate Indiesp 
but it 'met only a few times and a6hieved nothing; the difficulties 
'increased daily' and the 'confusion ana bad despatch of business 
for which 'this Council is so noted' had to await sallitiOn'bY '- 
Philip 111-CoPy of c6dula establishirig the cAmara de Indiaq, 25-Aug., 
: L600, B. N. lli592pf. '241-o'See'b'elowgpp*'77-8- 
2 Seet'fir inst-ahbepthei-meeting of 24 Sept. 1597pthought i- mp*-rtant 
8 
PrincepthiB curious body was gratuitously intended as something of a 
Regency Council for the young King; Philip formally enjoined his son 
ýa use the members of the Junta and the councillors of State - 
whoever they might be - at the time of his death and to 'avail 
himself of them all the time that they live and have health and 
strength to continue*. 
1 In his final. dispensation he'appointed Moura 
camarero mayor of his son and gave a oouncillorship of State to 
Garcfa de LoeysapArchbishop-elect of Toledo. 
2 Then he died - on the 
feast of Philip Martyr. 
On 20 Septdmber 15989after the immediate obsequies and after 
exactly a week in power.. Philip Ill. effectively resurrected the 
Council of Statelconvoking a meeting on that day and ordering that 
he was henceforth to be 'consulted' after every meeting. 
40n the 
following diqpWar was convened for the first time and within a week 
the Junta was abolished. 
5 State met frequently if irregularly - eight 
times in seven, and a half weeks - and with a cheerfully unrestricted 
memborship; by -November almost every available man of note 
had 
enough to Justify two consultas; these concerned themselves with a 
salary for a castellan "appointed by the Archduke Albdrt; the 
payment of 100 escudos , 
to the Archduke Ernestfs-seoretary; a 
pension for the daughter of Julia"a Romero, and with matters Of le comparable unimportance*Idia"quezVeladagruensalida and Chinchon 
attended. Cntas. 3t. 924 SePt-15979A. G. S. E. 2023, ff-11 and 12. 
Codicil to Testament of Philip lljl6 Aug. 1598gA. G. S- Pat. Rsal 299 
f-38- 
2- ibidegand codicil Of 5 Aug-15989ibidegf-379and anonymous account 
of the death of Philip 119B. N-5972tf. 155v- 
3- GonzAlez Divila (1771)gP-31. 
4- Philip 111 to Prancisco de Idiaquezq20 SePt-1598pA. G-S- E. 2636P 
no fole op 
6 Ua 
de Leyaa AAMn 5- Carlos Beco Serrano. 'Los Comienzos dela PrivE adý e Ii- los EmbaJadores FlOientinosIlBoletfn de la R) cadei ae 
attended either State itself or War as State councillorl - Mourap 
I Idiaquez; the dukes of Niýera and Medina7Sidonia; the counts of 
Puensalida, Miranda, PuentespChinch*o'n and Denia; the Adelantado of 
Castile; Rodrigo Vazquez de Arce, President of Castile; Juan de Borja 
and Pedro de Velasco. This flood-tide of the aristocracy found 
reflection an Warlwhich consisted for the first twenty meetings of 
the reign - three professional attendances apart - entirely of a 
State membership. War had beenplatterlypthe most important of Philip 
Ills councils; he had retained its consultas after he had renounced 
all othersp 
2 
and at least by January 1597 it had become virtually a 
privy councilydevoid of aristocrats and dominated by Moura. and 
If 3 For the great aristocrats, thereforetappointment to this Idiaquez. 
body carried a profound significancetand they preened themselves on 
their apparent restoration to power - the Adelantado roundly 
declaring that the world 'would see what the Spanish were worth now 
that they have a free handyand are no longer subject to a single 
brain that thought it knew all that could be known and treated 
Hista: ria, ocxliv (1959), 79. The despatches of FraricsscO Guicl-iardini 
of 29 Sept. and 5 Dec-1598 to the Grand Duke of Tuscany are 
appended pp. 9 4-100 and 100-101. 
1- Councillors of State were entitled to sit on War; references in 
this study to $Councillors of War' refer to the men appointed 
specifically to War. '11 
2- War's are the only consultas on which I have found even the 
royal initial in 1597-8qPJ: Lil4DIs last such being on a consulta 
dated exactly a year before his death. Attendance Register. Forty 
three meetings into the new reignpWar was still dealing with the 
backlog of Philip's business., Cnta. Warp 23 NOV-1598PA-G-8- G*A*5271 
f-105- 
3- They sat as the State membersgand only two councillors Of War 
attended regularly - Pedro de Padilla and Juan de Acu2ra Vela-Juan 
10 
everyone else as a blockheadl. Reporting thisIthe Venetian ambassador 
PraYed that Philip would not be led into rash ventures. 
Philip was not sure where he was headed. On 29 October, he 
granted Denia an gZuda of 568,000 ducatep 
2 
and began to relax from 
the cares of government. He summoned State on 11 and 12 November and 
forgot about it for nearly seven weeks. Neverthelesspa turning-point 
had been reached. What had happened with the aristocrats was simple; 
with the beginning of a new reignIthey had been especially anxious 
to catch the royal eye - where better to do so than at Court9how 
better than by serving on the councils ? For his partpaetermined to 
proclaim his accession with a flourishpPhilip had allowed them to 
add lustre to the new Court. but by mid-November the first of the 
two stages of the aristocratic restoration had largely burned itself 
out. In the shadow of the grandees, howeverpa revolution had been 
instigated on the junior half of Warlwhere the appointments of 
PUnOnr3str3qVelasoopEnrfquez and Valencia and the return of Acu"n"a 
Vela by 9 November had manifested less Philip's tolerance of the 
aristocracy than his military ambitions andpinstinctivelvithat 
reverence for experience that was to be the hallmark of his reign. 
Philip 111 has been accused of many thingspbut not generally 
of an exuberant belligerencegand yet this was a distinguishing 
do Cardona and Pedro do Velasco, eaoh sat twice. 
1- Soranzo to Doge and Senats, 27 SePt- 1598. Cal- Ven--vlXp 744- 
2 --Oquerellal of Lic. Chumacero SotomayorvB. T. -Eg. 2081vf-12TJ- 
11' 
feature of his early years. Thisq after all9was the young man who had 
had to be restrained from participating in 1596 in the defence of 
Cadizv 1 and of whom the Earl of Essex had feared in 1598 that 'his ... 
blood is hotter and his humour of ambition is like to be greater' than 
his father's. 2 It was to be Philip Ill who would dream of personally 
3 leading crusades in Africa and Italy in 1600, who would in three 
years send two armadas into northern waters9and who would as late as 
1603 dream of a great victory in Africa to match his grandfather's. 
4 
Philip ached for greatnessland if in his early years he tilted at his 
dream with the special enthusiasms of a young man desperate to cut a 
figure in the worldphe persevered with it in later years even when he 
had had to face the harshest realities of failure. 
5 It was therefore 
natural en3ugh that he should have first turned his serious attention 
to his Council of War. Where his appointments to State had been 
haphazard9those to War were clearly defined and had specific purpose. 
Field co=anders of excellence9his new professional councillors were 
Jgustino NanigVenatian ambassadorp'toý- Doje and Senateq14 Jul-15ý6y 
C'al. "Ven. PlX'9469. ' -I-a 
2 -'! 
ýý*ted bjý 'E*M. Tenis*np Elizabethan EnglandqX91596-1598 (1950), 352. 
3 Cnta*Juarf dd-'IdidquezOqIO"-)4ay 16000S. M. Eg., 32ýqf. 13r. Se-a 'bel*Vppp. 
2. 
4 Cntg. -'q'Jnta-d9 Tre_s. g Jul-16039A. G. S. E-2023, f-114-See belowvpp. 
264-5 
5 on his Icingshippsee especiallyvbelowppp. 284-308. 
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men of a stampgappointed and sitting as a group; from 26 October 1598 
when PuaborostrogVelasco and EarIquez first sat together - to 13 
February 15999five of them aggregated 143 attendances and sixteen 
State councillors only 175-Observers took partial ri3te. Ambassador 
Guicciardini reported back to Florence that 'this Prince lacks only 
experience and those insights that his youth and the scanty 
education given him by his father have not allowed him to acquirep 
but that if the councillors are good9the government will be most 
competent'. 
1 
AbroadgEnglishmen were particularly c3neerned-In 
Januai7ga merchant wrote home that 'the young King has altered many 
of his Counoil; only such as are fit for the wars are in estimation 
with him 112 and in February Cecil was informed that 'The Council of 
War of 12 persons sits five times a week9and since 13 Septemberpwhen 
the old King died2all the old martial men are sent forland soldiers 
3 
are training'. 
These men were to prove wiser than they knew. Philip 
appointed another four Councillors in 1599-1601jand 
bequeathed five 
I- Report of 5 Dec. l5989Guieciardini (1959)9]P-81- 
2- Anonymous merchant of Wexford to Sir Geoffrey Fenton, 28 Jan-15999 
Cal. Ireland, 1598-16019P. 481. 
3- Patrick Strange to Sir Robert Cecil, 3 Feb. 1599, Cal. Dom. 1598-1601, 
P-159. 
13 
of the nine to his son in 1621 as the nucleus of his Council of Warp 
and a sixth died in 16219three years after leaving War for the 
Finance presidency. 
1A 
historic generation was appointed in 1598-16oll 
and it began work On a Council sitting twice as frequently as Philip 
2 11's. had done in 1597-8. 
In DecemberqPhilip rekindled optimism at home by dismissing 
3 Mouravan avowed enemy of the Council of Statep and by reconvening the 
Council itself; from Lisbangthe Count of Partalegropfor thirty years a 
proponent of properly conciliar government admired the royal 
performance - 'the King our lard has more spirit than was thought' - 
and looked forward with relish to 'a new style (of government)for the_ 
ordinary conduct of affairs' based upon the arch-stone of State. 
4 
Philip then prepared to depart with his Court for the east9where he 
was to meet and marry his bridegand formally confirmed Denials status 
by appiinting him sumiller do corps. 
5 He was inconsiderately delayed 
1- On these mengbelowpp. 253-6. 
2 -'In 1597 War sat 61 times; in 1598,75 times t. 3 13 Sept. pand 63 in the remainder of the Tear; in'15999130; 1600,143; 16011109; 1602,127. 
The average attendance of the councillors of War in 1597 had been 
1-5 per meeting; in 1598 it was 1.6 under'Philip 11 and 2.2l'under 
his son; 1599t5.23; 160OP5.25; 1601,5-16; 160296.12. 
3- Luis Cabrera de CordobapRelacionesq(1857)9PP-1 and 56. 
4- To Esteban de Ibarraq? Dee. 15987-, printed in CodainpxliiipPpP555-6. 
5- Cabrera de drdoba. (1857)tp. l. ' 
141 
by the haggling of the Cortesp and while he fretted he casually 
appointed Bishop Salvatierra as examining judge (visitador) of the 
Council of Finance and abandoned his father's projected reforms of 
the Council of Castile. His monies were voted on 21 Januaryp 
1 
and he 
left on the following day9not to return until October. 
2 
Those months belonged to the Courtlas Philip launched 
joyously into his kingshiploreating deliberately for himself what 
3 
one dazzled contemporary called 'a new style of greatness!. Denia 
natWrally shared the. centre of the stage; the Council of State hadpat 
4 its first meetingpadvised the King against going to Valenciap but 
the Court now made its way to Denia itselfpwhere the Marquis lavish1j, 
entertained it. 
5 In allgDenia spent some 300POOO ducats on the 
6 journey, but found ready compensation in a variety of grantspone 
7 
worth no less than 173pOOO ducats. The journey witnessed the final 
transformation of a monachal into a baroqtke Courtvand Denials own 
part in the triumph was formally acknowledged on the return to 
I-I ibid. 9pp- 3-4. 
2- Un Philip's itineracygbelow, pp, 129-136. 
3- Gonz6lez DlCvila (1771)gpp. 64-5- 
4- Rnta. St. 920 SePt-1598, A. G. S. E. 26369f. 48. 
5-B. N. 23469f. 206. 
6- Gonzglez D4fdla (1771), P. 69. 
7- On the Sevillian escribanfa de siacasgbelowgpp. 46 and 340- 
1 
Madridpwhen an 11 November he was raised to the title by which he is 
known to history. 1 To help him celebratepPhilip granted him another 
400pOOO ducats. 2 
The new greatness was achieved almost wholly at the expense 
of Philip's governmental responsibilities. In planning the journeyphe 
had appreciated that his grandeza would hardly be furthered by the 
presence of a host of dour lavyers and clerkstand especially so since 
they would have to be paid, housed and fed for the journey. For this 
reasonpand because the marital gambol was not to be interfered with 
by affairs of stateghe had left the professional councils in Madrid 
to cope as best they couldptaking with him only a handful of 
administrators to act as liaison officers. 
3 State and War alone were 
significantly reprosentedtbut State travelled in effect only once 
again to ornament the royal greatness. Philip naturally had to haVS 
his high Court Officials and great magnates travel splendidly with 
himpand since by happy coincidence these men tended to be councillors 
of State he was able to take State with him*At the last moment he 
must have realised that he had forgotten to appoint all such 
luminariesgand with only three hours to go before he left Madrid he 
hurriedly conferred councillorships upon the dukes of Infantado and 
1- Cabrera'de Co 01 rdoba, (1857) PP- 51- 
2-B. M. Eg. 20819f. 128. 
3- For a not entirely accurate listqCabrera, do Cordoba (1857)pp. 
6. On 
the royal itineracy in general and its effect upon the 
Administrationgbelow, pp. 129-153- 
16 
Terranova, the Count of Alva de Lists and the Cardinal Of SGvillG-1 
It was not a happy portent for the Council. Nor was the fact that not 
all senior councillors qualified for the journey; alone of the 
presidents of councilsithose of Italy and Aragon accompanied the 
Courtvand the Count of Chinchongas deputy to bath9had to stay in 
Madrid. Similarlyp the Council was deprived during the journey of 
Miranda who returned to Madrid on his promotion to the presidency of 
Castile. Not that it mattered much; State met only four times during 
the progress* 
By contrastyWar was not only divided into two halves9but was 
convened 68 times during the journey alonepas Philip again made the 
distinction absolute between a Council of War whose advice he 
specifically and urgently needed and the rest of the Administration. 
War spent 1599 preparing the armada that would give him his great 
victory in Irelandpand it alone was therefore allowed to intrude on 
the festivities. By using WarpPhilip incidentall. V ckffered the 
aristocracy a second chance to display zeal and abilities in his 
servicetby sitting as councillors of Stateyand found them ignoring 
the opportunity; only Fuentes (61) and Nafjera (38) attended over half 
the meetings. 
As the Court meandered back to Madridlit was therefore not 
clear with whom the future belongedythe courtier-politicians or the 
professional admini Btrato, rs. Philipp howevert had reached his decision 
in favour of the latter and began now slowly but systematicallY to 
I- ibid-9PP -5-6 and Seco Serrano (1959)9p. 82yn. 2. 
--I 
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implement it, He turned first to the great men of affairs - men of 
presidential or councillor of State timbre. Thus far his only major 
decisions concerning such men had been to dismiss Moura in December 
15981to appoint Bernardo de Sandoval y Raj asp great-uncle of Deniapto 
succeed the- dead Garcfa de Loaysa in the see of Toledo in April 
15999 1 and to replace Vazquez de Arce as President of Castile with 
Miranda in the following month. 
2 Between October 1599 and April 1600 
he added changes in the presidencies of InquisitionjOrders and Italy 
and appointed a successor to Moura, as leader of the Council of 
Portugal. He then turnedgif under the impress of humiliationpto the 
Council of State. History has not judged these changes wellpallowing 
Philip neither his right to dispense with his father's servants nor 
that to replace them with men of his own choice. It has not because 
it has followed uncritically the views of a Venetian ambassadorp 
Simon Contarini9who compounded malevolence and ignorance by not even 
being in Spain at the time. 
I say that in Spain the Council (of State) is everythingy 
but it is not freelexcept in namegfor there is no one who 
dares give his view freelygand especially so if it is 
against the will of the Duke (of Lerma)-For having done 
so, Garcýa do LoaysatArchbishop of Toledo v ..... fell into 
1- Papal Bull of appointment, 19 Apr. 15999A. G. S. Pat. RealvBulas Y 
Breves SueltoBP5842. '- 
2- Mirandsý appointed 25 May 1599. A. G. S. Q-C-33-0n Vazquezpbelowt 
pp. 18-21. 
disgraceland Rodrigo VazquezpPresident of Castilepwas 
stripped of his duties and expelled from Courtl(and this) 
cost him his life. The same happened to Pedro Portocarrero, 
Inquisitor-Generalvand to Don Pedro de Guzmangentleman of 
the Chamberpwho spoke ill of the Duke to the King ... 1. 
' In matters of state ... there is a division between the 
followers of Philip 11 and those of Philip 1110each holding :! 
superior the government of his time; that of Philip 11 (is) 
Don CristO**bal (do Moura) its leaderoDon Juan do Idi&queztthe, 
Marquis of Veladapthe C3unt of Chincho"npPrince Daria 
Two statements in this phantasmagoria - that State was by 1605 
'everything' and that the system of Philip 111 differed significantly 
from that of his father - were substantially correct; the rest was at 
best irrelevantpmost notably in its obsession with Lermapat worst 
nonsensical .2 The origin of the story ab3ut the opposition to Lerma 
Contarini (1857)PPP-579 and 567. 
2 For instance - Guzmfuils post lapsed automatically with Philip 
11's deathyand he was appointed to his Chamber by Philip Illp 
serving until he died; Moura's disapproval might be thought 
understandable in the circumstances9but it prevented him neither) 
according a grudging admiration to the quality of the new Council: 
of State (below9p. 30)nor from accepting the leadership of the i 
Council in 1612; Idiaquez, Velada and Chinch6n led State in its 
deliberationsfeach serving to his death and thereby exercising 
more influence than they could have done under Philip 11; 
Idia"quez became the most important policymaker in Spainpand his 
advice was revered by the King (belawppP-353-6063-371 and 
Cabrera de CSrdobajl857vP-530)'; D3riaIs monogram is found on no 
consulta in the 1590stand he never sat under Philip lll; Lerma 
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of Garcýa and Vazquez probably lay in the embellishments given over 
six years to Cabrera de drdobals muted speculation of June 1599 that 
they had both advised Philip 11 to set up a regencyý-like counoil or 
Junta to guide his son in his firs t years. Such would not explain 
the early favours granted them by Philip 111. Garc 04 lapindeedphad been 
specifically nominated to Toledo in March 1598 at the insistence of 
the-then Princepand was no-tably in favour at his accession. 
2 He had 
known Philip intimately since his appointment as his tutor in 1585 
and if he lost favour in the few months before his death in January 
I 
had sat on State only twice by 1605 and he certainly did not 
dominate those meetings (belowppp-375-6); on Cointarini's hearsay 
evidence it might be remarked that Vazquez and Portacarrero were 
dismissed when Philip was itinerantpaad that even if outspoken 
opposition to Lerma necessarily led to dismissal - it did not; see 
belowpp. 27 - the fact that Garcfa died in FebruaryjVAquez was 
dismissed in May and Portacarrero in September-October should 
have led a perceptive man to wonder why intelligent men did not 
learn the value of discretion. On the dismissal of a criado of 
Lermals for attacking the 'confused and ignorant' government of 
Philip 11 in contrast to a eulogy on Philip llllspCabrera de 
Cordoba (l857)vpp-l73jl92j2369243 and 413. 
1-, ibid. 9p. 26. 
2- On n3mination, Gonzglez Davila (1771)ppp. 24-69and an relationship 
in September 15989Soranzo to Doge and Senate of VenicsY13 Sept-9 
15989Cal. Ven PlX9737- 
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1 
1599 there must have been dramatic reason. No such is rec3rdedgand the 
best that contemporary Court gossip could Produce in seeking 
nefarious explanation for a septuagenarian death was to speculate on 
a dispute over a pension. 
1A 
glance in the direction of the virulent 
plague that decimated the servants of Philip 11 might have been more 
2 .0 pertinent. Vazquez was certainly dismissed, but Cabrera absolved 
Lermagif only by omissionpin his astonishment - 'His Majesty having 
made so much use of him since he inherited9putting all the government 
of these realms in his charge. 
3 
As Philip acknowledged to Vazquez 
himself. the matter was simple enough; he wanted Miranda as his 
President of Castile. 
4 
1- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), P. 10. 
2- On the extraordinary death-rate among the councillors of Indies 
at the beginning of the reign9E. Schafeiji9p. 245-Of Philip 11's 
presidentspCastile and Arag6n died in 15999Inquisition in 1600, 
Crusade in 160290rders in 16049Finanoe in 1605 and Indies in 
1606; his aristocratic courtiers and administrators died in quick 
succession - LoaysapPuensalida and Diego do C6rdoba in 1599; 
'de Liste, Najerapl60O; *InfantadO9l6Ol; ths Adelantadotl602; Alva 
'1604; Besa and Borjapl606; Olivares9l6O7; Chinchan and Kiranday1608. 
The professional councillors of War died in 1599 and 1606; only 
one councillor of Finance survived 16079and then only in poor 
health (belowgp. 265); one secretary of State died and the Other 
retired in 1600; one secretary of Castile died in 15999the Other 
retired in 1602*The plague was doubtless responsible formany of 
these deaths and many scholars would equally doubtless follow 
Dr. Sch'afer in wondering how far the climate of Valladolid itself 
was responsible. Certainly9the town was notorious at the time for 
its climate; see Cervantes)Fxemplary StoriesgPengain Classicsq 
1972pp. 143. 
3- Cabrera do C&rdoba (1857),, p. 26. 
4- GonAlez"Davila (1623)tp. 378. 
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Philip Ill was now master of his own destiny, and if we must 
seek uniform cause for these dismissals we would do well to concentrati 
upon him. Garcfa and VIzquez - like Mouratwho contrived to stay at 
Court until April 1600 - had once ruled him; as he found his feet1so he 
ended the age of subservience to grave old men. We should perhaps only 
wonder that it took him so long, This syndrome probably also accounted 
for Portocarrera and MartIn de CSrdobagMarquis of Cart6s and President, 
of Orderspboth unfortunate enough to have been appointed in 1595-6 
when Philip 11 had been attempting to restrict his son's future 
options. 
1 P3: rtacarre= p moreoverp was Bishop of Cuencapand again unlike 
his fatherpPhilip 111 was a stickler for episcopal residence. 
2 There 
arep too indications that he was not even particularly efficient. 
3 
Philip broke further with his father's practice by filling 
these vacancies immediately. 
4 He chose men of character and 
distinati3n, als3 perhaps something of a novelty"; the substitution of 
1 Portocarrero appointed 7 June 1596, H. C. LealA Hist3rY Of the 
inquiaiti3n of Spain)4 vals., 1906-7 and 1922ti9557garld C3rtd'8913 
Apr-15951A. G. S. Q-C-33- 
2 Papal 11rief of 26 Feb. 1599 onginter aliasepiscopal pluracygand 
Philip's reaction topprinted by Gonzfil Ddvila, (1771)ppP-70-2* 
3 His successor had to involve himself in discreetly replacing many 
inappropriate Inquisitars. In a remarkably perceptive paSsagegLea 
commented on the incident and its wider implications - 'This 
indicated a desire to resume the close watchfulness of Ferdinand 
which had long since been forgotten in the turmoil and absences of 
Charles V and the secluded lab3urs of Philip 110over despatches 
and loonsultas'. A bureaucracy was establishing itself in which the 
various departments of the government were becoming more or less 
independent of the monarch ... '. Lea proceeded to show 
]Philip 111 
fitfully intervening to some effect in governmental affairstvOl-it 
gpýM-300- 
4c aferliql12-3precording that Philip 11 left Indies vacant for Q1 more than seventeen years. 
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a Juan de Idiaquez for a Cordoba or of a Fernando Nin"o de Guevara 
for a Fortocarrero was hardly suggestive of declining standards. 
El Greco's Inquisitor moreover -a criado of Lermals ?- was 
appointed on his return from Rome; the best man became availablevand 
was therefore appointed. The same criteria of excellence were applied 
to Italy as Philip appointed Juan Fernandez de Velasco y Tobarg 
Constable of Castile, Spain's leading soldier and twice Governor of 
Milantto succeed Miranda. 
2 Miranda's own advancement to Castile was 
doubtless not hindered by his long association with Lermaqbut Cabrerap 
who would have known9drew no causative connection. Miranda had served 
Philip 11 in two viceroyaltiespas President of Italy and as 
councillor of Statepand was much loved by Philip lll; we need hardly 
3 look to Lerma to explain his promotion. 
Lerma's favour may, however, reasonably be discerned in the 
appointment of an unclepJuan de Borjaqto succeed Moura on 
Portugaly 
although as an experienced diplomat and administrator recently 
returned from Portugalphis appointment was natural enough 
to have 
5- For a 13wingeing indictment of Philip 111s presidents9 
'Adbertencias al Duque de Lerma ... I, B. N. 10857, f. 
81. 
1- Idiaquez appoint6d 12 Dec. 1599, A. G. B., Q. C. 27jand Niifa commission- 
ed 11 Aug. 15999taking possession on 23 Dec. pLeapip557. 
2- Cabrera de CSrd6ba (1857)PPP-58p92995- *'- 
3- On'rdlationship with Philip lll, lbid., PP. 174,198t335p337-8tand 
with Lermappe 129. 
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been inevitable. 1 It was9toopemphatically in evidence in the 
appointment of his great-uncle Bernardo to succeed Garofa; bishops of 
Pamplona could not normally hope for advancement to the see of 
Toledophowever well-deserving they were. 
2 Such was not9howeverythe 
faction-building normally ascribed to Lerma; both men served him illp 
if at all. Borjagtr3ubled by goutserved on Portugal and State in 
1600 but retired from Portugal in 16019did not follow the Court to 
Valladolid until 1603pand then sat on State only infrequently until 
retiring in 1605- 
3 Cardinal-archbishopB of Toledo also had a way of 
doing much as they pl6ased, and within months Bernardo found himself 
refusing first to live at Court and then to follow it to Valladolid 
and thereby refusing incidentally to serve on State - and in all 
probability refusing appointment as Inquisitor-General. 
4 He also 
found himself quarrelling ostentatiously with Lerma, and penning the 
most remarkable of all indictments of his activities. 
5 Like the other 
appointees of 1599pToledo was a man of character and independence. 
If 
this was ducal favouritism, it was of a peculiar sort - and 
especially sopit might be thought, since the only one of the 
1- On appointment gibid. PP-52. 
2- Cabrera welcomed the appointment9thinking him 'a well-deserving 
person of great qualities'libid. 9p. 12. 
3- On service on Fortugallibid. tpp. 103 and 184; on councillor, 
hip of 
State, below, pp. 242-3; on illness jGuicciardini. 
(1959)pp. 87- 
4- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857) PPP. 94,97,141,16292949 and 
belowoP. 79- 
5- See below. pp. 26-27. 
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inherited presidents who was related to Lerma would also shortly be 
dismissed, for cor-ruptione 
1 
Having made these appointment s Philip again tried to forget 
the cares of governmentgand relied for advice on matters pertaining 
to the unreformed councils of State and Finance on a variety of 
grotesquely-composed juntas, 
2 State itselfphaving last met in 
August, was not reconvened. Problems w3uld notgunfortunatelvtevaporate 
and disaster in the Atlantic and the renewal of criticism at home 
provided Philip with his final impetus. The Adelantad3ls failure to 
even reach Ireland rankled deeply -I... and in spite of his 
relationship with the Duke of Lermapso bitter is the feeling against 
him on account of his failure this yearýthat he has not kissed hands 
yet'. 
3 Philip began to look for other dreazs. ]Sv the end of January 
16009he and his advisers were becoming a laughing-stock; on 24th-Ithe 
Venetian ambassador wrote scathingly of the lack of policymaking 
regard to England ... here there are no signs of provision either 
for offence or defencegand if they do come to any decision it will be 
so late and confused that it will end in nothing2as usually happens 
with their doliberations'.. 
4 On 12 February 16009the Council of State 
was reconvened. 
1- On the Marquis Of Pozalbelow9pp, 31-S 
2- For the m3st grotesque 9 Cabrera do Ctrdaba 
(1857), pp-48-9- 
3 Francesco Contarini 9 Venetian ambassadar2to Doge and 
SenateP7 Dec. 
l599pCal. Ven.. jlX, 83j. 
4 Same to samej24 Jan. 1600 (New Style)pibid-2845- 
Philip departed with Lorma almost immediately for what was 
to become his annual progress through Old Castilepand left the 
Council to its own devices-A pattern was becoming clear; Court and 
Government were being separated. The hunting season was nearyand as 
they were to do every yearpPhilip and Lerma took themselves off to 
the lodges and palaces. 
' They returned briefly to Madrid in Aprily 
but did not return until the end of September2and even then 
alternated in the last months of the year between the capital and the 
Escorial. The extravaganceotoopcontinued; at the time he reconvened 
StatevPhilip granted Lerma 50v0OO ducats for being the first to 
inform him of the safe arrival of the Indies fleet. 
2 The third 
resurrection of State therefore took place in depressingly familiar 
eircumstances. AgainvPhilip was not concerned to properly define its 
membershippot only did the courtiers - NajeratInfantado and Alva de 
Liste - continue to attendpbut so too did Moura and the Adelantadop 
both in disgrace. There were some hopeful signs; 4n Idia`quez2ChizichSn 
and Mirandapthe Council had an experienced corepand although it met 
only six times in ten weeks it was allowed to concern itself with 
major matters of foreign affairs - the Saluzzo crisisgrelations with 
England9the rebellions in Flanders - and it had major power to 
influencetPhilip accepting its recommendations quite uncriticallY- 
3 
It was a beginning - perhaps. 
1- On their itineracylbelowtpp. 129-134. 
Of 2- Cabrera do Cordoba 1857), p. 16. 
3- On Philip and State 2 bel0w9pp. 284-291 and 303-8. 
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For one manlit was not enough. On 9 May 1600 the Cardinal of 
Toledo addressed himself"to his great-nephew. It was generally 
believedghe wrote that 
The King applies himself freely to what (you) advise and ask 
forland it is said that the (projected) removal to 
Valladolid (will be on account of) the building of the Church 
and palace there that Your Excellency desires and covets so 
vehemently. 
(It is also said that) the King is taken to the countryside 
so that he shall not deal with anyone nor ascertain the 
multitude of virtues and good talents that there are in all 
kinds of his subjects. This same is said of the Queen's 
household and of that of the King9that particular attention 
is taken of persons appointed by Your Excellency ... The 
current belief is that the people who can communicate and 
deal with Tour Excellency are those who are favoured on 
account of the flatteries they afford Your Excellencypand 
everyone doubts their integrity and competence .. The 
observation must be made of Your Excellency that (you) 
indignantly and ungenerously ignore such warningspcounsels 
or petitions as are not to (your) tastegand that the replies 
and discussions on matters of business accord with the 
humour and pleasure in which Tour Excellency finds himself 
and not with their subject-matter *eel* 
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Toledo's fears were profound; lin all that one sees, reads and hears', 
he went onvIclear signs are in evidence which threaten the patent 
ruin of this Monarchy ... '. He was not concerned - Vazquez's perhaps 
apart - with the presidential changes, rather advising that Indies 
and Finance be added to the listpbut stressed that both itineracy 
and extravagance must cease and that the King surround himself with 
'independent and free men' who would honestly and openly advise him. 
His revard would have surprised Contarinilhad he been in Spain; on 22 
JunevToledo sat for the first time on the Council of State. 
If Lerma took notice of Toledo's complaintsvhe took no action 
upon themland spent 1600 not only planning the removal to Valladolid 
but speculating financially upon it, as always with brilliant succesi?. 
His attitude to matters political he manifested by his disinterest in 
the m-eeting of 22 June9which as it happened was on several accounts 
an extraordinaxy event. Philip and Lerma were in Avila when some news 
came about the Saluzzo crisisland for what was to be the only time in 
the reign,, Philip summoned the Council of State to meet him on the 
road. He was dreaming of leading his a=ies into Italy against the 
Frenchvand marked his interest by actually attending the Council 
himself9for the first time in the reign. Lerma did not deign to do soý 
1A copy of the letter, B. N-5013pf. 1019from Granadcu 
2 On thispbolowoPP-48-9. 
3A second meeting was held on 25 Junegin Babilafuente; Lerma did 
not attend. Attendance Register. See also Cabrera do Co'rdoba 
(1857) 
PP-71-2974- 
-1 
It was not therefore surprising that it 'was Philip himself and 
not Lerma who finally took the initiative in establishing State 
pr3perly-Suddenly and accidentallyhe found another Oause-On 4 July, 
J# Idiaquez casually threw out for the consideration of his colleagaes 
the idea of sending an empresa to help the Irish Catholicspand Philip 
as casually referred the matter back to the Council fof further 
deliberation. 11e, was not particularly concerned with Ireland; in reply 
to a. consulta of 1 July he had only suggested that aid to the Irish 
be increased. But on 11 JulyqState considered a report from the Duke 
of Sesa in Rome which argued strongly for a more active intervention 
in England; if Spain did not act9the succession would soon pass to 
James Vlpwhile prompt action would elicit support not merely from 
the Catholics but from many heretics and politiciansgamong them the 
Admiral, Treasurer General and Cecil himself. The Council reiterated 
Philip 11's policy of supporting the candidature of the infanta 
aquez's proposal; Chincho*n, Isabel. Two days latervit reconsidered Idi 
/ 
MirandapBorja, Toledo and Nin"O de Guevara rejected itland a confused 
King delayed. On 23 Julypthe Council again argued strongly against 
involvement9but Philip had found his cause; the expedition would be of 
service to the Lordland he would find the money even if he had to go 
without himself. 
I On his reply to the next consulta (29 July) he 
repeated his ambition; the plague was now on the wanegand 'in so 
1- Gntas. St-194911913923 July 16OOtA. G. S. E. 2511pff-4927p48,192. 
I 
abundant a yearleverything is easier and cheaper'. 
1 He held firm in 
the face of further conciliar resistancepand State9which had met 
twelve times in the first six months of the year9was convened on 
twenty five in July-Octoberjbut on only a further six in November 
and December as the prospects for an empresa in 1600 reoeded. With 
postponementvPhilip lapsed into a lethargy broken only when matters. 
i 
Irish were discussed, but the postponement itself had ensured State's 
survivallas the body charged with executing the royal policy. Like 
Warpit had risen because the King wanted a victory. 
Needing the C3uncilqPhilip, at last applied himself in 
1600-01 to establishing a proper membership. In the spring of 1600 he 
finally rid himself of Houra and the Adelantadogboth consigned into 
disgracepand allowed Na"Jera and Infantado to retire once again with 
hanour. Fuentes also left9to assume the Gove=orship of Milanvand 
although the gravity of the Italian-crisis was justification enough 
for the employment of his outstanding military gifts in the key 
duchypthe appointment was certainly an ambiguous one. Again royal 
antipathy is more apparent than is duoal. That Simon Contarinipfive 
years henoepperceived the enmity of Lerma behind Fuentes' removal 
from Court ma7 be thought9if not quite perhaps proof of ducal 
innocencep somewhat less pertinent than GuicoiardLini's assertion of 
1598 tha'ý the twO were olose friends. 2 philip's refusals OvOr a 
v 
, +, : --l ... -. , ... "T ,. -. - .I,. - .--, --. -. -,.. - '. . 7, 1 Rnta-Btý-29 JulY . 1600gibid. ', f. g. 2 Contarini (1857)PP-570iind Guicciardini (1959) in report of 27 Sept. *15989P. 94.,, - 
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decade to allow Fuentes to return suggested that it was he who had 
tired of the Count;; probablyplike the AdelantadopFuentes had been 
tainted by the 1599 failure-'NegativelylPhilip chose not to summon 
back various men appointed to ambassadorial or viceregal posts by 
his father or himself - Cardona in NavarrepSesa in RamegAlbuquerque 
in AragonpZgiga in Brussels - but all save the venerable Cardona 
would eventually be allowed to returnpas indeed would even Houra 
himself.. 2 In the spring of 16019when the Court moved to Valladolidp 
only one available man of distinction had not been appointedvand his 
absence provoked much comment. The Count of Olivares wasgin 
Portalegre's wordsýlborn for affairsland experienced in the most 
important of them from his youth to his old age'. Mouragin replyg 
allowed that the Council contained 'some most capable men' but thought 
that Olivares had been excluded 'on account of his not conforming withý 
the current m3de of living'. But it was Moura himself who was out of 
touchpin thinking that a great junta should be ehosen to supervise 
affairs 'as was the custom under the old patron'. 
3Spain 
now all but 
had a properly conciliar government headed by a regularly-functioning 
.r 1- On Philip's refusals I Cabrera de Cordoba 
(1857)opp. 68,69-7097291179 
2169414-One Englishman had closely identified them with the Policy 
of 1599 -I the furious humour of the Count of Fuentes and the 
Adelantado9who are counted the Hotspurs of Spaingand malicious 
against -r; nglandjmqy carry the young King into some action 
contrary to all probability ... 19Thomas PheliPPOS to 
William 
P. helippes96 July 16999CaUjom., 1598-1601 80. Fuentes was certainly 
the councillor of State most Closely associated with the policy, 
see above, p. 16. 
-2 - Seaapl 604; Albuquerque y 1610114auray1612; Z"iga21616. 
3- Portalggre to Mouraq? Mar. 16019and reply, 14 mar. 1601tpriated 
in 
Codoin, 9xliii9PP-569-572. 
3: 1 
and independent Council of State. In Novemberpthe Count of Olivares 
began his councillorship. 
He joined a Council which carried a little surplus weight in 
Lerma, and his relatives and the royal confessorgGaspar de, Cordobaq 
and an insipid courtier in the Marquis of Veladapbut which 
incorporated as its nucleus the experienced and distinguished 
presidents of Orders (Idiatquez), Castile (Miranda), Inquisition (Nino 
de Guevara) and Italy (the Constable) and the Count of Chinchon. Even 
Lerma's enemies - Contarinipstill not in Spainvapart - could only 
'P admire the new body. Pray Jeronimo de Sephveda was among those who 
had seen Lerma's hand everywhere; with hardly a pause between 
denunciationsphe set down his view of the Council - *The Kingpon 
inheriting these kingdomegestablished a great Council of Statepand 
appointed to it great menvall very well qualified mengeach of them 
worthy of governing the whole world'. 
In the autumn of 16009rhilip had appointed Juan do AcuEa. - 
'a very severe and upright man 12 _ as visitador of Finance in 
succession to Salvatierralwho had apparently accomplished nothing* 
While Acun"'a workedvPinance continued in the trough in which it had 
found itself from the beginning of the reign. Here, indeedpPhilip vex7 
nearly practiced what his father's school of thought would have had 
him dopsubordinating the Council to a juntapde Hacienda. He allowed 
Lermaptoopto dabble seriously in the Council's affairspboth of them 
treating it with a cavalier indifference best expressed by Philip 
1- Sucesos del Reinado do Felipe 11191924, pp*238-9- 
himself when in 1601 referring a scheme to raise a million ducats to 
the Junta 'because it is my wish that this be done without the 
Council of Finance having a hand in it'. 
1 They behaved thus because 
it was easy; under a president - Francisco de RojaspM4rquis of Poza - 
who at best was less than authoritative and who was currently 
concerned only with saving his own position in the face of a third 
visita in less than five yearspFinance, was in no condition to defend 
itself. Appropriatelypit achieved its only major entret into the great 
financial affairs of state by surreptitiously negotiating an asiento 
without the royal knowledge. 
2 Appropriately9toopits only overt 
resistance to the Junta was led not by President but by councillorsy 
who in 1601 baulked at ratifying the Junta's decisions on the grounds 
that 'they do not know the causes and reasons for the decisions taken 
in the Junta since they are not present at its deliberations'. 
Philip's reply was definitive; lwhen I order a despatch to be madepthe 
Council is not required to know how or with what advice I have 
decided upon it, for this is not its concerng(which, is)only to fulfil 
the orders sent it in my name'. 
3 Not surprisinglytPozal s Finance was 
often even unaware of what the Crown's financial policies were. 
4 
2- Cabrera de Cordoba 1857)tp-88. 
1- Cnta., Jnta. de Haciendaq22'Nciv. l6OOjA-G-3- C--T-11-284of-13- 
2 -'All other attempts to persuade the asentistas to advance credit 
havizig*failedp'Pinance arranged a 400j, 000 ducats l, anpcnta. Pin. e 
T, a, 
27 Oct, 16009ibid. 9f. 241-In 160l'it similarly arranged a 2OOvOOO ducats loanbut Philip cancelled the agreementpcntas. Finotl6 Feb. 
and 20 Mar. 16019A. G. s. C-J-H-2939ff. ý2 and ý5#' 
3- Enta. Pin. 915 Jan. 1601 ibid. of * 223. 4- Seelfor instancegLnta. Fin. 911 Jun. 1600 in which the 
Council 
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Mechanical lypPin ance worked tolerably well under Pozapbut 
at low levels consistent with its unimportance. In the period from 
January 1597 to the death of Philip 11 it had sat at the same level 
of frequency as War (136: 132)pbut as War doubled its work-ratel 
Finance was left behind - sitting 61 times in 1599p62 in 1600pand 70 
in 1601.33y September 1598pm3reoverpthe inherited councillors had 
little service left as a group; of the fivepJuan de Menchaza died 
in August 1600pEsteban de Ibarra effectively retired at the end of 
1601 to perform other dutiesýand Lds Gaitan de Ayala retired at the 
end of 1604-Only Francisco de Salablancapwho continued regularly 
until his death in 1607pmade any continuous impression after the 
1602 reorganisation; of the othersponly Gaitan in 1603vAlonso de 
Agreda in 1604 and Ibarra on his return proper in 1609 attended more 
than half the meetings in any one year. Poza appointed three new 
councillorelbut the inductions of Juan rascual and Alonso Radrez de 
Prado, manifested less hie concern for the well-being of his Council 
than that for his relationship with Lerma. 
1 AcUn-a himself was 
appointed as one of the two councillors of Castile whose presence was 
legally required9but retired on commencing his visita., These 
appointments brought the average attendance up from 4.2 in 1597 to a 
range of 5-0-6.0 in 1598-16019but consistency of attendance was low; 
i 
the 3.597 figure had been maintained by six mealwhile that of 5-94 in 
1600 - the highest of this period - required nine. 
complained that the first it had heard of an asiento agreement 
was when it was ordered to execute itA. G. Sr =77- 21549no fol. On these I below, pp, %, U6 &. Ij 6,4. -6 -1j. 102.66 41 
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Virtually all-Finance's documentation for 16029the year when 
the reorganisation was offectedphas been lost. Cabroraphoweverlin the 
autumn of 1601 oo=ented not implausibly upon the reason for Philip's 
decision to reform the Council - his inability to provide food for 
his own table and salaries for his servants. 
1 It must have been at 
about this time that Acuna presented his repart9for Pozals. riposte 
denying multiple accusations of corruption was dated 26 November 
1601.2 The Ordenanza, for the new Councillfinally published in October 
1602 did not of c3urse publicise such malfeasancepbut it did allow 
itself some astringent comments upon the presidential failure to 
follow proper administra, tive procedures and to adequately discipline 
the Council's officials. 
3 Only one structural change was evident from 
the thirteen extant initialled consultas for 16022but it was 
definitive; Finance was given to its reformer. 
4 
AcUn"a brought about a transformation comparable to that on 
war in 1598-In 1603-5, his Council sat 37.5% more frequently than had 
pozatspand five new councillors were appointed in 16039and another 
four in 1604-5 as replacements for Poza's dying councillors. These men 
would not serve for the generation that War's wouldtbut four attended, 
1- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)tpp. 117-8. 
2-Ac 3py p B. IL Add. 28 P 378 9 f. 247. 3- For ins tance , on the f ailure to keep the accounts prOPGrlY and because the accounts have not been kept with precision many ill- 
effects have followedpand there has not been the balance and good 
order in my royal books that is necessary - 0., POOPY Of the Ordenanza of 26 Oet-1602pB. M. Add*99932of-42b* 
4- Acu5a appointed 20 Apr. 1602pA. G. S. Q. C*24- 
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for a decadepa fifth to 1618jand a sixth would still be sitting 
as 1622 ended. 
1 They sat on a fully autonomous Council. Indeedlat 
only its fourth meetingpthe new Council had the self-confidence to 
advise Philip that a proposal of Lerma's could be followed 
2 'neither in justice nor in consciencell and by October 1603 
could refuse to acknowledge the validity of a ducal order on the 
grounds that 'ministers' of His Majesty could not be held to have 
'proper authority' when they did not follow proper administrative 
procedures. 
3 Where Lerma could not treadtthe Junta most certainly 
could notgand it sank into trivial and deferential oblivionp 
concerned now only with material that was too unimportant for the 
Council itself. 4 
The Government of Philip lil mey be said to have been 
fully in operation from the moment in January 1603 when the new 
Council of Finance began its work. It is the purpose of this study 
to trace the interaction between PhilippLerma and Administration 
and their response to the problems of governing the largest 
empire the world had yet seen. 
1- On the councillors of Finance p belowppp. Ul-2-21 
2-, Cnta. Fin. 912 Jan-1603, A. G. S, C-J. 11-3081no folo 
3- Cnte. Fin. 918 Oct. 1603gibid. pno fol., 
4- eafor instancevits attitude in 1604 to a quite minor matter - 
'it appears to this Junta that this does not belong to it and 
that Tour Majesty ought to be pleased to refer it to the 
Council of Finance$. Cnta*Jnta. do Haciendap20 Jan-1604PA. G. S. 
C-J-Z-320, no fOl-On the later history of the Juntagbel0wipp-1111-4 
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ll. Government ancl the Court. 
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-1 
2. Lerma and S3n. 
A. Ambition. 
The distinction between Lerma's generally passive and 
subordinate influence on the formulation of policy and his 
avaricious interest in self-aggrandisement was fundamental to the 
history of the reignpand suggestive of its most important 
characteristic - the distinction to be drawn between a corrupted and 
extravagant Court and a strong and independentpif costlyp 
Administration. 
Lermals own interests remained consistent with both his 
general background and his actions in 1598-1602. He was a courtier 
I 
and a nobleman. As far as may be gaugedphis apPeal for the King was 
that of a brilliant and sophisticated man of the world for an 
introverted youth. Perhaps he was something of a substitute for a 
father the King had hardly known; more probably, he provided that 
splendid and accomplished worldly ease which the King so painfully 
lackedvand in this reflected glory lay his attraction. 
For Lermaq everything flowed with flawless B. Vmmetrv frOO the; 
royal favour - the mercedes, the great marriagespthe vast extension 
of his landed estates. From this flowed, toophis Political interests; 
it was no accident that his keenest such activit. 7 was in negotiating 
the marriages of the royal children, far they were his chargespnor - 
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his own religious susceptibilities-apart - was it accidental that he 
was intimately involved with the m3risco expulsiongfor here at last 
I- the King found that grandeza, he sought so ardently. Lerma served 
Philip assiduously; it tends to be overlooked. He was obviously always 
particularly concerned to control himself appointments to the royal 
household, his technique being simply to hold all maj3r offices in 
those of King and heir himselfp2and to appoint his relatives and 
criados liberally to minor postsp3but without allowing any of tliemg 
even his eldest sonvto gain intimate and independent access to 
either. 
4 Such was welcome enough to both Philips but not to the 
queen; securephowever, in the King's gracepLerma could be ruthless with 
her9dismissing her own camarera mayor in 1601 in favour of his own 
1- On his political activitiespbelowgppi 
2- He was appointed caballerizo mayor to Philip by Philip 11 in 
1598pAnonymous account of death of' Philip 119B. N-599729ff. 155-6; 
on appointment as sumiller do corps9above9p&l3; he allowed Velada 
to serve as King's m&yordo; o mayor and succeeded him on his death 
in 1616; on his appointment as ayo and mayord3mo mayor of the 
heir# below, P- 5 2. 
3 On his eldest songbelowpn. 4; on his criadospbelowgpp. 399120-121; on 
his dominance of the royal socretaryshipobelowpp. 125; among the 
gentlemen of the King's ca'mara were his son Diegonephew Pedro de I 
Lemos and son-in-law the Marquis of la Baneza; his brother Juan 
Gomez was also his teniente as King's caballerizo mayor and 
gentliman of the ca"mara* 
4 On CristO'ballhis eldest songlater Duke of Cea and then of'Ucedag 
and his rivalry with Lermapbelow9ppe 
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sister--in-lawp 
1 
and adding further to reinal outrage by appointing 
Pranqueza as her secretary in 1602.2 
The Sandoval were one of the twenty most distinguished 
families in Spain 9303uld trace the Denia, marquisate back to 1484 and 
their ancestry to Ferdinand the Catholic. 
ýPolitically, h3weverpthey 
were living on memories, their only recent achievements having been 
to provide an archbishop of seville, 
5and the arms that cradled the 
dying D3n Carlos. 
6 
Dynastic ally 9 they were living on hopespand those 
rather wan. Certainlypthey had formed marital connections with the 
three richest families in Spain - the Medina-SidoniapPernandez de 
Castro (Lem3s) and Padilla (Adelantados May3res de Castilla) - as 
well as with the MedinacelipAltamira and Villamizar. 
7But 
a Medinw- 
Sidonia trifled with a Sand3valpand for Lerma both that and the 
1- The Duchess of Gandia being replaced by dA"a Angela de la Cerdap 
Cabrera de C'ordoba (1857)9p. 27; see alsovibid. pp-148. 
2-, ibid., PP-150. 
3- They were one of the original grande 
4- AlonBo Lopez de Haro, Nobiliario GenealogicO91622piqP-156. 
5- Cristýbal, Archbishop 1573-81. 
6- Lermals father doing so as Carlos' camarera May3r. 'Relacion de los 
servioios prestados p3r los duques do Lerma a los reyes de 
Espana' 93-N-112609f. 69a copy of a royal cedula of 1603. 
7- 1-ledine-Sidonia - thei heirgManuel Ito Lermal B daughter 
Juana; 
Lemos - Fernando 9 6th. Count pmarx7ing Lerma's sister 
Catalinapand 
their son Pedro (7th. Count)marrying Lermals daughter Catalina; 
Padilla - Mariana marrying the future Uceda; Medinaceli - Lerma 
himself marrying Catalina, daughter of the 4th- Duke; Alt amira -D3n 
Lope do Moscoso Osarioglater lat. Count of Altamiragmar37ing 
,, zar -d 
"" aernadina Corco marrying Lean3rpLermals sister; Villami ona 
Lermals brotherjJuan G6mez. Lopez do Haro (1622)gigpp. 639165-: 16; 
Tanez, Memoriasqlata 1723, pp. 23-5,74-6; MalvezzloAdidioneoppp. 144-5; 
13-N-liOg599f-f. 242V-261v. Loýpez is generally the most reliable of these sources. 
4W 
Lem3s connection were distaff and therefore potentially dangerous; to 
gain the prestige of such an alliancepthe family had to risk its 
inheritance. The Padilla - in 1597 - had granted him a daughter9for his 
eldest son9but notpinevitablytthe heiress; Mariana had two older 
brothers. But by one of the genealogical disasters to which the 
Spanish aristocracy were so prone, 
1 
those brothers died without heirs 
and she succeeded; Lerma's grandson would succeed to the dukedoms of 
LermapCea and Ucedapthe countship of Santa Gadea and the post of 
Adelantado mayor itself* 
Under Philip 111 - as Padilla had implicitly reQognised -a 
Sandoval marriage assumed rather more obvious possibilitiesgand Lerma. 
exploited them to good affect - the Miranda heir in 1601,2 the 
rejection of a furthervand almost completedgMedinaceli marriage for 
the best of all available heiresses9the Infantado. 
3 His eldest son did 
even better -a double connection with the Enriquez family 
(AdmiralB 
of Castile and dukes of Medina Rioseco )4; in 1612, the sister of the 
1- On thesepas affecting councillors of Statelbelowppp. 229-230. 
2- Daughter Francisca, marrying Diego do Zi%iga Avellaneda Baz&I y 
CardenasqL6pez do Haro (1622)ti9448 and Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)9 
p*129. 
3- His second sanyDiego Gomezpmarried the heiress of the 6th. Duke on 
7 Aug. l6039Lbid-vpp. l84-5; on cancellation of Diego's projected 
Medinaceli marriagesibid. ppp. 100 and 146. 
4- On arrangements for marriage of Uceda's heirpFranciscatt3 do2ra 
Felichesdaughter of Admiral Luis Enrfquvz, ibid*qp-387vand on 
marriage of doXa Luisa, to Juan Alonsop9the'Admiral, (12 Nov. 1612)9 
Lopez do HarO (-1622) 119166. This latter was a rearrangement 
necessitated by the death of Uceda's daughter in 1602qCabrera de 
Cordoba (1857)PP-153. 
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the wealthy Marquis of PliegO for his own re-marriage 
1 
; and in 1617, 
the Osuna heir for a daughter. 
2 
Such a family clearly had to have its grandeza. acknowledged 
formally. Lerma's own dukedom was therefore followed by those of Cea 
(1604) and Uceda (1610) for his oldest sonythe marquisates of 
Villamizar (1599) and Belmonte for his brother and Uceda's second 
son. 
3 Symmetry demandedptoogappropriate chivalric recognition. During 
the Valencian foray of 1599 the grand commanderships of Calatrava and 
of Castilevin the Order of Santiagophad. fortuitously fallen vacantp 
and the firstgreputedly worth lOtOOO ducats annuallypwas bestowed 
illegally an Lerma's second sontDiego. 
4Tho 
secondpworth 169000 
dlucatspwas not to be given away; held by PhiliP 11's leading courtierg 
the Count of Puensalidavit passed on his death by natural progression 
to Lerma hi,,,.. lf. 5These were followed by the grand commandership of 
Mantesa, for cousin Fernanda B3rja 
6 
;a double Santiago commandership-. 
for son Cristoba, 7; an encomienda worth 79000 ducats annually together 
x 
1- ibid. *P- 470., 
2- Juan Tellez Gir6n marrying Isabel an 11 Doo. 1617, Lopez do Karat (1622) Pip167 
3- CoapCabrera ýe Cordoba ( 1857) pp, 208; Ucedaq ibid. 9p. 39 4; 
Vill ami zaro 
ibid. PP- 55 and Matias de N3vaaqMeM3rias printed in C3doinqlx and 
lxiPlx: 19P-71; I have found no date for the Beimpte grantpto 
zernardO Antanio9but it was made before 16169L'opez de Nara 
(1622) 
1,165- 
r 4- Sepulveda (1924)qp-214 and Cabrera de Ctrdoba (1857)PP-10- 5- Sepulveda (1924)tp. 214 and Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP-37- 6- No date of appointment is recorded for this; hG is generally knOwn, by the title. 
7- Of Ornachos and CaravacavLo'pez do Kara (1622), L9166. 
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with the posts of provinCial do la santa hermandad of Seville and 
caballerizo mgyor of CO'rdoba for brother Juan, 
1 
and a claveria of 
Aloc'u'itara for his primogenital grands3n. 
2 
In turngsocial eminence demanded seigneurial and financial 
expression. The Court offices were not lucrative; with the exception 
of that of Reneral. cle la caballeria cle Espanla - created for Lerma in T 
1603 and worth 12,000 ducats annually3 _ they paid only a token 
salarypand that often years in arrears. 
4 philip allowed his. cortes 
and municipalities to lavish vast amounts on LermaP5 but made few 
substantial moneta17 awards himself after 1599- 
6 These were hardly 
even pocket moneypm3re than repaid by Lerma's expenses in 
entertaining the Court and in maintaining the new greatness -a new 
livery' for the caballerla costing him 1209000 ducats in 1605t 
7 the 
French marriages of 1615 - which he did not even attend personally 
1- Cabrera de CSrdaba (1857)PPP-151 and 60. 
2- LTpez de Haro (1622)9i9l67- 
3- Cabrera do Cdrdoba (1857) pp. 171. See below9p. 75- 
4- See belowpp. 156. 
5- Among themqqOtOOO ducats from the Valencian servicia p enta. Lic. Juan 
do ChumacerogB. M. Eg. 2081pf. 128. On the awards associated with the 
removal of the Courtbelow, pp-47-8. 
6- Chumacera recorded awards of 159400 ducats from the accounts of 
the Treasurer General on 15 Apr. 1600pand an undated award of 
14,000 ducats from the same sourcegibid. For more minor awardspsee 
Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PPP-13t55- 
7- Ibid. ýp. 244. 
some 4009000 ducats. 
1 Occasionally he even repaid the complimentp 
giving King and exchequer their own ayudas de costa - 10fOOO ducats 
23 in plate in 16019 a camarfn worth over 100pOOO ducats in 1603, a 
(reputed) 8009000 ducats in 1608.4 ,a lavished his Patronageltoogon 
the Universities andpmore especiallypthe Churchpoalculating himself 
4 
that he had spent 191529283 ducats on ecclesiastical buildings alone* 
Such monies represented for Lerma only a means to an end. 
The new style of greatness cost money9and his apologist only 
exaggerated when defending him - 'Spaniards and foreigners admired 
6 in the Duke the greatness of Spain' . Novoa might more pertinently 
have placed the King at the head of the admirers. Lermals ostentation 
was fundamental to and definitive of his political existence. 
When in 1601 he suffered one of his frequent illnesses, 
Philip sought to encourage his convalescence by presenting him with 
7 
a string of pearls worth some 30POOO ducats . It was the perfect 
measure of the man - Lerma could flaunt the pearls while losing none 
of the security they represented. To concentrate an his Politico- 
1- Gonzaftez Da'vjla (1771) 9p. 185 9 quoting from Lerma's inventory. 
2- Cabrera de C*rdoba (1857)PP-117- 
3- ibid. i PP- 171- 2.4 - ibid. 9p. 403. 
5- -d-onzSlez DSvila (1771) PP- 419 again citi-ngL6rmals inventories. 
He 
is in broad agreement here with Yanez (1723)gp. 24twho recorded 
that Lerma, founded 11 monasteri6s92 iglesias colegiales and 'many 
pious places in the Universities of SalamancagAlcala. and 
Valladolid. 
6- Navoallxitp. 126. 
7- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)PP-113. 
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administrative activitiespeven on the monetary grantspis to miss the 
point of his privanza. The supreme courtier was also the supreme 
speculator and investor; real estatefseigneurial and municipalp 
afforded him the security he craved for. Lerma collected towns. 
The most complete inventory of those towns was compiled in 
1616 and listed thirty four. excluding their lugares do jurisdiccion 
and the ancestral estates in GeagDeniapVillamizar and Ampudia. 
1 It did 
not record how he came by these estatesobut Cabrera inevitably 
commented upon some of them9and from his record it appears likely 
that the majority were bought by Lerma himself. He had PhiliP giving 
him the Arapnese town of Purroy in 1599,2 and Valladolid granting 
Tuaela de Duero in 1607 for millones exemptionp3 but otherwise 
accretion was by purchase. The list was formidable - in 16001having 
already bought three tovns from the estate of the dead Admiral for 
1009000 ducatsphe was negotiating for two more with thirty lugares 
4 
and reputedly worth c-533033 ducats ; in 16029having b3ught Valdemaro 
for 120pOOO ducats he opened negotiations for Getafe and los 
CaravanchOles in Madrid5; in 16062he paid 324,000 dUcats for more than 
1-B. N. 7423, ff-134V-135. T]3, is magnificent tract was compiled from the 
Government's financial records for 1616pand I have found it in 
error only insofar as it was occasionally incomplete; see belowvp. 
175pn-5-It included 30 lugares in the Cea dukedom an& three towns 
in the cOuntshiP of Ampudia. An inferior copytB. M. Harl. 35699f. 107. 
2- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)qp-10.3 - See belOwqpp-48-9- 4- Cabrera do CO"rd3ba (1857) pp. 62; figure converted from maraveds. 5- ibid. pp-134. 
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thirty lugares in the Lerma dukedomvagain in Madrid 1 ; in 16079he 
followed this with the thirteen. lugares of Behetria and its 6fOOO 
vecinOB9 
2 
and then paid 600jOOO ducats for eleven more placespwith 
9,000 vacinos to r3und off the Cea and Lerma estates. 
3 
The 1606 purchase was complemented by a royal grant of some 
109000 ducats of rent4; the second of 1607 by another such grantgof 
unspecified valus5; in 16019Philip gave him the adelantamiento of 
Cazarlagworth 20,000 ducats of annual rentv 
6 
and when he found the 
Camara do Castilla - under President Miranda unwilling to accede to 
his request for the restoration of some rents confiscated from his 
family in 1479vLerma turned to Philip and was granted 72vOOO ducats 
7 
of Italian rents in comPensation. This was language he understood. 
When in 1603 his son married the Infantado heiresslLerma 
congratulated him with 209000 ducats worth of rent9but gave him only 
half that amount - Diego Gtmez would have to wait on his father' a 
death for the other 109000 ducats*8 
Together with the seigneurial went commercial concessions 
1 ibid. pp. 176.2 - ibid. opp. 309-10. 3 ibid. op-333 4- Tb-i d. 9p- 29 2-* 5 ibid. qp- 333 6- ibid. pp-94. 
7 ibid, PP-150-See also, pp. 86,88-9,96-7,1()9. 8 ibid. P*PP-176 and 184-5-Ses also, pp., 148 and 509 for other grants 
made to relativel3* 
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and othor mercedes involving readilyý-realisable assets. The two most 
substantial awardsphowevervproved too hot even for Lerma's handspand. 
he had eventually to restore them. both to the city of Seville. The 
first9the escribanfa, do sacas y cosas vedadas of Andalusiagdealt with 
the almojarifazgo rents and had various excise duties in Seville and 
along the whole southern coastline. But the storm of protest at its 
award was such that in 1600 - the year after the grant - Lerma had to 
renounce it in the Kingvýmho in turn sold part of it back to Seville 
1 for 1739000 ducats* Lerma, doubtless received compensationtbut none 
is recarded. In 16089howevergSeville forced the cancellation of his 
right to a due of 1% on its merchandise as part of the millones 
agreement. 
2 No matter; there were always other awards - jaspar mines 
in the bishopric of Osma and the concession on the stones used to 
decorate the Escorial itself3; fishing rights in Valencia and 
Catalonia4; the office of gran canciller of Naplesqwhich he sold for 
5 80,000 ducats ; the elevation of Denia itself into a city and an 
episcopal capital. 
6 
There were, too 9 municipal offices. He had picked up a couple 
1- On this pbelowPP. 3409n. 1. .0 2- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP-342. 
3-B. N-74239f-: L35- 
4- Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)PP-176. 
5- Lnta. qLic. Juan de ChumacerolB. M. Eg, 2081tf. 128* 6- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857).. P. 445- 
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during the JourneY of 15999 
1 but soon'learned to concentrate on the 
alcaidfa. Such were generally more prestigious than lucrativevalthOugh 
he could - and therefore did - occasionallY reap profit from them. 
2 
In the southphe hold the tenancies of the Torre do Oro in Seville 
and the old frontier fortress of Velez himself, 
3 
and gave his eldest 
son that of the Alhambra in Granada, 
4 but these were casual 
accretions. The hand of the master was revealed in the location of 
the Castilian. alcaidfaB - that of the city of Burgas; those of the 
royal housesypalaces and stables of the King in Madridotogether with 
those of the casas del Campo y Sol and basques of Abrojo; the palaces 
of Tordesillas; those of Leo'njalladolid and Toledottogether with 
those of the bridges and gates of the latter. 
5 There was marvellous 
system heregfor these were among the King's chief places of 
relaxationvand Philip visited them all regularly9generallv indeed 
1- One of them9an Alicante escribanfaq included jurisdiction over an 
unspecified town in AragKn--jB. N. 234vf. 206.1 
2- On alcaiclfaspbelowlp. 1899n. lpand on Lermals dealings in that of 
Valladolidgbelow, p. 49. 
3-B. 11-7423, f-135- 
4- Lopez de Haro (1622), 1,166. 
5 BurgDBpgiven as a mareedp23 Jan. 1599 and perpetuated 3 Apr. 1601; 
Casa Real (MadridY and bosques of Abrojopgiven On vacationpl2 4 
Sept. 1600; that Of the palaces and caballerýzas of the King in I 
Madrid and of the casas del Campo y Solygiven in perpetuityv6 Jul.! 
1601; Tordesillaspon 6 Dec. 1600OLerma was given the perpetuation 
Of this officepwhich he had held since 1584; Valladolid casasp 
29 Dec. 1601; Torres de LeSh, q Feb. 1606; Toledo - given 15 may 
i6lo 
in PerPetu: titv the alcaidfa of the palaces of the city of Toledo, 
gates and bridges Of Alcdntara and of the gate and Tower of Cambroon. Also givengat an unspecified datelthat of Ucles. Cnta. Lic. 
Alonso de Cabrera925 Jun-16259printed by A. G. Falencia (1-9-3-27pý-Pe 
520-4. 
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all within an average year. Lerma as alcaide controlled the very 
right of entry to these palacesgand therefore access to the King 
himself; unwelcome influences could be kept out of the palacespeven 
indeed in the case of Madridpout of the royal stables! Madrid apartf 
he concentrated on Philip's two favourite hauntspBurgas and 
Valladolid. In burgosphe was also escriban3 mayarpTreasurer of the 
House of Money and Captain General of the artillery of the royal 
palaces. 
1 
But Valladolid he dominated as he brought the city back to 
a quite feudal baronage. He held himself the posts of alcaid0p 
escriban3 mayor de los hij3sdalg3sýcancillerj and guardamayor de la 
Casa del Monte of the city and its district within ten leagues. 
2 
What was left overphe gave to his favourite Rodrigo CalderSnpson of 
a leading citizen3 - alRuacil mayorvarchiverogregistrador de la 
Cancilleriagmuordomo do abrasgalcalde de la ca"rcel realgcorre3 
4 
mayarttvice a remidor with voting seniority. For good measurephe 
5 took added a concession on the Mulls of Crusade printed in the tOwnt 
the Simancas. alcaidia for himselfq 
6 
and gave the bishopric to Dr. 
3autista Acevedopanother criadol7during the Court's residence. 
I- 
-3-N. 74231f. 135. 2- ibid. 
3-J. Juderias (1905) txlllgP- 337. See also belowqpp,, ItS-IL%--IL4- 
4- 15-N-110119ff. 218-19 and 230V-231. 
5- This is sometimes listed as a royal morced9by for instancepthe Court se"n0rivaluing it at SpOOO ducats annuallYPIB-N-110119f. 2199 but Caldern is recorded in B. N.. 56754, f-54 as buying it- 6- Cnta. Lic. Alonso do Cabrerap25 Jun. 1625POP-cit 
7- Un-hi; -, below. pp. 78-01, wi-luo 
8- On this, belowvpp, mi. ILO. 
_______-- - _-nc_- 
Valladolidgmareaverpunlike Madridphad a contr3lied right of entrygand 
Lerma could therefore control entry not merely into the palace but 
int3 the Citv itself- 1 That was power as he understood it. 
The process whereby Lerma gained control of Valladolid's 
0 alcaidia showed his touch at its surest. During the speculation as to 
the removal of the Court in 16009Valladolid. Judiciously Presented him 
with a regimiento in perpetuity with the first vote after the 
corregidar and with an annual salary of 49000 ducats. 
2 In Decemberp 
shortly before the decision was published9he bought the alcaidia de 
las casas (reales) of Valladolid for 259089,904 maravedlospand in 1601 
after the inevitable appreciation sold itpfor 6498979317- 
3 He sold it 
well - t3 the King14 In returnqPhilip gave him the City's alcaidfa in 
perpetuitypagain worth 49000 ducats annually. 
5 The Duke was only 
, doubtless well aware starting. In 16029he bought some houses in Madrid6 
that the day would come when they would appreciate in value-What he did, 
with them is not recorded9but presumably he sold them9for in 1606 a 
grateful Madrid indulged him not merely with immense bribestbut with a; 
palacevno less. 
7 
Still he was not finished; Valladolid's alcabala 
exemption was purchased at a price, and it was Lermals - the town Of 
Tudela de Duer3.8 Thus the hand of the master. 
1- See enta. St. 922 Dec. 1601, A. G. S. E. 25119f-40pancl alsovCabrera de 
CorCoba (1857)tP-75- 2- ibid. op-78. 3- Abid-pp. 106 and B. M. Eg. 2081 f-128. 
Of 4- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP-1106.5 - ibid. -6 - ibid. 9p. 145- 7- ibid. vpp. 270-1.8 - ibid. 9p. 306. 
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B. Decline and Fall. 
mmm«. m 
Lerma. was powerful. That is not to Bay that he exercised his 
powerpnor even that he particularly wanted it; it is to say that 
power was allowed him by the King. Occasionallyghe involved himself 
seriously in matters political or administrativepbut largely only 
when and because he had to. Politics were an encumbrancepthe byýproduct 
of the relationship with the King which allowed him his wealth-His 
health was not goodgand his recurrent illnesses were accompanied by 
a melancholic abandonment of such governmental duties as he 
undertook. 
1 
But more importantlypsatiated boredom was never far offq 
and with his secular ambitions satisfiedpit was characteristic of 
him that he turned his mind to the Church. It was characteristiogtoop 
that his crises should have lasted for monthsoand finally for years; 
he never properly recovered from his second - in 1612 - but although_ 
he decided at that time to leave Court9he never quite got round to 
doing so. It was all too much effort, 
His first crisis was self-inducedvand almost certainly 
artificial-In October 1607 he proclaimed his retirementp 
2 
and 
continued to do so in the face of the royal refusal to grant him the 
necessary licence. 
3 His Position at Court was unchallenged and an 
1- Sew Cabrera de CO'rdoba (1857) 9pp- 139210-13099 9478-9 9 and 
below, 
P-53. 
2- ibid. op. 317. 
3- Abid. pp. 322. 
i) 
incredulous Cabrera waspishly - and probably correctly - calculated 
that,, having dissipated his wealthvhe was trying to force the King 
into making him new grants. 
1 But in January 1608 he was 
conspicuously absent from the swearing-in of the Princey 
2 
and shortly 
afterwards despatched all his possessions to Lerma itself, with the 
Proclaimed intention of following immediately himself. 
3 As late as 
the middle of Marchvhe was still 
do so is unclearvbut during 1608 
of criticismvand he decided that 
to mend his ways. Lermavafter his 
applied himself to reforming bot] 
expected to leave. 
4 Why he did not 
he was subjected to a rising volume 
the only alternative to leaving was 
f ashiong reformed himself and 
i Court and Administration. 
5 
The second crisis was far more serious. In October 1611 
Caldero'n9having failed to secure the succession to the papers of the 
es asked permission to late senior secretary of State Andr" de Prada, 
6 
retire to his house. 
7 
Why exactly he should have done so is not 
recorded, but it soon became evident that he had not asked of his own 
accard. Philip 'wanted him out of Courtpand in November he was 
appointed ambassador to Venice. 
8 
In later years he would be accused 
of having murdered the Queeng and the juxtaposition of her death and 
his request hardly appears coincidental*9 On 27 April 1612 he left 
1 t ibid. op. 317.2 - Gonzalez DSvila (1771)tP-128- 
3 Cabrera do Cordoba (1857) PP- 324. 4- ibid. op. 332. 5 See belowpPP- 74-81. 
6 Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)PP. 443. 7- ibid-qpp-453-4* 
8- ibidtpp. 456-7. 
9- She died on 3 Oct. 1611, Gonza"lez Davila (1771), p. 160. The charge 
was 
I 
fo 
. 
und not Proven, B. N. 110119 ff. 218-19. 
Court, now ostensibly as extraordinary ambassador to Flanders and 
France. 1 It was a sensational defeat for Lermap 
2 
and he sank into 
melancholypabandoning his audiences to his son and announcing that if 
3 he could not have Calderon to assist him he would have no one. 
Lerma might have seen it coming. In 1610phis eldest son had 
begun to acquire an identitY Of his own -a second dukedompof Ucedap 
in Januaryt4successful opposition to his own remarriage in julyt5and 
the reported succession to his posta of caballerizo mayor to the King 
in the autumn. 
6As 
he rose Lerma declined, accepting in January 1611 
the posts of ayo and mayordoma MaY3r Of the Princep 
7 
posts of, for himp 
purely honorific importance granted his own age (57) and the 
presumed longevity of a King who was not yet thirty three. Not until 
8_ 
July 1612 however- when he failed to secure Calderon's return did 
he realise the seriousness of his position and take up the challenge., 
forcing Philippfor the first timepto balance two competing parties. 
The King did so with some skill. In Augastphe found Lerma insisting 
that Beraabe" de Bibancophis own secretarylbe retired and replaced by 
Tristan do CirizaqUceda insisting that he stay in his post. Bibanco 
stayedgand Ciriza was appointed to the royal household*9 In 
September the parties were furtherz balanced when Bibancals, formal 
1- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)-PPP-462-39473. 
2- See ibid. PP-459P462-3,473Y488- 3 jbid-9pp-459P478. 
4- ibid* pp. 394.5 ibid. 9'pý'412- 6 ibid-op-419. This apparently did not materialise. 
7 ibid. qp- 429.8 - ibid pli-488.9 - ibid. op. 
490* 
appointment was paralleled by the promotion of Tristan's brother 
Juan to the vacant secretaryship of State. 
1 It was not enough for 
Lerma; on 23 OctoberpthereforepPhilip issued the famous cedula 
ordering the councils to obey 'all that the Duke shall say to or 
order you', 
2 
and almost immediately overruled Finance to allow 
Tristan to profit by 15,000 ducats from the highly irregular and 
illegal sale of his office of contador de mercedes on his promotion 
to the secretaryship of Inquisition. 
3 
Lerma's recovery was incomplete; 
his failure to re-establish Calderon in August was partially 
confirmed in 1614 by Philip's refusal to allow Calderon's son to 
succeed to the papers of the dying Idigquezlthe King preferring as 
Cabrera put it 'to introduce the Duke of Uceda, into the papers'. 
5 In 
1615 illness forced Le=a to abandon to Uceda the dutY of 
accompanying the royal children for their French marriagespand in his 
title Philip ominously referred to Uceda as the heir-apparent to all 
6 
Lerma's Court offices. 
1 Bibanco's appointmentvlbid. 9p. 4959but'forma1 appointment dated 
18 Oct. 16129A. G. S. Q. C. 16; C6brera's entry being dated 20 Sept. 1612. ý 
Ciriza appointed 10 Sept*1612ýA. G. S. Q. C. 25- 
0, 2 Cedula dated 23'Oet. 16129A. G. S. C. J-H-511, f. 759this being the copy 
sent to Finance; State's copygA. G. S. B. 2032, no*fol.: Et is also 
printed by Valiente (1963), pp. 161-2. 
3 On the Finance casegbelowtpp, 100-101,209-210. No title is extant for 
1 royal secretary on 31 the Inquisition post9but he was appointec 
Dea. 16129A. G. S. Q-C-40pan appointment which necessarily preceded 
appointment to a conciliar post, 
4 Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP. 490.5 ibidl. tPP-550-1- 6 C4dula of Instruction for the Duke of Uceda printed by Mantuano Tl61ZT9p-'l75-! See also Gonzglez'Da"vila (1771)lpp. 185-8- 
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It is not surprising9thereforepto find the most definitive 
account of Lermals fall dating his decline in the first instance to 
the fall of Calderon and2more pertinentlyq insisting that the final 
drama was played out over a period of some two and a half years 
prior to his final departure from Court on 4 October 1618. That 
account has it that the complaints of the heir's Maestro about 
Lermals neglecting his duties as ayo, set the final chain of motion 
in action as early as 1616. From that autumn Philip therefore 
gradually lessened the practical powers allowed Lerma while he 
watched his conduct in respect of educating the Princepand in the 
spring of 1618 finally ordered him to his estates. Lerma then 
contrived to secure a succession of postponements until finallyq 
having sent his coach away three times in August-September - and 
having been refused help by Cardinal Toledo in respect of securing 
another postponement - he was finally dismissed under ±oyal threat 
of personal violence. 
The importance of this account lies less in its ascription 
of motive than in the chronological framework it providesgand in 
its stressing that the initiative was Lerma's - that he had 
professed his intention of resigning for 'more than a year and a 
half I prior to a final insistence during a stay at Lerma itself in 
1617.1 This last is cruciallfor Nov3ajtOOyiS found insisting on just 
such a crisis. 
2 Clearlyl contemporaries knew that something critical 
1- Anonvmous account of the fall of Larmagoctober 16189B. 
N. 23489 
f. 401. A slighiýjty different versiongB. N. 11049f-152. 2- Novoaglxipp. 142. 
had happened there between King and Dukepbut the anonymous writer 
was the only one who thought, that Lerma had wanted to resign and who 
recorded that his threats to do so had started more than eighteen 
months before the confrontation at Lerma. 
I 
Ile thought9however9that that confrontation had taken place in 
July or August 1617; Lerma in fact spent two periods of a month - the 
whole of Augustland mid-September to mid-October - in Lermavand it 
was during the first fortnight of October that he was joined by the 
King. The importance of the error concerns not the Lerma stay itself 
but the dating of the first threat; lmore than a year and a half' from 
July 1617 would date that in the days or weeks prior to o. February 
16162whereas if we carry those months back from October 1617 we are- 
left with that first threat being made some time prior to C. April 
1616. The writer was of course expressing himself very looselyland it i 
would be unnecessary to pursue the ambiguity were it not for the fact' 
that Lerma himselflin the most important document of the reign# 
expressed himself as vaguely in referring back to that very threat* 
The only extan-. t letters between Lerma and PhiliP which 
comment upon their personal relationship belong to this period. At the 
end of July 1617 Lerma abandoned his governmental duties to his sonl 
and left San Lorenzo for Lerma itself. On 5 August he wrote to Philip 
about the threat of war in Italypand the King replied six days later. 
He had been illgand complained of Lerma's not having written often 
1- See belowMAW-4 
6 -1 
enough. 
' If Lerma repliedphis letter has not survivedgand he Is next 
found writing on 27 August in reply to a royal letter of 24th. He 
specifically stated that 'I wish ... to see Your Majesty and serve 
2 him' . Had it been in doubt ? Philip replied that he was looking 
3 
forward to seeing Lerma - Iquedo muy alvorozado Para veros' - and took 
-the unusual step of enclosing a letter from the Prince in which 
sentiments were expressed that were perhaps unbecoming in-a King - 
4 'hurry back1for we cannot suffer so long a separation from you', 
Lerma did sopreturning to the Escorial by 8 September. But on 
about 20th. phe left again and returned to Lerma. No evidence remains 
to explain this departurelbut a fortnight later Philip himself took 
that same road. The confrontation mentioned above took place within 
the next two weeks; by 18 OctabervPhilip was on his way back to San 
Larenzagwith Lerma trailing a couple of days behind him, On 21st, q 
Lerma was at Ventosillayand he joined Philip at Balsain on 29th*We 
may now consider a document salvaged for us by Gonzalez Davila: 
Sen"'ar. Your Majesty has known for seven years that I have 
wanted to be a religiouspand most recently (learned this) 
through the papers that I showed him a year ago in Segovia. 
1- Lerma to Philip 1119froni Lerma95 Aug. 1617 and replygfrOm San 
Lorenzopll Aug. jB-M. Add, 289425of-478. 
2- Lerma to Philip 1119from Lerma927 Aug. 1617gibid-of-481- 
3- Philip Ill to Lerma9from San Lorenzop2g Aug-1617gibid. 
4- Prince Philip to Lermayfrom Ban LorenzO927 Aug. l6l7qLb. -id-qf-485- 
57-j- 
I have asked many times for a licence from Tour Majesty, 
(and) he was not pleased to give it to megand because of 
thispand out of the love that I hold for himywhen finally in 
Lerma all my insistence was of no availqI decided to take 
another course'. 
Dh. la affirmed that 'the date of this letter9written in his own 
hand9im Ventosilla, 917 July 16121.1 In this he was clearly incorrect, 
among other reasons because Lerma was in Madrid on that day. - 
2 With 
Davila there can be no suggestion of forgery; time and againghe 
ferreted out documents of seminal value - where others all too 
easily adduced their own reasonspfor instance9for the dismissals of 
Fortocarrero and Vdzquez de Arce9he went to the archives and found 
the only documents which gave explicit clues to the real reasons; 
where others described Lerma's extravagancephe xquantified it from 
his own inventaries. His works are consistently illuminated with the 
remarkable document; this is only the most important. 
3 
Two alternative dates present themselves; the Segovia--Lerma- 
Ventasilla sequence would fit almost exactly a date of 17 July 1610, 
and such an ascription would have the merit of meaning that Davila 
misread only one digit. But this may be ruled out chiefly on internal 
1- Gonzýlez Davila (1771), p. 203. 
2- He had last been in Lerma on 5 Nov. 1611 but had not apparently been to Segovia since July 1609. Although Lerma was in deep crisis in 1612 it seems unlikely in the extreme that he was thinking of 
a religious career as early as 16059and Cabrerapwh3 was *atching him particularly closely in 1612psaw no indications that would fit the various circumstances implicit in the letter. The 
explanation probably lies in the uniquely illegible ducal hand. 3- On Partocarvero 9 above pp. 21 qn. 2; on Va"zquezpP-20, n. 4; on the inventoriespp. 14, n. 6 and 439n-5- 
evidence; it is all but explicitly stated in the letter that Lerma 
had taken the first step in committing himself to an ecclesiastical 
careerpbut in July 1610 he is known to have been making the final 
arrangements for his marriage to a rich widow. 
1 
The letter makes very obvious sensephoweverlif consigned to 
October 1617pand to c. 21st. when Lerma was in Ventosilla immediately 
after the King had left Lerma. itself. Such would corroborate the 
tradition of a confrontation at Lerma and push the disenchantment 
back to precisely the time specified by the chronicler of declineland 
it would confirm his insistence that the initiative came from Lerma, 
rather than from the KingIf such be acceptedlit would appear 
certain that both of Lerma's departures to his home-town and his 
pursuit on the second occasion by the King were specifically related 
to his intention to resign. 
There is one difficulty in this dating; it is not known for 
certain whether Lerma was in Segovia in October 1616.1ffe was in 
11adrid to the eighth and again from the 20th. to the end of the month. 
The eleven days unaccounted for would be quite consistent with a 
journey to Segoviagand indeed had he not undertaken such a journey in,, 
October 1616 it would have been quite exceptional - only the fourth 
October of the reign thus far when he had not done B092 and if he 
stayed in Madrid throughout that month it would have been the first 
! 
- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)gentry of lend of JulY' 16109P. 412. The date may be further ruled out by virtue of the same difficulties as obtain with a 1612 dating; see abovePP-57pn. 2* 2- The exceptions being the Octobers of 1607-9, each divided between Madrid andZ San Lorenzo, 
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time in the reign that he had spent the whole of October in one place. 
There is a second possibility here; if we exclude October 
1616, he was last in Segovia between 5 and 15 December 1615 - might he 
in a hurried moment have expressed himself loosely and referred in 
October 1617 to December 1615 as 'a year agol ? Had that been the 
Segovia visit in question it would have been very near the 'more than 
a year and a half ago' of the anonymous writer. Purthergit is known 
that Lerma's position was in doubt at that time; the Segovia visit 
took place on the return to Madrid after the French marriages for 
which he had been superseded by his songthe newly-proclaimed heir to 
his C3urt offices. 
1 
It is therefore all but certain that the letter was written 
on or about 21 October 1617pbut it is possible to reconstruot the 
ducal position at that time even without having recourse to it. One 
fact is certain - that as late as the end of August 1617 the King was 
still vastly enamoured of Lerma and anxious to retain his services - 
and a second may be assumed - that since Lerma's cardinalate was 
conferred in March 1618,2 he must have made up his mind to seek it byt, 
at the latestpoirca October 1617. Cardinalates were not obtained 
overnighttand Lerma could hardly have delayed any longer and had it 
conferred in March. Even without DKvila's latter, theref3regit may be 
adduced that in the autumn of 1617 Lerma had decided upon an 
1- See abovetP-53. 
2- In a secret Consistory on 26 March 1618yTgez (1723)vp. 25- 
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ecclesiastical career and had done so despite being still securely 
rooted in the favour of both King and heir. As the an3nymous writer 
maintainedpas that letter established9the initiative came from Lerma. 
A year later a reBOlute King dismissed a tearful Duke under 
threat of violence. To explain the apparent contradiction we can but 
dabble in unfashionable psychological waters. Le=a had threatened to 
resign before and had evenpperhaps fully three years beforeg 
committed that resignation to paperpbut Philip had been equal to him. 
Mut sending his luggage away from Court in 1607 and loitering himself 
was vastly different from twice leaving in 1617 and involving the 
Pope as an ally against the King. For nearly twenty years Philip had 
lavished every indulgence on this man; during August and September he 
had first assured him in writing of his continuing devotion and then 
chased after him to Lerma-But the Duke was leaving. There was nothing 
more that Philip could offer him; might not Philip's revulsion an 
learning this have explained his singleminded determination not to 
allow Lerma back ? Moreoverythe anonymous chronicler specifically 
stated that six months before Leimals departure in October 1618 he 
was given a paper by the King formally dismissing him. 
' That six 
months would take us back precisely to the time of the conferring of 
the cardinalate. In other words, when Philip was finally presented with 
what he regarded as a tWeaCherous fait accomplilhe reacted as a 
Hapsburg might be expected to. If Lerma, was leaving9he c3uld hardly 
1 -'B. N. 23481f-401. 
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have allowed it to be knownpmareovervthat he was doing so of his own 
accord. The lion roared9thereforelin a context vastly different from 
that generally imaginedpand because he did so Lerma took fright. Might 
he not have hoped that in his last years he could have enjoyed the 
best of both warldsgsocular and ecclesiastical ?; might not his tears 
of October 1618 have been those of disappointment in that 
expectation ?; might he not have realised - like the Count of Lemas at 
precisely the same time 
1- that the King of Spain could be cajoled 
and persuaded but not threatened ? Certainlyphe applied himselfgas 
he had in his previous crisesp 
2 to regain favour by frenetically 
cutting down on public expendituregand not the least of the ironies 
of the reign was the tenour of his final administrative notepto 
Finance - 'The many and necessary expenses that His Majesty has had 
since he inherited these realmsptogether with the wars and armies 
that he has maintained in Italy and in Flanders and against the 
Infidelghave put the royal patrimony in the painful state that (y3u) 
kn3w Ofp(and) this obliges the c3nsideration with much care ... . of 
refo= ... The best expedient that oan be used now is to esohew 
expenses in all parts'. Pinancegin ca=on with all other g3vernment 
agencies, was to see to this and also 'to the benefit and relief' of 
His Majesty's vassals. 
3 
*** *** 
1- See belowpp. 82.2 - See below, pp-74-5- 
3- To President Salazarq2? Sept. 1618, A. G. S. C. J. H. 402pno fol. See 
also his notes to Martin do Arostegui (? )p2l MaY 16189cutting 
down military salaries, A. G. S. E-2034, f. 97pand to Juan de Cirizat 
25 Jan. 1618gon Provisions for GermanylA. G. S. E-20321no fol. 
6il 
L6rmals fall has generally been attributed to the w3rkings of 
courtly intriguesibut if Philip listened to Uceda and Aliaga it would 
have been only because he was predisposed to do so by his own 
revulsion from the Duke. 
1 Six weeks after Lerma's departurefhe 
informed the C3uncils that the old administrative procedure was 
henceforth to cease; only he himself or a secretary would now give any 
orders to the C3UnCilS or juntas 
2 If Uceda was the new power at 
Courtlit was an inauspicious beginning. Philippm3reaverpheld to his 
purposepand the result of Lerma's fall was not less but more p3wer to 
the 'councils. 3 Uceda's own lack of character and of interest in 
administrative routine made his father a political leviathan by 
comparison. He had never been particularly active in administrative 
affairs; his first note to a council in 1601 had been followed by a 
4 
scare or so more notes annually over the next decades. When Lerma 
handed over the audiences to him they effectively ceased - Cabrera 
somewhat euphemistically recording in 1604 that he was 'little 
inclined to affairs!, 
5 
and in 1612 that Le=a had not wanted to give 
audiences land his son never wanted toyand therefore the despatch of 
1- Orý the other changes of 16189belowppp-82-84- 
2- Cedula. of 15 Hav. 1618tquoted by Valiente (1963), p. 162. 
3- One contemporary realised this - and although the Duke of 
Uceda and Maestro Luis do Aliaga, succeeded him in the 
valimiento: tthey did not have the fullness of power ... 19A. de Leon 
PineloyAnales de Madrid (1931)PP-204-On Philip's roleysee below,, 
pp. 114. -300 
4- Mentioned in cnta. WaTP17 Aug. 16019A. G. S. G. A-580tf-147-On Uceda's 
political and administrative activities qbelowpPP*31T-& 
5- Cabrera de C'Ordoba. (1857)tp. 216. See also p. 212* 
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business is not conducted'. 
1 Uceda's one distinction in life was that 
his handwriting was worse than his father'spand he was rather 
wickedly if truthfully characterised by a contemporary - 'He rose 
2 latevdid little and understood less' . 
Such influence as he enjoyed was spent well over a year 
before the end of the reign - by February 1620pthe Venetian 
ambassador in England was aware that I the Duke of Uceda had declined 
greatly. so the Duke of Osuna had been reoalled to Spain'13 in Marchp 
Philip himself gave audience to a foreign dignitary while Uceda 
merely made the arrangements4; in Junephis secretary Juan de Salazar 
was debarred from giving any audiences or dealing with any 
correspondence. 
5 He held on until the end of the reignpWhen ]Philip 
ended as he had begun; with only a few hours to live, he set the seal 
an the advancement of the Sandoval by elevating Uceda to a princedomý 
lie offeredgt3opa C3UnCillOrBhiP of State; appropriately - he had never 
sat on State or War - Uceda refused9but pathetically accepted the 
7 
post of mayarclamo mayor, to the heir* 
1- ibid. pp- 478. 
2-B. N. 110859f. 242v. 
3 Girolaw Lando to Doge and SenateP14 Feb. 1620, Cal-Ven. -pXVI, 
245- 
4 Undated and unaddressed royal notegMarch 16209A. G. S. E-2327pf-92. 
5 iB. N. 18723/7pf. 90. 
6. - Of 1Bisinian3pB-N-llO85jf-261v. 
7- ibid. jand -B. N. 11011pf. 211v. 
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3-A Corrupt Administration 
I Good government of the finances consists in always using 
(resources) for the general good ... and misgovernment. on 
the contrarylis when they are used for the individual'. 
Duke of Lerma. 
1 
In considering the nature of thLe corruption under Philip Ill 
it is necessary to draw a primary distinction betweea the ordinary 
and the extraordinarypbetween independent aggrandisement by regular. 
administrators and that defended and supported by the power of a 
Court favourite. It is pertinent, toolto recall that corruption was 
endemic within the system and that it had to be regularly rooted out., 
In his last yearsqPhilip 11 had had to concern himself repeatedly 
I with the problem at the highest levels of his Administration - in 
1592 with the Council of Castilev 
2 in 1593 with frauds of some 
3 590OOtOOO ducats on the Indies accounts, and in 1596 with the Council 
1- To Juan do Ciriza915 Feb. 1616, referring in particular to the 
situation in Flanders; inside enta. St. 923 Nov. 1615pA. G. Se E-2030g 
no fol. 
2- I**. and anyone who has not performed his duties properly is to 
be punished9for it is my view that there is more leniency (Iblandural) than is appropriatepand I fear that this is because 
many judges are not doing what they ought ., '*Instruction of Philip 11 to Rodrigo Vazquez do Arce on appointment as 
President9159 29B. M. Add. 280569f. 115bg a copy- 
3- Francesco Vendraming Venetian ambaseadorpto Doge and SOnate925 rob. 1593 OTew 3tYle) Cal-Ven. 91X, 133. 
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of Finance. The distinction in this political society between the 
tolerable and the intolerable - betweengf3r instance9fees and bribes 
2 
- was very fine. Venality had to be venial. When the remarkable 
Francisco de Salablanca died in 1607 in the middle of his ninth 
decadepCabrera mourned the passing of Ia very senior minister of 
3 Finance and (a man) of great integrity' p overl3oking - if he knew 
of - his having been fined 200 ducats arid sentenced to 'grave 
4 
admonishment' by Laguna's commission in 1596. Others of equal 
character were also fined by that visitay 
5 but among those cleared 
t6 was Lic. Alonso Ramirez de Prado. 
The difference between these men under PhiliP 111 was partly 
circumstantial in that Ramirez had the opportunity for peculation 
while Salablanca did not - Ramirezvthat ispsat on extra-conciliar 
juntas negotiating vast amounts with asentistaspwhereas Salablanca 
I- See abovepp. 6on. 6. 
2- See J-H. Parry, Public Officespipp-70-71. 
3- Cabrera de CSrd3ba (1857)pp. 3*b 
4- B-N- 38279fe 2549op-cit 
5- Such as Diego de Herrera and Lufs de Alarconpboth later 
c3uncill3rs of Financegand contador MartIn de Pradeda; on thesep 
belowqpp. M, x4. t; 
6- On his careervbelowvpp. it-3 
6ýj 
sat as only one of several councillors of Finance. But the real 
difference between them was of characterpof ethos; Ramilrezveven before 
he struck gold on the Junta de Hacienda in 16069and despite his 
acquittal in 1596ywas a political adventurer9protected by Lerma 
and unconcerned with his professional duties - he sat only seven 
times on Finance throughout 1605-6.1 As early as the beginning of 
1602 he was attracting ostentatious comment by livingpas was saidq 
like a king. 
2 Salablancaphowever, despite his conviction in 1596ywas 
an honest and admired administratarvaitting regularly on Finance 
until within six weeks of his death.. 
3 Ram1rez died in prison - 
itself a pertinent comment on the fibre of this Administration 
having been brought to account for frauds of 358v671 ducats4 ; 
Salablancalafter more than sixty years in the royal service9died 
5 
with insufficient estate to pay for his own funeral. It will be 
argued that it was helnot Ramlrezpwho was the truly symbolic figure. 
1- On his careerqbel3w, pp, *1&-3 gand on his councillorship of Finance. pp. 266 1 
2- Sepdlveda (1924), P. 292. 
3- On his c3uncillDrshipvbelowqpp. 2-4Cj- 
4- See below. ppot-%u&r. 
5- Lnta. Fin. , 14 Mv 16o8 , A. G. 3, C. J. If. 345 , f. 140. This was not 
uncommon; see belowtpp. t1j. tmto 
I 
Before proceeding to our own analysis of the careers of 
these men and their follows we might consider the verdicts passed 
on the reRime at three very different junctures. The first of thesep 
manifest in the reforms of 1607-91had the salutary merit of 
emanating from within the Administration itself, the second and 
third - of 1618 and 1621/2 - of being the verdicts of enemies of 
Lerma and his son. If Lermals power was absolute and nefariously 
employedpit is reasonable to assume that there would probably have 
been no reforms in 1607-91and that the criados with whom he is 
generally assumed to have packed the Administration would have been 
dismissed in 1621 if not in 16189especially because the later 
changes were associated not only with the beginning of a new reign 
but with a welling refoxm movement. 
*** *** 
I 
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. B. Refo=91607 - 1609. 
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As the first decpLde of the reign draw to a closepSpain was 
convulsed by a series of cumulative disasters at home and abroad9the 
recession in the Indies trade precipitating humiliating mutiny and 
I 
cease-fire in the Low Countries and bankruptcy at home. The 
Government was further rocked by the discovery of massive corruption 
among the very man to whom it had entrusted in 1606 the problem of 
solving the financial crisispbut it ferformel the marvel of not 
merely surviving but of emerging the stronger from its crisis. In the 
period between the arrest of Ramfrez do Frado on 26 December 1606 
2 
and the assassination of Henry 1V (14 Mkv 1610) a reforming spirit 
coursed through both Government and Court and left no on unaffeotedg 
! 
from the King himself down. 
Fernando Carrillo's commission as visitador of State and 
Pinance on 2 January 1607 
3 
was the proper starting-point and it was 
thoroughly unambiguous in intentpo man in Spain was better-equipped 
for the taskýand none could be reliea upon to pursue it as 
I Fo-r a discussion of these disasterspJohn Iqnoh (1969)Ppp-11#34P 
36941-2.0 
2 Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), PP. 296-7 
3- 'Visita Y cargos de D. Pedro Franqueza ... 22 Dec. 1609 yMadridg B-M. Eg. 2060jf. I; f. 6 giving date of commission* 
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relentlessly-A Cardobanghe was by profession a lawyergeducated by 
the Jesuits before progressing through universities in OsunatRome 
1 
and Salamanca. He had then entered the royal service as a Crown 
advocate at Court -a step unusual for a young lawyerpsuch men 
generally finding there was more profit in opposing than in defending, ý 
2_3 the royal causes and he very quickly won a reputation for himself* 
In 1594 his remarkable qualities were recognised by his appointment 
as Superintendant of Justice and Finance in the Netherlands with a 
brief generously enjoining him to 'put the affairs of the Low 
Countries in-order'. 4 lie may not have done quite that but as 
Superintendant and then as commissary for the peace negotiations withý 
the Dutch and English he earned the unstinted gratitude and i I 
admiration of the Archdukes. In 1599 Flanders was left in his hands i 
while they journeyed to Spain, 
5 
and they were as sorry to lose him in 
1600 on his own departure as they were reassured by his immediate 
return Albert making an exception in his case to his aversion to 
I- GonzUez Davila (1623)PP. 483. 
2- On thisphis concept of public service and his financial 
dif ficul ties p belowvpp. Ill- Vil' 
3- ly en poco tiemP3 se ygualo con los mej3res ... 'pGonziaez Davila (1623) 
9P. 483. 
4- His Instructions printed by Gonzalez Davilagibid, Carrillo'S 
widowlin a petition an his death dated his appointment as in 
15953, Petition of don"a Francisca Fajardo to philip lV, 8 Jun. 1622, 
Madridyprinted by A. G. Palenoia (1932)vpp. 344-354. 
5- During their absence he was left with Diego de Ibarra and Juan Bautista de TKssis as a governing tr3ika; the former returned to Spain and the latter went to France as ambassador, ibid. qpp. a 345-6. 
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lawyersp 1 and Isabel paying him the supreme compliment of thinking 
2 him more than a match for his English opponents. Baltasar do ZuRiga, 
his colleague in those negatiations. could find only one suggestion 
of a faultpin that his bluntness with his juniors and equals 
extended into his dealings with his superiors. 
3 
Ruthlessness in the 
pursuit of his duty was phoweverpprocisely the quality that 
distinguished Carrillo 9 and others admired or f eared him for it. On 
his death Gonzaez Davila wrote that 'had the times been milder. he 
would without doubt have been the first minister of his age' .4 He 
understated. For the last decade or so of the reignqCarrillo had been 
the most important man in Spain after the King. Among those who 
5 
quailed before himwas the Duke of Lerma. 
Spanish justice was criticised at the timovas it has been 
since2for its slowness in reaching a verdict and for its practice, 
especially in cases involving administrative corruptionpof imposing 
6 
monetary rather than physical penalties. Neither criticism obtained I 
in the circumstances of the case begun in January 1607; fraul of the 
'He has been so very diligent that one would think he was from 
another profession', Albert to LermaY3 Apr. 1600 printed in Codain, 
xlii9p-323-See also same to same, 19 Nov-15991l-bid-iPP-322-3. 
2 'Dan Fernando is not a man they will deceivetbecause he 
understands them9and thus is very well suited (to the task)y Isabel to Lermaq28 May 16001printed in B-R-A-R (1905)yp. 279. 
3 B. M. Eg. 2079 vf- 245 - 4 GonzSlez Dgýila (1623YPP-*4846 
5 See bel0woPP-929102-3,, 323-4,346. 
6 It is curious to find an Englishman criticising Spanish Justice for its liberalitytbut Sir Charles Cornwallis did solconcluding 
that its endemic leniency encouraged future transgressionsy DiscoursoPP-441. 
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nature and scale practiced by Villalonga 
1 
and his associates 
inevitably took time to unravelvand the first concern of the 
commission in sentencing was naturally to recover anything it could 
for a bankrupt royal exchequer. The arrests of Villalonga, Ramirez and 
Lvarez Pereira 2 had in themselves dramatic enough effect - 'These 
imprisonments have caused great admiration in this Court, since, they 
are three men who were so important in ityand thus the other 
ministers have been frightened and will all ensure that henceforth 
they exercise their offices as they are obliged to do ... .3 Wonder 
4 turned to incredulity when in May Calderon himself was arrestedg but 
he was immediately cleared by a separate commission on which Carrillo 
sat with Idiaquez and Miranda5 - perhaps because the prosecution 
itself was irregular; since he held no administrative office he was 
not subject to administrative visita. D3ubtless he was protectad, too, 
by Lermalbut in ý607 he was a very minor figure; when he became a 
major one and overstepped the mark9he too would fall. That, was in the 
nature of things. 
The visita proper c3ntinued slowly and thoroughly. The 
collection and collation of evidence both documentary and verbal was 
I 
1- On this notorious Secretary of State f belowppp- 7 2-3 p99-100 p 
114-12LI 
2- Secretary Of., POrtugal; see belovpP-72. 
3- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), P. 298.4 - ibid. pp. 306. 5- ibid. PP- 307- 6- See abovePP-48, and belowgpp. 99-100,118-121. 
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a time-consuming affairpbut by April Carrillo was ready to virtually 
acquit 
Avarez Pereira 
I 
as he reached out for more substantial 
victimsparresting Juan Nun4"ez Correapasentista and arrendadorpon 
charges of complicity with Villalonga and Ramfrez in asiento and 
commercial frauds. 
2 By January 1608 he had uncovered sufficient 
evidence to call in the fiscal of Inquisition to investigate 
3 Villalonga's seefetar7ship of that Councilp although to Villalonga 
4 himself9some months over the brink of madnesso it was no longer of 
IF any consequence. With Ramirezptoopwilting under the strainf5 Carrillo 
was finally ready in February 1608. He left the Inquisition charges to 
theliscalgand, indicted Villalonga on 464 counts.. 
6 
Ramtrezpdespite 
having already confessedtook natural enough fright and suddenly 
decided to exercise his prerogative and refused to have Carrillo as 
his judge. 7 It availed him little; he lived only until AuguBtv 
8 
and the 
investigation had proceeded far enough for a truncated sentence to be 
published in September. -9 Villalonga had no escaps. In July 16099 
Carrillo called in the fiscal of the Council of AragSn to investigate 
1 He informed Alvarez's wife that their separation would not be a 
long onelibid.. p. 300.0n, his discovery of corruption within the 
Council of Portugalgibid. PP. 301.2 - ibid. 9p. 3004 3 ibid. p-324. The fiscal was Fernando Acevedo; on hiatbelowtIO3-4. 
4 ibid. PP-315- 5- ibidolp. 6- ibid. pp-323. 78- ibid. PP. 345- 9 ise, b'elowlP-73-All outstanding-charges were dropped on his deathp ibid. 9P-349-In May9his son Antonio was fined 19000 ducats, -deprived of his Crusade fiscalla and expelled from Court in 
PerPetuityiibid. qP, 368. Re was formally deprived of his office on 28 Aug. 1609' c4dula of that datepAoR. N. Cons. 9L. de P. 724 ff-71-2. 
royal 9 
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his activities as Secretary of that Council, 
I 
and on 22 December 
finally presented his findings to the King. 
The process dragged on until 20 October 1611 when the 
verdicts of the fiscales of Inquisition and Aragon against Villalonga 
3 
and his criadas were publishedp but Carrillo's conclusions became 
known almost immediately 94 and remained unaltered in substance. Some 
slight leniency was shown by Philip to Villalonga's family95 and the 
Inquisition and Aragýn cases added only another 69259 ducats to 
Villalongals fine and a further lpl60 ducats of fines against six 
criados. The balance sheet9cancerned now with depredations from 
within the councils of StatepAragongInquisition and Finance and the 
Junta de Hacienda made startling reading; in addition to the 
confiscation of all mercedes and the life sentences against the two 
administrators9fines totalling 2p477plOl ducats were levieds 
Villalonga - 194069259 
Ramýrez do Prado - 358,671 
Nunez Correa - 711POll 
Villalongals oriados - 19160 
- Cabrera de-C&rdoba (1857), PP. 372-4-See also PPP- 39894009403- 2- -B. M. Eg. 2060pf. l. 3- 'Testimonio do las sentencias dadas -en la visita do -. 0 
11ranqueza 
ý* "y . *. Ramirez do Prado jy otros ... 
o, 2o oct. 16119bv Francisco 
0 MonzonpAbid. pf. 98. 4- Cabrera de C6rdoba (1857) recording them in his entry of 16 Jan. 161o,, P. 394 5- See ibid. 9p. 400- 6- B-M. Eg,. q20; 0, ff. q8-l00. j have found no record of the conclusions vis-a-vis the Council of Portugal. 
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The nature and length of the trial focussed attention on the 
need for reformpand its success encouraged hopes of such being 
effected. While the enquiry was still in its infancylLerma himself 
took obvious note; in March 1607 he instigated a massive reform of 
all military and naval expenses at home and abroado 
1 
and in Ootaber, 
as he professedly hovered on the brink of resignationghe extended his 
ifiterest to an equally massive reform of all royal mercede S. 
2 It was 
indeed a time for desperate measures - in March he was subjected to 
311 
a humiliating demonstration by his own vassalog and in July to the 
appearance throughout Madrid and on the very gates of the royal 
palaCe of libellous Pasquines. 
4 Cabrera commented slyly on his newly- 
He ordered an enquiry into and a refoxm of all military and naval 
salaries in FlandersItaly and Sicily and Spain itself9with 
special reference to the reduction of the size of the tercios. 
When Prada, presented an interim report on the situati n 
Flanders alonepLerma irately retorted that he expected the more 
general enquiry to be carried out at once-He referred the matter 
to Statepremarking that 'in the present state of the royal 
exchequer it is necessary to eschew every extraneous expense'. 
Notes to Pradap8 Mar. and 7 Jul. 16079A. G. S. E. 2025, ff-14 and 15- 
Over the next two yearsqLerma developed a close interest in naval 
reforms - cutting down on expensespaccelerating the supply of 
moneypeven re-forming squadrons and armadas. Seegfor exampleynotes 
to Bartolomef de Aguilart28 and 29 Oct-717-07. A. G. S. G. A. 670tno fols.; -, 
to Juan do Acu; fa, 20 Nov. 1608 and 17 Feb. 16099A. GoS. C. J. H. 356, no 
fols.; cntaseFinj28 Mar. 1608, ibid. p3529f. 18913 and 16 Ray 16099 ibid. T5-6vffol34 and 156olt was not coincidental that Philip 
himself took a close interest in naval reforms in 1606-7; see below 
p. 299* 
2 Belowgp. 1689no2, 
3- Diccionario de Hi toria do Espa? fapii9p. 223- 
4- Cabrera de -CSrdoba _F1657)9P-348. 
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I 
found diligence - 'He has given general audiences on most days 
without differentiating (between) people -a thing which he did 
not formerly do - and it is attributed to a memorandum which a 
certain Franciscan monk gave him advising him of what was being 
widely said of him ... 1.1 In his zeal he even went so far as to 
reform the behaviour of palace officials 
2 
and to returngfor the 
first time since 1603, to the Council of State. 
3 Philipltoolin his 
own way took noticegattempting in 1607-9 to reduce the expenses of ý 
bath Court and Government. 
4 In 1609 he took two more substantial 
steps-Fearful of attack by enemy forcesphe resurrected the milicia 
generallordering each nobleman to organise and train a levy from 
his estates. Since 1603 Lerma had been paid 129000 ducats a year as 
capit4i general de la caballeria de Espa^n'apand Philip at last 
found a task worthy of that dignity2ordering Lerma to organise the 
Whole operation. He hadjas he explicitly made clearpa, second 
purpose - 'although originally commissaries were appointed to 
organise this ... I have so much confidence in your love and zeal 
that I now wish this to be organised by your hand and (those) of 
the persons named by you ... v. 
5 The last of the royal courtly 
gestures was made coincidentally with the submission of Carrillo's 
1- ibid. PPP-344-5- 2- ibid. pp. 356. sg.?.,, 3- On Lerma's councillarshipgbelowgpp. 375-SS'I 
4- See belowppp, 144-i 
5- Copy of untitled cedulapdated 1609 onlyýt: D -tjje Duke of Lormal 
A. G. S. E-2025of. 221. See alsogab3Velp. 42. 
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conclusions, when Philip decreed that no military habits would be 
given for four yearspand that anyone petitioning for one would be 
imprisoned. 1 
Such were straws in the windysignificant rather than 
important. More substantiallvvphilip effected radical structural 
alterations in the councils of Castile, Finanoe and Indies andpin a 
series of presidential changes necessitated by the deaths or 
retirements of incumbents similarly improved the quality of their 
leadershipptagether with those of Araga'O'n and Inquisition. The Finance 
reform involved the publication of a new arancel or fee-book and a 
redefinition of the duties of the contadores; the fees that officials 
could charge or were entitled to were hopelessly complicatedgand in a 
remarkably ambitious projeotpPhilip addressed himself to rationalising 
dues that had often been fixed in pre-Hapsburg Spain. In doing sohe 
provoked an explosion of protest from officials deprived of their 
time-hallowed rights9but after some delay he held firm and published 
the new dispensation in September 1608., 
2 
With Castile and IndiesqPhilip's problem was one of 
administrative imbalance and of commensurate inefficiency; Castile's 
judges were overworked while the Council of Indies itself was 
underworked by virtue of the concentration of responsibility in its 
CKmara. In redressing these imbalances. Philip fully acknowledged the 
failure of his measures at the beginning of the reign-In February 
1- Cabrera do C&rdoba (1857), P-394.2 - See belowopp-Al 
7]P 
16089he implemented his father's decade-old decrees and established 
the Sala de Gobierno to take the main weight of Castile's judicial 
business. 1 With Indies, he did the reversepin March 1609 abolishing 
the Camara established in 1600.11e thereby restored to the full 
Council control over the government of the Indiespretaining the 
Junta de Guerra de Indias as the only part of the mechanism found to 
have been working satisfact3rily. 
2 The measure was somewhat 
ungraciously received by the Council's modern historian as 'a deluge 
of empty words and almost a burlesque an reality' on the curious 
grounds that no reforming measure 'given in the time of Lerma, and 
c3untersigned by a man of the qualities of ... Calderon' could 
3 
canceivably be deserving af serious attention. Dr. Sch'afer pratested 
too much; there was probably some measu re of truth in his description Jý 
of the Camara as g tool of Lermalagand he was d3ubtless correct in 
ascribing the Count of LemaB's advancement to the presidency as a 
direct refult, of his relationship with Lerma. 
4 
But as he himself 
found, the suppression of the Camara had been implemented specifically 1ý 
on the recommendation of Lemos himself5; was it not curious that a 
client should have so advised his patron?; was this notlif anythingya 
defeat for Le=a?; was not Lemostr, own supercession by Juan do Acuna 
1- Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)gP-331. 
2- Cedula abolishing the CamaraP17 Mar. 1609vA-G-S. G. A-7139n3 fole a 
Copy* 3 Sc7harf--G-rqi, 203. 
4- ibid.. P. 186. See xIx-w-below, pp. s*r-4 
5- E`c-hM-rPiPl87-8; his concern patently being to improve the 
efficiency and integrity of the Council. ' 
evidence of the spirit of reform? 
1 
; was not Villalongals fallgor 
Le=als own crisis, further such evidence ? 
The first of Philip's presidential changes was outrage3us. Dr. 
Juan Bautista Acevedo was an extraordinary choice for the Castile 
presidency at any timepbut more especially at this. 
2 Hiranda had been 
ailing for some timegby November 1607 had decided to retire3and 
refused to change his mind despite pressure from the Court. 
3 His age 
and the effects of an old war-wound were catching up an himoand the 
change was overduetsince his infirmity had dislocated the Council's 
work by forcing it either to adjourn to his house or to meet without 
4 him. An Englishman wondered whether his retirement Imay probably i 
mean a change of policy; for he may have foreseen great events 
approaching and have desired to withdraw'. 
5Great 
changes were in the 
airlbut Miranda himself presided over them9and like Lemos left his 
Council after reforming it. He did so because he vas dying; he retired , 
in April and died in September. 
6 The appointment of bautistap 
thereforejoame in the midst of reformbut it camegtoolat precisely 
the moment when Lerma was proclaiming his own retirement7 _ was it 
V 1- On Acuna's appointmentpbelowgpp. 90 
2- On this notorious criado of Lerma'sqbelowjpp*105*-&,, 
3- Cabrera de C&rd3b4-Flg5-7)YPP. 31023169322t333p335,337-8- 
4- On war-woundqGonzLez Davila (1623)9P. 3809and on dislocationgthe 
sources cited abovepn-3. 
5- Secretary to the English ambassadors addressing the Doge and 
Senate of Venicep12 Apr. 1608, Cal. Ven. pXI9232. 6 On retirement 9 Cabrera de C5rdoba (1857)vp. 335; on deathqGonz4lez Davila (1623) PP. 382. 7 See abovePP-52. 
the 1608 version of the 1612 cedulalthe extraordinary royal favour 
granted Lerma as reassurance Of his own position ? 
In the event it was of little practical consequence; Bautista 
was appointed on 13 April and died on 9 July. 
2 
Since 1603 he had 
served as an unlikely Inquisitor Generalvand was now succeeded in 
that dignity by Cardinal Toledo; after at least twopand perhaps fourg 
refusalegand with the Court again resident in Madridphe felt at last 
able to accept the appointment. 
3 
His credentials require no 
restatemtnt. For his new President of CastileqPhilip turned not to 
the men Court gossigmade the favourites - LemosgVelada and Tomas de 
Barjapeach closely connected with Lerma 
4- but to the President of 
Vall ad3lidgLic. Pedro Manso*The appointment waspin its different wayp 
as outrageous as Bautista's had been. Mans3ls was the Most brilliant 
career of the reign; he had been appointed to Valladolid only in 1606,1 
and was not yet thirty eight. 
5 His qualitieslh3weverphad been 
1- On the cedulavaboxePP-53. 
2- AppointmentgA. G. S. Q. C. 25 and A. H. N. Cons. 9L. de P-724off-42-3. 
Instructions an appointment printed by G3nzjlez D ila (1623), Pp. 
385 on; took possession 14 Apr. vCabrera do Cordoba 
(1857), pp-337-Si 
date of death 9 ibid. pp. 344. 
3- On refusal in 1601, ibid., 94, -B. N. 25779f. 
83. 
., 
ý7; details confirmd in 
Cabrera reported that on Nino de Guevara's departure in 16029 
Philip already had the Brief for Toledo's appointment. Eight 
months laterpafter Juan de ZuKigals death, he reported that it was 
again thought certain that Toledo wou]Ld be appointedv especially 
if the Court returned to Ikladridp ibid. opp. 1419154,162. The 
suggestion that Toledo was offered the post in 1599 and 1603 is 
speculative. On his appointmentpibid. PP. 346 and Lea9i9557- 
4- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)oP. 344; On LemosjbelowfpPsIV5'-106 ; on 
Veladappp*In, '%qI-%. j%-tj Borja was LermaB Uncle- 5- Cabrera recorded that in 1606 he was not yet 36, ibid. pp. 296 and 
dated appointment asop Aug. 1608vibid. p- 345, but A. G. S. Q-C-37 dates this 6 Sept. 16 
bol 
recognised by good judges - among them VSzquez de Arce and Mirandap 
both of whom had furthered his career 
1- 
and both Lerma, and his most 
bitter enemy, the Queengwere competing for his favour. 
2 If Lerma was 
involved in Manso's appointmentlit would only have been to 
demonstrate his concern for good g3ve=mentgespecially so since his 
appointment came shortly before those to the presidencies of the 
Council of Arag6n and the Chancillerlas of Valladolid and Granada of 
men known to Cabrera to have been both worthy of their new positions 
and quite independent of Lerma. 
3 Manso himself immediately confirmed 
the purpose of his appointment by tackling the immense administrative 
and disciplinary problems involved in reforming the offices of the 
escriban3s-de provincia Y del orlmen, and alguaciles de corte94 but 
his star shone only briefly. Having begun the morisco expulsionphe 
asked in August 1610 to be relievedoofthe presidency on grounds of 
ill-health. 
5 Juan de Acun'a was appointed in Octoberjand Manso died at 
the end of Novemberpnot yet forty* 
6 
In December 1" Acun"a had been appointed to succeed Lemos on 
Indies on his departure for the viceroyalty of Naplespand was 
himself succeeded on Finance by Carrillo. 
7 The characters and 
1- Gonziftez Da"vila (1623)PPP. 389-390. 
2- GonzIlez Davila reported that he was appointed ratriarch of the 
Indies as reward for his supervision of the Expulsion and for his 
reforming activities at the insistence of the Queenpjý`bid- 9P- 390. 
Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857), P. 344 wrote of his being 'much favoured' 
I: gr Lerma. 3- j_bid-pp-357- 
4- 1hid- PP- 353- 
5- Lbid. 9PP. 416,4189420-1. The r3yal note of 28 Aug. 1601 relieving him 
at his own request printed by GonzAlez DIvila (1623)PP-391- 
6- Cabrera de C6rdoba, (1857), P. 426. 
achievements of Acun-a and Carrillo will be considered in their proper 
contexts; suffice it for the moment to remark that ACUE'a had all 
Carrillo's qualities save his abs3lute ruthlessness and that they 
were the two most renowned judges in Spain.. 
I Carrillopmoreoverpwas 
promoted to Finance the day after he presented his great visita, 
conclusions; his appointment was in itself therefore as comprehensive 
a declaration of intent as the King could make and gave definitive 
perspective to the other changes of this time. 
2 Acuda was succeeded as 
President of Indies by the Marquis of Salinas, and again it was a 
thoroughly appropriate choicepof a man who had held three Indies 
viceroyaltiOB .3 The Presidencies of Orders and Ital. V remained unchanged 
in the distinguished hands of Idiaquez and the Constable, 
Of the three councils vilich form the subject-proper of this 
studyqb3th Finance and War were fully staffed by 1609. Statephowevert 
was in serious difficulties as the servants of Philip 11 died off. For 
various reasons - among them the demands made on suitable candidates 
by the Dutch war and the Expulsion - Philip delayed reformpbut in 
1610-11 appointed six new coundillors and restored the Council to a 
fully pristine health. 
4 
7- Appointment of Acug to Indies, 23 Dec. 1609 A. H. N. Cons. 9L. de P-724t na 
ff-76v-77vvand to Castile, 29 oct. 1610, A. G. S. Q. C. 24; Carrillo's 
appointment to Pinancefibid., 14 (23 Dec. 1609)pand Lemos's to 
Naples vAJI. N. Cons. 9L. de P-t7249ff-76v-77v- on their presidencies of Rnancegbelowgpp. 266-272 and 273-278 
respectively; on relationships with Lormaipp-315-324; on Carrillop 
PP-100-103#178-9,340-349 land on his visit aq above, pp. 
68-7 3. 
On visita conclusions r above P. 73. ie. vDon Luis Velasco; for careerpAppendix ll, no-315- 4 On these councils, below, pp. 226-291 
3.1618. 
The conclusion that Lerma's fall was a highly persaaalised 
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I 
affair was confirmed by the events - or rather9by the lack of them - 
in October 1618. The only leading administrator to fall coincidentally 
with Lerma was the Count of Lemospnow President of Italy, but the 
anonymous writer on Lerma's fall was not certain that the two events 
were related. He thought that Lem3s and Fernando do B3rjatcomendad3r 
mayor do Montesagwere involved in that miseducation of the Prince to 
which he in large part ascribed Lerma's fall; he had it that when 
Borja was dismissedgLemos attempted to force Philip to reinstate him 
by threatening his own resignationponly to be shattered on finding it 
accepted. The connection he drow9thereforepwas courtly rather than 
political or administrativephis implication clearly that Lemos did 
not fall specifically because Lerma, did so* 
1 Lerma's fall did of 
course have potentially serious consequences for Calderýn, but he was 
already a figure of the pastlalthough he c3uld entertain some h3pes 
of the future while Philip 111 lived, 
Lemos was succeeded on Italy by the count of Benaventepan 
affablellanguid courtier whose energies appear to have been ChieflY 
sexual; he had eighteen children. His new eminence was incidentallthe 
B. N. 2348pf-401qz2R,. cit. 2- See belowopp-86. 
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I real significance attaching to it only that he accepted it. A 0 
personal favourite of Philip's from the beginning of the reignq 
1 
heý 
had certainly refused a c3uncillorship of State in 1611 and 
probably rejected the presidency of Italy at the same time. 
2 He 
had sat briefly on War as State councillor in 1615, but only when 
the Court came to him and had fleetingly appeared on State itself 
in-1617-As President of Italy he took up his councillorship of 
State againgsitting regularly from February 1619 until his final 
illness began in 1621.3 It is of course possible - but in the 
highest degree unlikely - that Benavente deliberately eschewed 
power while Lerma held it-Had he done s3rc3ntemporaries might be 
expected to have commented upon the fact; none did so-Norimareover, 
was there to be any indication in his exercise of a fairly insipid 
councillorship of State that he finally deigned to join the Council, 
to ptirsue with any conviction any specific line of f3reign policv. 
4, ý 
The only other presidential change at the time of Lerma's 
fall was also incidental to itgaithough it had rather more 
significance for the future. Cardinal Toled3 died in December 1618 
and was succeeded as Inquisitor General by the royal confessor, 
1- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)pp. 8 recording that in 1599 he had 
ridden with Philip and Denia in JanuaX7 through the streets of 
Madrid in discreet disguise and that he had been thought a 
candidate for the Orders presidencypibid. ppp. 23-4. The Court 
senorrecorded that Philip spoke well of him in his last 
minutes, B. N. 11011 v f. 210. 
2- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)yp-415pand belowpp. 
3- On his c3uncillorshipybelow, pp. 1,44 4- See belowgpp. 323 
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Fray Luis de Aliaga. Aliaga had ambitions in both the courtly and 
Political spheresvbut againghis appointment as such was not 
directly related to Lerma's fall. 2 
The only other changes were also coincidental. Gardinal 
Zapata happened to return f rom Rome as Lerma f ell and was appointed 
to Statepand the Count of Gondomar similarly returned briefly on a 
temporary respite from his English embassy and resumed his 
councillorship of Finanee. 
3 Dr. Antonio Bonal. disappeared from 
Finance for five meetings in September-October9but returned to 
4 sit through to his dismissal in the last hours of the reign, but the 
other changes on Finanoepas on War and Statelwere purely normal and 
in no way related to Lermal a fall. 
5 No faction fell with Lerma 
because he had none. 
*** *** *** 
1- Toledo died on 7 Dec. pSalazar y Castro 
(1688) pp. 225 y and Aliaga 
was commissioned on 4 Jan. l6lqpLeaqip557- 
2- On Aliagalbelow9pp, 87P108-111. 
3- on Zapatapbelowyp. 383-pand on Gondomargpp. 2689272v273. 
4- On his dismissallbolowpp. 85tand on c3uncillorshippp. 274. 
5- on appointments to these c3uncilapbelowgpp. 226-281; on changes in 
1621-2, ppi 88-go. 
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C. The Transference of Administrative PowerpApril 1621 - December 1622. 
In the last hours of Philip 111's reignpUceda dismissed two 
councillors of Castile of somewhat dubious reputation - Dr. Antoni3 
Bonal and Lic. Pedro de Tapia - and deprived the former also of his 
joint councillorship of Finance. He hoped thereby to demonstrate his 
concern for good governmentg 
1 but as always with himpit was too littleý 
and too late. Philip 1V and his entourage would hardly be Satisfied 
with that offering. They were after larger game. 
On the first day of the reignp3l March9secretaries Tomas de 
t 
Angulo of Castile and Bernab! & de Bibanco of Inquisition were 
dismissed from officepand Juan de Ciriza was deprived of his State 
consultas but allowed to retain his other papers. 
2 The hunt was 
warming uP; these three men were each connected with Lerma or 
Uceda. 3 
Two weeks latergon 15 ApriltLerma himself was deprived of his 
notorious Sicilian rents. 
4 But it was still all fairly minor - both 
5- t3ken gesturestperhapsg Angula and Ciriza were later reinstated 
during the artificial interlude created by the coincidence of the 
1-B. N. 110119f. 211V and B. N. 18633pf. 79-On Banal jbelowqpp. 111--%-1j, 
114- 
on Tapirayppo iM ft A. 
2- Bassompierre (1943)9P. 79. 
.0 
3- On Anguloqbelowqpp. 14v, &ijj. -j ; on Bibancogab3veyPP-52-3 and belowv 
pp - 11.7 on Cirizalabovey52-3 and belowppp-12-1- 
4- Bassompierre (1943),, P. 79-On thesepab: )ve, P. 45 
5- ýngulo as supernumerary c3uncillor of Finance915 Apr. 16239A. G. S. 
Q. C. 40 and cedula of 10 Apr. 16230Entry Book of Royal Ordersyl623P 
B. 14. Eg. 335pf. 365b. Ciriza as Secretary of State for Italian 
affairs9A. G. S. Q-C. 25- 
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royal obsequies with the Easter devotions. On 23 April the hunt began 
in earnest; Uceda and Aliaga were ordered to leave the Court, 
1 
and 
Carrillo was given his commission to investigate all Philip 111's 
grants to Lerma* 
2 On 28 AprilpOsuna was imprisoned. 
3 Aliaga remained 
true to his ubiquitous selfpsitting on State until 27 Aprilp 
4 but 
Uceda went quietly, although at the end of the following year he 
essayed something of a comeback. 
5 Lermapprool aiming himself Ivory 
rich and happy'q 
6 
was content to live out his last days in 
Characteristic splendour. 
7 
While the various investigations-were 
proceeding, that of Calderon was speeded upjUntil on 21 October he 
died in expiation of Spain's sins,, 
8 I 
Two presidencies changed hands, both after some delay. With j, 
I 
Castilepthe effective dismissal of Fernando Acevedoybrother of the 
notorious Dr. Juan Bautistapproved simpler than did the problem of 
1-B. N. 110119 f. 213.2 - B. N. 23529f. 450- 
3-B. N. 110859f. 214.4 - Attendance RegisterpStates 
5- He was eventually sentencej to a fine of 2OpOOO ducats and eight 
years exileybut Gonzalez Davila (1623)gp. 172 recorded that a 
royal decree of 19 Dec. 1622 suspended the sentencepinstead 
appoiAting him Viceroy and Captain General of Catalania. He did 
not take up the position. 
6- To Philip lVpB. M. Eg-7409f. 13b. The copyist of the letter dated it 
13 Apr. 1627; it was presumably written in April 1621. 
7- An anonymous writer in July 1621 wrote of him that 'his spirit 
ispas it has always beengto concern himself only with self- 
indulgencegand 'with having banquets daily in monsteries ... God 
alone sees his soul# gibid., f. 18. 8-B. N. 110119f. 225v- 
persuading Francisco do Contreras out of an eight year retirement to 
replace him; it took Philip 1V until September to do so.. 
1 
With 
Inquisitiongthe problem was reversed; Aliaga refused to resignpand as 
late as the end of June was still gaily I consulting' the King fr3m 
his exilepwhile his Council continued to w3rkgheadlessgin Madrid., 
2 
Not until February 1622 did Philip succeed in ridding himself of 
Aliaga and in appointing his successor. 
3 While the farce continuedv 
Inquisition itself took two important stepsgabolishing the 
scandalous councillorship afforded the Dominicans in perpetuity on 
Aliaga's appointment as councillor in 1614,4 and nominating a new 
councillor to bring itself up to strengtj,. 
5 The other presidential 
changes were quite normal Rococampofi4o's interim presidency or 
Finance was confirmed after Salazar finally died, 
6 
and the deaths of 
presidents of Italy (Benaventet7 November 1621 and ZU^niga97 
October 
1- Letters of Philip 1V to Contreras of 29 May and 6 Sept. 1621 
tment printed by Gonz! CLez D4vila (1623) 9PP. 399-402; title of appoin. 
9 Sept. 16219A. G. S. Q. C. 19; on Acevedopbelowgpp. 103-4. 
2- Cnta. of Aliagap28 Jun. 16219B. M. Eg-345, f. 63-On the difficulty of 
removing an Inquisitor General who would neither resign nor accept 
a bishopric so that he* might be forced to do so on 
the grounds of 
epi6copal residenoepLeapip3O7-8. 
3- Leap ibid. 'PP- 577 dating the commission of Andrds Paehecho as 12 
Feb. 16229and Gonzilez DSvila (1623)pp-443 the papal confirmation 
as 26 Apr. 1622. 
4- Cnta. laq. 924 Sept. 16219B. M. Eg-345, f. 42. 
On this, belowpp, 110, 
5 '- The Patriarch being largely absent and Juan Ramýrezqsenior 
councillorgbeing ill; tho Council recommended three man aad 
Philip 
chose Dr. Cifuentes LoartegCnta. Inqot2l Apr. 1621pibid. 9f. 
60., 
6- jLppointed Governor 2 Mar. 16211, A. U. No Cons. L. de P. 724off-342-3., and 
President917 Apr. 162ltA. G. S. Q. C. 28. 
- 
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1622) p1 and of Indies (Carrillo923 April 1622 )2 necessitated new 
appointments. 
The new regime largely contented itself with the proceedings 
against LermagUcedagAliagay0suna and Calderon. The Marquis of la 
Laguna disappeared temporarily - and discreetly ?- from Statepand 
was thereforegAliaga. apart9the only member of that Council affected 
by the death of Philip 111, If he 10st-favourphe regained it quickly. 
3 
Of the councillors of WarvHin3jasa and Gelves alone left9but both had 
effectively ended their councillorships in 16209one on appointment as 
Viceroy of Navarre9the other on virtual retirement. 
4 One councillor 
0 
of Italy - the Marquis of la Floreste - was dismissedpbut f3r B 
insolence toward his President rather than for any association with 
the Sand3valvand he was later reinstated. 
5 A few minor figures 
completed the list. 
6 
There were more new appointments than there were dismissalso 
but such was not surprising at the beginning of a reignpand they were 
far from radical in Bcope. Only State - and therefore its membership b 
1 GonzLez Davila (1623)PPP. 469-70. 
2 ibid., 484-Villela appointed 17 Jul. 16239A. G. S. Q-C-30yal'though 
Uted 17 Aug. 1623 by Schafer in his Appendix; GonzAez Davilaqjbid. 
484 has him acting as President from 1622. 
3- He returned to War as State councillor and sat regularly in 1622; 
an his career, belowgpp.; LU- Us 1.41* 
4- On them1below respectivelvpp. 2,1*lktlfDs. %f$**?; 
5- Bassompierre (1943)vp. 78-He appears in several lists or ' 
consultas 
of the mid-1620s; seepf3r example 9 Gonzalez Davila 
(1623)sP. 454. 
6- Among them was Quevedo; others included GonzAez CentenapSecretary 
of Philip IllpAndres de Velazquezpespl'a mayorpand of course 
Bernabe do Bibanco; see below, ppoliT 
of War - was seriously affectedgas on 1 May the Marquis of Aytonap 
Duke of Montesclaros and Diego de Ibarra made their first appearancep 
with the Marquis of Manteleon joining them at the next meeting9on 25 
May. Ibarra'S promotion was merited and perhaps overduegas he now 
entered service under his third Hapsburg. 
1 
The three aristocrats had 
had no experience in the central Administration under Philip ill but 
had extensive diplomatic and viceregal qualifications for their new 
eminence. 
2 Although none of the four have ever apparently been 
described as enemies of Lerma or Uceda9their sudden appearance as a 
cohesive group hardly appears coincidental. Two other men were also 
appointed to Statetbut only in honorary capacities prior to departure 
from the Court - Zuniga's oldest brother, the Count of Monterreypand 
Fernando Acevedogreplaced President of Castile. 
3 War itself was 
vaguely and unsubstantially affected in 1622 as ten new councillors 
made their first appearances9but eight of them aggregated only 
thirty attendances between them in 1622 and only the Count of 
Gandomar (15) and Pedro Pacheco (81) made any significant impression. 1 
Among the eight was the future Count-Duke of Olivares. lfpas has 
often been suggestedphe had been systematically excluded from power 
by the Sandavalgit was rather remarkable that he was not to be found 
1- On his extraordinary c3uncillorship of Warqbelowqpp.; LV'S- 
2- For their careers y belowp Appendix llqpp*4-%4 
3- Monterrey going to Rome as ambassador without ever having sat on 
StatejAceved3 sitting twicepon 16 and 28 Sept. vbefore returning 
to his archdiocese. Attendance Register and B. N. 110119ff-214v and 
220. 
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found among the new appointees of 1621. His father had sat when Lerma 
was at the height of his power, his uncle before and after his 
decline; it might reasonably be suggested that Don Gaspar did not 
attend until 1622 because he had not wanted to. 
' 
It proved unnecessary to replace Banal on Finance as a 
complicated series of substitutions made good his lossJ2 but both he 
and Tapia were replaced on Castile, Philip 1V confirming his father's 
two nominees. 
3 A routine promotion to a third new councillorship of 
Castile resulted in a new fiscal being appointed to Finance; againq 
the change was in no way connected with the change of regime as sucO 
Indeed9the first appointment to either Finance or Castile savouring 
of a new favouritism was that of Don Pedro de GuzmanpFromoted to 
Castile fr3m Orders at the end Of 1622.5Tw3 new secretaries were 
named for Finance in November 1621jone to replace the retiring 
en RadrIguez Criadalthe other to enable Miguel de Ip O"arrieta to 
concentrate on his jointlyýheld councillorship. 
6 
ViSitad3r was appointed for Orders in julyp7and maJor 
1- On the counaill3rship of the 2nd. C3unttbelowjpp-, X4-0-2-4-' 
and of D3n Baltasar do Zu"n"igatpp*"f* 
2- See belowIppooXV19 I 3- Lic. Juan de Frias Mesiall Apr. 1621, A. G-S- Q. C. 26, and Lie. 
Belenguer de Apoiz Daviz, 12 jun. 1621, ibid., 9. Their nomination by 
Philip 1119B. N. 11011if. 211v. 
4- Lic. Garclo'perez de Araciel had been appointed councillor Of 
Finance on 5 MaY 16189but ordered not to take Possession of the 
office for three years. )A. 11. N. Cons. Lde P-7249f. 299,0n 
his 
service on Finance below, pp. ZVI* He was replaced as fiscal Of 
Castile by Francisco de AlarconqRococamp3frio to Philip 1V96 
May(? ) 16219A. G. S. C-J-H-414pf-83- 
5- On 11 Dec*16229A. G. 3, Q-C-37-He is described as the Count Of 
Olivarespbut his exact relationship with the familY is not 
certain. 
911, 
structural changes were attempted with Finance and the viceregal 
government of Portugal, Finance had grown significantly in size in 
the last years of Philip lllpl and in October 1621 the intention was 
proclaimed of reducing it. In Novemberphoweverpthe secretarial 
appointments nullified one important provisiongand at least by the 
end of 1622 the size of the Council itself had not been reduced. 
2 
More radicallypthe viceregal authority in Portugal was abolished and 
replaced by a troika of Governors* 
As the replacements for the dismissed ministers were 
themselves men who had been trained under Philip lll, so too were 
many of the most important servants of the old King among those most 
highly honoured by the new - most notablypof coursep Zu'n'iga as first 
6 On the former's retirement 9 GonzSle z Palencia (1932)9p. 344 and on the latter's positions9below. p. 28O. The success3rsgPedro de 
Lecama and Juan Rodrfguez Nun^ezpnamed on 25 Nov. 16219A. G. S. Q. C. 
37 and 28. 
7 Don Antonio de Castro9c3uncillor of OrdersgB. N. 11011, f. 216v. 
1 See belowgpp. 276-281. 
2 An undated copy of the 'Reformacion 
, 
1, B. N. 6754tff. 91-2; details 
confirmed in slightly truncated form in B. N. 110119ff. 222v-2259 
this latter providing the date. On the Becretariat, belovpp. 280. 3- ie. 92an Diego de Castro gCounj of Vasto; Don Alons3 MesiagBishop 
of Coimbrayand Don Alvarina Alvarez Fortugal; the VicGr0yjthG 
Marquis of Alenquerp returned to CastilevB. N. 11011, f. 217. 
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minister and later President of Italypand of the other councillors of 
State Infantado and Benavente were acc3rded maj3r C3urt 3ffices and 
Meiia the delicate task of guarding Osuna. 
'The 
enquiries int3 the 
depredations of LermagUceda and Osuna were similarly staffed by the 
servants of Philip lll; indeedpwhen Lerma heard that he was to be 
judged by Carrillo he wrote to Philip 1V begging that he sh3uld not 
be arraigned before so great an enemy 
2_ 
comment sufficientpit may be 
thoughtgon the probity of Philip 111's Administration. 
The only radical changes in this period were in the staffing 
Of the Courtyas Philip 1V indulged himself in bestowing titlesphabits 
and sees much as his father had dc)ne. 
3 
Such was inevitable at the 
beginning of a reign*For all the sound and fury of the reformersy 
therefore, the verdict passed on philip ill's regime was a lethargic 
onepbut it was nonetheless a valuable testament to the integrity of 
that re*gime. 
4We 
may now turn to considering the men who were the 
exceptions to the rule. 
1- Infantadalcaballerizo MELY3r; Benaventegmayordamo mayor; M, jia also 
became a gentilhombre de la cýmara,, B. N. 110119ff. 213-213vp and 
Bassompierre (1943)'Yp. bl. 
2 The Court se? r3rp reporting thistadded that Le=a need fear no 
partialiti-i-na man 'wh3m the W3rld kn3WS to be one of the most 
learned Christians and upright judges in Europe'. pB. N. 1 
' 
lOllpf-217. 
The commission consisted of Carrillo qLic. 
Juan Chumacera do 
S3tOM9Y3rVjic. Alons3 de Cabrera and 
ý-r-. G6onimo Caimcrn, B. N. 23529 
ff-450-451. 
3 These listed fully by the Court seon'3r, B. N. liollyff. 212v-2l4v92l6vp! 
217-8 9 219- 222v. 
1 
4A number Of men returned to Courtvand it mly be that -s3me at least, 
of them had been opponents of the Sandoval - the Marquises of 
Vol adaq Vill amenrique del Real2de los ArcOstde Alcanizes; Dukes Of ý BSj ary Cardona- Count Of Vill amediana; D3n Diego de AragSn-B-N--110111 ff. 212v and 216v. 
93 
4, The Criada. 
The most remarkable aspect of Lermals patronage was that it 
was so little exercised. Less than a score of professional 
administrators can be identified as at Most owing some advancement 
in their careers to him, few of them held major offices of state - 
and then mostly in the first half of the reign - andpLemas and 
Aliaga apartvthey did not last for very long. Such should not really 
be surprising9for the equation was quite simplegeven if we assume 
that Lerma wanted to control policymaking - with the royal favourthe 
hardly needed a faction; without itgone would have been of no use to 
him. M3reoverq even with the royal assent the creation of such a 
faction would have been a difficult matter, for there were other 
forces at wo3lc within political society apart from his ownymOst 
notably the inbuilt conservatism and strength of the political 
institutions. What Lerma. did do was to occasionally take advantage of 
eiroumstancesgor of certain weaknesses in those 
institutionsto 
'place' his own men9but he did so haphazardly without any abiding 
interest in systematically controlling any given offices of state, 
and indeedginsofar as he had any such interest 
it was in Offices 
ecclesiastical rather than secular. When he placed men 
in officevit 
was not to pursue any Policies - he did not need them 
to do that - 
much less to speculate on their own account9for by so doing they 
could undermine his own position. He placed them as a reward for their 
services to him. services personal rather than politicalgand rendered 
chiefly in the days of his penux7 under Philip ll. The most 
significant fact about his criados proper - that ispexcluding his 
relatives - was their background - Calderon had been his page 
Bautista Acevedo2tutor to his children 
2 
; Aliaga)his confessor ; both 
Cirizaj; ýigo Ibanvz de Santa Cruz and Dr. -Tuan GonzkLez Centenolhis 
4 
secretaries ; Toma's de Angulophis accountant5;. Tuan Pascualphis 
financier. 
6 
Villalongaltoopmay be presumed to have belonged to this 
groupphis rapid promotion to the State secretaryship in 1600 being 
highly suggestive of his having formed intimate contact in the 1590B 
as Secretary of Arago'n for Valencian affairs with the-then Deniap 
7 Viceroy of that Kingdom. 
Lerma's ability to influence administrative appointments 
depended on no sanction other than the royal favour. The two documents 
which are generally presumed to have given some form to that ability 
1- From April 1589 Juderias (1905)PP-338- 
2- Contarini (1 57ý*P-ý7g- 
3- Cabrera do C2rdoba 1 57)qP-350- 
4 Identified from their ifiricas on Lerma's administrative notes; on 
these notes, belowqpp, 3oj - s;. 4- 
5 Cabrera do Cdrdoba (1857)pp. 230- 
6 Sepdlveda (1924), P. 2*7. 
7 Curiouslypna reliable source mentions any close relationship between the two at the beginning of the reign9and the connection is assumed - not unreasonably in view of Villalonga's career; seo belowtpp. 99-100,114-121. 
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had in fact other significances. The cýdula of 16129as has been seeng 
had its own very peculiar importance in respect of courtly politiesp 
confirming Lerma's position after his crisis of 1611-12.1 The order 
sent to the President of Finance in 1605 that henceforth all d lie 
parte petitions were to be referred to the Council by the King 
through a secretarypand that the Council was not to consider any 
requests not so remittedp 
2 had a purely administrative importance. 
Clearly2since Lerma could influence the Kinglit had a possible value 
to him; he could use the power to speed up certain applications and 
perhaps to withold or delV others. He had v however, always had 
that powerjand made little use of it in the futurejas he had in the 
past-Furthergeouncils could not take decisions; only when the King 
signified his assent an a consulta did a conciliar recommendation 
become a decisionpand Lerma could exercise his Power rather more 
conveniently at that juncture than at the beginning of the process.. 
The administrative context was more important than the ducal; 
the 
Administration was consistently concerned with the untruths and half- 
truths told by petitionerstand needed both to vet inappropriate 
applications and to ensure that all previous awards granted - or 
refused - an applicant be listed for consideration* With3ut such a 
central clearing operation a petitioner could not only falsify 
his 
1- See abovegP-53. 
Valiente (1963)op. 689 2- Lerma to Juan de ACU'n*agg Jul-1605Yquoted by 
n-39 a copy. 
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past services or past decisionspbut could play one council off against 
another. As recently as 1603pLerma and the Council of Castile had 
attempted to reform the procedure and as late as 1618 the Junta de 
Reformacion would still be conoerned with it* 
1 In any eventpit was 
quite normal for the King to remit material to the councilspand he 
did so quite punctiliously 
2_ 
government would otherwise have 
collapsed - and the overwhelming majority of Lerma's notes to the 
c3uncils were similarly innocuous*3 
Those notes could concern a criado in two ways - either in 
ordering payment of monies to him or in appointing him to an office. 
In both instances Lerma worked through the councils both because 
they controlled the purse-strings and because they had legally- 
defined rights in respect of controlling the appointment of their 
own personnel. Administrat3rs in hardship or seeking mercedes or 
ayudas do costa had to apply to their own councilovand Lerma's only 
interest in such applications was in occasionally forwarding them to 
the appropriate body; they would have found their waypif sometimes, 
more slowly, without his involvement. His notes were therefore at once 
concerned with men of dubious probity but also with men such as 
Carrillo 94 and most significantly of all, they were concerned with 
1 Cnta. tJnta. de Reformacion925 May 1618 , summ arising 
the 1603 
correspondence between L-erma and Mirandapprinted by Gonzftez Palencia (1932)oPP-4-8. 
2 See belOwyPp. 284-308. 3- See below, PP. 309-324. 
4 To Pedro do Contrerasp30 Jun. 161lyA. G. S. C. J. H. 366#no fol., 
authorising payment of 49000 ducats to Carrillo 'having 
consideration to his services ... and the need 
in which he finds 
himself 
Lerma himself. When he was legitimately owed moneyphe approached the 
cOuncils as did everyone else. 
I Soptoovdid his criadas and familyý 
For instancepCaldero"n in 1614 asked the King for exemption from the 
duty of lodging troops in la Olivagand Lerma in forwarding the 
request to War fully explained his reasons - that it was a small 
places, its inhabitants were very poor and that Calderon was entitled 
to exemption for it as he held the countship of the town. 2 The 
significance of the request was less that it was minor than that it 
was addressed to the council least able of all the major bodies to 
resist Lerma. 
3 All had that power and used itpaometimes to the point 
4 of open defiance of both King and Dukep but such was Lerma's 
conservatism that they were rarely thus tested. More typical of 
routine administration was a council's questioning of an award or 
its demanding that it be paid from sources other than those insisted 
upon by Lerma. This latter - the location of available monies - was 
the real problem and will be considered in various contexts. For 
present purposespa small example will suffice, -in 1605 Uceda's wife 
was given a grant of 19000 ducats so that she could go to Planderst 
and when Lerma informed Finance of the award it, discreetly replied 
that 'it appeared convenient' to ask His Majesty to give a proper 
1- 'SeXor. The Duke of Lerma asks Your Majesty to order that the 
9,000 maravedfs that he has in salary for the alcaid: (a and 
tenancy of the palaces of Tordesillas should be situated in some 
of the royal rents .., I pcnta. Fin. p4 Jul. l608pA-G-S- G. J. H. 3529no fol, See also a similar request 
. 
2nta. Fin. 16 14ar. 1608pibid. 
2- Cnta. War,, 31 Dec. 1614pA. G. S. G. A. 790Pf-138. 
3- l-e. pbecaus-e it had no active president; see belowppp. 99-100. 
4- For e: xamplesgbelow, pp. 101-3,315-325, etc- 
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order authorising the award and perhaps also to suggest where the 
money might come from. Philip ordered that the rents were to be 
situatied, in 'crecimient3s do rentas' and Finance then replied that 
the Duchess wanted them in the Portuguese rents but that these were 
reserved for other purp3ses; perhaps His Majesty might suggest a 
further alternative ? Philip then gave the Council carte blanche to 
use whichever source appeared most appropriate t3 it. 
1 It was a small 
but significant case; Finance could not refuse the awardpbut it could 
limit the damage done it by in effect refusing to locate it as 
either King or Duchess wanted. 
The one device within this spectrum which Lerma used with 
consistent dubiousness was to order councils to pay certain amounts 
of cash for what he termed 'secret expenses of state' and 
specifically enjoining that In3 account ever be asked' for the use of 
the money. It would be surprising if at least some of this money did 
not find its way into his packets or those of his criados. The amounts 
varied from a hundred to several thousand ducats9but when the larger 
amounts were involvedyLerma clearly felt obliged to give some hint as 
to purpose - 29000 ducats were to be paid annually from 1610 for Ia 
work of very great charity' which would be of divine as well as of 
royal service. 2 Ordinarily such monies were clearly destined - at 
least ostensibly - for the support of the spy serviceg a matter in 
- Cntas. Fin. 10 Har. and 17 Mav 16051A. G. Se C. J. 11-332, f. 86. 
2- Lerma t3 Carrillo, 16 Oct. 1610, A. G. S. C., T. H. 361 no fol. 
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which Lerma maintained an especial interest, 
1 
and it may be of 
significance that they were normally entrusted to administrators such 
as Andre's de Prada or Antoni3 de Arostegui Whose integrity has never 
been in doubt. Beyand thispit is possible only to speculate as to 
the nature or level of any peculation by the Duke. He was not given 
to ignoring such opportunities. 
*** *** 
Lerma had to be even more circumspect in attempting to 
introduce his criados into administrative offices, for all councils 
except State and War had formal and effective powers of resistance. 
They hadvin fine9hallowed Ordenanzas defining their legal rights and 
dutieBvand presidents with the authority to assert or defend them. 
The King himself was President of State - and therefore of War - and 
he appointed its councillors and secretaries andvtheoreticallyg 
supervised their conduct. The radical growth in State's practical 
powers under Philip Ill was notthowevertmatched by comparable 
organisati3nal gr3wthtand of its perS3nnelgonly the secretarial 
officials were directly and manifestly responsible to internal 
discipline. 
2 
C3noiliar leadership and pr3cedural practice were of 
absolute importance. The significance of the first may best be 
A 
expressed by pointing out that Franqueza and Calderon were 
1- See belowqpp. %OI%-%%% 
2- Excluding9that is, the parterspwho were shared with War andpafter 
I 1607pthe c3ntad3res de mercedesgboth minor offices; on the 
latter, below, pp. %oe, 
i 
secretaries of Statelwhich had no purse-strings to tempt them9and 
not of, for instancegFinancegwhich hadýTo appoint such men to the 
State officestLerma had only to give them control Of the papers. 
There was no president to argue against their appointments, nor were 
there statutes demanding any particular requirements of a secretary 
of State. Even solhe was characteristically cautious; Franqueza 
exercised the office for a year before being formally appointedgand 
Calderon never was so appointed. 
2Bothqmoreoverpwere balanced by their 
11 c3-secretary Pradavjunior to Franqueza but senior to Calderon. 
These structural differences between State and War and the 
other councils may be further evidenced by considering the manner in 
which Lerma succeeded in placing three men as contadores de mercedes 
in the offices of State (160791614) and of Finance (1612). With Statep 
he had merely to write to the secretary of the Council informing him 
that the two individuals had been appointedyand the matter was 
effectively at an end. 
3 
The 1612 case became something of a classic-In the eventp 
Lerma was again successfulpbut the case was yet the exception that 
proved all the rules. The legal point at issue was the right of 
1- State secretaries did of course have financial vewards attaching 
to their officepand these were not inconsiderable; see below, pp. 
I qO - 1044. 
2- Franqueza's appointment recorded by Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP. 
62pentry of 4 Mar. 1600jand my first record of his acting as 
secretary, 24 Mar. 1600. His title of royal secret arythOwevert was 
dated 10 Jul. 16019A. G. S. Q-C-36; this prefaced conciliar appoint- 
ment, but no formal appointment is recorded. N3t even that much 
exists for CalderA. Formal titles do exist for all other 
secretaries of State. 
3- Appointment Of Juan de Ceballos as contador for Aragonese 
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Tristan de Ciriza to sell his office to whomsoever he chose by 
virtue of a royal licence granted in 1611.1 When in November 1612 his 
purchaser presented the title for which he had paid 159000 ducatsp 
Finance summarily refused to admit him and curtly brushed Lerma's 
objections aside; the licence specifically allowed it a veto on any 
unsuitable candidategand it exercised that right. For good measure, it 
threw uninhibited - and well-documented - accusations at the King 
himself of illekalityllack of judgement and plain dereliction of duty. 
But Philip held firm and refused to cancel the sale. 
2 
The uniqueness of the case was that all three principals were 
found in quite extraordinary postures - Lerma, locked in combat with 
Finance over such an office in support of a Sri ado 
3; 
Philipp breaking 
his own virtually hard and fast rule about not allowing the sale or 
renunciation of administrative offices 
4; Carrillo plosing, 
5 
There wasp 
howevervfar more at stake in November 1612 than the control of a 
single officegand the stances adopted by Lerma and Philip are 
explicable only in the context of the former's crisis at that time; he 
fought Carrillo because he had to fight Ucedagand Philip supported 
mereedespLerma to PradaP5 Sept. and 20 Nov. 16119A. G. S. E. 2637pn3 fol 
Ap. p3intment of Eugenio de Marban to succeed CeballosqLerma to Juan ' 
do Ciriza93O Dec. 16149A. G. S. E. 2028, no fol. 
1- Lerma to Carrilloq12 Apr. 1611, A. G. S. C., T. 11.366, n3 f3l. 
2- Enta. Fin.. 3 Nov. 16129A. G. S. C. J. H. 371of-70- 
3- Un-his deference to the councils 2 belowpppo 102-3il 4- On taispbelowqpp.: LAT-I 
5- Seeqf3r example 9 below, pp, oa%. -s, %or-ar, 34. *, 04. 
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him because he wanted to retain him. 
1 Carrillo himself was easily 
able to deal with Philip or Lerma or his criados in cases where the 
ducal prestige was not involvedgand waspindeed9currently 
administering a massive defeat to the combined forces of Philipq 
Lerma and the Council of Castile over an office worth nearly twelve 
times as much as Ciriza's. It took him two years to May 1613 to 
achieve that victory0but he had to concern himself then only with 
matters of good governmentyregal and ducal prestigepbut not with 
ducal survival. 
2 
In the last resorttheref3reLerma coula aefeat the m3st 
outstanding of presidents on his own ground. More characteristic of 
his relationship with Carrillo howeverv was a note of 1615 - 'On 
other occasions I have asked (you) to grant the merced to Gaspar 
j Rodriguez Of the office of receptor of the Council of Finanoegand I 
now return to ask again ... s. 
3 
Rodriguez may well have been quite as 
worthy as Lerma claimed; Carrillo did not appoint him. 
4 
This deference 
was typical. When Uceda sought a humble c3ntadurýa post for a criad39 
Lerma in asking Carrillo to appoint himIduly recorded that he 
'would receive this as a very great favourl-5 On another occasiont 
1- See aboveop-53.2 - See belowjpp*W0-1(*q 
1 
3- Lerma to CarrilloglO Jun. 16159A. G. B. C. J. H. 3709no fol. 
4 No record survives in either t. lie A. G. S. q. C,, or A. II-Ne Cons. L. de 
P. seriespand I have found no record of him in the Council's 
papers. 
5 The criad3 
, 
was Bartolome de Arteaga. Lerma to CarrillO915, Oct- 
16119A*G. S. C. J. H. 366pno fol. 
0 
Lerma expressed himself even more definitively; vhen Carrillo refused 
to dismiss an incumbent in favour of Miguel Zapataja criad3 
recommended by Lermagand instead appointed him only to a post for 
which he thought him qualifiedyLerma explained himself fully - 'I 
kiss the hands of Your Excellency for the favour done me in thispbut 
that which I have always asked for my recommendees (tencomendad3st) 
is that they should be placed reasonably ... and if they cannot be 
placed justlyj would not want them given any position ... and 
especially so when it might be at the expense of someone else'. 
1 
Not every presidentlof coursetwas a Carrillolbut each had the 
authority to resist the encroachments of Lerma or his criadoB. To 
c3ntrz)l a council other than State or War9ther8f3TepLerma would have 
to c3ntr3l the presidencygand especially so since within the councils 
themselves presidential power could be virtually absolute. 
2 This he 
patently did not d3. Miranda on Castile and B3rja on Portugal may 
conceivably have been appointed to farther his ends butgas has been 
remarked9there are no indications that either did 83.3 Fernando 
Aceved3ldespite his dismissal in 1621 and his kinship with the 
notorious Dr. Juan Bautista Aoevedotshould prabablY also be thus 
1- Same to same)2 Feb. 1611, Lbid. The p3sition was in the administrat- 
ion of the parts of Valencia. For similar examplespLerma to A='naj 
23 Sept. 1608p asking him to favour Nic3la"'s de DurangagA. G. S. C. J. H. 
3539no fol. gor Uceda to Carrill3gasking for a past for Francisco 
de Santa CruzqA. G. S. C-J-H-395, no fal. 
2- See belowppp, jiT-2V, 
3- See ab3vegpp*22-23, and an their councillarships of Statelbelow) 
respectively pp, %ucp -, &%6- 
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characterised. His promotim to the presidency of Castile in 1616 was 
certainly unduly rapidp 
1 
but he appears to have exercised his charge 
independently en3ugh. The best-informed of c3mmentat3rs in 1621 
thought him a worthy man of many admirable qualities, 
2and his career 
would appear to confirm this judgement. One of the judges of 
3 Villalonga in 1608, he had had to be ordered to tLecept the 
presidencyf4and exercised it with a marked integrity; he led the 
Junta de Reformacio'n - and was thereforegamong other things9chiefly 
responsible for the fam3us consulta of February 16,95 - and led 
vigor3uslyltoogthe opp3sition in 1619 to the Portuguese j3urneyt 
remonstrating personally with KingfUceda and Aliaga about the 
deleterious consequences of the excursion to good government. 
6 
When 
he was replaced in 16219it was with full honours that he left Court. 
7 
The differing significances vis-a-vis Lerma of the 
presidential careers of Toledo and Poza require no restatement. 
Of the major councils Finance had the most distinguished succession 
of presidentspall of them after the effective diSmissal Of POza in 
-i 1 See Appendix ll, na. 'So It may well be that the proximity of his 
celebrating the marriages of 1615 and his appointment to Castile 
(15 Feb. 16169A. G. S. Q-C-14) was not accidental. 
2 ie., the Court sen3r, B. N. 11011, f 223v. 3- See abz)vepp. 72, n. 3. 
4- Documents printed by Gonz9lez Davila (1623)tp. 395- 
5- The documents of the--Tunta published by Gonz9lez Palencia 
(1932). 
6- See Leon Pinelo (19311-9pp. 129 and 381-6. 
and 7- He was given a councillorship of Stateq69000 ducats of rent 
two titles in Italy9two habits and the promise of the first 
vacant Santiago encomiendaB. N. 110119f. 223. 
8- On Taledolab3ve9pp. 23-4,26-7,79, n., 3; on Pozappp. 31-4. 
1602 men of quite unimpeachable integrity. 
1 Both presidents of Orders 
after 1599 - Juan do Idiaquez and the Marquis of Caracena - have 
remained free of any taint of being identified with Lermay 
2 
and if we 
absolve Mirandaginherited from Philip 11 as President of Italyponly 
Lem3s of the presidents of Italy and Indies has not remained free of 
such taint. 
3 We are left9therefore, only with Lemos and Bautista 
Acevedo as men who may reasonably be described as criados placed in 
presidential office by Lermagand even Lemos showed commendable 
4 independence on at least one occasion. Both held two presidenciesp 
but of their four appointmentslonly LGM3S'S to Indies in 1603 was 
unequivocal; on his return from Naples with Lerma's widowed sisterpthe 
5 incumbent was dismissed and he was appointed. Lem3s wasphoweverta 
dilettante already by 1606 it was rumoured that he would be returning 
to Naples,. 
6 He left Indies for Naples in 1609jand although it was 
=moured in 1613 that he was to be appointed to the presidency of 
017 he was instead appointed to the far less important ItalY9 Castil 
1- On Aculn"a and CarrillOpsee references cited abovapp-819n. l. On 
Salazargbelowgpp-278-9 and on R3cocamP0frf0qPP*28O-l* 
2- on Idi4fqUezvab3veqp. 189 and below9pp-353-6063-70071; on Caracenag 
Appendix 11 In3.315. 
3- on Mirandap above, P. 30. 
4- See above 9PP. 77R-78 on Lemos; on Bautistagpp. 78-9- 
5- Lid. Pablo Laguna appointed bishop of C6'rdobaq Cabrera do Cordoba 
T-1857)PP-173tand see alsogpp. 1399148 and 166. Lemos's appointment 
dated 6 APr 1603 by A. G. S. Q. C. 36 but as 7 Apr. by Schafergigp. 352. 
6- Cabrera de 
; Srdoba (1857)pentxy 28 Oct. 16o6. 
7- i-b-id. 9p. 505- 
and did not bother for most of his presidency to actually attend the 
Council. 1 Bautista's scandalous appointment to Inquisition in 1603 
in all probability only followed Toledo's refusal of the post, 
2 
and 
when in 1608 he was promoted to the Castile postpit was only after 
Miranda had insisted on retiringgand with indeed only three months to 
live himself. 3 
As therefore with secretaries Franqueza and Calder-Snlso 
with the presidenciesgLerma was chiefly concerned to take advantage 
of circumstances and of structural weaknesses in order to place his 
criados; no one could gainsay a presidential appointment. There 
doubtless was a point beyond which Lerma could not have gone in 
respect of appointing a whole series of men of Bautista's stamp to 
presidential office9but he was both too wise and too lethargic to 
find out where it was. Unless we understand that Bautista was 
exceptional - and that AcuWat Carrillo jdia*quezp the ConstablevNin-o de 
GuavaragToledogSalazar and their like were typical - the reign 
becomes incomprehensible. Thesevthe most important positions of state).! 
went ordinarily to the most appropriate candidates. That was the 
rule; the rider may then be added that occasionally Lerma influenced 
1- Appointment to ItalypAbid. sP- 509; on absenteeismjbel3Wqp- 
225- 
2- See ab3VePP-79, n. 3. 
3- See abovaPP-78. 
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an appointment to the advantage of an associate. 
The same rule applied with C3uncillorships. 
2 In the first 
instancepthere was little point in Lerma's attempting to 'Pack' a 
council in order to influence its policydespite the accusations 
traditionally levelled against him to that effect. Conciliar decisions 
were not reached after a vate. Againgstructural differences between 
State and War and the presidential councils were fundamental. Largely 
because they had no president9but also because of the highly 
individualistic character of their c3uncillorspState and War often 
recorded individual pareceres in their consultas. The King therefore 
often had available to him the views of each councillor and could 
if he chose - base his decisions on purely personal c3nsiderations. 
In practicelhoweverlthe possibility of that happening arose only 
rarelygaince only in the most exceptional circumstances did all 
councillors actually record properly distinct pareceres What 
happened)in effectýwas that the first two or three speakers 
outlined their reactions to a problem and the others voted en bloc 
signifying their assent or dissent. Seniority of speaking carried 
great prestigeland was gauged strictly by date of appointment to the 
c3uncil; thus9for instancepMoura wha had not sat at all since 1600 
immediately took over the leadership of State on his return in 1612 
while Lerma himself did not qualify to lead the Council until 1616. 
1- on appointments to presidencies 9 belowyPP-"9'-'g* 2- On appointments to councill a rships below v PPOL"r'"'I 
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What was important in practicelboth to fellow-councillors and to 
King9was the quality of a man's parece vand fundamental to the 
judgement both made of that was the quality and length of the 
experience that informed it. Of coursevLerma himself was the 
exception to the rulegin that when he sat on State both councillors 
and King paid particular attention to his views, but the very fact of 
his attendance was testament to the importance of Stateýand the fact 
that he never stepped outside the mainstream of conciliar thought 
testament to the prestige of the Council and of his own conservatism. 
But he waspand absolutelypthe only exception to the rule. 
1 
Oil presidential Finance9procedural practice was even more 
important. The president appointed councillors and convened meetings 
with an authority that made the Council a reflection of his own 
personality. The president was the Council - indeedpFinance often 
expressed itself in the presidential first person. The same order of 
precedence was observed as with State and War, but only in the very 
rarest of circumstances - perhaps a dozen or two times in the reign 
did the consultas of the Council even record individual pareceres02 
Very few of Lermals criados 9 theref 3rep were appointed 
t3 
3 councillorships, and 3nly Aliaga and Pascual came from that group 
On the councillors of State 9 below, pp3$1 -111 and on 
Lermappp. SM-311i 
2- See belowqppjW-jft Xqj-(& 
3- Of the councillors of State sitting from 1600, only PozapBorjaq 
Toledo )MirandapInfantado VlqLa Laguna and Aliaga have ever been 
connect edv however vaguely or often err3neouslvibY tiU'reither 
contemporaries or modern historians with Lerma; of those of Warp 
only San German has been similikrly SUBpected. Of the 134 men who 
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emanating from within his own household. Lerma advanced both careers 
with his usual conservatism. Pascual was tolerably well-qualified for 
a councillorship of Finance but wast significantly enough 9 appointed 
during the Poza, presidency. Although he continued to sit under Acun"a 
in 1603-49he was effectively finished as a political force by 1602y 
and achieved his notorious eminence not as a councillor of 
Finance but as a member of a junta not subject to direct conciliar 
control. 
2 Aliaga's promotions were orthodox to the point of 
ordinariness. In the first six years of his royal confess3rship he 
achieved the administrative importance customarily afforded the 
guardian of the royal consciencelbut againjonly in an extra7-conciliar 
capacity as a member of various juntas 
3 Not until 1614 was he 
sat on FinancepCastilevIndies and Orders four were dismissed 
during the reign for malfeasance - Ramirez de PradogGarofa do 
Medrano9B3nal and Tapia - and Pascual of Finance was saved from 
dismissal. only by his death. It appears that Ocantrillo and 
Agust: fn Xlvarez do Toledo of Indies owed their advancement to 
Lerma. None of those identified as having sat on ItalypArago'n and 
Navarre have ever been conneotedvand of Portugal's oouncillorag 
only BorJaphis son and 
livarez Pereira have ever been accused of 
such a connection with Lerma or of corruption. Inquisition was, 
however, signift 0 antly undermined; see generallylbelowypp. 125-8. 
1- See below9p-266, n. l. 
2- See below, p. 115- 
3- His first entrSe into major affairs of state came at the end of 
1612 when he was given control of the papers held by previous 
royal confessors; he had already been confessor for four years 
and could have reasonably expec , 
ted to have been given those 
papers much earlier. Lerma to Pedro de ContrerasP15 Dec. 16129 
A. G. S. O-J-H-356tno fol. 
iio'j 
- 
appointed to his first councillorship9of Inquisitiongnot until 1615 
was he promoted to State itselfgand not until after Lerma had fallen 
was he appointed to a conciliar presidency. lie probably had littlev 
therefore, for which to thank Lerma beyond the favour of his original 
appointment as confessor in 1608pand even that may have been one of 
merit - Cabrera had welcomed him as 'a man of great virtue and 
scholarship'. 
' The only extraordinary favour he received thereafter 
from Lerma was that in 1614 he was appointed supernumerary councillorý 
of Inquisition with precedence over all his colleagues. It was the 
only occasion in the reign when such an award was madejand Aliaga was 
therefore the only man specifically exempted from the normal conciliar 
structural discipline. But although this was clearly a personal favourg 
the, true significance of the award lay in the proviso added - that 
whenever in the future the royal confessor was a Dominican he was 
to succeed to the postpand when he was not it was to be given to a 
memb . or of the Order. 
2 In a very substantial sensepthereforepthe award 
was less testament to Lerma's zeal for advancing Aliaga, than to that 
for indulging his beloved Dominicans. 
Not until the last three years of the reign did Aliaga 
conduct himself in a manner that drew him to the attention of 
. If 1- Cabrera do Cordoba 1857)op. 350- 
2- ibid-PP-560. This position was abolished in 1621 (abovevP-87tn-4) 
after Inquisition had described it as I so prejudicial and so 
contrary to the reputation of this Council --- Of the very 
greatest detriment ... 11, Cnta. Inq. 924 sept. 162193. 
M. Eg-345of-42. 
contemporaries. He then set about with something of a vengeance to 
correct that state of affairsoand over those years earned for 
himself a notoriety matched perhaps only by Le=a himself and 
Calderon. The more scurrilous stories about him were duly recordedp 
ananYM3UBly, in 1621 and his character analysed with some lack of 
charity; the royal confessor and Inquisitor General was a friend of 
astrologersynone too diligent about saying Masslaccustamed to 
living in the ostentatious style of a secular princeperude in his 
eating habitaplewd in his conversation - withalptlittle decency and 
1 
less religion'. All this may well have been truegand even relevant 
to his political activities in his later yearspbut it should not 
inform our picture of the man advanced by Le=a. Aliaga was his own 
manvand at least until he achieved his own power-base as Inquisitor 
General in 1619 he was in no way an exceptional figure - savingg 
perhaps9that uniquely among Lermals criados he was able 
to wean 
himself from his maBtere 
2 
Without an award such as that made to Aliaga in 1614othere 
was little point in advancing a criado to a councillorship 
in order 
to pursue a political objectivegalthough, since councillors of 
Castile wore automatically judges there could be some profit for 
Lerma or a criado in his influencing an appointment to that 
Council,. 
1- 'Sobre las partes de Frai Luis do Aliagagconfesor del Ray Felipe 
lll'pB. N. 23489ff-59-66. 
2- On Aliaga's cauncillarship of State 9 belowqPP* -t#PAI# 
V24--4 
:1i 2" 
There wasp howeverp point in accelerating a man's progress to a junior 
councillorship as reward in itselfland it may well be that Lerma did 
so in favour of a small group of men who were never expressly 
connected with him by any contemporary c3mmentatorpbut who shared a 
rapidity of promotion at the beginning of the reign withvin each casep, 
a reputation of some dubiety - Lic. Juan de Ocontrillo of Indies and 
Castile; lLic. Agusti ,n Avarez de Toledo of Indies; Pedro de Tapia of 
Castileland Dr. Antonio Bonal of Castile and Finance. All had had 
respectable careers under Philip 11 and all, with the possible 
exception of Bonal for whom no title of appointment to Castile has 
survived, 
1 
achieved suspiciously rapid promotions at the beginning of 
the reign. 
2 Noneghoweverlbecame major figures. 
3 
*** *** 
1- See Appendix llpnos. 218926lp230 and 117. 
2- This was in itself of course auspicious in view of the promotions 
of FranquezapPascual and Ramfrez de Prado; see aboveopp-33pn. 1 and 
100pn. 2. 
3 Bonal and Tapia were dismissed in 1621; see abovepp. 
85-Neither was 
thought important enough to justify the instigation of judicial 
proceedings. On Bonal's councillorship of Financepbelowppp. 274 and 
279-On Tapia's arrogance at the beginning of the reign, see an 
untitled memorandum of Francisco Gonzalez do Heredia 'against 
the pretensions of Lic. Pedro de Tapialin which he rebutted 
Tapia's claims to precedence over him; undatedva aecond memorandum 
dated 14 Oct- 1599 9B. N. 12179 ff. 8-). GonzAez won 
his case; see the 
verdict ? _B- 
N, 11319/31 pundated. On Alvarez de 
Toledo and Ocontrillo, 
see Schafergippp*249-250plBO; and 194-5 respectively. 
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There wasihoweverga second dimension to the distortion of 
normal promotion, and it allowed Lerma his one consistent breach into 
the decision-making PT3CeSS for his criad3s - he could take business 
away from the councils and invest it in Juntasqbut even here he was 
subjected to the restraints imposed both by institutional strength 
and his own conservatism. 
The junta)whether formal or occasional poccupied a peculiarly 
important administrative niche. Fully autonamousythe councils of 
Philip 111 became more and not less jealous of their Jurisdictional 
rightsland they did so despite - partlypindeedvbecause of - the 
continuing increase in the volume of government business; finding it 
increasingly difficult to Cope with their own business they yet 
insisted that they would yield none of it. The junta was therefore 
necessary - and increasingly s3 - as an agent of delegation I taking 
some of the weight off the councils and serving9often only 
theoretically sagas a medium of compromise between warring councils. 
i 
Lerma's interest in the junta was simple; he c3uld influence 
it - its conv3cationte3mposition and agenda - far more readily than 
he could a c3uncil. There were, howevervas alwayspmajor limitations 
bath as to ambition and ability. We have already seen, for instanceyhow : 
he was able to take advantage of the weakness of Poza's Finance to 
raise the Junta de Hacienda to a position of major importance at the 
1- For a fuller discussion of the juntn belowiPP-311-3 
On conciliar powers and rivalrypbelowipp - 3*1" 1 
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beginning 3f the reignýbut that the Junta then declined in the face 
of a reformed and-properlym-led Council. 
1 The status of the Junta was ý 
Vierefore directly related to tý2e prestige of the Council itselfpand 
the cycle repeated itself exactly as the prestige of the Council sank, 
again following the financial disasters of 1606-7-Philip spent much 
of 1606pas he had 1601tplVing with the idea of establishing a parx- 
conciliar junta to deal with all consultaB on the pattern of the old 
Junta do Nochegand he did so under the very obvious influence of 
Lerma - in January9the membership was to have been composed of Acunay 
President of Finance; Cardinal Javierregroyal Confessor and 
councillor of State; Ramirez de Prado and Franquezagnow Count of 
2 Villal3nga. By July the prospective members were to be Cardinals 
Toledo and JavierreqMirandaqB3rja and Villalongap 
3 
and by Septemberf 
MirandapIdiaquez and Acun'a - all of them presidents - Javierrep I 
Ramýrez de Prado and Villalonga. 
4 
Lermaptheref3relwas clearly 
determined to place criad3s on the Juntaýbut was sufficiently 
sensitive of the administrative niceties to balance them with 
independent and properly professional administrators. I 
Elsewherephe was similarly cautious. The informal juntaý 
established to meet an occasional or immediate need and with its 
1- See aboveppp- 31-2.2 - Cabrera de CSrdoba 
(1857) pp. 269. i 
3- ibid. pp. 283. 
4- ibid. pp. 287. These in fact did sit regularly on the Junta; see, 
for instancevits L3nsultas of 3 oct. p16 and 22 
Nov. 1606ýA. G. ý. 
C. J. H. 3459no fOl-gff-2419227. 
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membership appointed on and for the momentgrepresented the easiest 
prey of all. It comes as no surprisepfor instancelt3 find Franqueza 
and Ramýrez do Prado sitting in 1603 on a Junta dealing with troop 
supplies for Flanders 
1 
; or RamZrez in 1602 considering some 
arbitrios 
2; 
or Pascual and Poza in 1600 dealing with supplies f3r 
3 Guipuzcoa ; or La Oliva in 1613-14 concerning himself with a variety 
of matters ranging from the reform of the army and administration of 
the royal patrimony in Flanders to the allocation of minor mercedes.. 
4 
So, tooqLerma himself appeared occasionally; in 16olpfor instancepwith 
Franqueza, on a junta considering minor militar, 7 appointments. 
5 
Even with such occasional Juntas as thesephoweverpLerma was 
abidingly cautious9going to almost mathematical lengthe to ensure a 
balance with the professional aclministrator; Radrez and Franqueza in 
4f and Esteban do Ibarrap 
6 
Pascual 1603 were thus balanced by Idiaquez 
97 -14 
by Idi/ 
8 
and Poza in 1600 b. V Ibarra again La Oliva in 1613 aquezq 
and Le=a himself and Franqueza in 1601 by IdiaquGz and 
Esteban de 
Ibarra-9 
The more formal Juntaytiecl to one or more councils and 
governed by its own ordenanza or ce'dulappresented greater 
1- Cnta. Jnta. )21 SePt-16039A. G. S. E-2023pno fol- 
2 -'Le=a to Pradatl Febol602qAoG. So E. 621, no fole 
3- Rnta-Warq17 Jul. l600qAoG. S. GoA-570pf. 211o 
4- On this untagbelowppp. I%X-3. 
5- inl-taol2lt-ao 91 May 16019contained inside cnt&. War, 
13 marol6olt 
A. GoSa GoA-5799no fol. 
697P80 - as notes 10*46 above. 
I 
11i 
difficulties p but again Lerma kept the rules as he understood them., 
War's de Fabricas may serve as an example. In 1603 it was established 
to supervise virtually all matters navalvand was ordered to meet at 
least three times weekly and allowed precedence over all councils 
and tribunals 'without any exceptionI. Among its founder-members were 
FranquezavRamýrez do Prado and 
Lvarez Pereirapbut balance was 
supplied by IdiaquezyAcu*nKajAcu5a Vela and Esteban de Ibarra. 
1 
Although Lermals criados were appreciably advanced by him in 
respect of Junta membershipptwo major limitations emerge in that he 
generally took advantage of circumstances - and rarely created them - 
and fastidiously balanced the criado with the professional 
administrator. Two more complete the definitionpost of the important 
criad3s were secretariesgand few survived into the second decade of 
the reign. 
The less formalised Junta could have two justifications, 
being established either as a sub-committee of a particular council 
on the recommendation of the council itself or on direct royal order 
to consider a particular problempor as a special body concerned with 
an urgent or critical matter. The membership of the former would 
almost invariably be limited to the personnel of the council 
concerned while that of the latter would be drawn from several. One 
fa0torph3weverpwas common to both in the attendance as full voting 
members of conciliar secretaries. The secretax7 was a far more 
substantial figure than he has tended to appear of late. He was 
1- Royal c4dula, 15 Jan. 16039 establishing the JuntaYA-G-S- C. -T. H. 3119 no fol-. -ja, --d3bjy. 
1i_ 
certainly no Gonzalo Perez - the times were too sophisticated for 
that - but he was still a major figure of statepand an Andres de 
Pradavan Antonio de Arosteguf or a CristObal de Ipenazrieta could 
exercise considerable influence on the policymaking process. But SOP 
toopcould a Franquezava Calderýn or an Angulo. As Secretary of State 
itselfpFranqueza was a clerk - if a well-paid onel - writing up the 
consultas and passing them back and forth between King and Councilp 
and dealing with despatohespbut as a member of a junta he could 
consider the great affairs of state and could legitimately 
* 
and fully 
make his voice heard - on the organisation of the A=y of Flanders, 
2 
on the future of the Moriscos of Valencia93 on the provisioning of 
the empresa de Irlanda. 
4 
By ubiquitously thus appearing on a plethora of occasional 
bodies in addition to doing his regalar work as Secretary of State 
and as a member of formal juntasgFranqueza at once gave the world a 
false impression of greatness and 9 uitimately 9 ensured 
his own fall. 
When contemporaries spoke of the great power of the non-presidential 
criado - that ispohiefly of Franqueza and Calder&n - 
it was 
to the extra, -- concil i ar r5le that they were referring. 
The reins 
of power could often be drawn together and concentrated 
in such a 
juntapalthOugh the Junta de Hacienda wasqaB will be seengthe last 
1- On secretarial salaries and feespbelovoPP-190-194- 
2- Cnta-untitled Junta (Idid"quezgLermalMirandag Cordoba and*Franque 
; stablished as a result of a consulta of a State Juntalg Sept. 
1602jA-G. S. E-20239f-82. 
3- Cntauntitled Junta (Ididquez, CSrdobagFranqueza and Esteban 
de 
Ibarraq2l Sept. 160--39ibid. gno fol. ba, Franqueza and 4- Cnta-untitled JuAta TVeTadaqIdiaquezqCordo 
Esteban de IbarFr-aT7 Mar. 1603, A. G. S. E. 2511inO fOl- 
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great Junta on which at least one important and corrupt criado was a 
major figure. 
1 
Lerma did continue after c. 1608 to put business in the 
way of his followers in this mannerpbut Calderon's fall in 1611 was 
the final drama in an era which had effectively ended with the arrest 
of Villalonga-Government was too serious to be left to such men; the 
2 lesson had finally been learned. 
*** *** 
The criado was not the simple creature sometimes imagined and 
certain qualifications may properly be demanded of him - that he be 
an intimate of Lerma's raised by him to major administrative office 
for which he was more or less inadequately qualified; exercising his 
office carruptly; dependent upon Lerma for his survival in officeland 
rewarded9often lavishlyvby him. In fine, the criado proper was a 
courtier superimposed upon the Administration. Only Calderon met all 
the requirementspalthough Bautista Acevedo and Villalonga should 
probably be characterised as nearly perfect examples of the species. 
Alone of these mon, Villalonga had had some solid administrativýj 
jý 
experience prior to his initial advancement by Lerma - some thirty 
3 
five years or so in the offices of Aragon and Inquisition. 
Bautista had merely 'visited' the Zaragoza archbishopric and 
7: 
1- On Juntaspsee also belowgpp. 331-333. 
2- See als3 below, p. 123. 
3- B-M- Eg. 2060pff. 1-6 and Juderias (1908)ppp. 314-6 and Appendix Up 
no. 44. 
. L. L, q I -, 
achieved the dubious chaplaincy of the Court's House of Correction 
for Fallen Women under Philip 11,1 while Calderon had had no I 
2 administrative experience of any kind, All three were marked out for 
advancement at the beginning of the reign, Villalonga and Caldero*n 
achieving it during the 1599 jOurneyorespectively as Secretary of 
the Cortes of Aragod and as ayuda de Camara to the King. 4 Bautista 
was offered a canonry in Toledo and the bishopric of Tortosapbut 
refused both and had to wait until 1601 for the see of Valladolid., 5 
Villalonga and Bautista then Progressed rapidlyprespectively to the 
Italian secretaryship of State in 1600 
6 
and to the Inquisitorship 
7 General in 1603 9 but CalderSn continued as a courtier until 
effectively assuming the junior secretaryship of State in 1607 
Of the threepVillalongapthe erstwhile administratorpwas the 
least successful. Bautista, as an ecclesiastic ran a different course 
from the two secretaries9but ran it well; the Valladolid post and the 
Patriarchate of the Indies (1605) were their own rewardspeach more 
lucrative than either of his presidencies-9 For good measurewhen in 
1- GonzAez Divila (1623)pp. 383. 
2- He is Often referred to as having been made secretary of Castile 
in 15999a, mistake emanating from confusion of the two uses of the 
word ctmara; see belowqn-4- 
do CSrdoba (1857)PP. 7 3- Jude asT1Fe)qP*309- 4- Cabrera -8. 
5- GonM3z Da ila (1623 9P. 383- 6- See abovepp. 100pn. 2. 
7 Gonz9lez Da"vila, (1623ýpp-384- 
8 No title exists for the appointment (aboveop. 1009n. 2). 
9 Cabrera de C&rdoba (1857), pp. 2599310tand B. N. 7423, f. 128v. 
120- 
1607 he was obliged to renounce Valladolidphe was given some 12,000 
ducats of rent in compensation a rather apposite examplepindeedp 
of the balance struck between Philip's insistence on episcopal 
residence2 and Lermals on Protecting the interests of a criad3. 
The difference between the favours granted Villalonga and 
Calderon is instructive. Where the-then Franqueza married the 
daughter of a regidor of AlcalapCalder6n won the se'nora If la Oliva 3; 
where Franqueza was raised only to a countshipyCalderon won a 
marquisate 
4 
; where Villalonga was abandoned by Lerma in 1607, Caldex6n 
was lavishly protected by him in 1611-12.5 Both were given military 
habits for themselves and their familiesvbut Calderon's were the I 
more irregular grants - among themps, habit for an infant son and the 
comendadoria meyor de Aragon for the father he disowned. At Court9tool 
he could more than match Villalonga's dubious secretaryship to the 
1- Cabrera do Co*rdoba (1857)PP-310; see alsopibid. 9p. 272. 
2- See abovepp. 219n. 2. 
3- Franqueza; doga Ana Graviel, Lopez de Haro (l622), i, 4o8. 
CalderSn; 6? a Ines do VargaspB. N. 11011pf. 226. 
4- FranquezapCount of Vill alonga, Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), P. 188. 
CaldedýpMarquis of Siete Iglesiasqjbid. PP-558. At the sime time 
his son was made Count of la OlivaqLbid. 
5- FranquezagAbid. gP. 294; CalderSngibid. gPP-456-7p4599462-39473t488 
and aboveqP-52*I have retained the use of CalderSn's surname 
rather than use his title on grounds of general usage; Franqueza 
has been traditionally known by name or by title. 
6- On habits of Calderon's sonsoCabrera do Cordoba (1857)lp. 2679 
LSpez de Haro (1622)49419 and Juderias (1905) yp. 352; these wenal 
one in Alea'ntara in 1605 for a son not yet two; one in 1606 for 
Juan in Calatrava; in 1607 the priorate of S. Juan for Miguel. On 
his fatherpalso comendador mayor do Mqntalbiýi (Santiago) OLSpez de Harojjbid. On disavowal of fathergbelowgp. 121, n-5-Calder5on was 
comendad3r Of Ocana (Santiago)gand Franqueza comendador of Silla, 
(S. Juan? ) 9 Cabrera de 0,56doba (1857)ppp. 456-794599403. 
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Queen with his own captaincy of the German Guard and his father's 
lieutenancy of the Spanish. 
1 Villalonga held only one municipal 
office - that of alcalde mayor do sacas y cosas vedadas of the city 
and district of Murciagworth probably less than 1,000 ducats a year 
2 
3tw3 
- while Calder3*n hadvin addition -to his many Valladolid offices, 
voting regimientos and an escribanýa in Plasencial and regimientas in 
Soria and Nava. He had, tooga seat in perpetuity in the Madrid town 
hall and its casa de la comediagwas an unlikely patron of the royal 
chapel in Madrid and of the Portaceli monasterypand had two lucrative :1 
concessions on the East Indies and Brazilian trades. 
4 
The disparity - reflected even*in the circumstances of their 
births5 - had a fine symbolism; these men stood for the two levels of 
protected corruption - Villalonga9the bureaucrat adopted as it were, 
by Lerma and advanced by himbut left largely to speculate on his own! 
accountland Calderon the court favourite - as might be saidgLermals 
Lerma - grafted on to the Administration and having his fortune 
presented to him through the misindulgence of the royal grace. They 
1 On Vill alongaý above Pp. 39 qn. 2. On CalderSn9B. 
N-llOllvf. 226, and on 
his fatherpCabrera do Cordoba (1857)9P-55- 
2 Cnta. Fin. 930 Tun. 16129A. G. So C. J. H. 371of-49- 
3 ýee abovepicp. 48.4 - B. N. 110119ff-219 and 230V-231. 
5 Villalonga was the son of an Inquisition familiargJuderias 
(1908), 
p. 312; Calderon was the son of a soldier serving in Flanders and 
was conceived if not born out of wedlock I Juderias 
(1905 ), P-337 
and L&pez do Haro (1622), i, 419-On Calderon's 'proving' in 1612 1 
that he was really the son of the great AlvaqCabrera de Cordoba 
(1857) 9P. 497. Bautista Acevedo was also of dubious enough 
birth to 
D .0 ila (1623)PP. 483. have to hazard a limpieza testpGonzalez av 
'r, l2pllj'ý 
were of course extreme examplespbut the other Criad3B of Lerma and his 
Son divided between theee two types - AngulopAliaga and the Ciriza, 
professional administrat3rs; lbanez de Santa CruzpGonzalez Centenopla 
OlivagAndres de Velazquez, Juan Vazquez de Salazar and Bernabe, de 
Bibanco 9 courtiers. 
The first group certainly owed their initial advancement to 
Lerma2but all four men were left thereafter to their own devices and 
worked as professional administratorsq achieving promotions appropriate 
to their p36itions. Indeedponly Angulo received any spectacular single 
promation; an insignificant Secretary Of Crusade could not normally 
hope for promotion to a Junior secretaryship (do Justicia) of 
Castilepespecially after only a year in officelbutpappointed to 
1 
Castile in 1605, he stayed there for the rest of the reign. Juan de 
2 
Ciriza's career was in itself unexceptionalp and those of his 
brother Tristan and of Aliaga were distinguished in terms of 
promotions only by the extraordinary fav3urs of 1612 and 16149and in 
both cases the identity of the criado wasgas has been suggested, 
incidental to wider issues*3 Broadlyphoweverpthese men had one thing 
in common as against Villalonga and Calderon - second generation 
criad3S9they achieved their eminence in or soon after 1608pandt 
1- Royal secretaryp6 Dec. 16049A. G. S. Q. C. 40; Becretary of Crusadeq 
Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)pentry 27 Nov. 1604pp. 230; Castile 
Secretary de Justiciagig Sept. 1605 and de Camara Y Estado, 19 Nov. 
16081A. G. 67. Q-C-40- 
2- He had9for instance9seven years secretarial experience priot to 
his appointment to the State office; see Appendix 
3- On Tristan de CirizapaboveyPP-52-3 and 100-102; on Aliagagabovep 
P. 110. 
I 
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Tristan apart - who died in 1614 - they survived until the end of 
the reign. 
I Only Aliagavand then only after Lerma's fallpachieved 
either major administrative position or Personal notoriety on the 
scale of Villalongag Calderon or Bautista Acbvedo. The second 
generation was much more modest than the first - as Philip IV 
recognised by executing Calderaln but by merely rebuking Juan de 
Ciriza and Angulo. Aliaga was of course again the exception to the 
rul e. 
2 
These men came from within the Lerma household and shared 
0 with Calderon and Bautista Acevedo and the mai3rity of the second 
gr3up this c3mm3n origin andpAliaga again excepted9the manner of 
I 
their introduction inta. los papeles as personal secretaries to Lermap 
an writing the notes he was too lazy to write for himself - Ib *"ez de 
Santa CruzpGonzilez Centenogla OlivavBibanco and VaFzquez de Salazar 
3 
were all originally thus engaged9the latter two with Uceda. This 
40 
second group achieved no great conciliar emimence - IbanezvG3nz4lez 
and Bibanco were royal secretaries, but only Bibanco progressed to a 
conciliar p3stTpalth3Ugh Vazquez was allowed to buy the Indies 
receptor 
I 
a. 
4 
Br3adlyj thereforeq the Sand3val criad3 was a d3mestic servant 
or personal aide casually introduced into administrative officeland 
f 
1 Angulo and Juan de Ciriza both held important positions prior to 
1608pbut Angulo was promoted in that year to the senior Castile 
post (abovepp. 1229n. l)and Ciriza was only one of four secretaries' 
of Indies9was not promoted to War until 1610 and State until 16124 ! 2 See aboveypp. 85-6. 
3 Identified from their handwriting and rubricas; on these notesy 
bel3w, pp. 3cOk. 12.4. 4- See below9pp-til-1612044 
124 
generally indeed into minor office. There was no system here 
justifying the usage of the vocabulary of 'factionl; it was all too 
haphazard. N3r were they introduced to use their offices for their 
own and their patrons' gain - the worst service a man could render 
his patron was to be found dishonest. Fasoination with the rise of 
these men should not obscure the simple relevance of their decline. 
The more successful a man became so the More insecure he became9for 
the point inevitably arose with a Villalonga or a Calderon where 
the scandal he caused jeopardised the royal greatness and the 
prestige of the monarchy itself; then he had to go. The King loved 
Lermajand Lermagof all his cri_aclo_s t loved Calderontbut Calderon felI 
from power - that was arguably the most significant event of the 
reign. This was a society that needed scapegoatspand if found them 
almost regularly. The final qualification of the criado was that he 
be expendable. 
*** *** 
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The Offices. 
The offices held by these men reflected Lerma's own caution 
and limited interests; cri ado s were appointed to the secretaryships of 
Stateýpresidencies and to extra-c3nciliar juntas precisely because it 
was so easy to appoint them. Beyond this we find a concentration in 
the royal secretaryship9the Council of Castile and in the offices of 
the Church and the Council of Inquisition. 
The royal secretaryship had its own very obvious significance, 
and was indeed the only office systematically undermined throughout 
the reignpall of its holders apart from Tristan de Ciriza - who died 
prematurely - being dismissed (Ibanez de Santa CruzgBibenco and 
Gonzalez Centeno)va fate shared with at least one Queen's secretary 
in Villalonga. 
Castile variously incorporated Bautista Acevedo (and Miranda 
and Fernando Acevedo) in the presidency; Ramirez de PradovB3nalt 
Ocontrillo and Gil Radrez de Arellano 
1 
as c3uncillors; Angulo as 
Secretary and Tapia and Ocontrillo as fiscales*With StatelCastile was 
tfie most prestigious of the councils being both the supreme judicial 
body and, with Inquisitionptae chief dispenser of patronage secular 
and ecclesiastical. The significance of such appointments need hardly 
1- There is no extant record of any connection with Lermalbut, 
unusually for an administrator, lie turned up fairly regularly in 
C3urt ceremonies; suspicion therefore may attach to him*F3r 
career details I Appendix 111no. 124 Ip-"2- 
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be streBsed. Castile's councillorspm3reoverpwere as judges required to 
sit ex-officio on certain other councils to legitimise their judicial 
activities - two sat as do tarde councillors of Financeq 
1 
one each on 
Inquisition and Crusade as comisariosgand one on War asm asesor when 
after 1604 that Council assumed same modest judicial function. 
2Thusp 
e far instancegRamirez de Prado, and Banal sat on Financepand Tapia and 
Ocontrillo on Inquisition. 
Again qhoweverý there were significant limitations. It will be 
observed that the councillors of Castile were all appointed in the 
first years of the reignlm3stly indeed in 1599 - the neatest Lerma 
came to 'packing' a Uouncil - but that they were all from that group 
connected with him only by implication. That they were carruptvand 
significantly soýis proven only in the case of Ramirez de Prado. Heq 
more3verpwas the only one of these men to achieve exceptionally rapid 
pr3m3tion to the Camarapthe C3uncil's supreme organ. In practicepthat 
distinction went with seniorityland only two exceptions appear to have 
been made to the rulegin the highly pertinent oases of Ramfrez himself 
and Carrillo .3 Of the othersgonly Ocontrillo 
(c. 1611) and Ramirez de 
Arellan3 (1614) were pr3m3ted to the Camara. Castile was much troubled 
f 
during Philip 111's reign, but Ramirez de Prado was in effect 
1- See belawppp. 167L. 2- See belowtpp*4-7*9 1 3- No title of Vpointment survives for Ramirezpbut he is found 
witnessing cedulas (as councillor) between 1600-06. Carrill3 was 
appointed supernumerary councillor on 14 Feb. 1600 but left at once 
for Flanders9and since he was appointed to the CKmara 
immediately 
on his return (8 -Tan-1603) he effectively took up both 
simultaneously. A. G. S. Q-C-14- 
Bautista Acevedo and his three months' presidencY apart - the only 
major criado to hold si#nificant office, 
Inquisitionphoweverpwas undermined in remarkable fashion,, It 
had Bautista Acevedo as President for five years and Aliaga for half 
that time; it had Aliagals 1614 cOuncillorshipt together with TaPiap 
Ocontrillo and Lio, oGabriel Paniagua de Losysaycriado of Calde x n1as 
councillors; VillalongapBibanco and Tristan de Ciriza as unlikely 
secretaries. These appointments phowever, should be seen against a more 
general backgroundyfor favouritism and nepotism flourished with the 
Supr as with no other major council. philip 11 had set the tone in 
June 1598 b. V appointing Lic,. Alondo Marques do Prado as councillor 
merely for his services as the Duke of Feria's assistant in 
Catalonia-' ilis son followed suit; Fernando Acevedo may well have 
deserved his fiscalfavand later his eouncillorship, but he was 
appointed durilig his 
brother's prosidency, 
2 
and an uncle of LemOs and 
a son of Benavente 
both found oauncillorships for which they were 
disqualifiedgrespectively by their youth and illegitimacy. 
3 
Crusade 9 although far less 
important than Inquisitiongwas 
subjected t-: ) similar 
treatment. Paniagua de Losysapfor instance, 
1- Cnta-St-92 Jun-1598fA. G. S. E. 2741pno fol. 
2- 75-nzkl", I)2vjila 
(1623)PP-392- 
3- ()n Rodrigo do Castrogbelowgp*202pand on Enrique de Pimentel, 
Cabrera de Co'rdoba (1857)ppp. 269 and 528. 
--- 
------- 
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presided briefly over it in 1612,1 and it suffered 
Ingulo 
as a 
secretary and Lic. Alonso Ramirez de Pradogson of the councillor of 
Castilepas fiscal until his dismiBsal in 1609.2 It waspmareoverlthe 
only council with which Philip allowed the sale of a councillorship. 
3ý1 
To establish that Lerma and his criados were less 
important administratively than is generally assumed is not of 
course to establish that they were not importantgnor even - 
occasionally - major figures of state. It is Merely to plead for 
some perspective. Of courselsome were important and some were corruptp 
but there was rather more to this Administration than Villalongaq 
3autista Acevedo and Calderýn, We may now pass to more pertinent 
perspectives. 
- ibid. 9P- 49 2. 
2- on Ejuloqaboveqp*l22qn. l; on Ramtrezi above 9p. 72, ng* 3- Juan do Chavarri paying 1,496,000 maravedfs in 1603-4 for the 
right to renounce his office for one ljfe,, Relaeion general do 
todos los maravedfa qua so han reoevido y PagadO an las arcas 
dd tres llaves ... I B. ]N. 6754, f-54; on the sale and renunciation 
of administrative offices 9 below, pp*Lalv - 1ý 
"' 
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5-Court and Councils. 
A. Itineracys 'Tan repetinas muclanzas 
Philip 111 was rarely in one place for long. There could 
be various political or courtly justifications for the royal travels' 
-a royal birth or marriagepthe meeting of a Cortes9the need for 
Philip to show himself to his various peoples - but they were 
abidingly personal and subject to an often capricious whim. Philip 
liked to return time and again to his favourite places of 
relaxation; generallytthese were in Castile - Burg3sqT3rdesilla2v 
LermapVentosillapSegoviapSalamanca and Aranjuezvtogether with Madrid 
Valladolid and the Escorial - and each year he visited some of themp 
not regularly but as -the mood took him. He rarely went outside this 
circuit and neverpfor instance p travelled as King fatther south 
in 
Castile than Toledovalthough he favoured his eastern kingdoms with 
his expensive presence in themearly years. -2 
Tile Court was always 
uncertain of the royal movementspthe Government chary of them; Stateli 
advice to omit Valencia and AragSn from the 1599 itinerary was 
ignoredpas were its pleas at the beginning of the reign that he 
go to Portugalthose of 1619 that he should notýAppropriatelyjit was 
.01 1 The quatationgfrom Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)vpp. 196-7. letters and 2 Royal itinerary, based upon the date-lines of royal 
. 
cedulas and on B. N. 2347, f. 343. 
3- On l599paboveqp*l4pn-l4; on Portugal pbelOwPPP* 131-49135pl36. 
- 
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PhiliP 111 who moved his immense Court twice within five yearagand 
left it even on those two occasions bemused as to its eventual fate. 
The speculation as to the removal began as soon as the Court returned 
to Madrid in 1599 P1 and no sooner had it settled in Valladolid than 
rum3urs began of an imminent return to Madrid. 
2 Having eventually 
returned, it was disturbed in 1608 and again in 1610 by surmise of a 
3 
re-return to Valladolid, and all this in addition to the routine 
speculation as to the royal movements - where would Philip spend his 
s=mer in 1606?; which of two unnecessary journeyatto Valencia or 
Portugallwould he undertake in 1612 ? 
The irresponsibility of the early years was inspired at 
once by Philip's own concepts of regal grandeza and by his fondness -- 
inspired no doubt by his Valencian favourite - for his eastern 
kingd3ms. Somewheregat the beginningpthere would be a dramatic 
gesture for him to make; he was not quite sure where. In 1600 he 
. a5 in favour of a personal abandoned his projeoted crusade into Afrir 
intervention in Italy to resolve the Saluzzo crisis. Quite how he 
intended to do this was not very clearvand when so informed State did 
not press him on the point. Insteadp as was its wont when opposing him, 
( 
it offered effusive thanks to the Almighty for having given Spain a 
king of such couragegwisdom and Christianityland stressed that its 
1- Cabrera de C6rdoba (1857), PP-56,59,75t8og8l, 86, etc- 
2- ibid. ppp. 126 and 145- 3- ibid. 9pp. 3519406. 4- ibid. ypp. 280,460. 
5- Cnta. Juan de IdiLfquezglo May 16009B. M. Eg. 329of-1319 and abovetp-27-ý, 
RT-1 1 6- On State's OPPositiongbolow9pp, li 
______________ - 
l3fl 
opposition was motivated only by its concern for the 'greater good 
of Christianity' ; His Majesty was young an& would have other 
opportunities to show his qualitiespbut for the moment a more 
pressing need was to secure the succession. Financiallypthe requisite 
Rrandeza could not be supportedland Philip was urged to wait on the 
outcome of negotiations before proceeding. Withallthe greater valour 
would consist in not gaing,, Philip was persuaded. Ife informed the 
Council that he would go to Barcelona inste *1 
State again thanked Heavenoand turned to a fresh disabusal. 
Certainlypthe King must do what God c3mmandedpbut had he interpreted 
Him correctly ? Might not France draw a different interpretation and 
construe such a journey as a challenge ? The Council repeated its 
objectionstbut Philip continued his preparations92 On reflectionghe 
changed his mind again, ana in 1601 moved the Court to Valladolide 
By February 1602 he had approved a Journey to Portugal to 
counter the growing unrest therep 
3left 
at once -for Valencia but on 
his return in March began again planning for Portugal. 
4 The 
Government impressed the absolute importance of this journey upon himý I 
and by June the arrangements had proceeded far enough to 
incorporate 
the plans for conciliar division. 
5 
But Philip dallied; his summers wex 
1- Cnta. St. 922 Oct. 16009A. G. S. E. 26369f-125- 
2'- En-ta. St. pV Oct. 1600#lbid. pf. 123. 
3- 2-nta-W5rp8 Feb. 16029A. G. S. G. A-5899no fOl* 
4- Pedro Alvarez Pereira to Lermap3O Mar. 16029A. G. S. E. 25.11ýf-79-' 
5- Cnta*Jnta. do Dos926 Jun. 16029A. G. S- E. 20239f-83- 
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for Castile, By September it was again an open question as to whether 
he would go. The queen was pregnant and could not accompany himpand a 
State Junta - led by Lerma - attempted to cajole him into using this 
to justify a short trippin which he could lavishly promise reforms 
and a visit proper at a less inopportune timeghave his monies voted 
and return home at once. 
1 He did not go. In Decembervin response to 
frantic pleas from Mouragnow Marquis of Castel RodrigagWar advised 
that affairs in Portugal 'could not be worsened ... except by a 
rebellion 192 and in February a State Junta stressed that there was 
now no question as to advisability; Philip had to go*He agreed -I the 
more I think about it9the more necessary I believe my journey to 
Portugal to bel; when the Queen was better there would be no problem. 
3 
Spring, howeverp was app-roachinggaad in April he left f3r an 
extended Castilian tourpeancelling the Portuguese journey in favour 
1A of a pleasant summer in the bosques of Mac d. 
In NovemberqPhilip posed a new problem for State - should 
he go to Valencia or Portugal that winter ? Idiaquez alone thought 
Valencia worth consideration, but recounted the various financial 
deficits and the advantages of a PortuguesO Subsidylpr3mpting 
Olivares to add the rider that if there was a Subsidy in it Philip 
I 
Cnta. Jnta. pq Sep 
I t. 16022ibi I ci. 9f. 82. The Cýther members were IdidqueztMiranda and Grrdoba. 
2 Cnta--Wd: tjq Dec. '16029A. G. S. G. A-5899no fol. 
*3 - 
Tn-td-Jyitaý21 Feb. 1603, A. G. S. 1,. '20231f-84- 
4- Cabrera de CLdoba (1857), Pp-135 and 172o 
133) 
should go to India. The other councillors expressed themselves as 
forcibly - B3rjaqhimself Portuguesetwarning of the rampant 
disaffection in Portugal 
1 
; Miranda scornfully contrasting the 'rodeo 
'I 
de Valencia y Sevilla' with the necessary 'Jornada de Portuýzali 
Poza reminding Philip of his legal duty to go; Chincho'np Alva de Liste 
and Infantado adding to the unanimity. Philip thanked the Council for 
its advice and approved the journe. V. 
2 Within dVs, however#Le=a 
was info=ing Borja that Philip had decided to hold the Valencian 
corteB and that he would be leaving in a couple of weeks. 
3 Cabrera, 
bewildered enough by rumours of a projected return of the Court to 
Madrid, gasped at the royal decision and felt for the already 
impaverished. valencianas. 
4 
Philip grew slowly into the acceptance of his 
responsibilities; in 1606,1607 and 1609 he was fairly sedentary9but 
in 1605 was away from Valladolid from April until the second week in 
Novembertin, 1608 from Madrid for three and a half m3nthspand. in 1610 
from Madrid from March until mid-September. This lastghoweverlwas the 
water, shed; thereafter he alternated between Madrid and San Lorenzo 
for most of the yeart5 and limited himself to brief progresses in 
1-'... The Portuguese have begun to suspect ... that Your Majesty 
holds them in little regard because he does not favour them with 
his royal prosencogand it appears to them that that Kingdom has 
been reduced to a provincepas it it had been conquered'., 
2- Cnta. St. 92 NOV-16039A. G*S. E-2636pf-125- 
3- Letter of 24YOv-1603 B-M Add-289425of-144- 
4- Cabrera do C6rdoba (1957)iPP-196-7-It was in this entry that he 
used the phrase quoted in the subheading to this chapter. 
5-A misconception of Contarini's is of significance here; he had 
Philip spending 'eight months of the year in his country housest 
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October-Novemberg with of course t1le exceptions Of the marital Journey , 
of 1615 and the Portuguese excursion of 1619. 
*** *** 
Royal itineracy was expensive of timepof personal and 
public inconvenience g and of administrative dislocation. The two 
removals Of the COurt, for inBtancogwere vast upheaval s1posing 
immense logistical problems; transportpfood and lodging had to be 
paid for for administrators and courtiers by the Crownland simple 
mechanics meant that on both occasions the turmoil lasted for 
S-everal manths. In 1601pto provide lodgings in Valladolidthe 
Audiencia had to be moved to Medina del CampopMedina's fair to 
Burgosland the University and Inquisition of Valladolid had to 
vacate their quarters 
1 
; the cortes had to be dismissed in Madrid and 
reconvened in Valladolid; the Court prison had to be moved and its 
inmates fed and lodged on the journeyv 
2 
and suitors and appellants 
had either to follow the Court or effectively abandon their cases. 
Since there was insufficient transportpthe progress had to be a 
gradual one; the councils9for instancepmoved at fifteen day intervalsq 
and in 1606 some officials had even to walk the 150 miles to Madrid. 
3 
particularly in the EscorialIpContarini (1857)PP-562*lle was 
writing in 1605; in 1604 Philip stopped briefly at the Escorial en 
route to Valladolidgend in September stayed there for 10 days ind 
in October for fOur*In 1605, Oftthe 310 days for which I can 
accountphe spent not one at San Lorenza. More perhaps than any 
other manpContarini has been responsible for posterity's verdict 
on Philip 111 and his reign. 
Lyma to Poza, 27 Jam. 1601, A*G. S. C. j. g. 293, f. 224 and Cabrera do 
Cordoba (1857), P. 2- iýjd. qpp, 809276 
3- ibid. gpp. 969276., 
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1, ,I 
On each occasion it took over three months for the councils to move. 
1 
The removals were of course disastrous for the towns involvedp as 
2 Madrid acknowledged by offering immense sums for the return in 1606, 
and as Philip acknowledged in 1608 by granting Vdladolid a decade's 
alcabala exemption in compensation for its loss. 
3 The effects 
stretched even farther afield; during the Valladolid residence the 
Customs House of Badajoz - and presum ablyp therefore 9 the city's 
trading community as a whole - cuffered a serious decline as 
travellers bound for Court from Lisbon by-passed the city for more 
convenient northern routes. 
Royal pro, 5resses posed problems as immense. The 1619 JOU=GY 
might be taken as an example. Philip calculated that he needed a 
guard of some 3t5OO menybut had to thrash around desperately to find 
them-War ruled out a levy from the Barbary presiaios because once the 
men were allowed on land they would none of them be seen againvand 
one from Galicia on grounds of logical practicalities- ChOO sing 
Andalusia as the least-disqualifiea sourcegit then set about the task 
1- On administrative dislocationbelowppp-138-152- 
2- It paid 2509000 ducats over ten years and a tax of one-sixth on 
its rentsfCabrera, de Gýrdoba (1857)pp. 270- 
3- Lb--id-tp-351- 
4- The return to Madrid was foreseen by one shrewd man who bought the 
escribanfa de rentas of the city and district of Badajoz for 
19500 ducats in 1604 and who opened negotiations for its sale in 
1609 at 2pOOO ducats. Cntas. Fin. 97 Deo. 1603 and 
18 Feb. 16049A. G. S. 
C. J. H. 309pf. 234 and port of contador Salcedov7 3209f. 269pand re 
Oct. 1622 and untitled record of perpetuation of Sebastian Monterop 
A. G. S. D. G. T. 240229City and Province of Badajoz. 
I' - -t 7 
- 
367tj 
of enlisting captains and disciplining the motley levy. Some twenty 
five ships would be necessary to carry thempand War had to rearrange 
the duties of the squadrons of Cantabriaýthe Straits and the coasts 
of Portugal in order to find them and ensure that Philip enter the 
realm with appropriate majesty. 
I 
*** *** 
The King was morallyland often legallygobliged to compensate 
his servants for the inc3nvenience and expense oaused them by his 
travels. Their r03ts and families might be in Madrid in 16019but they 
had to go where the King commanded; such was part of the price of the , 
royal service. 
2 In return, they could expect compensation. For the 
removals themselvespfar instancepeach councillor of Castile was paid 
19000 ducatsf3 those of Finance 500t 
4and 
of Indies 600.5 The cost of 
each journey for Indies alone was some 149000 ducats., 
6 
and by repute 
the 1601 removal cost some 390009000 ducats - enoughpas SepIlveda 
wryly pointed outv to send an armada against England. 
7 
As always9such payments took time; by March 16079the two 
1- Cnta. Wary27 Mar. 161gpA. G. S. G. A. 8404.204- 
2- On the royal service I bel3wq cap. 6, pp. %IS-#%12- 3- Cnta-Cýmara de Castillaq15 Dec. 16069B. M. Eg. 3379f- 152. 
4- Ifem3rial of Gaspar de Pons925 Mar-16139A. G-S- C. J-11--1809f-119- 
5- Schaferpigpp. 184-5- 
6- ibid. 
7- Sep6lveda (1924), p. 244. 
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secretaries of War had still not been paid their ayudas for either 
j3urneyp 1 and as late as December of that year the secretaries of the 
Camara of Castile were still appealing that the award of EýYudas of 
600 ducats for each j3urney be raised to one of 11000.2 This held 
true more generally9with less formal payments; Juan RuG de Velascog 
oficial mayor of the War secret ariat 9 waiting for conpenaation after 
the 1599 journey9was fortunate enough to hear of a condemned ship in 
Cartagenagand sought his recompense in the form of one of its casksq 
worth 400-500 ducats. 
3 In 16199the best that War could do for 
secretary Arce and three secretarial officials was t3 suggest that 
they be paid for part of the debts they incurred on the Portuguese 
jornada. 
4 
The Court came first-Members of the royal family had to 
travel in appropriate style, and that did not come cheaply - when in 
1607 the infantas found Madrid too hot for their tastepthey decided 
to g-3 to San Lorenzo immediatelygand Acun"a had to find some 2,000 
ducats literally overnight for their expenses*5 More generallyg 
1 Cnta. Warp2g Mar*1607, A. G. Se G. A. 6709f. 32. 
#4 2 Cnta. camara de Castilla, 15 Dec. 16069B. I. I. Eg. 337, f-152. 
Ayllonq 3- gnta. WarjU Mar. 1599pA. G. S. G. A-552pno fol. Miguel de 
variously a porter of four c3uncilsois found in 1597 pleading 
with Philip 11 for payment for a j3urney in 1596 in cash; Philip 
apparently insisted on payment in kindj. 2_nta-Warý10 Feb. 15979A. G. 3; 
G. A. 4999no fOl-Payment in kind was quite common; see below9pp. 
4 ýnta-WarvV Dec. 16199A. G. S. G. A. 840Pf 447 
5 Lerma to AcunaP20 Apro1607vAoG. S. c. j: jj034, n3 folo 
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although courtiers were often in considerable hardship - especially 
at the l3wer levels they as a rule did better than the 
administratorsgsince their condition reflected on the royal grandeza; 
Court expenses were therefore calculated before a royal j3urneyq 
administrativepafterwards. F3r the 1603 journey t: ) celebrate the 
birth of the heirpPhilip had to pay s3me 400ý000 ducats for courtly 
2 expensesjm3st of it in backpayment of his h3usehold's salariesy and 
generously complemented this with a series of appr3priate mercedes 
reputedly costing another 6009000.3 For the 1615 journeypthe 
household costs escalated daily; as early as 1613 Lerma and Carrillo 
agreed on a figure of 120yOOO ducats for certain expenses only ýor 
Lerma to inf3rM the President within days that he had thought 3f 
4 other costs w: Ach would consume a further 201000P and in 1615 itself 
the Duke added the same amount to an agreed 80,000 ducats in 
5 
precisely the same circumstances* 
The Court came firstptoogwhen Philip allocated those 
lodgings (casas de aposento), t3 which his serVantS were legally 
entitled. Lermaý as always, did extra3rdinarily well for himself9being 
I- See bel3wjpp. lCle- 161 
2- Cabrera de CSrd3ba (1857)pp. 164; see alsolibid-2p. 168 on the 
provision of twenty encomiendas to courtiers. 
3- ibid. pp. 164. 
4- Juan de Ciriza to Carri113920 Dec. 1613vA-G-S- C-J-rI-377pn3 fol. 
5- Same to same, 26 Mar. 1615pA. G. S. C. J. -d-387, no 
fol. 
able in 1599 to vacate quarters large enough to house State and Wary 
and in the consequent reshufflegmayordomo Velada took over 
accomodation previously large enough for the immense Council of 
Indies. 1 Converselypthere were no proper lodgings available in 
Valladolid in 1601 for Portugalland it had to accomodate itself in 
the house of the Count of Salinaspits leader. 
2 Even with the 
evactation of Valladolid's tribunals and University9there was a 
period of great chaos while the city hurriedly erected new buildings 
for its army of guests. 
The final confirmation of return to a cheaper and healthier 
-Madrid was welcome enough to the King's servants 
for him to have to 
forcibly prevent some of them encamping for Madrid in February 1606 
before arrangements were finalised. 
4 
The return itself brought 
Ifadrid to chaospot only had the city and its lodging-houses 
decayed in the royal absencepbut the announcement of the return 
encouraged the various entrepreneurs who lived off 
the Court to 
flood back after their exclusion from Valladolid by the controlled 
right of ently. 
5 The situation was further aggravated by the 
increase in the size of both Court and Government in the years since 
16019and by July there were over 600 royal servants competing 
for 
I- Cabrera do drdoba (1857)YP-50- 2- ibid. 9p. 103- 
3- ibid. PPP-979126 and 270. 
eding the Court in Madridpoes 4- ibid, 9p. 270-On the logistics of fe Tb-id. 9 pp. 271 and 281. 
5-I 9P. 283. 
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eighty placespand emergency measures had to be introduced to provide 
them with some semblance of housing. 
' 
Neverthelesspit took - years to sort out the chaos. Juan Nunez 
Velapporter of State and Warghad to wait until 1609 before being 
housedgand he was among the more fortunate. 2 Finance and its 
tribunals had still not been c3mpletely rehoused by the end of the 
reign. In 1608 Finance was deprived of the duty of collecting the 
monies offered by Madrid for the return in favour of a reorganised 
CastileY3 which in turn downgraded Finance from its third-ranking 
seniority behind itself and State to a position inferior to 
Indies and Italy. Castile then dealt easily enough with Finance's 
counter- attack 2 it B aposentadores refusing to allow 
Finance lodgings 
in contravention of direct royal orders in reply to consultas of 
September 160990otober 16149Pebruary and October 1615. A decade after 
the returnpand with at least twenty seven of its officials still 
not ace3m3datedpFinanoo retaliated and refused to disburse some 
monies due to the aposentadores. The latter then blithely reacted by 
depriving councillors of Finance either of their lodgings or of 
compensatory allowances. After four had been so treatedpFinance - in 
October 1616 - again turned to the King and received a less than 
- ibide 
2- Cnta. Warj23 Jul. l6lOvA. G. S- G. A. 728pno folo 
I. H. 3529xf. 32. 3- Cnta. Fin. 915 Jul. 16089A. G*S. C-- 
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authoritative reply; 1it would be as well' if it would pay Castile its 
money and 'it would be as well' if the aposentad3res would provide 
Finance with its accomodation. 
1 In their own good time - and 
encouraged perhaps more by the enquiry of the Junta de Refo=aci / on 
into their general behaviour 
2- the aposentadores did so9but as late 
as January 1621 Secretary of Finance RodrZguez Criado ýLt least had 
still n3t been housed.. 
3 
*6** ** *, 
The royal travels had the most serious and continuing effect 
on the functioning of the Administration. Againgsimple mechanics were 
important. All incoming documentation addressed to the King had first 
to go to the capitalpbe forwarded to the King9considered b. V him and 
thenjalm3st invariablypreferred back to the councils. They in turn 
then discussed the matter and sent their consultas to Philip, who read 
them and sent back his reply. Then the decision could be implemented - 
unless Philip askedlas he often didpfor more advicepand provided 
there were no other complications. This was an especially tiresome 
procedure for Statefor its information had in the first instance to 
come from abroad. Thus. for examplepon average some seven weeks i 
elapsed between ambassador Velasco writing his despatches in London 
1- Cnta. Fin. P4 Dec. 16A, Ar. G. s. C. J. H. 395vf. 43. 
2- Fn-ta. Jnta. de ReformaciSn925 118Y 1618, printed by GonzAez Palencia 
t-19 3 2) 9 pp'. 9 -10. 
3- Cnta-Fin. 110 Jan. 1621, A. G. S. C., T. H. 4149f-l- 
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and their being considered by State in Madridgaithough they 
normally arrived in Madrid within 22-25 days. The responsibility was 
manifestly Philip'sphis itineracy compounding his often-erratic 
diligence; for instancepin August 1606 State had to consider some 
letters from Planderspbut while those of Spinola were only three 
/of 1 weeks old those of Zuaiga were nearly seven. Againvas the great 
crisis of 1610 moved to its climaxpState was still concerning 
itself in mid-April with letters from France and Italy of between 
27 February and 10 March. 
2 That the Administration could in fact 
support the royal itineracy - but only granted appropriate royal 
application - was evidenced by the reaction to the momentous news 
contained in Cardenas's despatches from Paris of 17 Mv 1610. 
Normally such letters would take three weeks to reach the Council in 
Madrid, but the itinerant Council met in Lerma an 24 Maypthat resident 
in Madrid considered its consults, on 26th. and returned both to the 
Kingvand the itinerant body considered his response on 29 th. 
3 
But 
the assassination of a fellow-monarch was clearly an exceptional case. 
Once information reached the Government a dual complication 
arase. If a decision was taken during an itineracylthe men travelling 
with the Court had the opportunity of undue or immediate influence as 
1- The letters dated respectively 18 July and 22 June p. 2nta. St. 12 
Aug. 16069A*G, S, E-2512pf. 121. 
2- On 14 APrilgfor instance, it considered letters from Milan of 9 
and 10 Harch9from Savoy of 28 FebruarYY5 and 7 Marchpand from 
Paris of 27 Februarypenta. 3t. 14 Apr. 16109A. G. S. E. 25139no fol. 
3- Cntas. St.. 24j26 and 074a. ý 16100A. G. S. K-15939ff-22923p24. 
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against those administrators left behind, There were moments of prime 
absurdity - thuspf3: r instance pI today, in a place where His Majesty 
ate' some papers were given to Idiaquez to c3nsider; they concerned 
the duration of the Suspension of Arms. Again, in 1608 Idiaquez 
found himself considering the question of war or peace with the 
Dutch at a meeting in Valladolid in company with Albuquerquepmaking 
his first appearance on the Council. 
2 Howeverýat least State was 
represented on the royal travels by its senior and most important 
councillor; Finance and War9normally unrepresented save on the great 
progresses of 1615 and 1619pfound themselves faced with the problem 
of communicating with the King. Ordinarily they were obliged to wait 
until Philip replied to a C3nsulta or until he returned to the 
capitalybut in extraordinary circumstances might be obliged to send 
a messenger directly to him. Thus War in 1604 'finding itself close to 
the royal person' of the King sent two councillors to plead a 
particular case. 
3 SimilarlypFinance in dispute in 1617 and 1620 with 
Orderstsent first its fiscal and then a councillor to catch Philip 
and present its cases before its rival could do so. 
4 Formal divisions 
of there councils presented obvious problems; in 1619 the Council of 
-I 1- Cnta. Idiaquez (in Lerma)915 Jun. 16070-N-14921f. 317va copy. 
2- dnta-litin. St. 919 Sept. 1608, A. G. S. E. 20259f-146. 
On the unique 
significance of IdiSquez's councillorshipgbelowgppJv't-&ý, 36-7, -7r 
3- Cnta-Warpl2 Mar. 16041A. G. S. G-A. 626jf-8. 
4- Cntas-Fin. 96 Nov-1617 and 20 Jul. 16209A. G. S. 
C. -T-H-3959f. 161 and 
410, f. 107- 
- 
-- 
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War resident in Madrid found that it was unable to look at some 
papers relevant to an important discussion because a secretary had 
them with him in Portugal. 
I Itineracy9thereforelcaused complications 
between and within councils and the decision-making process was 
often slowed downpua-balanced or indeed simplY in effect abandoned 
f3r m3nths at a time. 
The secretaries of State were particularly affectedgas 
over the first half of the reign in particular the dividion between 
them often becameyduring itineraoiesvless one of differentiation 
of papeles than-of one of importance between the secretary itinerant 
and the secretary resident. The real importance of the division lay 
in the identity of the men concerned; braadlypthe criado-seoretary 
travelled with King and Dukegand therefore became in effect9if often 
only tempo rarily t the senior secretary. We thus find 
Caldera"nvf3r 
instance, forwarding papers to Prada in Madrid in 1608 and - quite 
improperly - giving him instructions. 
3 Similarlypin 1602 we find 
Franqueza - unlike Calder6n actually Secretary of State and senior 
to Prada - being entrusted during an itineracy 'with the most secret 
papers on Flanders. 
4 The importance of this de facto division should 
1- The Council complained that 'it is lacking information that it 
should justly have on everything concerned with its dutiesland it 
cannot give the appropriato orderd (without these papers)eeel 
cnta-resident War, 28 Jun. 1619, A. G. S. G. A. 840pno f3l- 
2. - In 15999for instance Philip deferred a decision on a dispute 
between War and Finance until he returned to Madrid9three months 
laterlSnta. War95 Jul-15999A*G*So G. A-5539no fol. See also Lerma, 
to Prada923 May 16099B. N. 1492pf. 266vpa copy, deferring a decision 
on some State consul tas "until the royal return. 
3- From Lerma915 Jul-160K. A. G. S. E. 2025 f-134; on Calderon above P. 100,4 - 2nt'a-Jnta. de Dos, ý6 Feb. 16029A. G. Sal. 202Ypf. 
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not be exaggerated; as always with Lerma, the moment was of importancep 
its exploitation never too systematic - thus9for instance, Prada 
travelled in 1608 and his Papers were taken over by Antonio de 
ArostegulpSecretary-of Warvand not by a criado. 
Par more importantlypitineracy affected the composition of 
the Council of State. Indeedgit had significant effect upon 
appointments to the Council-As in 1599 with four councillors, 
1 
BO 
Toledo in 1600pAlbuquerque in 1608 and Benavente in 1615 all made 
their first appearances on itinerant councilswhile Aliaga took up 
regular attendance in Valladolid in 1615 after having only sat once 
previously. Four great councillors of State or War also made their firsi 
appearances on itinerant councils of War - Diego do Ibarra at Barcelone 
in 15999the sixth duke of InfantadoyBrachera and la Laguna at an 
extraordinary meeting in Madrid in July 1601 after the Council proper 
had left for Valladolid. 
Similarlypas the Court travelled9so it became more 
convenient for men to sit; Alva do Liste sat regularly on State only 
after the removal to Valladolidyand Enriquez and Castrillo, both 
reappeared on War there in 1615 after not having sat since 1609 and 
1612 respectively. Ironic ally, Juan de Cardona was appointed to State 
in 1602 so that he could make the arrangements in Lisbon for the 
imminent royal arrival; he went, but the arrangements were cancelled 
and so was his councillorship. 2 
1- See above, pp. 15-16.2 - Cabrera de Cordoba 
(1857)gp. 149. 
ConverselygState's composition was consistently affected 
as various courtiers and advisers trayelled with the King, The loss of 
the c3urtiers from the resident Council was generally not serious; 
Lerma was the least diligent and Velada the least important of the 
councillors. Nor was the loss of the royal confessorswho necessarily 
travelled with the Kingpof any great consequence. Javierre exercised 
only a taken 03uncillorshippAliaga was not appointed to State until 
'r 1615 and travelled then and in 1619 and only Cordoba had repeatedly 
to abandon his conciliar duties - appointed in October 1600phe missed 
six weeks in 1601, nearly five and a half months in 1602, three and a 
half in 1603 and three in 1604-One lossph3wevergwas fundamental. Juan 
do Idiacluez travelled every year until his death except in 1612; the 
royal travels deprived State of his services for 0.154 weeks between 
January 1602 and his death in October 16149and hopmore than any 
other mangwas responsible for setting the tone of the Council's 
discussions. In 1613 he asked to be excused from further travels on 
grounds of ill-health2but Philip refused; while he had life2Don 
Juan 
was to work at his papers and travel with his King. 
' The loss to 
State was severepand sinoe he was also President of Orders that 
Council's efficiency may also be presumed to have suffered severely. 
For all that he took Idiaquez with himpPhiliP clearly 
i 
Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857) 9P- 530-Var further* analysis 
of 
Idia'quez's absendealbolow. pp. 240- 
: 147'111 
regarded the Council resident as the proper Council of State. It will 
be recalledsfor instance, that in 1600 he went so far as to summon 
State from Madrid to Avila to deal with an important matter rather 
than simply rely on advice from his itinerant advisers. 
1 He never 
did that againgalthough in 1615 and 1619 the Council was fonnally 
divided. 0therwiseponly in 1608 (3) and 1610 (5) did he even call 
itinerant councils. 
After 1600 State was deprived of the services of itinerant 
councillors in l60lpl6O2tl6O3pl6O49l6O69l6O89l6O9pl6lO9l6ll and 1614 
and was formally divided in 1615 and 1619. Additionallypthe removals 
of 1601 and 1606 caused considerable dislo cation; State met only once 
between 15 April and 1 June 1601 and only once in the ten weeks after 
28 April 1606. On both occasionspmareaverpit lost: Lits conciliar 
presidentsytravelling with their own councils9for additional 
periods - in 160111diSquez for ten weeks, the Constable for two 
months and Miranda for over three; in 16069Idiaquez for three months 
and Miranda for several weeks longer. 
2 
In 1606 State maintained an average attendance of 5- 57 
councillors per meeting in the three months before the upheaval 
beganobut after resuming in Madrid in July averaged only 4.43 over 
the remainder of the year. This erosion of consistency was a 
I- See ab3ve9p. 27. 
2- The Constable did not sit between 28 February and 14 Marchlbut as 
he missed only one meeting no conclusions are drawn. 
14 8 
recurring phenomenon; thus far it had happened in 16019160291602 and 
1604. The Valencian sojourn of 1604 had particularly serious effects, 
for in 1603 the Council had settled down for the first time since the 
end of 1600 and was maintaining a stability of attendance it was not 
to show again in the years prior to 1612; the ten meetings prior to 
the departure were attended by the quite remarkable average of 9.7 
councillars, but the eleven coinciding with the four months itineracy 
were attended by only 5-0, and the ten immediately after the return by 
only 5-1- 
This second Valencian foray was the last itineracy with at 
least overtly political justification until 1615, but Philip continued 
his annual trips around Castile andgespecially in the years of crisis 
of 16o8-i6ioldirectly furthered the decline of the Council 
associated primarily with his failure to replace dying councillors, 
In 1608 the Council was divided for just over sixt6en weeks - losing 
. 01 IdiaquezlVelada and Toledo - and in 1609 for a further sixteen9during 
which it again lost the two laymen. On neither occasion did the I 
reunited Council regain its former stability; the first ten meetings 
of 1608 were attended by 4.7 councillors9the last sevengafter 
reunificationgby 2.859and while in 1609 the first thirteen were 
On thispbelowpp. 243-4. 
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attended by 4.23, the average for the last nine was only 3.62.1 In 
the following year royal irresponsibility reached its nadir; as 
Henry 1V mustered his forces. Philip blithely began a tour of Old 
Castile that lasted for thirty three weekspand left a Council in Madridý 
on which only four men sat regularly, of whom only one - the Constable 
- was a major and experienced councillor. 
2 
The preposterous tour of 1610 wasthowevervthe turning-point; in 
1611,1613 and 1614 there were brief progresses but State lost only 
Idiaquez of its serious councillors and had now in regular attendance 
3 
the group of new councillors with whom resurgence was associated. 
After 1610)in finegState was itself vastly more professionalised and 
less troubled by the royal itineracy. The progresses of 1615 and 1619p 
however9cansed considerable dislocation both in respect of attendance 
and frequency of convocation; on both occasions a month's work was 
lost at the beginning of the progressland in 1615 similar periods were 
also lost as the Court travelled first from Valladolid to Burgos and 
then to Madrid. By 1619 Lerma had gonebut Philip still relaxed into 
the old ways. Ironic ally faced now by a Council which, save Aliagagwas 
unanimous that he should go not to Portugal but to Arag6n, he retorted 
that he was going to Portugal and that those councillors who wished 
to do so could accompany him. 
4 
1- In 1608 Chinchon happened to the as the Court returned9but, the 
decline in attendance was nonetheless significant- 
2- The others being Toledo pInf antado and Albuquerque. M6jia sat once. 3- See below, pp-244-6. 
4- S-n-ta-St-919 Apr. 1619, A. G. S. E. 23269ff. 65-6. 
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On the whologWar and Finance were affected much less 
severely by the royal itineracy than was State*In the first 
instance9of course9their councillors were not important courtiers 
and were not therefore ordinarily called upon to travel with the 
Court. 1 War was deprived of itinerant councillors of State0but 
again the loss was not too significantoand especially so since 
Idi6quez himself did not attend the Council normally with any great 
regularity. 
2 As with StatephOweVerpsO with War a number of men were 
appointed to the Councilvor returned to itvduring itineraoies. 
3 
The removals of the Court did disrupt both councils 
seriously. Warlhaving met 14913 and 9 times in the first three months 
of 16019sat not at all in Aprilland its seventeen meetings of April 
1606 were followed by only one in MayoAttendanceptoolwas affected; in 
1601 it lost Valencia for six veekspand in 1606 Me'jia far five, with 
Guzman resuming regular attendance on the return to Madrid. Finance 
did not sit at all in the five weeks after 11 April 1601 - having 
sat eight times in the previous five - and lost three weeks' work 
in 
1606. In 1601 it was deprived of Esteban do IbarrapSecretary of War 
and travelling with that Council9for twenty one meetingstand 
in 
1606 lost him againpfor nearly three manths, On the latter occasion 
1- On their Court officesgbelow, pp. 25Op275- 
2- See below9260-261. 
3- See abovegp. 145- 
JL 
it also lost its two councillors of Castile for some four months. 
The annual royal progresses did not affect the mechanical 
perfarmances of War and Finance as they did that of Statepalthough 
the Valencian journey of 1604 appears to have slightly affected 
Finance's frequency of convocation. 
1 The effect of these progresses 
was chieflyland seriouslypfelt in the slowing-down of the conduct of 
their business. 2 The journeys of 1615 and 1619 phoweverg inevitably had 
disruptive effect. Finance stayed behind on both occasionalbut lost 
Carrillo for a month in 1615 and Gamboapalso councillor of Castilep 
for the whole of the 1619 journey. Philip compromised with War. In 
1615 he blithely ordered everyone who was able to go to Valladolidq 
but found that s everalý council 10 rs had to stay behind to deal with 
outstanding judicial businessL Brochero, missed the first ten and 
Diego do Ibarra the first fourteen itinerant meetingspand Salazar and 
Fobar stayed behind throughout. In 16191philip formally divided the 
Council into twOlvith the itinerant being the senior half, 
4 
and both 
sat regularly with consistent membership. 
5 
1- It sat seven times in December 1603pbut only three times each in 
January and February 1604; it also lost GaitKa de Ayalalcouncillor 
of Gastilepf3r four weeks. 
2- See ab3vatpp. 143-4. 
3- Lnta. WarylO Jun. 1615, A. G. S. G. A. 7991no fol. 
4- Cnta. itin. War, ll Sept. 1619, A. G. S. G. A. 8401no fol. 
5- See extract from Attendance Registervab3vepp. 152. 
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B. The Cost. 
The Government of Philip 111 knew better than to try to 
tabulate the exact cost of the Court of Philip 111 because it was, 
probably literallypinealculable. Broadlypthere were two types of 
expenditure on the Court - the first. coming under the purview of the 
Council of Financetconsisted of the normal annual allowancesqWhile 
the second consisted of what may be generally characterised as de 
gracia awards made directly by the King himself. The first of these 
was more or less fixedgif within fairly generous limits, but the 
second was as fluid as the royal benevolence itself; as the mood took 
himpPhiliP might add hundreds of thousands of ducats a year to the 
normal expenditure. 
In the autumn of each yeargPinance worked out its projected 
expenditure for the forthcoming financial year. It was a task of quite 
byzantine complexity. The budget for the financial year ending in 
October 1609 might be taken as an example. Some lp8OO)OOO ducats - 
incidentallypthe precise amount thought to be coming from the Indies 
- were allocated for Flanders while some 
834vO30 ducats were reserved 
for various courtly expenses; 
620,000 - the ordinary expenses of both royal houses, the camaras of 
King and Queenpand the correos. 
409000 - casa de Castilla. 
15 
20,100 - r3yal chapel 
539840 - Spanish and German guards 
1009090 - salaries of the criados of both royal houses. 
These figures incorporate several complicationseThey omitv 
for inBtanGOqthG costs of the households of the royal children and 
of the upkeep of the various alcazareapthe expenditure on carriages 
and sundry royal grants charged each year to the household accounts* 
Converselypthey include several expenses in block payments which 
were usually calculated separately - for instancepnormally a figure 
of about 62OpOOO ducats would be listed for the lordinarioslof the 
two royal housespand this would include the salaries of the criad3s 
but exclude the expenses of both otmaras and of the correospeach of 
which generally had their own accounts. Finance here was doing two 
things - laying down its broad prioritiespas for example 
between the 
normal expenditure on the Court as against that on Flanderspand 
making a separate calculation of priorities within the household 
accounts. Thus the 100,090 ducats in the last entry was the current 
annual cost of the salaries of the criados of the royal householdsp 
but was not actually paid them as such; since they were owed more 
than three years' salary it was given to them as a temporary 
settlement against what was owing to them for two yearsý 
1- 'Relaciones' of the state of the royal exchequerll Nov. 1608-31 
Oct. 1609 and 1607-8pA. G. S. G. J. H. 352, no fol. jand 345pno vol. 
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All courtiers9from Lerma himself downg' were Owed varying 
amounts of moneypand during the financial year itself therefore the 
principle of the greatest need continued to operate; thusgfor instancep 
at the beginning of 1609 some men who were nearly four years in 
arrears were able to use the part-settlement of some three year old 
claims to justify their being considered next. 
2 Financepabstracted as 
it always was by the cost of the Courtpdid what it could, but 
courtiers know naturally that their best line of approach lay through 
the King himself. Liberal always with those nearest to him, Philip 
readily and repeatedly ordered Finance to pay his courtiers9but, 
found that even his authority could not conjure up non-existent" 
monies. Typical of the way in which the Court was actually financed 
was his order of March 1601 to Finance that three groups of courtly 
salaries be Paid, totalling in all 1879113 ducats. He therefore 
established a priority - to encourage courtiers to go to Valladolid 
with the Court ?- but gave no concrete help himaelfpeither to 
courtiers or to Finance. It remained a gesturejonly one-third 
3 
effective; Finance found 509000 ducats,, 
Some examples; a, note of Hiordnimus do Quinquo c (to ? )P5 Apr*1604 
recorded Lermals being owed 295119955 marave-di': -soA. 
G. S. C. -T. H. 321y 
no fol.; another of the samepof 4 May 166-6-m-entioned-a deficit of 
364,977 maravecits despite a payment to Lorma, of 2,139,809 
maravedistA. G. S. C-J-H-3339no fol. on amounts of 263,160 and 
548v230 maravedis claimed'by UcedaicntaB. Fin. 92 May 1609 and 28 
Feb. 1621, A. G. S. G. J. H. 356, f. 117 and 414of-41. 
2- Enta. Fin. 97 Feb. 1609, A. G. S. C. J-H-356pno fol. 
3- Cnt as Fin. , 11 M ar. 1601 v A. G. S. C. J. H. 29 3, imf . 
88. 
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In this morass9figures lost virtually all meaning and on 
only the rarest occasions did either Crown or Government bother to 
calculate a mean figure for any actual expenditure. Neverthelessf 
certain conclusions may be obviously drawn*That the Court was 
too expensive need hardly be stated9but to find the salaries of the 
Queen's household alone in 1607 costing 52P591 ducats or those of her 
camara in 1608P53P563 ducats adds point to the conclusion, That it 
became more expensive over the first decade appears also self- 
evident; in 16031for instancepthe royal chaplaincy and guards cost 
549643 ducats while by 1608 the cost had risen to 63p707 ducats. 
2 
Similarlylin 1603 112,690 ducats met the costs of the criad3s of 
both royal households and of the transport corpspwhereas by 1608 the 
King's criados alone were casting 1129399 ducats. 
3 Equally obviouslyp 
the payment of monies on such a scale must have had serious political 
consequences; we have seengfor instance9how the budget for 1608-9 
reserved virtually half the money coming from the Indies to meet 
some courtly expensesland that 834pO3O ducats was indeed two and a 
half times as much as was ordinarily reserved for the cost of the 
'Nemorial da la libgado en el dinera quo vina en los dltimos 
galeones para pagar'los gäjes de las casas reales' pA. G. S. C. J. H. 
3539na fal- 
2- On 1608yLbid-pand an 1603gLerma to Acun"ag22 Oot. 16039A. G. S. Geiene 
311. no fol. 
3- On 1608, INemzrial de la librada go-p. eit , and an 1603. Lerma to 
Aeu"n'*a922 Oct. 1603,0b-eit 
58 
Atlantic fleet and nearly seven times the current cost of the 
conciliar n3mina. 
1 
The great itineracy of 1610 brought Philip's grandeza to a, 
humiliating degradation. In the first three months of his presidencyg 
Carrillo paid out 162,407 ducats for Various major courtly expensesq 
2 
and when the itineracy began he had little left for the Court. In 
March he paid onlv 39000 ducats for the expenses of the Queen's 
3 householdt and Philip and Lerma had on their own initiative to 
order the c3rregid3res of Burg3spValladolid and Aranda to take the 
necessary money from the millones. 
4 Carrillo then reminded Lerma 
that it was hid duty to administer the royal financesIbut graciously 
offered to listen to any respectable suggestions from the Duke as, to 
how his management of those finances might be improved. 
5 Lerma 
6 
yieldedocangratulating Carrillo on his logic. By Augustpthereforeý 
tile President felt free to provide only l2fOOO of the 1009000 reales 
demanded by the Queen's comptrollarg and the latter in turny 
complaining that the offer W3Uid barely provide for two days' 
expenses and that he had debts already of 70tOOO reales 
had to beg 
Lerma to m3ve the Court to Larma itself where twice as much credit 
1 on the 16o8-9 budgettaboveoPP-154-5; on the cost of the fleetq 
2 
belowpp. 161-2.9 and on the n3minaqpp. IbS*-& 
. 
2_nta. Fin. 9 27 X ar. 1610 9 A. G. S . 
-G. J. H. 360 , f. 100. 
3- Lerma to Carrillo96 Mar. l6lOpValladolidpA. G. S. C. J. H. 36igno fol. 
4- Same to samejundated, Lbid.; since the reply was dated 10 Apr. 1610 
(belowjn-5) this would have been written at the end of the first 
week in April. 
5- Carrillo to Lerma#10 Apr. 16109Madridgibia. 
923 Apr. 1610, Ventasillaijbid. 6- Lerma to Carrillo 
155C,, i'l, 
could be obtained. 
1 Lerma - characteristically - could only throw 
himselfgand the royal greatneaspinto Carrillo's a=s; the Queen's 
ladies-in-waiting were having to rely on their relatives for foodpand 
the King's reputation was suffering appalling damage on the streets of 
Arandavespecially since the disaster was being observed by itinerant 
ambassadors. Carrillo was not even to let his Council know the contents 
of Lermals lettervand was to provide money at once*2 
It can have been no coincidence that the tour of 1610 was 
the last great indulgent itineracy of the reign. Whether Carrillo paid 
any money to the Queen's ladies is not recorded, but he persevered 
throughout his presidency with his more general onslaught on the 
royal extravagance - in 1611 he professed himself willing to provide 
for the Court with his own blood and in 1613 rather more 
substantially lent the King 7pOOO ducats to pay for some expenseS3 ; in 
1614 he warned Philip that he was putting himself in danger of 
tinfamous rain and disaster' if he did not cut down on expenses4 and 
foresaw for 1615 and 3.616 'such a great deficit as will obviate 
payment of the most necessary expensea#5; in 1617 he in quick 
1- Contralor do la Reyna to Larma928 Aug. l6lOqAranda2jbid. The Court 
aid go to Lerma at once. 
2 Lerma to Carrillo, 28 Aug. 1610qArandaýibid. That the ambassadors 
were itinerant may have been partly due to the fact that their 
houses in Madrid were falling into disrepair because of the royal 
failure to pay for them. See same to same, 12 jun. 16logA. G. S. C. J. H. 
353, no fol, 
3 Cnta. Carrillo 9.15 Oct. 1611 and cnta. Fin. 913 Jul. 
1613PA. G. S. C. -T. 11- 
3659no folevand 375114f-4- 
4 Cnta. Carrill3j28 Oct. 16149A. G. S. C. J. II. 3809f. 42. 
5 =nta. Carrillo. 28 Oct. 1614, lbid., f. 35- 
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succession remonstrated twice with Philipptwice with Lerma and once 
each with Uceda and Juan de Ciriza warning them that expenses had to 
be pared and that Philip had to understand thisjor be made to do so, 
'so that he might be pleased not to charge the royal exchequer with 
expenses that it cannot support ... 1.1 
Carrillo met with realpif relativepsuccess; Court expenditure 
appears to have reached a peak in 1611-13 and to have declined 
thereafter. The budget for 1611 allowed 72OpOOO ducats for the 
ordinarios of the royal houses - the highest verifiable figure for 
those expenses for the reign, and one that had risen from 683,404 
ducats in 1610 - and a quite extraordinary 100pOOO ducats for the 
casa de Castilla. Those two expenses alone9thereforepaccounted for 
over half the anticipated income from the Indies (19500pOOO ducats) 
2 
and very nearly equalled the allocation for Flanders (960,000 ducats) . 
The ordinarios - the largest single item of expenditure - were 
maintained at 720,000 ducats in the budgets for 1612 and 1613p 
3 but 
I 
by 1615 had been brought down to 6OOfOO0 ducataland stVed at that 
level for the remainder of the reign. 
4 
1- Cnta, CarrilloP7 Mav 16171A. G. S. C-J-H-395pno fol. 
2- Enta. Fin. 915 Oct. 16119A. G. S. C-J-H-367, no fol. The 1610 cost 
calculated from cnta. Fin. p27 Mar. 16109A. G. S. C-J-H-36OPf-lOO- 
3- 'Relacion do las cosas precisas qua ey qua consignar oada un ano 
ea los'dos millones con qua al Rayno sirve a Su Md. para desde la 
paga do fin do mayo del ano, qua biene 6 Aug. 1611 9A. G. S. C. J. H. 
367pno fol- 
4- On l6l5tS-n-ta- Carrillo 9 28 Oct-1614, A. G. S. C. -T-11-380, f. 35; for 1616-17 646p2OO ducats were all3wedganta. Fin. 921 Dec. 1616fA-G-S. C. J. H. 
3959 
f-58; fOr 1619,646,000tenta,. Fin. plo Jan. 16199A. G. S. C. J. H. 4059f. 
3; 
for 1 6g6jO00, cnta. Pi 23 JT' 16209A G no fol.; 
fOr 
1621,94422990 p'2L8*Jan. l9n2IpA. G. S: 
b? LHC: j41*H4*91l-O1i- 
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It may be no coincidence that from 1615 the figures for I 
Court expenditure become intelligible to the point of reliability. 
They show a distinct levelling off of expenditure over the years 
1615-17 and a pronounced drop thereafter as the commitment in central 
Europe grew. Like the 3rdinarios, the extraorclinarioS of the two royal 
houses remained constant over the years 1615-17 - despite the rather 
remarkable fact that the Queen was dead - at 1509000 ducatspbut 
unlike them then dropped significantlvlto 1009000 ducats in 1619 and 
down to 60yOOO in 1620 and 1621. Similarlygthe cost of the royal 
carruajes dropped from 509000 ducats over the years 161591617 and 1619 
to 30,000 in 1620 and 1621. Other figures are not strictly comparable 
because of the conglomerate method of calculation whereby different 
accounts were variously merged or separated as convenience dictated. 
Nevertheless9the extraordinarios and the carruajes expensesptaken 
togethergshow a remarkable trend - in 1615 and 1617pthey cost 200jOOO 
ducats; in 1619,1509000jand in 16219901000. Conversely, monies were at 
last made available for rather more substantial purposes; the Atlantic 
fleet9for instancepas late as 1617 was maintained at 300tOOO ducatsp 
but by 1620-21 was receiving 480,000 while the allocation for the 
Presidios rose over a similar period from 400POOO to 480,000 ducats. 
The figures for this Paragrapha are taken from the Consultrts 
cited abovepp. 1609n. 4. 
16ý1 
In the twenty three months from January 1619 to November 1620, 
the councils of State and War paid out 150P354 ducats in various 
awards after consulting Philip, but he himself dispensed by decrees 
with 2599495-Of seventy four awards by the councilsponly eleven were 
for amounts in excess of 19000 ducatspwhereas of Philip's forty fiveg 
twenty three were in excess of that figure. The councilhI awards were 
almost exclusively political rather than courtly in nature; they 
included2for instancepno less than 1109000 ducats in ambassadorial 
salaries and expenses and only two significant awards were for 
courtly purposes - 2,366 ducats to an imperial ayucla de camarapand 
12,000 for Philibert of Savoy's expenses on the 1619 journey. The 
remainder were eloquent testimony to the nature of the Government's 
commitments - pensions to soldiers' widows; 700 ducats for seven 
Jesuits; 100 ducats for an Irishmangto enable him to return to fight 
in Flanders; two awards of 200 ducats to Irishwomen entering religious 
lifeland awards t3 English and Dutch gentlemen. 
1 
Philip's grantsp 
howevervincluded, only 229000 ducats in politico-administrative 
expensespa, sum only sixty five ducats in excess of his disbursement 
on jewels for himself and his friends. They includedgtoopa further 
130,000 ducats in ayudas t3 cousin Philibert. Smaller sums told much 
IlRelacion de las mercedes y ayudas de costa quo desde prine p 
dozenero do 1619 as a servida Su Magdode hdzei POr resoluciones 
do consultas do los Consojos do Estado y Guerra' 91 Dec. 16209by 
Bartolome do Anaya y Vill anuavapA. G. S. C. J. II. 414pno fol. 
1 -'1 63 ý' 
of the royal interests - 18,000 ducats for a cardinal's journey to 
Rome; l2tOOO ducats in ayudas for his own doetars; 149000 ducats in 
food allowances and salaries for three of his son's courtiers; 81000 
ducats for a chapel in Planders; IP500 ducats for the daughter of the 
imperial ambassadar; 1,160 ducats far a Court lady; IpOOO ducats for 
the cavalry of his daughterpthe Queen of France; 1000 ducats for the 
widow of an ayuda de cknara,; 19000 ducats for a nobleW3man in a c3nventol 
Not without justice was Philip known as Philip the Good; this 
generosity was born of a basic moral decency as much as of his own 
concept of grandeza His definition of his obligationsphoweverptook 
emphatic cognisance - as it had done throughout the reign - of the 
demands of his Court and did so to the neglect of more serious duties; 
his do gracia awards were not onlypthereforelprepOBterous in extent, 
but were profoundly unbalanced in nature. The Court - comprised of those 
people nearest the King physically or spiritually - came firste 
Generosity was compounded. by an inability to understand the 
realities of finance. That money was needed for good or holy purposes 
seemed to Philip justification enough for autharising its payment, 
1- fRelacidn de las mercedes y ayudas do costas qua su Magestad Be a- 
servido, do hazer poi decret3s rdbricados 'di su real 'mano ^ddddqi 
lirimard do *dnero mil *84iscientas diez y 'nuave ... I 9'by the sameg 
ibid-A third relacia"n recorded that -when he -died Philip had not 
yet paid aw amounting to-189310 cludatspibid. 
771- 
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and if he was unable to refuse requests from his courtiers he was 
equally unable to refuse himself9to differentiate between needs, or 
even indeed to appreciate that a vast number of minor awards added 
up to large ones. In 1608pfor instancepat a time when the foreign 
ambassadors' houses in Madrid were falling into disrepair because of 
his failure to pay the landlords properly, 
1 he spent 3,000 ducats 
entertaining the Persian ambassador, 
2 49000 ducats on the completion 
of his own genealogy f3 2pOOO ducats on some mulesP4 2p8OO ducats an 
the Queen's cavalry, 
5 
and authorised scores of other such payments. 
6 
Even when he accepted the need to cut down on such expenditurephe was 
unable to accept that this actually involved not giving awards; in 
December 1613 he tacitly agreed to Carrillo's demands that he eschew 
all unnecessary expenses but yet within seven weeks ordered the 
President to find some 109pOOO ducats, over half of which was to be 
for quite unnecessary, courtlylexpeni3es - 40pOOO ducats for some 
infantrymenl27,000 for a present for the King of Persia; lOpOOO for a 
jewel for a prince; 23POOO for the Count of Barajas; 5oOOO for a jewel 
for the French ambassadorvand 4POOO for a present for himself. 
7 
*** *** 
1- Cnta. Fin. P5 Oct-1608vand Lerma to Acu"n*a, 16 Jul. 16099A. G. 
S. C. J, 11. 
353, no fols. 
2- Same to same924 Jan. 1608jibid- 3- Same to same926 Feb. 1608libid. 
4- Same to samet28 Mar. 1608, lb--id- 5- Same to sameP30 Mar. 1608, jbid. 
6- The leRajo cited above, nn. 1-5, consists largely of orders of 
payment for do gracia awards and for courtly expenses.. 
7- Cnta-Carrillop3l Jan. 1614, A. G. S. C. J. H. 380vno fOl- 
1I. 
The cost of Philip's Administration is m3re nearly calculable. 
Againgthere are a number of variables but it appears certain that over 
the reign expenditure on the Administration was multiplied by a factor 
of between two and three. The autonomy afforded the councils by Philip 
led to a dramatic rise in the volume of business they canductedpand 
that in turn necessitated an increase in the number of personnel they 
employed. The price rise, moreavergeompounded the difficulties created 
for the Crown by this cycle by forcing it to increase the salaries it 
paid to its administrators. Thusyfor instancegin 1598 there were twenty 
two secretaries of statepearning a total of 9033 ducats annually at 
an average of 424 ducats eachlbut by the mid 1620s there were forty 
sevengearning 389941 ducats, now at 828 each. Each secretary of course 
had to have officials working under him9and the cost of those 
rose over the same period from 11120 ducats to 6P448- 
1 Similarly, in 
1593 the Orders contador ma: vor de cuentas was paid 133 ducats but by 
1620 was earning 200jand his teniente was granted a rise over the same 
period from 40 to 80 ducats. 
2 Moreovervas will be seengsalary was only 
the beginning; all these men had to have casa de aposento and courtly 
allowances-hn 15979Philip Ills last full yearpthe conciliar nomina, 
had amounted to 79P543 ducatst4but by 1600 it had risen 
to go, ooo, 5 
1- 'Advertencias a el condo duque para el, remedio do los Dam3s de la 
Monarchia, .... I, anonymous but probably by 
the Finance s earstariat; 
mid 1620sgB. N. 904pf. 47. 
2- 
. 
2jta. Fin. p2O Jul. 16209A. G. S. C. J. 11.410pf-107- 
3- Belowgpp. 169-170. 
4- Enta. Fin. 917 Jul. 16169A. G. S. C. J. H-3959no fol. 
9f. 279. 5- Enta. Fin. 910 Dee. 16009A. G. S. C. -T-H-285 
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by 108 to 123pOOOp 1 by 1616 to 1549899,2 and by 162o to 190,000.3 
The payment of such increases was a remarkable achievement in 
view of the decline in resources; the 1620 figureyfor instancepwas 
achieved despite a reduction in the servicio from 1209000 to 1009000 
ducats. 4 The nature and extent of this escalation may be evidenced by 
the difficulties of Orders, paid by a Fugger asiento on the rent of 
the mesas maestrales. On a 1604 cost of 479430 ducatspa ten year 
asiento was arranged for 489000 ducats for the years 1604-149but 
by 1614 the. actual cost was 709666 duoatstand by 1617 the Council was 
asking for an increase on even that figure9pleading that it needed 
another 29658 ducats. In 1617, h3weverythe Fuggers while only paying 
Orders 702666 ducats were in fact themselves-drawing 79,731 ducats 
from the Orders rents, the additional 9,065 ducats comprising the 
interest owed them. On one council alone therefore a price rise of 
. 
E. 68% in ten years still left an annual deficit of 11023 ducats, 
That deficit could have been nearly made good if Philip had 
been of harder heart; in 1597 his father had granted some m3nasteries 
a single lim3sna from the Orders nomina, 
because of the sterility of 
that disastrous year9but Philip 111 allowed the award to become a 
1- 'Relacion do la hazienda qua S. M. tendra hasta fin do octubre eoe 
16091, A. G. S. C. J. H. 3450no folo 
2 Cnta. Fin. 917 Jul 16161A. G. S. C. 
J. H. 3951no fOl- 
3 =nta. rin. 924 Dec: 162OpA. G. S. C.. T. H. 
410pf. 202. 
4- ibid. 
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traditional onegand by 1617 it was costing the Council some 8,606 
ducats annually. 
1 The royal generosity was self-defeating. 
This was true more generallypfor Philip persisted in charging 
monies to the conciliar accountspand in consulta after consulta 
Finance had to remind him that each such award meant a deficit for 
the council concerned and a delay in the payment of conciliar salaries. 
It had some successes, but Philip nevertheless continued in his 
confused way; in 16119for instancepFinanoe persuaded him that because 
Brochero of War could not got a 3,000 ducats award actually paid out 
of the Seville almajarifazgos was no reason for his having it from 
the War, no"minag 
2 but failed to divert an award of 66 ducats to porter 
Juan Nunez Vela. 
3 
At least Philip had a superficial justification 
when administrators were concerned; he had none whatsoever for 
ordering in 1616 that Lerma's salary as mayord3ma mayor be charged to 
the c3uncils94 nor had he any in the same year for brusquely 
ordering Finance to pay 200 ducats of courtly salary 
from its 
nSminageven if the claim was sponsored by his own a=t. 
5 
Finance had to keep a wary eye openotoopin other directionslin 
1- CntaoFin. 912 May 1619pA. G. S. C.. 
T. H. 405, f-105. The limasnas were 
given in the form of wheat9the figures quoted 
being the cost price 
which was manipulated by the Fuggers, 
2- Cnta. Fin. 98 May 16lipAoG. So Go-T-H-3659fol29- 
3- Snta. Fin. p18 Jun. 16119ibid. tfo 377- 
4- Cntao Carrillo p28 Oct. 16149A. GoS. CoJ-H-3809fo35- 
5- Enta. 'Fin. P*17 Jul. 16169A. G. S. C, J. H-395, no 
fol. 
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1611 it had to bitterly oppose an award made to Antonio de Arostegul 
in the Granada. alcabalas-Only one other such grant had been made by a 
Hapsburg - to Lermall - and it was appropriate that Arosteguf Ia award 
was not for his normal duties9but for his activities in the French 
marriage negotiations. 
1 
It was equally characteristic of Philip that when he made 
gestures in the direction of financial reform they should have been 
utterly inappropriate. In 1601 he ordered War to cease consulting him 
on the provision of any now military salariespin effect attempting to 
deprive unemployed or wounded soldiers of the possibilities of 
2 
compensation and even of employment- What he was really after was 
to stop those men cluttering up his Court with their uglyj 
importuning presence. In the distress of 1607 he even went so far as 
to order War and Finance at least to cease consulting him on all do 
parte business orgif they were unable to do thatvt3 drastically 
reduce the number of their submissions. Both opposed 
him. War 
vigorously pointed out that the applications concerned men who 
had 
run great risks and lost their bloodoften indeed 
their lives, in the 
rOyal service and that King and Government had no option; 
in 
deserving casespsuch grants as could be made had to be made. 
3 
Finaacepas pointedlyplectured Philip on the difference 
between the 
1- Cnta. Fin. plO Nov. 1612, A. G., B. G. J. 11-371if. 276. 
2- Enta-Warp22 Feb. 1601, A. G. S. G. A. 58o, f. 164. 
3- Cnta. Wart4 Oct-1607, A. G S. G. A. 6709f. 161. See alsopLerma to 
secretary Aguilar92 Oct: 16071. ibid. pno fol. 
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'obligatory debt, and those de gracia awards which he might profitably 
eschew. 
1 
His decree became a dead letterpbut was nevertheless in its 
own way profoundly significant of his purpose and priorities, 
So too was the way in which he involved his councils in his 
courtly festivities. There were seven ordinary feasts in which they 
were expected to participate - Now Yearythe EpiphanyvEaster Sundayp 
PentecostqChristmasqBulls of San Juan and Santiago - and for each they 
were entitled to compensatory allowances - to colacionespluminarias, 
limosnas. pgajes, gastos destradog and the like. The cost was immense. The 
Ckmara of Castilegfor instaacelcost, some 5vOOO ducats annually in this 
respect; for each feast9the President was allowed 29000 realespeach 
councillor and secretary lpOO09aad when luminarias were in order the 
President was entitled to an extra 48 escudos and each councillor to 
twenty four. Add: Ltionallypfor the three religious feastspan ayuda of 
29000 ducats was paid to the President and one of 1,000 to each 
councillor and sooretaxy? Various attempts were made to reduce these 
expensesp 
3 
but by 1618 the Junta de ReformaciA was recording 
persistent failure and a rising conciliar expenditurejestimating 
indeed that Philip was spending more than 30yO00 ducats annually on 
1- enta. Fin. 924 Dee. 1612, A. G. S. C-J-1L3459no fol. I 
2- Cnta. Jnta-do Reformacionq12 May 1618, printed by A. G. PAlencia (1932). 
pp. 1-3. 
3- On 1603PCabrora de Cdrdoba (1857), p. 196, and cnta. jnta. do Tres. 14 
Mar. 16031A. G. S. E-20239f. 88; on 1607 , Cabrerap ibid. 9P- 322; on--- 1-608, il" 
ibid. vpp. 342-3; on 1616pcnta. Jnta. do 
ReformA r-O'E94-cit-PP-3. 
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colaciones alone. 
1 The Junta's attempt in 1618 clearly met with as 
little success; an authoritative source estimated that in the mid 1620s 
the Crown could have saved 82pOOO ducats annually by abolishing the 
conciliar propinas de colaciones and luminarias and a further 119500 by 
depriving the procuradores de cortes, of the same rights. It listed, tooo 
the different amounts paid ordinarily by the Government for three 
councilogand if it was not strictly now the Government of Philip 1119 
the figures yet bear repetition; 
Castile; - 25,333 ducats - sala37 
6,000 feet - gastow destrad3spfiestas and luminarias 
Indies; 229666 to it -s al a77 
21,837 fill - pr3pinas and luminarias 
219266 fill - colaciones and achas 
Finance; 331,813 fill - salary 
229840 fill - propinas and luminarias 
239690 list - colaciones and achas 
8t773 fill - casa ds aposent3 allowance 
49800 slit - colaciones and achas for the Contaduria 
Mayor de Cuentas. 
2 
Additionallypof cOurse. thOrG wOrG the extraordinary exPenses, I 
I 
1- Cnta-Jnta. de Reformaciongibid. *. 
2- 'Advertencias'a el c3nde duque 99 0,13. N. 904, 
ff-43v-47. All but the 
second figure are converted from 
; 0a; 
aveYýs. On Indiesysee also 
Scha'fergi, pp. 124-6 and 249-258- 
1 
and these were inevitably very heavy. On the Emperor's death in 1603, for 
instancepthe obsequies reputedly cost IOOpOOO ducats each for Court 
and councilspand would have cost very much more had Philip not been 
prevailed upon to limit mourning to Valladolid and Madrid alone and notp, 
as he had at first intended9to impose luto general throughout the whole 
country. 
' 
Againvon the death of his Queengthe mourning costs for 
I Finance and its Gontaduria MaLyor de Cuentas alone came to 2,602 ducatsp 
and the money had to be found by the Council itself. Castile, more 
fortunate in its resources9cost over twice as much but found the money 
more easily. 
2 
e 1- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)PP-169. 
2- Finance's difficulty being that it had no income from legal 
COnfiBOationspas Castile did. Cnta. Fin., 6 Apr. 16059A. G. S. C. J. H. 
3219no fol. 
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III. The Personnel of Governments 
17311 
*Poorgold, dying of hunger and heavily in debt'. The Royal Service. 
1 
There were fortunes to be made in the royal service9but the 
criteria governing such success were less those of excellence of 
ability and integrity than those of the accidents of opportunity. 
Indeed9the rewards were ordinarily so inadequate as to make it a 
cause for wonder that men entered the service at all. Three 
considerationsphowever. were persuasive. Negativelypthere was not much 
of an alternative for qualified men - as Sanoho Panza acknowledgedp 
'better the King's crumb than the lord's favour'. 
2More 
positivelyq 
that service offered security of employment and conferred prestige. 
This latter was of immense impartance; Quevedo was not being merely 
sardonic when he observed that the burden of being the King's 
overworked servant was 'much relieved (or supposed to be) by the 
hon3ur of being his servanil. 
3 Honour was i tangiblegindeed a 
quantifiablepreward. 
It was thus appropriate that the supreme councillorship 
should have been unsalaried, -a place on State was not given lightlyp 
and appointment itself was reward enough. Many councillors of State 
held salaried posts on other councils, but these were commensurate 
1 The quatationpfrom the Plea of ambassador Giran in Franoepoited 
without documentation by Paz (1914)PPP-739-740; see belowtp. 180. 
For a general discussion of the attraction of the royal service, 
J. H. Elliott (1970)PPP-311-18. 
2 Cervantes (1965)PP-344 
3 quevedo, IE1 Buscon' ppublished in Two Spanish Picaresque Novels Penguin Books91969 pas 'The Swindler' ppoiajorranslated Dy 
Michael Alpert, 
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with their abilities and importance and were not given specifically as 
reward for their services on State. 
lNor 
were they given ayudes None are 
listed in the Council's filespand even Cabrera noticed only twolboth 
quite excepti-onal. Fray Gaspar do CSrdoba was given a 29000 ducats 
pension in 1602, but he was clearly less able to support himself than 
were his aristocratic colleaguesq 
2 
and courtier Alva do Listo was 
given an immense award9but explicitly to discourage him from 
retirement. 
3 
Nothingg indeed, became the councillor of State like the leaving. 
As aristocrats9they most coveted social and courtly eminencepbut were 
repeatedly thus favoured only in exceptional eircumstances. Puenteatthe 
I- ConstablevOlivares and Zuniga were all given new or improved 
4 
encomiendaslpbut only for their foreign servicep and 
Miranda was 
5 
similarly favoured, but only on his retirement. Awards, toopwore given 
to the families of Barja and Sesa, but only after their deaths.. 
6 Sottoog 
with the supreme honaur of grandeza In 1603pChinchc)npPoza and 
Olivaresp 
all active councillors p were summarily refused 'that 
dignitY and told not I 
I 
0-II 1- See belowjPP-, t3 r. 
2- Cabrera do CGdoba (1857)pp. 146.3 - ibid. tpp. 134-5. 
4- ruentfsv ibid. pp. 275; the Constable, ibid. ; 
7. -417; Olivaresvibide tP- 156 9 
and Ztgiga- - not yet a counoillor - Ibid. pp. 
19 2,1 
5- ibid. ppp-333 and 337-8-An award in 
1603 did not materialise. ibid. 0 
p. 174. 
6- Barjals son was given an improved encomianda and his seat on 
rortugal; see below, pp. 2,01. On SesajCabrarapOP-cit opp. 268-9. 
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to hope that Philip would change his mind in future, 
I 
while Moura 
(1600)pFuentes (1600) and Spinala (1612) were allowed to remain 
covered in the royal presence - but only before leaving it for 
foreign service. 
2 Philip could be relentless; the fabulously wealthy 
Spinala ached for the honour but had to wait years before Philip 
3 obliged himp and Villafrancapnot yet a councillorýfuriously 
resigned his appointment to Milan and retired to his estates when 
refused a grandeeship. 
4 
The same parsimony operated with the bestowal of titles. 
CertainlypPhilip created now titles with a relish probably 
unequalled in all Spanish history - he created at least five now 
dukedomsvforty two marquisates and sixty three countships5 - but did 
A 1- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)#P-191. 
2- MOurapibid. PPP-56t58; SpinalagAbid. PP. 473; FuentespB. N. 74239f. 104, 
this latter adding that the award was both for his military 
services and because his county would revert to the Crown on his 
death. 
3- 'I see him (as being) totally devoid of cupidity and of personal 
gain ... If Rio Majesty allowed him to choose between being 
covered or having that office which has now been given to him 
(ie., maestre d, a camp* general)he would chose the former9because he 
is greatly concerned that he shall be remembered in the histories 
as having given some special service to God and to His Majesty .. R. 
Thus Prada's appraisal in 16059to Lerma95 Mar. 1605PB-N-14929f. 215v, 
a copy-Although thoroughly exceptional in other resper-tspSpinola 
was in this more Spanish than the Spanish; in 1616 this man9who 
paid for whole armiesvis found insisting that the 300 escudos 
of monthly salary paid to his son should be raised to the 400 paid 
to the sons of other grandees - otherwise 'it will be of great 
damage to my reputationgthis being the most valuable thing in 
this lifelpto Lermaq14 May 1616yA. G. S. E-2030pno fol. 
4- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), pp. 168,173PI91 and 195- 
5-A list comprised chiefly from B. N. 7423off. 104-79and Porre'no C1723) 
P-311-Neither is comprehensive and I have added to thempchiefly 
with material from Cabrera do Cordoba (1857). These figures 
17ý-j 
not bestow them upon his administrators. Miranda was raised to the 
dukedom in 1608pbut only on his retirementgand in all probability only 
1 
as an attempt to encourage him to remain in the Castile presidency, 
and - Lerma apart - only Moura and Spin3la of the other councillors of 
2 State were given titlespb3th again for foreign service. Similarlyq 
although councillors of War did bettervit was not for their service 
an the C3uncil; la Laguna and Castrillo won theirs' before their 
councillorships3; Pobarphis for a marriagep 
4 
and Velasco his for his 
courtly services and to mark his retirement as veedor X comisario 
general. 
5 6 0, Enriquez won his countship in Flandersq and Gelves and San 
German were both given supplementary titles9but for their viceregal 
7 
services in Aragon and Milan respectively. Juan de Acuna's 
contrast with those of A. Domfnguez OrtizpýLa Sociedad Espa'h-'ala en 
el Siglo XV11 (Madridtl963)ppp. 209-222. See alsoGonzilez DAvila 
T1-771) pp. 252-3- 
1- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)gPP-333 and 337-89and ab3vetP-78- 
2- On Mouravibid. 9PP-195668"64-50n Spinala's dukedom of 
Santa 
Severizialgranted after OstendyLbid. lpp. 237-8- 
3 Both held titles when appointed. On la Lagunatibid. 9p. 8. No date is 
recorded for Castrillo's award. 
4 i-b-id. pp. 459. 
5 Cabrera implied rather than stated the connectiongibid. PPP. 3239345 
and below9p. 278. 
6- ibid. pp. 221. 
7- GT1-ves' countship was raised to a marqui sate vibid.,, P. 540. San 
'German was given the marquisate of la Hinojosaq although again the 
eonnection was not Bpecificall: y made by Cabrerapj_bid- pp-469. 
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1, 
marquisate of Valle de Cerrato was the only title conferred 
specifically for conciliar servicefand even that was given tardilyptwo 3 
years after the promotion to the Castile presidency that it was 
supposed to complement. 
I Of the councillors of Finance only Sarmiento 
de AcuZa was given a titlepand thatpappropriatelypfor his 
2 
ambassadorial services in England. 
The professional administrators were as ill-rewarded as the 
peers on Stategand the conditions under which they worked both at home ? 
and abroad may be most appropriately illustrated by following briefly 
the difficulties and expenses incurred by the best and most honest of 
them, Carrillopas in so much elsepwas a perfect symbol. His service in 
Flanders was castly. For his 1595 journeyphe was given an a3rud of 
1,000 ducats, remarkably inadequate for a ninety: -six day journey which 
involved transporting his family and possessionagand his own estimate 
was that it cost a further 41000 ducats of his own, On arrivalphe had 
then to maintain four establishments - one for himself on campaignptwo 
in Brussels for his wife and two sonspand one in his home town of 
CSrdoba for his other sons - and he tabulated these residential 
expens8B alone at some 169000 ducats. His only compensation was a 
merced of 1P500-2pOOO ducats from a sympathetic Albert. 
3 
1-A. G. S. Q. C. 24. 
2- Garret Mattingly pRenaissance DiplomacY-9(1955)9p. 
244- 
3- No more precise figure is given* 
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At the and of his tour of duty he returned to Spainvarriving at 
Court on a Monday. On the Wednesday week 21000 ducats were delivered to 
his house with a royal order that he leave that very day for Flanders 
to serve as peace commissary. Characteristically - and unusually for a 
royal servant in even normal circumstances - he did so; the return took 
another three months and cost him a further 3POOO escudos (. a. 3,200 
ducats). Characteristicallyptoolbecause he was leading a reforming 
ministryphe refused to ask for an ayuda At the end of 1602 he returned 
to Spain to take up the councill3rahip of Castile to which he had been 
appointed during his brief sojourn in 160O. He progressed rapidly by way C> 
Of the Camara and various juntas to his great visita of 1607-9tand was 
given another 29000 ducats an completing the latterybut was left 
uncertain as to whether this was in acknowledgement of his services in 
Flanders or for the visita, itself. With the Finance presidency he was 
given in 1609 the customary 89000 ducats marcedland another such with 
the Indies appointment of 16179but was given no allowance for the 1615 
journey. At the end of the reign he was awarded a further 49000 ducats 
for sixteen years service on the comision de hebreas. 
His sonsgtoopserved the Crown at some expense. Two won babits, 
but both died as saldiers. the older in action at the age of twenty four, 
and a third was given 500 ducats for his studies but elected to serve 
the King in Italylat his own expense. 
When Carrillo died in 1622 he left debts of some l4pOOO ducats. 
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The Junta considering his widow' s request for a posthumous merced 
listed the various grants made him and drew remarkable conclusions; he 
had been 'most amply rewarded' for 'he was occupied in the greatest 
offices of the realm ... and although he deserved them and exercised 
them wellpthey should also be considered as reward9for they were not 
given to him for any seniority9but because he deserved them most and 
would serve them best'. It had been his privilege to serve the King; 
perhaps Indies would give her a merced. The Junta would not. 
1 
Foreignpor even regionalpservioe was the administrator's 
nightmarejand Carrillols, reappointment to Flanders was only the most 
extreme example of the obedience required of the royal servant. He was 
indeed very fortunate in being allowed to return to Spain Iz liftas 
early as 16029for administrators at every level could be subjected in 
this respect to the most erratic royal whim - thus Fuentespat the top 
2 
of the scale. was explicitly made to stay in Milan until he diedo 
while contador Diego do Blerreravat roughly the 
bottomphad after six 
years in Portugalpto remind Philip of his promise 
that his tour of 
duty would not exceed one. 
3 
4 
The most disastrous appointment of coureepas 
is well known, 
was the ambassadorialgand the chief ambition of most appointees was 
1- Memorial of d3n'a Francisca Pajardatto Philip 
JV08 Jun. 1622, 
printed by A. Gonzaez Palencia (1932)ppp. 344-356. 
2- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP-3" -SeID also0ab3ve, pp-29-30. 
3 Cnta. Jnta. de Hac. 92 Apr, 1607tA. G. S. C. 
J. H. 3459f. 102. 
4 See G. Mattingly (1965)ppp. 222-5- 
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to secure release - or the promise of it - from their burden. None 
expressed themselves quite as plaintively as Giron in Francepbut his 
plea cited in the heading of this chapter would have found a general 
echo., 
1 
More subtly, Sarmiento de Acun*a wrote from England in 1616 that 
he needed to come home because he had something to tell His Majesty 
that was so important that he dared not entrust it to a letterpbut he 
then gave his game away by asking not simply for some money for his 
travelling expenses but also for an ayuda de costa and a title. The 
councillors of State turned a friendly blind eye and suggested 
granting him his request9but Philip, unfooled9vetoed judiciously - if 
one man was allowed such a favourgeverybody would start demanding it. 
2 
This attitude was most perfectly expressed - although doubtless for 
his own reasons; he had voted for Sarmiento de Acun"'als licence - by 
Aliaga when in 1617 he suggested denying Osuna's request for a licence 
after seventeen expensive years abroad - 'this is the first 
time that 
the Duke has asked for a licence, and if it is given to him on this 
occasiongthe service of Your Majesty could be endangered' .3 
The difficulties in replacing a man were two-fold; his debts 
had to be paidpand an ggreeable successor found. Castrolfor instance, 
was unable to leave Rome in 1616 until debts of 14pOOO 
ducats had 
1- See above9p. 173. 
2- Enta. St. 9 26 Jan. 1616 j A. G. S. E. 2514, f. 69. See also 
below9pp. 39 3-4. 
3- Rnta-St-914 Nov. 16179A. G. S. E. 18809no fol. 
been paid9while his successorgZZigagwas similarly unable to leave 
Vienna until his of 109000 were met. 
1 AgaingBautista de Tassis in Paris 
in 16039knowing that he was on the point of being replacedgreminded 
the King that he was owed 3YOOO ducats. State took the hint and 
impressed upon Philip that the money had to be paid before a 
successor could be named. 
2 Whilephoweverpambassadorial patience and 
resource remained unexhausted9the King could pay with promises; Sesagin 
Rome since 15909was appeased in 1601 with an ayuda and a c3uncillorship 
of State and in 1602 with the post of mayordomo mETor to the Queen, but 
was not actually replaced until 1604.3 
These conditions obtained nearer home. Luis Enrfquez's service 
on War was twice interrupted by service away from the capitalpand by 
July 1615 he had sat in effect only for nine months since his 
departure for Flanders at the end of 1601. Appointed Governor of 
Galicia on his return in 1607, he had the singular misfortune to be 
reappointed in 1615. Like Carrillo's9howeverphis second tenure was 
brief; in poor health1he was able to persuade Philip to replace himpand 
in September 1616 recommended his councillorship. 
4juan de Cardona was 
1- Lerma to Carrillop26 Feb. 1616 (Castro) and 12 Nov. 1616 (Zun'iga)p 
A. G. S. C. J. H. 392pno fol. and f-3- 
2- Lnta. St. 925 Feb. 16039A. G. S* K-1426, f. 46. 
3- Cabrera de CSrdoba (l857)qpp*l02ql43vl54463- 
4- Appointments to Galiciaj17 Nov. 16071A. H. N. Cons. pL. de P-7249ff-29v- 
33vpand 19 Sept. 1615 vA. G. S. Q-C-32.0n his expenSOsIcntas Warvll 
Sept. 1609 and 9 Dec. 1610, A. G. S. G. A. 712, ff-192 and 7299f*20; on 
ill-health, Enta. War, 28 Feb. 1615, A. G. S. G. A. 7991f-102. On his 
councillorshippbelow, P. 254. 
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less successful 9 dying at 90 in 1609, some twenty years after his first 
retirement and after a succession of disappointments (1599,160291603 
and 1609) in his expectation of being all3wed to return to a 
councillorship of State* 
1 Like Carrillopthese, men were given ayudas on 
appointment to officephad. to rely on their sala3: 7 and their own 
resources and then claim for their losses offly after they had been 
disbursed. Thus Enrfquez in 1609 had to undertake a visita of the 
Galician coast and claimed a merced only when he despatched his report 
to Madridq 2 while Punf'onrostroývisitador of the northern frontier in 
the 1601 invasion-scarephad to prove that he had spent his own m3ney 
on the mission, but only when he returned to the capit423 and this 
despite the Government's knowledge of his financial difficulties even 
4 before his appointment. 
Few councillors of War escaped such missions. Pu5onrostro 
himself had as recently as 1596 supervised the defence of Lisbonjand 
in 1603 barely escaped a similar appointment to Sevi, 1695 and all but 
five of his twenty one colleagues had their service interrupted by 
occasional or more permanent appointments 
6_a 
commentary at once upon 
Cabrera do Cordoba (1857), pp. 23-4,145,149,155,158-9,166,18o, 362, 
366 and 384-See also abovelp. 145- 
2- Cnta. Warvll Sept. 16099A. G. S. G. A. 7129f. 192. 
3 -, 2nta. War92D Doo. 1601, A. G. S. G. A-58o, f-78. 
4- In appointing himpWar had to have Philip suspend a lawsuit over 
his estates in order that he could golcnte. Warv8 Feb. 1602pA. G. S. 
G. A-5899no fol-See alsojbelowjp, R*Q 
5- On 15961. anta. WartlO Nov. 1603, A. G. S. G. A. 6059f-509and on 1603, this 
and cnta. Jnte. de Trosq14 Mar. 16039A-G-S- E. 2023vf. 88. 
6- ie. pValencia#Tassis Esteban do Ibarraq SotomVor and 
Pobar, all 
xrecently returned. 
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their extraordina: t7 qualifications and the Junior status of their 
Council. 1 The councillor of State was more sedentary9both because he 
had other duties at the centre and because9promoted as the climax of 
2 his careerphe had already done ample service abroad. Of the thirty 
one who sat after 1599jonly eight left the Council on such service, 
three of them - Mouraythe Adelantado and Fuentes - in extraordinary 
circumstances in 1600.3 In effeet, thereforegonly five - Spinalapthe 
Constable, VillafraneatNion'o do Guevara and Zapata - were appointed away 
from the capitalland the Constable and Villafrancaplike Mouralreturned 
to resume their councillorships. The professional administratorptoop 
tended to stay in the capital once appointed; of Finance's thirty four 
councillorsponly three had their services interruptedvand one of them 
- Esteban do lbarra - was so affected as Secretary of War rather than 
as Councillor of Finance. 
4 
Several men wereplike Cardona. appointed to councillorships prior 
to foreign or regional servicepand severalplike Carrillo and Sesagwere 
appointed to make their absence more endurable. They could then work 
with greater dignitytbutgm3re importantly9with greater hope - one day 
they would returnjand to a counoillorship. Far more systematicallygmen 
returning from such service were similarly rewarded. Obviously, they 
1- See below, ppo 2.4-1-Irl 2- See bolowpppoILI"-I-&Ir 
3- See above, pp. 29-30- 
The others being Cabala and Sarmiento do Acun"'alses belov, pp,,, %, S, ILlr 
I 
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were the better qualified by their servioepbut equally the conclusion 
is inescapable that their councillorships were given as reward for 
their service. They were paid less - indeedvon Stategnot at all - than 
they had beenvbut no longer had to support their official expenses. 
When their position was becoming untenableplike the ambassadors they 
asked either for an ayuda or for leave to come to the capital for 
financial or health reasons. Once therepthey could press their case 
on a King unable to pay an ; 9guda and be replaced by men seeking a 
reputation and whoyperhaps having served in relative comfort at the 
centre9would not ask for an ayuda for some time. It had become a 
conventionvand may be illustrated by the process whereby the 
brothers Pedroso were appointed to Finanoo. Bernabegas proveedor 
general of the Atlantic fleet9was given an aYu4a of 19500 ducats in 
1599 to cover his expenses over the previous two yearspbut had 
immediately to ask for another such amountgand was awarded lpOOO 
ducats-' His woxk, however, continued to take him expensively round 
Spainp 2 and in January 1603 he was appointed to Fi4ance. 
3 In 
*4 September he asked leave to retire from the proveedoria on grounds of 
ill-healthpand to be allowedgas a merced9to renounce it in his 
4 brothero This was an unusual steppbut Juan was b3th well-qualifiecl 
1- Cnta. War, 3 NOV-1599, A. G. S. G. A-553, no fol. 
2- in 1599 ýe served as visitad3r of the almolarifaggo administrat: k: z 
-iongenta. Fin. p2 Oct. 159gyA. G. B. C. J. 11.274pf. 231. 
3- NO formal title is extant, but the appointment is recorded by 
Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)pp. 164 and confirmed by cnta. Fin. 923 Nov- 16039A. G. S. C-J-H-309pf-253- 
4- Cnta-Wartl6 Sept. 1603, A. G. B. G. A. 604ýno fol. 
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for the post and in difficulties of his own; after thirteen years as a 
proveedor in SpaingPortugal and Brittany9he had had no ayuda and was 
some 49000 ducats in debt. The renunciation was allovedgand took 
place in gotoberlbut both remained in didtficultiesgand in November 
again approached their councils; Bernab6 was now without a sala. 379and 
Juan unable to afford even to take up his new post. Bernab(f was 
therefore allowed to retain the militai7 salary while Juan was given 
a 19000 ducats eLvuda. 
lIt 
took another year to resolve their 
difficulties, and not until January 1605 did Bernabg commence his 
councillorship? Juan then went through the familiar routiney 
satisfying War in 1608 that he deserved an ayudag 
3 
and in 1610ja few 
months convalescences 
4 In 16141he was appointed contador in the 
Contaduri ,a Mayor do Cuentasp5 but continued to tour Spain as 
proveedar general. In 16179while in Gibraltarphe was appointed 
supernumerary councillor of Financep 
6 
but not until 1619 did he plead 
for the three or four months leave of absence to come to Court for 
1- On Bernab4q cnta. Fin. , 23 Nov. 1603 9 A. G. S. c. 
J. il. 309 9 f. 253; and on 
Juan pLnta. 
iFaL-rq 26 Nov. 1603pA. G. S. G. A. 6049no fol. 
2- First sitting on 12 Jan., Attendance Register, 
3- Enta. War, 6 Sept. 1608 9A. G. S. G. A. 
6891no f3l, In Janua37yBernabe was 
given a 4,000 ducats ayuda in reward for 38 years' serviceqLerma 
to Acuna926 Jan. 16089A. G. S. C-J-1i-352qf-? 
4- inta. War, 28 Aug. 16109A. G. S. G. A. 728pno fol. 
5- On 17 Dee. 1614pA. G. S. Q. C. 28; confirmod by Lerma to Carrillo. 28 
Jan. 16159A. G. S. C-J-H-387, n3 fol. 
6- On work in southpcnta. Pin. 915 Mar. 16179A. G. 
S. C. J. H-40,1 vno fol.; 
the councillorshipP17 Dec. 16179A. G. S. Q. C. 281with A. H*N, Cons. 9L. 
do P-724of. 256 mistakenly dating it 17 Feb. 1617. 
convalescence. 
1 This was grantedyand in May 1620 he took up his 
councillorship. 
Such promotions should not be misinterpreted. Certainly 9 there 
was something of a convention here9but councils knew their men and did 
not accept stories of hardship - much less disburse monies - 
uncritically. 
2 Nor were inappropriate men appointed to the councils. 
Diego de Brocherofor instancefserving as Admiral of the Atlantic 
Fleet duly claimed for an Eyuda in 1598 and then in 1602 for leave of 
absence to 'come (to Valladolid) to treat of and remddy his financial 
affairs'. 
3 On doing so he took up his councillorship of War. No man was 
better qualified for the post - and few9perhaps9currently needed so 
much on a council dominated by soldiers - than Spain's leading sailorg 
and no councillor of State, War or Finance was to serve with a 
diligence as remarkable as his. 
4 
That he was appointed almost 
casually was of no consequence; that he was appointed was. 
5 
Promotion to Philip Ill's councils went by merit and 
6 
experience; vith a few courtly exceptionapthat was an inviolable rule. 
I- Cnta. Jnta-de ProvisionesA Feb. 1619, A. G. S. G. A. 840of-327. 
2- Nor of course did acceptance by a council inevitably lead to a 
councillorship; State thus acknowledged Villafranca's hardship in 
1609 at a time when Court rumour had it that he was on the point 
of being appointed to State-Philip did not appoint him. 
Cnta. St. y 
7 Apr. 1609pA. G. S. E-25139no fol-pand Cabrera do CSrdoba7-1857), 37l, 
3- Cntas Warpq Oct-1598 and 21 Oct. 1602, A. G. S. G. A-5279no fol. gand 
590fno fol-See alsovRnta. Warp8 Feb. 1602, A. G. S. G. A-589pno fol. 
4- On his councillorshipgbelowppp. 255-6. 
5- Nor did his difficulties cease; in 1603 War insisted that unless 
Philip gave him a grant he would be unable to Support the cost of 
living at Court 9 cnta* War97 Oct. 1603PA-G-S. G. 
A. 604pno fol. See 
also ab3votp. 161. 
6- On appointments 9 below, 0 ap. 7 pp. 213-238 y 247- 
251,262-281. 
Foreign or regional experience was only part of the more general 
qualificationybut an appreciation of its importance d3es help to 
establish that a conciliar appointment was a climactic honz)ur. As 
Carrillo's widow foundtprom3tion was its own reward. On appointmentp 
presidents were given ayudas and secretaries of State and 
councillors of Castile militaz7 habits9but otherwise an administrator 
at this level had to rely on his salary and was not ordinarily 
allowed any supplementary ayudas 
Oftenjindeed, the Crown could not even find the cash for the 
salary. Pons of Finance was instead given a food allowance - not an 
uncommon arrangement - but found consistent difficulty in locating 
his award as one s3urce after another became exhaustedvand after 
fifteen years was some 12,000 ducats in arrears of his colleagues. 
One of themtDiego de Bazangwas given 19000 ducats of annual rent in 
lieu of a salaryp 
2 
while as has been seen the Pedr3so retained their 
salaries from their previous positions. 
3 ConverselypSarmiento de AcuKaýý 
was given his salary as councillor of Finance to meet his expenses in j 
I 
Enjkland. 4 Lower down the scalepthe officials of the War seoretariatq 
faced as their Council acknowledged with 'little possibility of 
maintaining themselves' on their salaries were given a housing 
Appointed by Philip 11 in 15989he did not take up his seat until 
fOrMallY reappointed on 26 Oct. 1602yand the arrears were 
calculated from 1598-Memorandum of his servicesq25 May 1613, and 
enta. Carrillo94 Aug. 1614, A. G, S, C. J. H. 3809f. llg; his appointment in 
16029A. G. S. Q. C. 20. 
2- Lerma to Carrillo Mar. 16171A. G. S. C. J. H. 3951no fol, 
3- See above pp. 184-0. 4- Lerma to 6arrilloP13 Dec. 1613, A. G. So C. J. H. 377, no fol. 
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allowance instead of an increase, 
1 
while Loba Castrillo on his 
prom3tion to State's offices was deprived of his 300 ducats Balary 
and given rents in Navarre and Naples. 
2 
The general recession extended even to those minor municipal 
offices occasionally given or sold to senior administrators as 
avuclas. -ýf any 0 Carrillo among thempwere given escribanGs do rentas, 
4 
but as early as 1600 the Cr3wn had to order the abolition (I coneumal ) 
of the seventy two offices of escriban3s mayoreagboth because they 
were no longer necessary and because it could not support the meagre 
sum (. E. 219826 ducats) of their annual salary. 
5 More impartantly, in 
1- CntasWar93 Jun. 16099A. G. S. G. A. 712of-439a copy. 
2- =101dula addressed to him (on appointment"? 
)911 Sept. 1600pA. G. S. 
C-J. H. 366pno folja copy. 
3- The general exhaustion of supply may be demonstrated from the 
following table of sales in three provinces; 
a)'Regimient3al 1580-1589 1590-1599 
Kadrid 21 2 
Salamanca 14 2 
Badajoz 60 4 
b)'Escribanias' 
Madrid 10 4 
Salamanca 113 205 
Badajoz 75 
The only exception to the rulepthen, was in the Salamanca 
escribanfasybut no less than 201 of the 318 offices sold over 
the d 
twenty years were sold in 1588-1592pand only 20 between 1593 and 
1599. A. G-S. O. G. T. 24: 3229Cities and Provinces of Madridq Salamanca 
and Badajoz. 
See alsolfor statements by Finance of Philip 11's policy on 
office sales and the limited possibilities open to Philip 1119 
entas. Fin. 99 Jul-and 16 Oct. 16009A. G. 
S. C. J. H. 284ýff. 16 and 31. 
4- See Appendix 11 3nqfor instance9the offices held by Carrillo, 
Menchaza of F-inancegSarmiento Valladares of Castilepand Amezquetap 
Secretary of Castile; respectivelygnos. 
5- Cnta. Fin. , 20 Sept L'Ma-ra of Castile* 
l6o8ýA. G. S. C. J. H. 352, f*40, summarising the 
Is order of 7 Sept. 1600. 
iã 
1611 in accordance with an agreement with the Cortespit had to 
abandon its practice of awarding castle alcaidias to administrator2 
The councillor had only one possibility of supplementing his 
salary. If he was appointed to an inBtitutionalised Junta he was 
entitled to an extra allowancepand similarly councillors of Castile 
working Jointly on other councils were paid for their attendanceY2 but 
in 1607 all other councillors were deprived of any such second 
salaries. 
3 Every councillor found his salary inadequategeven those of 
Castile; Xena de Barrionuevopjointlv asesar of Warydied Inatoriouslv 
Poor' after thirty years in the royal servicegand others suffered 
similarly. 
4 However he came by his postgand at whichever level he 
served9the councillor was liable to a similar fate. Salablanca and Pons 
of Finance both died leaving insufficient estate to pay for their own 
1- They were traditionally granted to administrators for various 
reasons -'strategically important9they were thereby placed in 
reliable hands; BOMGtimesttoopit was part of a process of centralis-ý 
ationgtaking them out of the hands of local families who had in 
some cases held them since the Reconquest. The first recorded sale 
was by Philip 111of that of AlcaA la Real in 1574 to Lic. Benito 
L, dpez de Gambaa. On offices held by Pedr3 de Padilla and Dr. AndrSs 
Lozada, y Pradagbelowipp. 200 and 202-3; on those of Lermagabovetpp. 
47-8. The turnine-point was Philip's refusal in 1611 to allow 
M31ina de Xedrano to buy back the Velez tenancy which had been held 
by three members of his familygand his refusal to sell a second 
office to an unnamed person. entas. Fin. 911 Mar. and 9 Aug. 1603, A. G. S. 
309off-52 and 124 and 13 Aug. 161lpC. J. H.: 23659f. 220. 
2- On taesevab3velp. 126. 
3- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)vp. 32l. F3r the context of the decision, 
abovegP-74. 
4- Inta. War928 Sept. 1618, A. G. S. G. A. 826tf. 93-On Juan do Prl*'*aspsee 
belowip-200. 
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funerals -the former after sixty years in the Ministry - and the 
heirs of both had to borrow money to pay for the burials. 
1 Bernabe do 
Pedroso hadpunlike thempeome to his councillorship from outside the 
Ministrylbut he t3a died in poverty after forty five years service, 
the last eight as councillor- 
2 Juan do Acuinia. Vela of Wargafter 
seventy one years servicepthe last fifteen as councillorpleft 
3 insufficient estate to pay for his son's educationg and Pugonrostrog 
maestre do campo general in 1588 and councillor of War for eleven 
yearstleft his famil 
.y in great hardship. 
4 
Even a presideacypas 
Carrillo had again foundocarried no guarantee of solvency; whan Juan 
do Acuna died in 1615 after forty seven years in the royal servicov 4, 
the last twelve as President successively of FinancepIndies and 
Castilelhe left more than 49000 ducats of debts. and his widow had 
both to sell some of his goods to meet some of these and throw 
herself on the royal mercy for the funeral expenses*5 
One senioradministratorghoweverpnever complained seriously 
of financial difficulties. The secretary was properly rewarded. His was , 
salablaaOaq. 2_n_ta. Fin*vl4 MaY 1608, A. G. S. G. J. H. 345tf-140; Ponsg 
Salazar t3 PhiliP 11195 Oct. 16189and cnta. Fin. 914 Oct-16189A. G. S. 
C. -T. H. 9402pno fal. vand f. 274. 
2- Enta. Fin. 91 Mv'1614, A. G. S. C. J. H. 3809f. 
39. 
3- gnta. Wargll Jul. 1616, A. G. S. G. A-808of-115- 
4- Cabrera do C&rdaba (. 1857)pp. 398-See also belowppp*7-09 
5'- Cnta. Cknara do Castilla, 5 Feb. 1623, printed by A-Gonzglez Palencia 
(1932)gPP-412-4. 
the best salary of all; the secretaries of Stategfor instance, were 
paid more than the presidents of Castile and Inquisitionvthose of 
Italy more than that of Finance. 
1 This phoweverp was only a beginning. 
Like the senior councillor9the secretax7 was regularly co-opted onto 
Juntaspand was paid for his troublespbut unlike them he had the right 
of derechopof levying fees for his administrative work. He was thus 
paid for every royal titleloeaul and despatch he arew up and 
witnesseagand for verifying the claims of applicants for offices and. 
mereedes. These could vary enormouslypbut as the volume of government 
business rose, so the secretary profited; the secretaries of State thue 
earned an extra 39000 ducats or so each annuallygand those of Italyp 
some 29000.2 
The secretary was thuspand willigglypthe most overworked 
member of the conciliar hierarchygand he jealously accumulated work. 
His achievements and ambitions were most perfectly expressed in the 
career of Francisco Gonzdlez do Heredia-Exceptionally able and 
1- The material in this paragraph is chiefly drawn from two undated 
papers (1619? ) on the Italy secretaryship 9 A. G. S. C-J-H-W4059f- 
152; 'Las causas do quo procede el dano ton los derechos de los 
secretarios del Consej o do Italia .*-, I )and I Medio para poner en 
execucion el reparo y augmento de os derechos de los despachoe 
del Consejo de Italia'. See alsopcedulas of appointment to War of 
.0 Andres de Prada and Andres de AlvaP13 Jun-1586yB-N-20589ff-14-18, 
copies; and Instruction given to Gabriel de Zayas on appointment 
as Secretary of Italyq2O Oct-1579, B. N. 1167iff-338-3419a copy. 
2- Papers on the Italian secretaryship cited aboveqn. l. 
1 -ý7 ,- 292 
experiencedghe was able to manage both Orders secretaryships together 
with Castile's Patronata Reallwith the help of only two officials. 
1 
He did so to his own considerable advantagepleaving a firtune of 
some 2509000 ducats. 2 The Crown, toopprofitedvbut had to replace him 
with three secretariesgeach with two officials9and all with housing 
and financial allowances, and thereby increased the burden on the 
.1 nomina by the 109000 ducats annually which Gonzalez's labours had 
savel it. 
3 
His was of course an extraordina: L7 casevbut was nonetheless 
significant of the work being done by socretariesgand this found more 
general redognition in the early years of the reign in the number of 
offices being divided; they could not only supportpbut indeed demanded 
more men. Italy had been divided into three in 1595,4 and Finanoe into 
5 two in 1596p and Portugal (1602) and Indies (1604) were both 
divided into four, 
6 
all previously having been held by one official. 
Philip tried to reverse the trend by uniting the secretaryships of 
1- Cnta. Jnta. do Reformaci&n, 25 MSY 1618pprinted by A. Gonzkez 
Palencia (19ý2)YPP-408- 
2- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)PP-551- 
3- Cnta. Jnta. do Reformaci&n925 May 1618pop. cit. 
4- Fe7d-ula reorganising the secretariat of the Council of Italy, 28 
Jun-159593. M. Eg-338, f. 106ta copy* 
5-B. N-38279f. 254. 
6- Portugal 9 Cabrera de CIýrdoba (1§57) qpp. 145-6; Indies gibid, gp. a., %S 
ancl on the latter see alsapSchaferpippp. 198. 
War (1600-04)91 and Castile's Justicia and Ca"mara -v Estado papers 
2 (1599-1605) 
1 but had to admit failure in both cases; there was too 
much work to be d3ne. 
The secretaries were of course only too happy with the 
situati3nvand only on four occasions did any of them consent to 
promotions to council lo rships. Juan de Ibarra did so on Indies and 
Avarez Pereira on Portugalpbut both only on receipt of adequate 
compensation - Ibarra receiving 4pOOO ducats of annual rentP3 and 
If Alvarez an ayuda of 159000 maravedis and an enC3Miendaand 5009000 
4 
reis of rent for his son. In effectpthengthey were paid to leave 
their offices in order to allow general rational is ations to take 
place. The other cases were different in kindgreflecting the royal 
reverence for experience. The prodigiously overworked Esteban de 
Ibarra held both secretaryships of War together with a c3uncillorship 
of Finance - andpindeedpa vast am3unt of junta business - but in 
1- Esteban de Ibarra holding one office from 21 Aug-1598 (A. G. S. Q. C. 
13) until his appointment to a councillorshipo-on Prada's promotion 
to State in 1600 he assumed his papers; he held both until 1606, x 
when he was succeeded by Antonio do Arosteguf (12 Mar., jjbid. 97) and 
Bartolom8 do Aguilar y Anaya (18 Mar. vj:. bid. 99). 
2 Luis Vazquez de Molina y SalazaipJusticia secretaryp taking over the 
Cknara papers on the retirement of Juan V'dzquez do Salazar on 4 
Jan-1599 (ibid*932); on his own retirement he was succeeded by Juan 
Riltz. do Vilasco9who in turn in 1605 was succeeded by Juan do 
Amezqueta and Tomas de Angulalsee Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PPP-150i 
259-2609and for datespAppendix llgnos. 239-243. 
3 On rentspCabrera de CSrdoba (1857), pp. 198-200. 
4 jbid-PPP-145-6 and 199. 
1§71, 
effect his secretarial duties cost him his councillorshipjand he sat 
as an effective councillor of Finance only after he had been 
promoted from the secretaryship to a councillorship of War. In less 
gargantuaa fashionpMiguel de Ipegarrieta hold both secretaryship and 
I 
councillorship of Financeland was able to perform both satisfactorily 
The secretary's officials did not share his wealthpbut could 
claim for supplementary ayadaspand did so quite regularly. Bartalome' 
Aguilar y Anaya of War was rewarded in 1600 for his services and 
compensated for his difficulties by being appointed royal secretarypa 
marvell3usly sophisticated award by the Crown since it cost nothing 
while giving him the guarantee of an eventual conciliar appointment; 
not promotion but Vie promise of it was his reward. 
%e hadphoweverp 
still to eat9and four months later had to ask againgand was awarded a 
300 ducats ayuda 
3 Not until 1606 was he finally appointed to a 
conciliar post. 
4 Not every official was as fortunate. Birbiesca Of 
Finance won the acknowledgement that his 250 ducats salary was 
inadequate and was in 1602 awarded an annual ayucla of one suppressed 
escribania worth 2OpOOO maraved: rs (R-53-3 duoats). By 1609 he was 
again in difficulties sufficient to merit a marced of 150 ducats but 
1- On Ibarrap belowppo 2659 and on Ipen"arrietagp. 280. 
2- On his difficultiesp2nta. War, 13 Feb. 1599pA. G. S- G-A-5529na fol., 
a copy; royal secretarvshipllg Mar. 1600pA. G. S. Q. C. q. 
3- Enta. Warg3l Jul-16009A. G. S. G. A-570, f-19- 
4- See abovep. 193, n. l. 
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insufficient to prevent him asking for yet another in 16109being 
awarded 100 ducats. This phoweverg was to be a last cash awardyand he was 
given a second annual escribania to prevent him asking for more cash 
in future. I Femat of War experienced similar difficulties; awarded 
300 ducats in 16079he had to ask again in 1610 and was granted 
another 300.2 
The use of the suppressed escribanfa was significant of the 
Crown's more general economic difficulties. With hardly any more 
offices to sellgand with indeed hardly anyone willing to buy them, it 
could only sell back to the towns the privilege of exemption from 
further salespand it generally used the meagre profits to reward its 
own servants; in 15979for instancepFinance met its own expenses for 
the Feast of the Bulls by abolishing nine escribadastworth 409000 
3 
maravedis eachp and in 1596 had supplemented the salaries of its 
secretarial officials by granting them three offices9a procedure it 
repeated in Easter 15971giving them now one each. 
4 
Such was perfectly legitimatelbut the Crown did occasionally 
resell these officespalmost invariably to help its own servants. As 
the offices were minorpso were the administrators - secretarial 
I- Cnta. Carrillo P14 Dec. 16109A. G. S. C. J. H. 36of-331- 2- Cntas-War924 Nov. 1607 and 22 Dec. 1610pA. G. S. G. A. 669 no fol., and 
728, no fol. 
3- Cnta. Fin., 15 Oot-iiI21597, A. G. S. D. G. T-24s323va copy. 
4- Te-morandum of Pedro do Lecama, and the officials of the secretariatv 
7 Jul. 1605PA-G-S. D. G. T. 24: 323. 
2567' 
officials, c3noiliar porters . escribano a do cGarasppareja ores de las 
obras and the like. A typical case was that of the escribanfa of 
Sanchobuen3va village in Salamanca; sold for 100 ducats in 1592lit 'Was 
suppressed in the advantage of Finance's secretarial officialevand in 
1602 it was re-created and sold for 50POOO maravedi4s (0-133.3 ducats)v 
abolished once againIthen re-created and sold againtstill in 1602. The 
Cortes were forthright in their condemnation of such practice; no 
objection could be made to the 1592 transactiontbut the successive 
deals of 1602 were dubious. The reasons for the two sales of that year 
are not rec3rdedtbut the first was clearly cancelled and the money 
Would then have had to be returned to the purchaser. There would have 
been profit for the Crotmthereforeponly in the abolition of 1592 
and the second such of 1602. What the Crown was doing in 1592 -aand 
probably again in 1602 - was to give some slight relief to its own 
servants9and the veV complexity of the procedure was highly 
significant of the decline in its resources. It would have been far 
easier for it to grant the administrators the proceeds from first 
salespbut there were hardly of these. Thusvt039it only very rarely 
resorted to the correlative device of granting an office to an 
administrator and makingk him pay for the privilege. It was not worth 
the trouble. ' 
1- Cities and provinces of SalamancaqMadrid and BadajozpA. G. S. D. G. T. 
24; 322. 
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Financegunlike State and Wargemployed a large number of 
accountantspat sub-secretarial official level-The c3ntador could rely 
on his fees (Iderech3l)to supplement his salaxy9but also found 
himself in chronic difficulties. The older his office the longer ago 
its rewards had been fixedgand the more inadequate they therefore 
were; by 1608 the contadares de rentas were complaining of a price rise 
of over 600 % since their salaries had been fixed - at 400 ducats - 
150 years previouslyg 
1 
and the c3ntadores de mercedes similarly 
complained at the same time of salaries 132 years old. 
2 For such meng 
further price rises or coinage devaluation were simply extra 
vexations. But even more recently-founded offices had their hardship; 
the contadar del libr3 de caja coincidentally asked for a rise on the 
2vOOO ducats granted his office on its foundation in 1593.3 
Administrative as well as economic circumstances had changed 
somewhat since the days of Columbus's youthtand for only one office 
had change been advantageous. The contadores de resultas now required 
only four hours daily to fulfil the work for which they were paid 600 
ducats annuallyjand could spend the rest of their week on contracted 
do Parte businesspan arrangement which suited Pedra de BeVuelos - until 
1- Memorandum of the coniadares de rentasql6o8qA*G. S. C-J-H-3529no fol 
2- Memorandum of the contadores de mercedes91608, ibids 
3- Ln--ta-Fin-98 Feb. 16089A. G. Se C. J-11-353tf. 15- 
-ITI 
lg, Y 
11 
he was prom3ted to the de rentas office. 
1 
M3re typicallylthe contador 
del libro de caja found his expenses consuming two-thirds of his 
salary. 
2 In the reorganisati3n of the Finance offices in 1602 an 
attempt was made to rationalise these anachronisms but 'was not 
completedyand not until 1608 was the new fee-book (larancell) 
introduced. It was the first such since 1476d 
Br3adlypthis raised the salary level at the expense 3f the 
derecholand it caused an uproar. One of the complaintalof the 
contadores de rentaspillustuated the manner in which government 
business could, by force of economic circumstancepbe conducted at this 
level. One quarter of their woxk was de partelthe rest. de oficiogand 
in order to conduct this latterpthe contadores had each to maintain 
four officialovand did so in extraordinaxy fashion by 'putting-out' 
the de Darte work and paying the officials' salaries from the profit 
thereby made. The new aranc ellp however, deprived them of vittually all 
their fees and they were consequently unable to maintain the 
officials to dconduct the main volume of their work. 
4 Similarlypthe 
contadores de mercedes were forced to dismiss some of their twelve 
officials. 
5 Such was perhaps commendable enoughybut the Crown was 
1- Memorandum of the contadores do rentaspOpecit The contador was 
obliged to spend three hours daily plus another five weekly. 
2- RntaeFin. j27 Sept. 16089A. G. S. C. -T. H. 352tf-296. 
3- Enta. Fin. tlB Sept. 1608tA. G. Be C-J-H-353, no folo 
4- Memorandum of the contadores de rentastp2-cit- 
5- Memorandum of the contadores do mercedesqOP-cit 
: 199 07. 
then m3rally obliged to employ the dismissed men elsewhere. The 
anachronisms of a century and a half could not be wiped out overnight. 
InevitablygtOOpmore were created. Two offices profited from the 
reforms; the contadores de la raz I on were accorded a three-fold rise to 
3009000 maravedýs (S. 800 ducats) and were given an additional 
, ayuda 
of 200 ducats together with two suppressed escribanGs9l and the 
2 contadores de relaciones were given an improved derecho .. 
*** *** 
1 Memorandum of the contadores de rentaspop. cit 
2 Memorandum of the c3ntadares de morcedestop. cit. 
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Finance and the renunciation and sale of administrative offices. 
As he neared the end of his active servicelthe administrator 
was faced with the problem of losing his salary and housing and 
financial allowances and of being therefore quite unable to maintain 
himself and his family-In exceptional circumstancesphe might be given 
a lucrative award on retirement; thus Padilla of War was appointed 
alcaide of the Alhambrap 
1 
while Finance2s contador, Ayard was 
appointed ad honorem councillor with a salary of 200 ducats and the 
appropriate allowances. 
2 More generallyphoweverpthe administrator had 
to wait until he was on or over the brink of death before he or his 
family could ask for a compensatory ayud a3 The Crownpeensible of 
its 
obligations9did its best to provide some measure of reward - thus Lic. 
Juan de Frfas's daughter was given a military habit with which to 
4 tempt a suitorp while Punonrostrols eleven year old son was given 
5 titular command of a company at arms. 
The principle that a son might be rewarded for his father's 
services was well-established; there was 
thus nothing wrong with the 
ip 1- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857) 1p. 27. 
2- Carrillo to Philip 111flO Dec-1616, A. G. S. C. J. H. 391pno 
fol. A 
similar merced had been refused Nicolas Mensa 
then in 1614 he 
asked for the honorary secretaryship of Arag6n after 
32 years 
servicepCnta. Jnta. de Guerra do Aragon931 Oct. 16149A. 
G. S. G. A-7909 
no fol. 
3 See also aboveppp. 1799190. 
4 En-ta. War928 Sept. 1618pA. G. S. G. A. 8261f-93- 
5 Cabvera do C6rdoba (1857), P. 398- 
20: 1', y . 
theory of the Junta dealing with the claims of Carrillo's widow that 
the habits granted to his sons had been for his and not for their 
services. More generouslyghoweverpthe principle was frequently and 
formally acknowledged prior to an award; when Luis Gaitan do Ayala, 
died in 1607pFinance advised Philip thatlas he had served with 
distinction and been ill-rewardedphis son should be employed in the 
r3yal service as a posthumous merced. 
1 
The principle thus acknowledged had a more general 
applicationgfor the administrator frequently asked that his son be 
invested with his own office as just such a raward. Frequentlypindeedt 
at the administrative levels the son had assisted the father in his 
later years with a view to securing the successionland the Crown was 
therefore faced with a real temptation; aware of the quality of the 
projected renunciateevit would be able to reward the administrator 
and to maintain its own standards at little cost to itself. It was 
therefore prepared to consider the pleas made to it by its ageing 
servantsland the sale or renunciation of an offiod should not 
therefore be necessarily thought indicative of declining standards. 
In practicepthe privilege was allowed almost exclusively only 
at the lower administrative levelsgandpas invariablyponly when 
appropriate safeguards were in operation. On four occasionsoit was 
1- Cnta. Fin. pl2 Jan-1607pA. G. S. C. -J. H. 3459f. 398- 
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allowed with councillorships9but so exceptional were the circumstances 
that none in effect represented a formal renunciation. The sons of 
Chinch6n and Borja were allowed to succeed respectively to their 
Treasurership General of Aragon (and Italy) and councillorship of 
Partugallbut both had to wait for nearly five years before being 
allowed to enter into their new posts. 
1 
The third grant - and the only 
one on a major central council - was also made to a relative of a 
great man of statepbutgan award of favourgit was not posthumous; 
Rodrigo de Castropuncle of the Count of Lem3sywas allowed to deputise 
on Inquisition for Francisco Manuel who had been appointed while under 
-age even though he himself was no older. 
2 More formallypthe right was 
allowed on insignificant Crusadeybut Finance was able ta cancel the 
licencelostensibly because it could not guarantee the quality of the 
son to whom Philip had allowed the rightobut in practice because of 
its shocked objections of principle. 
The Castro licence was thus the only one not granted 
posthumouslypand one other great man Of state was not diBsimilarlv 
rewarded. On the night before Andres do Prada diedgPhilip visited him 
and comforted him with the grant of a Santiaga habit for one nephew 
On ChinchSn's son, Cabrera de CIrdoba (1857)ppp. 384,400 and 519; on 
Borja'sqjbid-ppp*288-9*See Appendix 119nos. 
2- ibid. PP-345- 3- =Lus Valle do la Cerda, had failed to renounce his Office and when 
his widow asked that a deputy be named until a son came of age 
Finance took cynical9perhaps legally dubiousoadvantage of the 
minority to rule that the second life should last only until one 
son9preferably the olde3t, attained his majOritjv-Lnta-Fin., 6 Dec. 
16069A. G. S. C. J. H. 34lona fol. 
20; Yll ý 
and the la C3ru-n'a alcaidia and an appointment as royal secretary for 
ro 
another. 
1 
It wasphowevergto be thirteen years before the latter was 
appointed to a conciliar post. 
2 
This was a doubly appropriate awardpeoncerning as it did a man 
who was himself part of one of the many seoretarial clvnasties. Although 
Philip continued to appoint members Of these dynasties to 
secretaryshipsvhe effectively put an end to what had been a growing 
practice under his father. The secretaries of Castile had had a legal 
right to renounce their afficesp 
3 
and those of State had latterly 
had it effectivelv, 
4 but Philip allowed it only on comparatively 
unimp3rtant Arapn1where, the Gasol and Villanueva had de facto if not 
de jure renunciation. 
50n the major councils he allowed no more 
renunciations; his father's standards were not high enough for him. 
On o cc asions I however, he did allow it at administrative level. 
The problems facing him at this level were perfectly illustrated at 
the end of the reign by his and Finance's reactions to two cases. In 
1619,1)iego R. Ariguez da Torres, contadar de rentas2asked for 
1- Cabrera do C5rdoba (1857)qp-443; Dr. Andro`s LozadaX y Prada appoint- 
ed royal secretary 16 Jul. 16119A. G. S. Q-C-7- 
2- Lazada y Prada appointed Secretary of State93O Apr. 162Apibid. 
3- 'Since time immemorial ... they have always passed from fathers to 
sons .000 Miguel do Ondarca, Cavala. to Gregorio do TaPialundatedp a 
reply to Tapia's letter of 18 Apr. 16059A-G. S. C. C. 8889f. 48; the two' 
inherited secretaries of Justicia and C&nara Y Estad3 (Appendix 11, 
nos.. plK andL4.0 pp. 4ja were almost certainly related; none of 
their successors were. 
4- The inherited Secretaries being Francisco and Marttn de Idia"quezq 
the latter indeed having specifically succeeded Juan do Idilquez (31 Dec. 1596)9Pýrez Mfnguez (1935)ppp. 219 and 264. Again, no more 
were related. 
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permission to renounce in fav-Our of his son in reward for his fifty two 
years'service. That service had variously taken him to Planders, Granadap 
Seville and Aranjuez as well as Madrid and Valladolidyand having spent 
his wife's dowxy and never having had a mercedphe asked for the 
renunciation as the only inheritance his son could receive. 
In a significant manifestation of the tension always present 
between the principle and justifiable expediencypFinance divided over 
his requestland in doing so afforded two statements of the arguments 
as to the advisability of permitting such renunciations. The first halfp 
led by President Salazarlimpressed upon Philip that both the length 
and quality of R6driguez's service justified the favourvand drew more 
general conclusions; 
Your Majesty should grant the favour that he asks because - 
(the 
son) having the requisite qualifications - these councillors 
think it convenient that the son of a father who has served with 
satisfaction ; ind with intelligence and integrity should continue 
serving the office that his father held. This example ... would 
give encouragement ... to those who serve 
beoauseoknowing that 
their sons have to be favoured and helped9they would not 
divert 
themselves from the service of Your Majesty ... so that when 
they die they will not be left unhelped and in hardship 
In the view of these councillors9the sfifeguards suggested by Rodrfguez 
1- ThusgFrancisco de Gasol succeeded Gero'nimp de Gasallwhile 
Agustin do Villanueva was followed by Jeronimo d6 Villanueva and 
then b. * Juan Lorenzo de VillanuOva. I have found no formal evidence 
of renunciation as suctx. 
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were sufficient to ensure that the renunciation could be properly 
allowed; his son was only fourteenvand RSdriguez would therefore 
continue in his Post until he attained his majoritygand had agreed 
that if when the time came his son should prove to have neither the 
requisite qualities nor the age the licence should be cancelled. 
Moreavervin their view, the office was not very demanding of 
intelligencegand they therefore strongly advised Philip to allow the 
request. 
Their colleagueopsympathetic to the supplicaikitinsisted that the 
legal prohibition on filling offices before they became vacant be 
preserved. The son might not fulfil the hopes of the fatherpand might 
indeed be complacent in learning the duties of the office if he was 
assured that it was to be his. Disagreeing with their colleagues as to 
the qualities demanded by the positiongthey pointed to the 
deleterious effect on administrative moralepthers who had served as 
diligently as Rýdriguez and with as little rewardpand who had only 
reached their positions after years in the service9would. be 
discouraged. The office should be filled only when it became vacantý 
and then only in the beat candidate. Ro"driguez's services should be 
acknowledged by the grant of a place in Finance's offices to his sanp 
but any further promotion should then reflect only the s3n's 
abilities and , p,, ience. Philipptrue tO his general policygeupported 
this latter views 
1 
Cntas. Fin, p12 Jun*1608 and 6 Mar*16199A. G. S. C. J. U. 353, no fol. 9 
and 561pf. 62. The arguments are taken from the latter., On Philipp below2pp. 2-q#+-7 
2o671 
At the same timefFinance considered a similar request from 
Treasurer General Juan Iba"nez Segovia-He had served for thirty six 
years, sometimes at great personal risk9and in his twelve years as 
Treasurer had received no merced or ayuda and was unable to properly 
Pay his Officials. Unlike ROdriguez'sphis son was a mature man with 
ten years' royal service to his credit. and with his character and 
qualifications therefore well known to the Council. Again it divided, 
although now in different formation. Salazar now led a minority of 
three in advising that although the son would be a 'very appropriate' 
choice the prohibitive laws should nevertheless be observed. The 
majority of seven, including two of the five who had voted against 
Rodriguezgconsidered the son's qualities sufficient to justify an 
examptiongespecially since he had helped his father in the office. 
PhilipyconBiStentg refused. 
1 
Nearly two years laterpin the last months of the reign9the 
Treasurer tried againvand like othersvfound a second hearing more 
successful. With the further service to his credit, he met now with a 
unanimously favourable response from the councillorspand their 
suggestion that the thirty eight year old Mateo was the candidate 
they would recommend were the office vacant changed the royal mind. 
2 
The Grown had exacted extra servicepand now gave a merced, at no cost. 
1- Cnta. Fin. vl4 Apr. 161gyA. G. S. C. J. H. 4059f. 62. 
2- 2nta-Fin. P7 Feb. 162lpA. G. S. C. -T. H. 4149f. 267-Salazargillgwas 
absent for this meeting. 
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Others won the same privilege2but no more easily. Pedro Lufs do 
Torregrossago3nted3r del libr3 do cajapleft his daughters only his 
debtspand Finance allowed them effective renunciation9but with the 
stipulation that it be left to Miguel Perez Colladophis nephew andq 
more imp3rtantlyphis official and a man of known character. 
1 
Againp 
the Crown had the best of both w3rlds. RLriguez do Torres had been 
able to cite five cases in which renunciation had been allowed by 
Philip or his fatherpone of them in the Casa do C3ntratacion,, Of the 
other fourqn3 information is extant on that by Juan Vello de Acun"a of 
his office of contador de rentas in his son9but at least by the end 
of the reign Francisco de MonzOn had not actually handed over his of 
contador de mercedes9nor Liego Lopez de Gojenaga his de sueldo; in all 
pr3babilitypthereforelthe Crown was again exacting extra years of 
service for the renunciation.. 
2 The documentation for the last case 
cited by R3driguez reflected the Crown's thinking in his and other 
cases. Alexo Dolmos had by 1601 served for forty twoyears in 
Finance's officerptwelve in various minor positions. and the last 
thirty as contad3r do sueldoland between 1591 and 1596 had also 
served as contador de la Tazon. Claiming that he had been overlooked 
for prom3tion, he asked to be allowed to renounce in reward for his 
servicespand the C3uncil agreed both to this and to the ancillary 
1- Cnta. Fin. t27 Sept-1608, A. G. S. C. J. H. 352tf. 296. 
2- Cnta*Fin. p6 Mar. 1619, A. G. S. C. J-H-419 of-57. 
P3 08 
.1 
request for a pension of 300 ducats annually to support his old age. 
It was satisfied with the qualities of a son who had assisted him 
during his illnesses and deputised for him during his absencesgand 
Philip agreed to the renunciationybut refused the pension and 
allowed instead a single award of 600 ducats. 
' Dolmos's hopes being 
thus thwartedphe had to return and ask permission to exercise his 
offices Jointly with his son - and to share the salary with him -'and 
b3th Council and King agreedpagain winning extra years of service. 
2 
The Crown drove hard bargains* Cris tSbal de Alma: ciýljafter 
forty years in the service asked for pexmission in 1603 to renounce 
his office in favour of a future son-in-law so that he might provide 
at least one daughter of his four with a dowrylbut while he was 
pressing his case found his office granted to someone else. Then 
offered 300 ducats pensionphe found that too inadequateland spent a 
further twenty months asking both that it be increased and that he 
be given some post with which to support himself. Finance recommended 
a further 200 ducats of annual pension, but again. Philip 
limited the 
grantpto a thr$41 year poriod. 
3 
1- Cnta-Fin. 928 -Tan. 16019A. G. S. G-J-H-2931f-178- 
2- Znta. Fin. 11 Mar. 1601 vjbid. ,f- 87- 
3- Fn-ta. Fin., 19 Feb. 1603PA. G. S. C-J-H-3089f-56- 
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The sale of administrative offices was strictly illegalp' but was 
nevertheless countenanced on a few occasionapin each of which 
exceptional circumstances obtained. Although each council controlled its 
own sales Finance had to ratify their agreements by entering them in 
the libro de la raz3n and it was therefore able to interfere in their 
sales. Its first concern was to observe the lawpits second, more 
pragmatiept3 make the best of circumstances by using its authority to 
ensure that the Crown profited from the few sales allowed by the King 
or by other councils. 
The reign of Philip 11 had ended inauspiciously. In 1594 he had 
blatantly advertised the sale of War's escribanfa do-caMara de los 
neg3cios do justiciagand had cynically auctioned it offptwice agreeing 
a price with a purchaser only to dispossess him when higher bids were 
offered. He thereby raised the price from 
89000 to 111,027 ducats before 
his victim took legal proceedings against him and forced him to 
abandon the sale altogether. 
2 
The near6st Philip Ill came to such cynicism was in allowing 
Tristan de Ciriza to sell his office in 1612jand in rebuking him 
Finance made its principles quite clear; 'if this office were vacant 
tjjis Council would not propose Valencia for it to Your 
Majestypbut 
$No office go shall be sold in any mannerynor g1ven 
as dowry 
because it is important that great care be taken in the election 
of officers ... *'pCnta. Fin.. 3 Nov. 16122A. 
G. S* C. J. H-371if-70t 
quoting directly from the Ordenanzav. 
2 anta. Fin. p19 Jun. 1597pA. G. S. G. J. Ro 263, no 
fol. 
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persons who had passed through other contadurGs and who had practice 
and knowledge of the papers of the royal exchequer'. 
' Only on two 
occasions did Finance itself break those principles. 
Martýn do Pradeda, had by 1599 served for twenty three years 
as escribana do Camara in the Contaduria Mayor de Cuentaspand had for 
the last rhee served jointly in the same office in the second 
Contaduria. By doing so9he had saved the exchequer some 120 ducats 
annually. Despite thisphe was allowed to renounce only on condition that 
he pay 29000 ducatsland because. the office was not lucrative he was 
unable to find a successor. Nine years laterlthereforeohe appealed again 
to the generosity of the Counciltand if he found satisfactionvin having 
the 2pOOO ducats canoelled9sa did the Council. Its self-interest 
demanded that it retain a valued servantyand one from whom9indeedpit 
had once again exacted extra years of service; 
The Council says that Martýn de Pradeda is a good official and 
serves wellIand because of this the most important matters 
*** are ordinarily committed to himýand he would 
be missed if 
he should leave the said office. It therefore holds it to be 
most convenient to the service of Your Majesty (to allow him) 
what he now asks .., becausepholding a cedula of 
Your Majesty 
allowing him to dispose of it in life or in deaththe will 
Cnta. Fin. p3 Nov. 16129A. G. 3, C-J-11.371, f. 70. On this caseoab3ve, pp. 
53 and 100-101. 
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be content and continue to serve in it'. 
1 
The concern to reap profit from necessity governed 
Finance's reaction to the problem of selling its own receptoria and 
those of Castile and Indies. Its own it sold for 509000 ducatolan 
immensely profitable transaction tolerated only becausepwith. a 
spectacular and puzzling decline in the revenue from criminal fines, 
it found the office no longer supporting itself. 
2 The other cases 
were different in kindpand in both Finance was concerned to preserve 
its own jurisdictional interests. The Castile office was granted for 
two lives as a merced to Uceda's secretarypand Finance was able to 
profit rather nicely from the alienation and to affirm its own 
authority by selling him the perpetuation for another 3p2OO ducats. 
It was indeed rather pleased with itself; the office was of little 
importance and the final agreement - unlike the first - 'very 
advantageous to the royal exchequer,. 
3 A year later it asserted its 
authority more trenchantly vhen Castile sold the perpetuation of the 
Indies office for three lives for 119000 ducats; with a sale involved 
Finance refused ratificationgand sternly rebuked Philip for having 
I- Cntas. Fin. 96 Feb. 1599 and 9 Aug. 1608, A. G. S-C-J-H-352pf. 2520 
2- On the salepLnta. Fin. 24 Jan. 1607 and included 'Relaoioneslg 
A. G. S. C. J,, H. 3459,20 fol.; on the decline in revenue 9 'Rel acion de 
los maravedis quo han entrado en poder del Receptor general .. ' (19 Nov. 1612 - 10 Sept. 1623) printed by Gonzaez Palencia (1932)' 
PP-489-485. 
3- Cnta. Fin. pl2 Jun. 16159A. G. S. C. J. H. 387, f. 75- 
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tolerated the project; better not to sell than to sell at a profit. 
I 
Cnta. Fin.., O? Nov. 16169A. G. S. C., T. H. 391, no fol. A copygand therefore 
no royal decision is recorded. See alsolSohifergio-374. 
W-L 
7-Councils and Councillo-ra- 
1 
In considering both appointments to councils and the 
exercise of councillorships there are exceptions to every rule. On 
State and War in partioulartfor instancetthe fact of appointment did 
not necessarily mean that a man would actually sitgnor indeed that he 
had not already satfand on every council there could be the very 
greatest differences between institutional and personal performances - 
betweenjf3r instanceyState's sitting only 32 times in 1608 or 
Finance's 122 in the same yeargor between Bra chero 9 sitting lp6882 
times on War or Belvederg sitting only twice. All councils had men Who 
were councillors only in name. Many different pressures or 
circumstances could limit a man's servicepagain especially on 
aristocratic State and War9but they could obtaintooton the 
professional c3uncils-Of Finance's thirty four councillorsyfivep 
serving as deputies9sat only 42 times between them - MonroyqMazo, 
HurtadopAyatcli and Alarco"'n - and a zixthq Cabal ay sat onlv 36 times. 
before being appointed to a post in Seville; a seventhpSarmiento de 
Aodgalwas lost to an embassy; an eighthvAcuýaqsat only 26 times as he 
waited to begin his visita; a ninthpIbarrapattended only seven times in 
1 The statistical and biographical material upon which this chapter 
is based is summarised in vol, llpbelowgPP*399-464. 
2 The figure relates only to the initialled consultas; he probably 
attended over 120 or so of the other 153 meetings. 
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five years and a tenthtRamirez do Pradoponly seven in twopas other 
interests consumed their time; and an eleventhvGaita'#n do AYalagonly 19 
in two as illness caught UP with himWhat was important about a 
council in the first instancetthereforepwas how the nucleus of 
its councillors served andycorrelativelyphow ancillary councillors 
were used to make good temporary deficiencies*A presidencytto0owas 
fundamental; Finance, under PozatAculn"atCarrillO and Salazar underwent 
such radical changes as almost entitle us to speak of four different 
Councils of Finance, No, councilvin shortIcan be properly stu died 
'without the statistical data of performance and attendance. For Stateg 
War and Finance9such data will be used in detail9but that discussion 
might profitably be prefaced by some general remarks as to the nature 
of the composition of the other councils. 
The majorpCastiliantcouncils divided into three groups - 
State for the greaterjand Warpthe lessergaristacrac. V; CastilepOrders, 
Indies and Inquisition, for the university-eduoated; and Finance, 
effectively self-educated. Although there were occasional deficiencies 
in the experience of groups of councillors and although individual 
qmbition could be limited by social classpit remains true that this 
Administration offered a career for the talents; the exigencies of 
governing impossibly complex empired had created a class of man of 
massive and bewildering experiencevand Philip 111 made the fullest 
use of them. 
Z. L 4; 
.i 
a. The lawyer-councillor; Castile, IndiespOrders and Inquisition. 
m»ý»ffl»m»m »Wm»UMM- a"U 
CastilegIndies 1 and Orders were for-letradas. Castile had 
six doctoratespIndies and Orders three eachpand all other of their 
councillors had first degrees except for IbarrapDuarte and Ocampo on 
Indies9the two tftUlOB Malpica and Gerona and Perez de Rivera on 
2 Castile. All councillors of Castile and Orders had traditionally to 
be of caballero rankpbut there was only the occasional suggestion of 
n3bili'ty, and then only in five cases - Castile's two tftulos; Pimentel, 
the illegitimate son of Benavente; Guzmangrelated to the Olivarespand 
Padillapholdera of a se5briopthe latter three all sitting on Ordersdý3 
There were four routespall judicialpto a place on these 
councils. with Castile additionally siphoning off a number of men from 
other councils and in turn providing ex-officio members to Warp 
FinancepInquisition and Crusade. The first was the Audiencia; three of 
Castile's councillors came directly fromtthose of Valladolid or 
Granadagand at least another eleven had begun ttheir careers therepand 
The councillors listed in my appendix differ from those listed by 
Dr,, SchRferjhe did not include Criada y Castilla (no. 277)pOcampo 
0, (291) and P6rez do Araciel (295)twhi-le I have included in my 
analysis those five listed by him but of whom I have found no other 
record - Arias Maldonado (270)gAyala 
(271)gMaldonado Verdesoto 
(288), Rooo do tillagutierre Chumacera (296) and Rodrfguez do I 
Valtodano (267). He was clearly incorrect in having Saavedra (297) 
promoted from Finance and I have included him among those of 
unidentified background. 
2- The A. H. N. Cons., L-de P. and A. G. S. Q. C. series almost invariably 
list a man's degreelbut there are exceptions and it may be that 
some of these men had in fact graduated; it would appear highly 
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five of Indies' and seven of Orders' also came directly. Additionally 9 
Castile and Indies both took one councillor from the Seville 
ContrataciSngand another seven of the latter's members were appointed 
on their returns from Audiencia posts in the Indiesqfour as oidares 
and three as presidents. The second source9the alcaid: fa de casa Z 
corte9provided Castile with sevenjIndies with eight and Orders with 
one, and the third. the oidorýa of Finance's Contadurýas Mayoresythreeg 
six and none respectively. 
The last and the most regular of the routes was the 
conciliar fiscal3. a. The fiscal was a definitive figure, for he was the 
Crown lawyer in those judicial cases which formed the largest sector 
of the business of all Castilian councils except State, War and 
Finance; it was thus his existence which in effect defined the consejo 
supremop 
1 
and he brought a peculiarly valuable expertise to the 
council table. Six of Philip 111's seven fiscales of Castile were 
pr3nl3ted by him to 03uncillorships92 and they brought diverse 
probable that Duartegfor instanceglater President of the 
Contratacion had such a degree. 
3- See Appendix ligrespectively nos*197,2339334g3269332. 
1- 'Supremal in this context being synonymous with 'judiciall; only 
Zastile and Inquisition were literally 'supreme' in that they were 
final courts of 'appeal. 
2-A seventhgDiego Ramfrez (248)was appointed 
(19 Apr. 16009A. G. S. Q. C. 
12)but apparently did not take up the post, which was filled by LjLc., 
Gilimon Ramfrez de Arellano (226). 
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experience of other offices - three having been fiscales and one an 
oidor in the Contadurýa May3r de Hacienda, gand one a fiscal and then 
councillor of Indies. bloreoverpan3ther seven of the councillors of 
Castile had served as fiscales in a wide range of offices. Six of the 
the eight Orders' fiscales after 1604-t 
1 
went an to councillorshipsgas 
did all of Indies' seven, while two other councillors of Indies had 
also served as. fiscalespof Orders and the Contadurfa Mayor do 
Hacienda. 
Information is available on the backgrounds of thirty eight 
of the forty one councillors of Castile appointed by Philip 1119 
thirty six of Indies' thirty nine and thirteen of Orders' twenty one; 
of these9the four judicial posts therefore provided twenty9thirty 
five and thirteen respectively9the outstanding councillor of Indies 
being Juan do Ibarraýpr3m3ted from the secretariat. The councillor of 
Orders could reasonably hope for a promotion to Castile; of the 
thirteen promoted during the reignýone went to Inquisition, one to the 
presidency of Valladolidgand ten went directly - and Ocontrillo 
indirectly - to Castile. On Indies9however9the councillorship tended 
to be a final honour; of the forty six serving in all9twenty seven 
served until they retired or diedg 
2 five were appointed to the 
The office certainly existed prior to 1604lbut I have found no 
record of appointments before that date. 
2 The dates of their deaths derive almost exclusively from Dr. 
Scha. 'fer's appendixl, i9355-8o 
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Contratacion presidencypone to that of Granada and one to a 
professorship at Salamanca. In allpseven were appointed directly to 
Castileybut VU18164ez died before taking up his appointmentpand 
Villela was sent to Flanders to serve in Carrillo's old postplike him 
in 1600 a supernumerary councillor not to sitpat least yetIon the 
Council. 1 Of the othersyGasca de Salazar was promoted by Philip llý 
2 
and Flores by Philip 1V. Philip 111 p thereforef directly promoted only 
four men to Castile. Another threephowever9progressed indirectlyp 
Tejada y Mendoza and Marmolejo via the Contratacid'n presidencypthe 
latter under Philip lVqand Perez de Araciel through the Castile 
fiscalG. 
In additionýthereforejto the four judicial routesq 
eighteen of the councillors of Castile appointed by Philip 111 - that 
isgapproximately half - came from other c3uncillorships; eight came 
34 from Ordersp six from Indies and Villagomez came indirectly from 
the C3ntratacionvand one each from NavarrepAragon and 
5 Inquisition. There was thus a considerable diversification of 
Gonzalez Davila (1623)op. 468. He was appointed President under 
Philip 1V; see no., 260. 
2- Appointed to Indies 15 Jun. 1570 and to Castile 29 Sept-15929A. G. S. 
Q. C. 11; Dr. Sch'aL'fer (Appendix llvno. 40)had 29 NOV-1592 for the 
latter dategand has him finishing on Indies on his Promotion. I 
have found him initialling an Indies consulta in 1598- 
3- ie. vAlderete de Haro 
(196) pBenavides 
Tl-9-8-5 _yCabrera (200) 
gContreras 
(203)qLSpez de Salcedo (21O)ONedinilla (212)gMedrano (213) and 
Padilla (219). 
4- ie. tMolina de M5drano (216), oc3ntrillo 
(218)gPe"rez de Aponte (221) 
Salcedo, (227)pPerez de Araciel (222) and Villadmez (235). 
5- ie. qSan Vicente (229) qGuardiola (208) and Paniagua de Loaysa ( 220). 
-1 
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experiencepand one broadly justifying Gonzkez D6ilals dictum that 
the councillors of Castile were I the most learned men of the kingdom' . 
33 
Inquisition was broadly of a kind with those three 
cauncils. Of its thirty one councillorspthe backgrounds of twenty five 
can be analysed. Of these at least six councillors, as has been seen, 
owed their offices to the exercise of favour. 
2 University education 
was again fundamental; five had doctorates and only three - Castrop 
3 Manuel and Guzman - were not licentiates. Five sat as Castile 
c3misarioaga further two were pr3mated from Inquisition's own 
fiscalfa and another from the post of auditor de rota in Rome. It was 
thus substantially part of the letrado, network. In at least five other 
cases legal experience was supplemented by ecclesiastical - two came 
from regional Inquisitorshipaltwo from episcopacies and one from the 
chaplaincjr of Madricli 0 Encarnacion. 
*** *** 
1- Gonzalez Ddvila (1623)pp. 356. 
2- See ab3velp. 127. 
3-I have found no record of Gu*zman's holding a degree9but it appears 
highly probable that he had such; he later rose to be Archbishop 
of Seville. 
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Note; the extra-Castilian councils. 
The biographical information on the extra-Castilian 
councillors allows of only one substantial conclusion in that it 
confirms the well-known subordination Of those kingdoms to Castile, The 
leading aristocrats on ItalyqAragon and Portugal - Navarre had none - 
were castilianisedjappointed only too obviously as centralising agents! 
More generally, subardination was expressed in the limited 
possibilities open to their members; they could not hope for a place on 
a Castilian counciltand it can hardly have soothed their resentment to 
appreciate that those councils were after all concerned with matters 
Castilian. In particularpthe regentea of Aragon and the Italian members 
of Italy were men of considerable distinctionpgenerally as appears 
with that legal training necessary for a place on CastilepOrders and 
Indiesgand with considerable administrative experience. 
2 But only two 
councillors of Aragon were promoted to central councils - M3nserrat de 
Guardiola under Philip 11 to Castilet and Navarra to Inquisition - and 
the Councillor could otherwise hope only for the place that went 
with seniority on the Junta de Guerra de Arag3noNavarre did somewhat 
1- Seepmost obviously, the Chinch3n on Italy and Arag-5n9the Moura and 
Borja on Portugal; respeativelypnoo-432p433 (and 4149415); 4619462; 
4519452. 
2- Seegfor instance9the careers of Caim&n (399)gCorseto (402)pquintana 
DueWas (409)pRodrfguez de Salamanca (412) and Tapia (413) of Italyý 
Fontanet (436)tMartinez do Villar (439) and Zalba do Vallseca (448 
The information on these men in the Appendix derives chiefly from 
Gonzhez Djtvila (1623), PP. 454-5 and 438- 
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better; it hadgat different rem3vesysupplied Contreras and RamIrez de 
Prado to Castile at the beginning of the reignpard it provided San 
y councillor of Castile in 16159and Jimenez de Vicente as supernumerar. 
I 
Oco to the Orders fiscal3"a in 1614, whence he passed in 1616 to a 
c3uncillorship. But such were excepti3nal; m3re typical was the career 
of Camarg3, sitting curiously an both AragSn and Navarre and winning a 
promotion to the Granada oidoria. 
1 Regente Escudera of Italy almost 
shared San Vicente's triumphpbut died before taking up his place on 
Castile* 2 
*** *** 
A-H. N. Cons., L. de P. 72 f. 25v. lle did not however appear in the 
Granada lists for 16,9 and 16079and in 1607 took up the position 
of aidor'in Valladolid, Almansa and Acosta were also both promoted 
from Navarre to Granadalbut Acosta again did not take up his 
place j continuing on Navarre for four years. 
2 Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)tp. 33- 
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b. The President8. 
I After the dismissals of Vazquez de ArcepCortespPortocarrerop 
Poza and LagunavPhilip III appointed twenty two presidents to Castile,, 
FinancepIndiesgOrdersgInquisition and Italypt3gether with one 
G3vernor each for Finance and Italy as deputies for ill and absent 
presidents. There was no aristocratic restorationsPhilip 11 left three 
of those six councils in titled handspbut only eight of his s3n's 
appointees were nobles - Miranda (Castile); Lemos (Indies and Italy); 
Salinas (Indies); the Constable and Benavente (Italy); Salazar (Finance) 
and Caracena (Orders). Two, distinctions should be drawn here - between 
Italy and the other councilsland between the old and the new 
aristoorac. v. Italypconcezzed to rule a foreign landpwas necessarily 
led by great magnates, for only they had the elevated experience and 
rank appropriate to the leadership. 
1 The Constable and Benavente had 
such in full measurejand if Lemos was a less obvious choice9he had 
some modicum of Italian experience to complement that gained from his 
leadership of Indies. In the event he was largely an absentee 
presidentgand his deputy, Dr. Juan Beltr1n de Guevaragwas thoroughly 
well-qualified. The Presidents of Italy, thereforegare not directly 
On the significance of social rank in determining which nobles 
served in Italyvbelowvpp, 2. sq'-& 
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relevant to the problem of the role of the aristocracy in government, 
I Of the titulos leading the Castilian letrado councils, only 
Miranda and Lemos were of the old aristOoracv; Salinas, Salazar and 
Caraoena all had now titlesgas did Acuna for the latter part of his 
presidency of Castilegand all were men of singular distinction and 
achievement. The Olftaristacracygindeed9did rather less well than it 
might have even ordinarilv expected. 
The lawyer was more successful. Although Inquisitionplike 
Italygdemanded a particular qualification of its president - it was 
amply fulfilled; twO were cardinals, twagbiShOPB and one a royal 
confess3r - it had in NiZo do GuevarapZaiga and even Bautista 
Acevedo presidents 'with legal training. CastilepFinance and Indies were 
effectively dominated by lavyer-administrators; all four of Miranda's 
successors on Castile and Acu-na and Carrillo on both Finance and 
an I Indies were thus qualifiedgas were Governors Beltr" do Guevara 0 
(Italy) and "ococampofrio (Finance). Neither of Order's presidents had 
legal training9but Idiaquez was qualified for any government post 
while Caracenalpreviously Governor of Galicialhad clearly demonstrated. 
his administrative abilities as Viceroy of Valencia supervising the 
Expulsion.. 
Philip 111's presidentp the reforepwas a man of considerable 
political and administrative experiencelas often as not with legal 
2ijI 
training; only exceptionally was he closely associated with Lermat 
1 
and 
even more rarely was he drawn from the higher aristocraoy; and he had 
virtually no previous experience of his council. 2 
His tenure of office wasthowever, fairly consistently 
undermined by absenteeism caused either by ill-health or by various 
other claims on his time. Finance was apparently alone in its 
resistance to such pressurevand indeed in this respect attained 
perfection; in the twenty five yearS3 from 1597 to 1622jits presidents 
missed only 22 of the 1584 meetings for which initialled consu. 1tas 
have survivedvand three of those were accounted for by Carrillo's 
journey with the Court in 1615 and tan by Salazar's terminal illness 
I 
at the turn of 1620-2l. Orders, howeverywas as has been seen consistently 
14 deprived of Idiaquezy while Castile suffered over the three years fromý 
the autumn of 1607 from the successive illnesses and deaths of 
Inquisitiongsimilarlyphaving MirandayBautista Acevedo and Manso, 
5 
lost Ni"na de Guevara a little over a year after he replaced 
/, W months. 
6 
Italy fared Portocarrera then lost Zuniga within another five 
1- See abovegpp. 103-6. #P, 0 un 2 Acuna had served on Castile and briefly on Financepand Z iga and 
Aliaga on Inquisition9but none of the others had had any previous 
experience of their councils, 
3 On the lack of documentation for 1602pabovepP. 34. 
4 See abovepp. 146. 
5 See abovetPP-78-9. 
6 On HirTa's appoi5tment to SevillepCabrera de Cordoba (1857)PPP-94 
and 97tand on Zu'n"i9a's death vibid. YPP- 154o 162. See also LeapiPP-306 for the suggestion that Nil'a was effectively dismissed. 
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worst of all. The Constable, appointed on his return from Italy, left 
Court immediately to convalescepand with this absence coinciding with 
the removal of the Court9missed two m3nthslw3rk on State; and also 
presumably therefore on Italy. 
1 
His extraordinary embassy to England 
then deprived b3th of his services for more than fifteen months in 
1603-4,2 but he then attended State at least regularly until his 
appointment t3 Milan in the autman of 1610.3 When he returned in the 
summer of 1612 it was as a broken many and he waw., unable to resume on 
45 
Statevand regente Lana served as his deputy on Italy. With Lemos 
being virtually an abseaAee presidentl 
6 Italy was thus effectively 
with3ut a p: resident for eight years to September 1618. Benavente's 
appointment rectified the situation only temporarily, for he and his 
successorlZilXigalboth died within nineteen months of the beginning of, 
3 
Philip IV' s reign. 
1- He was appointed in May 1600, returned to Court on 29 Dec. pand 
assumed the presidency on 10 Jan. 1601pleaving for two months on 
21 Jan. 1601, Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)PPP-5899205196. He sat on 
State an 29 Jan. 1601ýbut not again until 1 AprilýAttendance 
Register. 
2- Attendance Register. On English embassy 9 Cabrera do C6rdoba 
(1857)p 
190-1; see alsolibid. opp-174 and 195 on projected appointments in 
1603 to Flanders and Milan. 
3- ibid-opp-414-5 and 417paad appointment announced by Lerma to 
Carrillo913 Sept. 16109A. G. S. C. J. H. 361, no fol. 
4- j_bid-qpp-479v488 and 496 and Attendance Register. 
5- 
. 
1bid. pp. 417. 6- On Beltrtn de Guevara's assumption of the Governorship after 
refusing the Vice-presidencytibid. oPP-509 and 516; on Lemoses 
general absenteeism pGonza'le z 
-D-Ma (1623)tp. 468. 
2261 
StatepWar and Finances Appointments and the Exercise of Councillorships. 
A. The Council of Statep1600 - 1621. 
mm WMHWýMmmwmbý m 
Appointments. 
Appointment to State could be marvellously chaotic. As has 
been seengfive of the councillors sitting after the reorganisation of 
the spring of 1600 made their first appearances or assumed regular 
cauncillorships on itinerant councilsywhile Poza was appointed 
apparently only to compensate him for his dismissal from the 
presidency of Finance. 
1 Four more men - C&rdabalthe ConstablefOlivares 
and X4'jia - were all swo= in after they had actually begun sitting. The 
Constable and Olivarespindeedgwere even then only formally appointed to 
add honour to impending foreign servicepbut while the Constable - 
having already sat 74 times - went abraady0livares evaded his 
appointment and assumed his councillorship. 
%ot dissimilarlygla 
Lagunapgiven the alternative of the Valencian viceroyalty or a 
councillorshippchose the latterp3while Albuquerquegappointed to State 
1 On T; Dledo, AlbuquerquagBenaventepAliaga and Alva de Listelabove, p. 
145-On Pozap'abovePP-34; he sat regularly from 7 Feb. 1602. 
2 MdJia's is the only extant title to a councillorshiP95 Oct. 1612p 
A. G. S. Q-C-5; fi6 first sat on 3 Sept. 1610, and regularly from 30 Apr- 
161I. On appointmentpsee also Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)PP-431. 
CSrdoba first sat on 19 Oct. 16CDOtthe Constable on 29 Jan, 1601 and Olivares on 5 Nov. 1601; on their appointments 9 ibid. ypp. 88 P 1569 203. 3- On appointment pibid vPp-453Y456 and 459- 
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to h3n3ur his departure for the Aragonese viceroyalty9sat twice in 
1608 - on itinerant councils - did not take up regular attendance 
"I until 1610 and yet contrived to evade going to Aragon. Converselyl 
Card3napappointed in similar circumstances did not sit at allpwhile 
Sesa and Zilgiga both assumed counoillorships on returning from abroad 
and having won release from further foreign service. 
2 
Finallypthe 
sixth duke of Infantado was given his councillorship in reward for a 
3 Sandoval marriage. In all I therefore, thirteen ofthe twenty eight 
councillors attending after 23 April 1600 were introduced in quite 
casual mannerbut once again the manner of induction was less 
important than the fact. Many of these men became major councillors- 
Beneath the smokescreen there was system enough. State was 
the supreme policymaking body; as an anonymous contemporary wrotey'its 
authority is the most that the King gives to his vassals'. 
4 That 
authority was concerned chiefly with formulating Spanish foreign 
policiespaad the vassals were great nobles with considerable personal 
experience abroad. Neither qualification was absolutepbut as a body 
State was elitistlboth socially and politically. 
The Count of Fuentes may to all intents and Purposes be 
excluded from our analysis of the councillors proper of State since he 
0 
I- ibid. op-346. 
2- On these menpaboveppp. 180-2- 
3- Cabrera de Cdrdoba (1857)ppp. 184-5- 
4-B. N. 904pf. 44som-cit 
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sat only twice after that meeting on 23 APril 1600 which effectively 
divided Philip's old Council of State from his new. 
1 Of the twenty 
seven, sixteen were of the titled aristocracy at the time of 
appointment: 
Dukes; InfantadopSesapAlbuquerquevthe Constable (Frias). 
Marquises; Velada, PozapVillafrancapLerma (Denia)qla Laguna. 
Counts; Chincho'*nqMirandaqBorja (Picallo)pthe Alva de ListepOlivaresp 
Benavente. 
The remaining eleven divided into two groupsgneither exclusive of the 
other and both subordinate to the first. Most obviouslypthere were the 
ecclesiastics - confessors CordobapJavierre and Aliaga, and cardinals 
Nino de GuevafavToledo and Zapata. Even herephoweverpthere were two 
representatives of great housesiToledo and Zapata were ecclesiastical 
younger sonspand the latter would indeed have succeeded to the title 
of Count of Barajas on the death of his brother without heirs if he 
had not already entered the religious life* 
2 Ni: Ko de Guevara was 
also of rank, xif on a slightly lower planegbeing also an 
3 
ecclesiastical younger son9but of a family only ennobled by Philip 111. 
The other five counoillors may be broadly characterised as 
meritacrats; SpinolayMejia and Zu'-n'iga coming to the Council from 
brilliant careers abroadjand Idii%uez and Moura achieving their 
See above ypp. 29-30; the Adel antado qNQ era and the fifth duke of 
Infantado made their last appearan'Oes on that day9while Moura left 
after the previous meeting (8 April). 
2- Lepez de Haro (1622)piip224-5- 
3- His brother Juan being created Count of Villanover de Tormes in 
16019 ibid. 91, PPP- 117-8 and 213. 
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chiefly at homepat the centre of government. Againghoweverithere was 
nobility here; Spinola had an Italian title9while Mejia and ZZiga were 
both younger sons of great houses. The two adminiBtratorspmore3verp 
raised their families in statusgif not quite to social greatness - 
Idiaquez. comendador mayor de Leo'n9was father of a duke and a county 
while Moura became a marquisva grandee of Portugal and consuegro of a 
count. 
2 It would perhaps be stretching the point to include Moura among 
those who held a title when appointed to State - as he did when 
reappointed in 1612 - but Zapata should certainly be added to the 
aristocratic listvand ToledojMejia and ZZigapperhaps even Nin'O de 
Guevaragmight reasonably be similarly bracketed with the greatest 
of the land. If we similarly include Spinolalwe are left only with the 
three confessors and the two former secreiaries as the exceptions to 
the aristocratic rule. 
Thoughts of any 'aristocratic restoration' mustghowever, 
be 
tempered by the realisation that the very richest tended not to serve; 
there was no place at all xfor an Enrfquezq0sunajLemos or 
Bejar and 
while Medina-Sidonia and the Adelantado did serve at 
the beginning of 
the reignpthey did so only briefly and were not succeeded on 
the 
Council by relatives. 
Acknowledgement should similarly be made of the remarkable 
1- ie. 9 the Count of Aramayona and the Duke of 
Ciudad Real. 
2- His son married the daughter of the Count of Tentugal 9 Cabrera do 
CSrdoba (1857)tP-542; on his title, of Castel-Rodrigolibid PPP-10t 
and 58- 
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precariousness of inheritance. Four of the titulos - Pozavthe sixth 
Count of Alva de ListepSesa and Benavente - inherited through: t the 
deaths of older brothersywhile, Miranda - like the Adelantado before 
him - won his title by marrying his own niece. The two greatest of the 
titles passed even more haphazardly. The fifth duke of Infantado, 
himself a cauncillorpinherited directly from his grandfather and in 
turn passed the title on to his own granddaughter. She married twice 
before becoming the heiresspand it was thus her second husband, the 
seventh son of the third marquis of Mondejarowho had the incredible 
good fortune to become the sixth duke. 
1 The Albuquerque title similarly 
went to the second husband of the daughter of the fourth duke. 
2 These 
accidents were to have significant effect on the careers of these men, 
and c3nsequently upon the type of expertise available 
t3 the Council. 
Councillorships of State were not for the young. Of the 
railable3 twenty one for whom information is ai , only four - 
Spinola (41)t 
Lerma (45)tBoria (47) and the sixth duke of Infantado (48) - were not 
at least fifty when appointedvand only Spin3lapla 
Laguna and Zapata 
survived into the 1630S.. 
There was no direct conciliar path to State, 
just as there 
Lopez de Hara (1622)pitp. 253- 2- ibid. 9p. 351- 
3 Dates of birth are available for 129and in 8 cases it has been 
possible to infer a minimum age; f3r example gBenaventeg appointed in 
1615 may be presumed to have been over 50 since he had been appoint-. 
ed Captain General of LeSn in 1580. The six exceptions - Cdrdobap 
JavierragVeladagla Lagunagthe Constable and the sixth 63unt of 
Alva do Liste. In the cases of the three men inherited from Philip 11 
I have, calculated from the date of reappointment by Philip ill. 
2 3,1, 
" ý, -ý 
was no promotion from State to other Councils; this council was uniquep 
and the qualifications for it lay outside normal administrative 
experience. Councillors of State might sit ongor more normallyppreside 
over other oouncilspbut there was no causative link. The neat 
arrangement of 1599 
1 therefore proved to be coincidental; Miranda 
(Castile), Poza (Finance) and Idia"quez (Orders) were not followed on 
to State by any of their presidential successorsland none of Indies' 
were elevated. Two presidencies9however9were exceptionalgItaly for 
reasons already discussedp 
2 
and Inquisition because of Philip's 
religious suseeptibilities. Both were represented on State by three meny 
but the exceptions were the more interestinggand indeed significant. 
With ZZiga exdrcising only a six-week presidency of Inquisition, in 
effect only one president of each was not app3intedgand they - 
Bautista Acevedo and Lemos - were of course precisely the two Most 
closely associated with Lerma. 
3 
These presidencies apartgonly the royal 
confessarship carried anything resembling an ex-officio councillorship, 
but even here one of four - Fr. Mardones - was not appointed. 
Nor was there promotion from State's junior Councilgalthough 
la Laguna and Me"jia had both sat as councillors of War. La Laguna sat 
only twicegin 1601jand then earned his councillorship Of State by both 
his foreign service and by having the right courtly conneotionsýand 
1- See abovegP-31.2 - See abovepp. 222. 
3- See ab3veYPP-78-9P105-6,118-19. 
4- On 1603-6 embassy to Pl anders p Cabrera de Cýrdoba 
(1857)PPP-172,183 
23592689289. In 1611 he was given two cuent3s for life and the 
alternative of a councill3rship or tho- dFancian viceropltypand 
shortly after being swarn in as councillor left the pos of Maor- 
ýýj 
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although Meiia's was more nearly a direct prom3tionqit was immediately 
earned - as was Villafranca's - by services in administering the 
Expulsion. 1 
Appointment to State represented a supremely personal choice 
by the Kinggand since so many considerations might weigh in his mind 
in any one casepanalysis of his appointments will necessarily be 
complex. Ab3ve all else, h3weverpit must be remembered that Philip 
himself changed over the years. At the beginning of the reign he had 
appointed men more or less as they became available; of the twenty seven 
sitting after April 1600 no fewer than fifteen had been appointed by 
the end of 1603.2 These mengtogether with Javierre (1605) and the fifth 
count of Alva do Lists (1608)pformed the first of two distinct 
generations of councillors divided by the year 161O. The difference 
between the two was precisely that the first was appointedland often 
satpeasually, while the second - Aliaga apart - consisted of men of 
excellencegall of whom took their councillorships seriously; it was the 
difference at once between the dilettante and the professionallbetween 
the euphoria of the beginning of the reign and the trauma of the 
middle. 
doma mayor to the Queen; perhaps therefore his COUnCill3rship was a 
quid pro quo for renouncing the Court officegibid. tPP. 4539456,459- 
1- ibid. 9p. 431pand enta. St. 926 Mar. 16119A. G. S. 
b-. 2643pno fol, 9which 
made the specific connection with their m3risco services. 
2- Sesaqwho did not sit until 16049is included in the fifteen because 
he was appointed in 1603; see above 9 p. 181. Conversely vMOural 8 
appointment is taken in this connection as being in 1612. 
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The first requirement of a councillor of State should 
obviously have beenpand generally waspof experience of foreign 
service. Only eight had not served abroadjand of those Javierre and 
Aliaga sat as confessors and Toledo as Primate of Spaing-while of the 
laymen Lerma and Albuquerque had exercised domestic viceroyalties 
and P3za a great presidencylif with some lack of positive 
distinction. Infantado and the sixth count of Alva de Liste alone 
therefore of the eight brought no particular expertise by way of at 
least nominal compensation. 
Otherwisepthe range of experience was dazzlingtprobably far 
outstripping that available to any contemporary ruler. Five had served 
in Italian vioeroyaltiespand of those the fifth count of Alva alone 
had not also been entrusted with at least one other major positiong 
and he had served in Sicily for thirteen years; VeladagNiranda and 
Benavente had also served in domestic viceroyaltiespwhile Olivares 
had held a French embassy. Nine others had served on at least one 
embassy - Idi6quezqCOrdabaqSesa and Chinchon in Italy; Villafranca in 
France; la Laguna in Planders; M3ura in Portugal; Borja in both Ge=any' 
and Portugalland ZZiga in FlandersqFrance and Germany. Additionallyp 
coursepIdiaquezpMourapChinchon and Miranda had had vast experience 
Of foreign Policymaking at the centre of government. 
The military service of the councillors was less 
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comprehensive. especially after the loss of Fuentes and the Adelantadop 
but the first generation could count on the expartise of the Constable, 
and to a less distinguished extent an that of Chinchong0livaresgMiranda 
and Sesavand the second on the brilliance of Spinala and Mejiafandy 
v again less impartantlyp3n that of Zu/niga-Sailors were in shorter supplyp 
and again the Adelantada's experience was missedguntil the induction of 
Villafranca in 1611-12y although both Sesa and Meiia had fought at 
Lepanto)and Zu"n"iga on the 1588 empresa 
There were deficiencies. In the first half of the reign no 
councillorgafter Fuentes's departureýwas able to draw on recent first- 
hand experience of Flemish affairspand this deficiency obtained until 
the appearance of MejiagSpinalapla Laguna and Villafranca in 1611-12. 
There was a shortage of French experts; Z&higa had been Ambassador in 
Paris in 1603-6 but did not sit until 1617yand Villafranca's 
extraordinary embassy of 1608-9 was thus the only other recent personal 
experience. Nor, the Constable's extraordinary embassy of 1604 apart9was 
there any personal experience of English affairs. In practicepthese 
deficiencies were of only limited consequence because the Council could 
rely on both ambassadorial and other reports and an the use in junt 
of the expertise of men who had recent and ample experience of these 
areas. There was one exception; the complete absence of any realistic 
information on the English situation prior to 1604 had disastrous 
effectsvas the Council was forced to formulate an English policy in 
3 j'T ' 
virtually complete ignorance of political realities in England. 
I 
The significance of these deficiencies was that they were 
in large part socialogical in origin. It was no accident that fifteen 
in all had served in Italy. The most distinguished of the Spanish 
aristocrats - that istthe heads of great houses - tended to serve in 
the major Italian diplomatic posts while their younger brothers 
entered military or ecclesiastical carears; thus, State's ecclesiastics 
apartýthe definitive distinction between the councillor of Stateg 
titled with Italian diplomatic servicepand the councillor of Warg 
2 untitled and a troop leader in Flanders. As rules went in this 
s3cietylthis was remarkably fixed. Of the fifteengten - including 
Zapata - were titled heads of families9while of the five týtul3s who 
had not served abroad at allpfour - PozagInfantadogthe sixth count of 
Alva and Albuquerque - were among those who had inherited their titles 
unexpectedly. Only Lerma himself therefore of the five exceptions was 
an eldest sonfand he had presumably not served abroad because of his 
financial difficulties. 
Carrelatively9the other three men who had not served abroad 
at all - AliagapJavierre and Toledo - sat as ecclesiastics rather 
than as aristocratspwhile of the four who had served abr3ad but not 
in Italyqla Laguna and Z45iga were both younger sons while M3ura and 
Borjajas P3rtuguesagwere at once both effectively excluded from the 
1- See below, pp. 31'4. -Ir 
2- On the councillors of Warp belowppp. U-7 
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Italian service and necessarily required to work in Portugal. 
Distinctive patterns begin therefore to emerge. With a few 
exceptionapmostly ecolesiasticallthe councillor of State was the head 
of a family and hadyunless he had inherited unexpectedly or late in 
lifelserved as a diplomatpnormally in Italy. Two other factors require 
investigation - the relationship between 'courtly' and properly 
professional appointments, and the manner in which council 1o rehips were 
exercisedpboth individually and corporately. There was a remarkably 
precise correlation between the two. 
The first generation was both more numerous than the 
second andjas a wholepless broadly experienced, ]* In respect of both 
manner of appointment and service it divided into two main groups 
. OF with a third bridging the tw3. The retention of Idiaquez, Chinchon and 
Miranda and the induction of Olivares and the Constable provided the 
Council with a solid and highly professional care of quite massively 
variegated experience. It had als3phowevergsix men with no foreign 
experience at allyand of those LermagInfantado and the sixth count of 
Alva sat as courtiers and Cord3bagJavierre and Toledo attended as 
senior ecolesiastics. Alth3ugh Velada. had considerable foreign 
experiencephegto3psat as a royal intimate. The third group consisted 
of men who were well-qualified for councill3rships but vholfor 
different reasons9made little quantitative impression upon the 
Council. The fifth count of Alva and Sesa served only briefly beforo 
dyingpas did Ki'no de Guevara before being appointed to Seville. Only 
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Poza and Barjalthereforegboth relatives of Lermaywere actively 
irresponsible. With the appointment of Alva's brother in 1608 the era of 
the casual appointee was finally closed; only two of the ten thereafter 
appointed - Albuquerque and Aliaga - had not served abroadtand only with 
Aliaga and la Laguna were there suggestions of favour being exercised in 
respect of appointment* 
Twelve councillors in all made little or no quantitative 
impression upon the Council2and onlytthree of them belonged to the 
second generation - Spinala and Zapatapbecause they left to pursue their, 
professional careers9and Mouragbecause he was recalled only shortly 
before dying. SimilarlypNi5o de GuevaraySesa and the fifth Alva were each 
available for less than two years. The other six were all closely 
connected with the Court - LermagCo*rdobagJavierrepthe sixth count of 
AlvagBorja and POza-Converselyponly seven members of the first 
generation were numbered among the fifteen statistically most important 
councill3rspand two of those - Toledo and Velada - are thus included 
only by virtue of having sat at the lowest of levels over long periods* 
The other fivegh3weverpwere precisely those men best-qualified for 
c3uncillorships - Idi, <quezChinchongMiranda)Olivares and the Constable. 
The rule becomes almost absoluta; the closer a man's connection with the 
eourt or the less purely political the reason for appointing him, the 
less likely he was to take his councillorshiP seriously, 
The one exception to the rule of 'courtly' amateurism 
238-1 
was Infantado. Between. 1603 and 1608 he sat with a casualness fully 
appropriate to the circumstances of his appointment, 
1 
but in 1609-10 
transformed himself into as professional a councillor as any of his 
colleagues2eventually indeed attending more times than any of them. 
His career was marvellously symbolic of the more general 
transformation of the C3uncilyas he became the Moura of his 
generationgthe erstwhile courtier turned professional administrator. 
2 
*** *** 
See abovepp. 227. 
menino to do a JuanaA. C. C- 2 Moura having come to Court in 1554 ag -n in Diccionario de Historia de E22ga'2ndoodition-p"(1-968)pvol. 11 
d P-1137. 
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StatetThe Exercise of Councillorships. 
The reign9then9divided itself neatly into two parts after 
the re3rganisati3n of 1600; the first ten years to 16099and the last 
twelve from 1610pwith *wo troughs9the first (1606-9) as the Council 
all but disintegratedpand the second (1610-13) as it transformed 
itself*This was true at once Of C3. uncil and 03uncillors. In the first 
period it met on more than forty occasions only in 1600 and 1605P 
whereas in the second it fell below that figure only in 1611-139 
and indeed over the last seven years to the end of 1621 and despite 
the great itineracies of 1615 and 16199it sat More times than it had 
in the whole of the first ten. The difference was one of 
professionalised Consistency; in the first ten years it met more than 
fifteen times in any four months on four Occasions, while in the last 
twelve it did so on twenty three. The average attendance reflected 
this, for while it only sank below 4.00 in five years (1607-10 and 
1617), its maintenance in the first period was almost vh. ')11. v due to a 
care of five men while in the second only three mengall left over 
from the first generation - LermayVelada. and Toledo - failed to 
attend with impressive regularity. 
The most important councillors in the first part of the 
reigngthengwere the best qualified and most able of themoUntil his 
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retirement in August 1614, within two months of his deathJdia"quez led 
the Council at a remarkable average attendance of 72,3%-It was a 
noble effortlunmarred by any absences othur than those of the royal 
itineracies; theygindeadpaccounted for the six years in which he fell 
below a 70% attendancep 
I 
and the professionalism of his performance 
was evidenced by his attendance in those years not thus affected - 
1600 (92. ", ), 1605 (89.1f)vl6O7 (85-7%), and 1612 (92*3%). Miranda was 
the least important of his major colleaguespbut despite his duties on 
Castile still attended over 60% of the meetings in all years to the 
end of 1604 except for 11602 (34.3%). 
2 lie then missed the first four 
months of 1605 and effectively retired at the end of that year. 
3 
Chinch6n, with only one personal absence - of four months in 1603 to 
visit his ill wifQ4 _ sat more consistentlylat an average of 80.8% to 
within five deys of his death in September 1608*The recently desk- 
bound experience of these men was complemented by the more 
immediately foreign service of the Constable and Olivares; from 
January 1602 until his departure for Milan in October 1610 the 
Constable sat at over 75% of the meetingspsaving only the fourteen 
monthslabsence of 1603-4 for his English embassy9while Olivares -a 
ten monthslabsence in 1603 in Seville on government business apart - 
missed only four meetings out of 139 from September 1602 until his 
1- The others thus affected - 1601(75-5%)gl6O4 (77.1%)91606 (76.9%) 
and 1613 (75%); see abovepp. 146. 
2- No explanation is recarded, but it was not due to an itineracy. 
3- He sat thereafter only 7 times; on his illnesslab3vePP-78. 4- Ile was absent between 21 April and 21 Au st; on the reasonp Cabrera do CO'rdoba (1857)vpp. 1113 and 18T 
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sudden death in March 1607- 1 The Council had thus a consistently 
professional c3re; by the end of 1607, only on seventy seven occasions 
had it met without at least three of these men in attendancepand 
thirty two of those belonged to 1600-019before the Constable and 
Olivares took up regular attendancepand a further twenty six to 1604 
when the Constable was in England and Olivares temporarily absent. 
Of their colleaguespthe courtiers inevitably had the worst 
recards. Velada in 1605 and 1611 twice contrived to sit at six 
consecutive meetings, but attended only 157 times (25-4%) over sixteen 
and a half yearspand only in five did he sit at more than one third 
of the annual meetings9with a best attendance of 37.1% in 1604. 
Infantado started promisingly enoughvattending sixty of seventy four 
meetings over the last twenty one months in Valladolid9but then 
reverted to apparent type by sitting only once in the next twenty* 
Lerma had sat three times by the end of 1607. 
Eight more distinguished men served in effect as ancillary 
councillors. 9 either fitfully for for limited periods. Ni'no'3 de Guevara 
and Poza both served regularly (83-,. ' and 86.3A) for Periods of just 
under two years9and thus had the longest consecutive attendances of 
the eight. CSrdoba was necessarily itinerant2but his attendance of 59.8% 
at those meetings for which he was available contrasted poorly with 
that of Idiaquez. 2 Toledo was affected by different residential 
L- He sat regularly from 18 Sept. 1602 until 15 Mar. 1607-On his deathp 
Cabrera do C&rdoba (1857)PP. 300 
2- On Cdrdoba's itineracygabovelp. 146. 
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requirements and could thus plead some excuse at least until the 
Court returned to Madrid; having sat regularly enough (85%) in the 
second half of 1600 he was all but absent in Valladolid9saving only 
an eight m3nths' attendance when in 1603 he travelled to Court on 
ecclesiastical and family business. 
1 His real proclivities revealed 
themselves when on the return in 1606 he sat only briefly (9: 14) 
before tiring of Court and returning to Toledo itself. 
2 Even when in 
1608 his Inquisitorship brought him back to Court2he sat consistently 
only for nine months (22: 24) until August 1610.3 
The councillorships of the fifth count of Alva and Sesa 
reflected their poor health. Having sat once in 1600, Alva attended 
regularly after the removal to Valladolid (16: 26) before retiring at 
the end of 1601. After then returning in March 1602 at the royal 
insistenceY4 he sat regularly until his final retirement in June 1604 
with one absence of two months accounting for eight of his nineteen 
absences from fifty six meetings in that period. Sesa similarly sat 
for four months (11: 12) in 16049missed as many againgand then returned 
for a final nine and a half months (27: 32) before retiring in 
September 1605- 
5 Borja, toogwas illýbut his failure was more 
irresponsiblegand he bestirred himself only in 1600 (65-8%) and- for 
1- See Rafael Alcala Lainez (1935)gpp. 110-112* 
2- Cabrera de C rdoba (1857)vp. 294. 
3- The papal Brief arrived on 4 Oct-16o8gibid-pp-351yand he resumed 
regularly on 20 Nov. 
4- See abovegp. 174. 
5- He made a last attendance on 15 Nov. 1605jand died an 9 Tan. 1606. 
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nine months in 1603-4 (76.9%)pthen missed a further six months in 
October 1604 before returning for a final fifteen months (38-, 309 
retiring in October 1605-1 Javierre made no impression. 
In 1608 two more men were introducedpAlbuquerque sitting 
twice an itinerant councils in that yeargand the sixth count of Alva 
do Lists sat f3r ten weeks in January-March 1608 and for a further 
nine months in 1609 but still sat only twenty two times in all, In 
16071for the first timepthe average attendance sank below 4.00 and 
as the great politico-econimic crisis approached its climax State 
could rely - after Chinchon's death - on the attendance of only two 
men of distinguished achievement. Of these2the Constable would be 
appointed to Milan in OCt3ber 1610 while Idia"quez would attend less 
than 60% of each year's meetings between 1608 and 1611 as he 
travelled with the King. Two great magnatesvh3weverpbelatedly took up 
regular attendance - Infantadolfrom -Tanuary 1609 (66: 70 to December 
1610)vand Albuquerque a year later (36: 38 to December 1610)*They were 
inadequate compensation for the losses of Chinch3on and Olivarespand 
two great soldiers who could have provided such compensation - M4jia 
and Spinola - sat only onaegin. September 161O. In 16109therefore, of 
1- See also abovejp. 23- 
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nine councillors four - VeladaLermaySpin3la and Mejia - sat only ten 
f times between themland Idiaquez sat at only eighteen of forty four 
meetingsýfive of which were itinerant. With the Constable's departure 
only four men were left in regular attendance - the seventy year old 
Idigquezývho would continue his travels; Toledolwho might tire of 
attendance at any m3ment; Albuquerquelwh3 would retire in February 1613, 
and Infantado, who would alone continue to sit regularly for many years* 
At the end of 1610, the Council of State was on the point of 
disintegration. 
It was saved by a transformation comparable to that on War 
at the beginning of the reignias improved frequency and consistency of 
convocation was matched by a vastly improved consistency of attendance. 
Continuity between the old and the new was provided by Idiaquezy 
Infantado and Albuquerque. Between January 1611 and Ax 16 August 1614 
.0 Idiaquez sat at sixty five meetings and missed a further twenty six 
through his itineracy9but was otherwise absent for only six. Ile died on 
12 October7at seventy four and after twenty eight years as a 
c3uncillor. 
1 Albuquerque continued to his retirement as he had in 1610 
(59t68)9and Infantado into the next reign as he had since January 1609. 
In the thirteen years to the end of 1621, he attended over 90% of the 
annual meetings in five (1611-14) 1621) over 
80% in two (1609-10)gover 
t 
App31nted c3uncillor 31 Dec. 1586, Perez M&guez 
(1935)tp. 219. 
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70% in three (1616,1618 and 1620)9and over 6V,.,, in a further one (1617, 
68.9%). Overalighe attended 75.5% of all meetings9but exclusive of the 
itineracies of 1615 and 1619 missed only 97 of 538 (81.9%). 
Two new councillors seryed only briefly - Spinola at 30: 35 
over the year ta his return t3 Flanders in April 16129and Moura at 
40: 49 between March 1612 and his retirement in November 1613. Of the 
3thers9only Villafranca and Zapata did not sit at a similar level from 
their inductions to the end of the reign. Mejia9from. April 1611 and 
excluding the itineracy of 1619; sat at 88,9 (414: 470) of the meetings to 
the end of 16.219and la Laguna at 78. V, - of those from January 1612 to 
the end of the reign. Villafranea sat at an Infantado-like 93-8% from 
January 1612 until his departure for Milan in August 1615 and at a 
similar level from his return (18 September 1618) until April 1620. He 
then missed thirteen months before resuminglagain at the same levelq 
under Philip 1V. 
Velada, Lerma and Toledo concluded their councillorships at 
their accustomed levels and were therefore all but passengers9l and in 
July 1615 Aliaga in effect took over from Villafrancapand sat at over 
half of the remaining meetings9with a five monthslabsence after the 
fall of Lerma. In 1617pthe average attendance again fell briefly below 
4-00 (3-87), but there was still consistency of attendance, with 
Velada sat 62 times between January 1611 and his retirement an 
21 June 1616; Lerma, 13 from January 1611 to his dismissal; Toledo 
sat throughout 16139but for only half a year or SO in 1611-12 and 
1614-169and only very occasionally in 1617-18. 
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InfantadayMejia and la Laguna all sitting at over 70% of the meetings9 C2 
and Zuniga's introduction in July made good the deficiency. He, 
Benavente and Zapata were the only new councillors after Aliagaland 
they maintained the requisite standards; Zaiga and Benavente sat 
respectively at 78.2% and 91. M, of the meetings fr3m July 1617 and 
February 1619 to the end of the reignpand Zapata at 65-9% of those 
over the two years from September 1618.1 
*** *** *** 
All three figures±take account of the 1619 itineracy9when ZEiga 
alone travelled. Zapata left in 1620 to take up the viceroyalty of 
Naples. 
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B. The C3uncil 3f Wary1597 - 1622. 
Appointments. 
=ýMMMM awmýwmw 
The councillor of War was socially junior to the councillor 
of Stateland his experience was therefore of a different9less elevatedq 
kind. If wasghowevergif anything more extensivegand the professionalism 
with which he performed his duties was certainly basically superior - 
so much solindeed9that after 1601 Philip had in effect only to appoint 
supplementary councillors. In 1601 there were nine councillors of War 
and in 1621 five of them still formed the nucleus of the Council, with 
la Laguna0wh3 had only sat twice as a professional memberpsitting now 
as a councillor of State. AdditionallypVelascolCount of Salazarpeat 
regularly from October 1598 until his promotion to the Finance 
presidency in January 1618. The efficiency of the Council of War 
therefore depended on the correlation of the performances of three 
groups of men - the generation of 1598-16011the two groups appointed 
in the years 1604/5-1610, tagether with Castrillo 
(1612); and the 
councillors of State. 
Excluding the asesorestwho joined War from Castile for a 
a few meetings annually after 1604 to comprise 
the. Consej3 de Guerra 
de Justicia Philip 111 appointed twenty two councillors of War9two of 
whom - Acuna Vela, and Padilla - were inherited 
from his father. Eleven 
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held titlespbut none had inherited directly-Of the six held on 
appointmentpthose of la LagunaCastrill3 and Belveder were newly- 
1 created9while that of San German was Savoyard. Pun"onrostro and 
Mirabel alonepthereforegheld inherited titles on appointmentpbut did 
so by respectively succeeding a dead brother and marrying an heiress. 
2 
Of the others, Laso and Pimentel inherited indirectly after appointment 
while GuzmanvVelasco and Eariquez were given their titles by Philipi 
The latter'spindeedywas a Portuguese title givenglike the 
supplementary marquisates of Hinojosa and G; lves for extra7-Castilian 
service. 
3 In sumpthereforelonly ten held Spanish titles and six of 
those were new creationspand neither the dukedom nor the major titles 
were represented: 
Marquises; la LagunapGd1vespPobarpla, Ilinojosa, CastrillopBelvedetp 
Mirabel. 
Counts; Punonrostro qLaso 
(Vill anover) p Salazar, Enrifquez (Villaflor). 
Of the twenty twoponly six were neither segundones nor sons 
of such. No information is available on the families of TasSiB and 
Brochero, but both were clearly of some rankpthe first having risen to 
occupy a French embassy and the second to that of Almirante General 
and the Grand Priorship of San Juan. 
4 Two mzq be precisely defined as 
I 
hidalozos; Acun'a Vel a' sf ather had died in battle as an untitled Viceroyl 
1- On San GermanqCaro de Torres (1629)gp. 287. 
2- Pugonrostro, being a second and Mirabel a third son. 
3- see abOvetP-176. 
4- Brochero may have been distantly related to the Alva do ListerwhO Ii traditionally held major office in the Order of San Juan. 
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of Peru and he himself had then followed a military career in Europep 
1 
and Satomayorvalso son of an untitled fatherphad won a legendaxy name 
for himself first in Flanders and then, more especiallypas a true 
connuistad3r in the Indi es. 
2 Less obviously, the hidalRuG should also ' 
incorporate Diego de Ibarrayson of a pr3veedor y comisario general and 
3 
councillor of War andylike him9a comendador of Santiago, The 
antecedents of his namesake Esteban are again unclearybut they were I 
certainly inferior to those of any other councillorghis career owing ' 
its first impetus to the patronage of the great Alva. 
4 
Experience reflected social status. The two American 
g3vernorsbLips of Sotomayor and Padilla' B in Milan were the nearest 
they had come to viceregal dignityland they were exceptional positions 
5 in that they demanded a chiefly military qualification. Similarlypthe 
only full embassy held before appointment was Bautista de Tassis's in 
Parispof a post which9curiously9went by tradition to segundones. 
6 
The 
J. 
min3r govern3rships of Padilla,, Pu5onrostr3 and Mejia and the 
extraordinmr. v embassies of Bautista do TassisoPimentel 
(Ge'lves) and 
Guzman were again quite appropriate to rank.. 
1- Cnta. War93 Jul. 1616pA. G. S. G. A. 8089f-115- 
2- Vo-rdetails of his careerqCaro, do Torres (1620)ppassim. 
3- do la Mota (1599) tp. 303 and Salazar y 
Castro (1688) v-p-. 228. 
4- See letters of President Pazos of Castile to PhiliP 11 Of 27 Feb. 9 
4 Mar. and 2 Apr. 15809printed in CodoinvViiiiPP-521-3. 
5- On American viceregal appointments and on Sotomayor's refusal of 
a second term in ChilegSeh"afergiipP-53OpAppendix Vpn3.6. 
6- For a list of ambasBadaragwith career detailspArchivo General do 
Simaneas, Cataloga de NeRociaciones de Francia, pPP-726-733. 
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iI 
Service on War could form the recommendation for further 
advancoment. San German y do la, HinojosapCastrillovEnriquez and G'elves 
all thus rose to domestic vicer3yaltiesgwith Hinojosa also progressing 
to the Milan Governorship and Gelves to that of New Spain. Giron and 
/Ar Zuniga thus rose, toolto a French embassy and the captaincy generalship 
of Portugal respeotivelygand four extraordinary missions abroad - by 
Diego do Ibarralla, LagunapGir3n and Las3 - were enhanced by the dignity 
of their COUnCillOrBhips. 
Court service followed a similar pattern. Five held minor 
2 
positions as gentlemen of the 
_Camara 
or boca of the Kingo and four 
held variously important posts in the minor Courts of Flanders and 
Savayy 
3 
but while none held major Spanish posts before appointment 
five were thus promoted after years of service. 
4 Only in the case of 
Guzmýnqlater Marquis of Pobar9was there any suggestion of the 
exercise of favour in respect of appointmentland that regal and not 
5 .1 ducal. The advancements of la Laguna and San German owed nothing to 
their connections with Lerma. 
6 
Ineligiblepthengfor the greatest offices of statelthe 
councillors had carved out their own destinies as professional 
1 G61ves's appointmentlin 16219was not taken up; see Schafer, 
0 2 ie. San Germ6jPobar)MejiatSotomayor and 11irabel. 
3 Flanders; Diego do lbarrapla LagunagLasogand SavoygCastrillo, 
4- ie., VelascopEn'rfquezgCastrillogBrochero and Mirabelpthe last four 
four under Philip 1V; on la Lagunat above tp. 231 qn- 4. 
5- See below, pp. 1ft-I *# 6- On la Lagunapbelow9p. pl. 1 and on San German qbelowqp*Ar6-7 
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soldiers of excellencevand had done so in every theatre of wary 
MediterraneangDatchgEnglishpFronchyltaliangAfricanpPortugueset 
AragonesegGermanyAtlantic and transooeanic. They had begun to come 
of military age at the And of Philip 11's first decadepand from 
SotomVor's marching with Alva in 1567 had fought at every major 
engagement over the years to the Truce of 1607. Thus only Admiral 
Brochero and administrator - and formerly proveedor - Esteban de 
Ibarra had not led troops2and only BrocherolVelasco and Castrillo are 
not recorded as having served in Flanders., 
As with Statogthe accidents of circumstance could dictate 
the moment of induction. Six were appointed on their return from 
foreign or regional servioer 
1 
and five to add dignity to foreign 
service. 
2 For all but Esteban do Ibarra the seat on War was the 
first Spanish conciliar poottand only for Mejiapla Laguna and Salazar 
was there a further promotion under Philip 11I. But if the experience 
justifying a councillorship of War was not thought appropriate to a 
seat on other councils it waslas has been seengralevant to a wide 
range of domestic and foreign positionstand only six councillorships 
were not interrupted by appointment to suche 
*** *** 
1 ie. Diego do IbarraqBrochero qTassis 9 San GermanýSotomayor, &%iga, 
2 See above9p. 250. 
3 These includecl Esteban de Ibarraywho was engaged in a vast amount 
of governmental work1see belowpp. 256v265. The others included 
Aculn"a Vela, Valencia and S3tomay3rgall appointed as the climax of 
their careers. The other two were Tassis and Pobar. 
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War: The Exercise of Councillorships. 
The revolutiona: r7 structural changes br3ught about in 1598 
16011were broadly maintained throughout the reign. With the exception 
of 1603 - when Diego de Ibarra and Brochera were both temporarily 
absent - the average attendance remained at least three times that 
maintained in 1597 (1-5) until the end of 1609swith indeed a 
quadrupled expansion in 1607-8.2 The deaths of four councillors in 
1610 brought it down between 3.00-4-00 in the years to 1613, and it 
declined further in 1614-15 to 2.00-3-009but then rose againgand in 
1620-22 stayed over 4.00. The decline of 1610 was not seriousýfor the 
nucleus remained in consistent attendanceýand with the coincidental 
resurrection of the senior half of the Council the overall average 
remained over 5-00twhile even in 1614-15 the professionalsirecord was 
still an improvement on the 1597 level. 
This was maintained in the face of a radical increase in 
the frequency of c3nvocation. In 1599 - 1602 War sat on average twice 
as frequently as in 1597 
(114-5: 61), and although the level dropped in 
1603-6 it remained at an average of 83 annually with 1604 - the worst 
year of the reign - still an improvement 
(65) on 1597-In 1607 the 
1- See ab3ve9pp. 10-13. 
2- In 1602 it was not strictly trebledý at 4.19. 
253 
frequency picked up again and averaged 96-5 annually to 1615pwith the 
low figures of 1610 (87) and 1615 (80) associated with the royal 
itineracy. From 1616 it recovered still furthergand to the end of 1622 
maintained an average level (131-4) even exceeding that of the 
beginning of the reiSn. 
If Philip changed the Council almost beyond recognition 
from the body he had inherited, he persisted with an unchanged 
councillorship9the two inherited councillors prefiguring the type of 
man he was to appoint himself - Acuna Vela's experience going back to 
service under the Empararjand Padilla's encompassing spells in 
Africapthe AlpujarrasvFlandersPortugalgNaples and Milan. Padillap 
howevergeat only once before retiring and Acu'na Velapin his seventh 
year on the Council 
1 
was joined in 1598 by Pu53nrostroqVelascoj 
Enriquez and Valenciagin 1599 by Diego de Ibarragand in 16ol by 
Pimentelvla Laguna and Brochera. La Laguna alone of these men was not 
massively experiencedvand he alone - and then only as professional 
councillor - made no great impression on the Council; Enrilquez, Ibarrap 
Pimentel (Gglves) and Br3chero were still sitting regularly in 16219as 
was la Laguna on the senior half; Velasoo sat regularly until January 
1618, Pun"'3nrostra until December 1609, Acuna Vela until August 16o6 and 
Deduced from a statement of his services in enta. War93 Jul. 1616, 
A. G. S. G. A. 8o8, f-115- 
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Valencia until August 1605- 
Only in the latter two casesphowever, was service 
completely uninterrupted. Of the absences of PU5onrostrovIbarra and 
BrocheroponlY the first'spin 1599-1601twas of any real significance. 
In two cases interruption was serious and continuOUB - Enr: rquez's 
service in Flanders and Galicia restricted him to tan of the twenty 
two and a half years to the death of Philip lllpl and Pimentel's in 
Italy (1601p1606) and Aragon (1613) his to eight and a half out of 
twenty and a half. 
2 The loss of Enrfquez was the more serious; having 
3 
sat at 81% of the meetings to September 1601P he thereafter sat for 
only nine and a half months in 1607-8 and on the itinerant Council in 
1615-From. resuming in September 1616 he sat at 69.8% to the end of 
the reign. Pimentel (Gdlves) was less diligent; by October 16179he had 
served only for five calendar yearsland then at a low level - only 
rising above 70% in 1613 - and in the three and a half years remainingý 
to him sat at only 55, -- 
La Laguna's apartphis was the worst record of the man 
appointed by 1601. The ageing Acuna. Vela, kept pace with the increase 
in meetings9fell below a 60% attendance only in 1603fand averaged 71% 
I 
over the period from the beginning of 1597 to his retirement-Velao0o 
1- See abovapp-176. 
2- Although appointed to Aragon in 1613 lie did not leave War until 
#0 the and of 1614; see Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)PPP-513 and 540- 
3- The percentage includes only the figures for the resident Council 
in 1599- 
1 
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was the least effective of the major c3uncillorsobut if he sat at over 
75% of the meetings in only six years (1600p1601,1607,1611o1612 and 
1616) he still averaged 63% to the end of 1617-Pu'n"onrostro and Valencial 
for sh3rter periodsphad more remarkable records; Pun'. 3nmstro sat only 
nine times between January 1599 and May 16019but thereafter to his 
retirement maintained an average of 80% attendanceofalling below 75, - 
only in 16029and Valencia to August 1605 was disturbed only by the 
itineracy Of 1599 (6Tp')Obut maintained an overall attendance of 82%pand 
in 1600 and 1602 sat at over 96%. 
Two men had records as remarkable but over virtually the 
whole reign, Diego de Ibarra attending 72% of all meetings between 1600 
and 1622jand Brochero 78% over 1603-1622-In tairteen of his twenty 
three full years Ibarra sat at over 75%, and in two of those attended 
more than 90% (1600,92%; 16011931o) and in another three more than 80% 
(1602987, t; 1613986%; 1616984, %). In another two he sat at between 70-75% 
(161791618). Even in 1607, when he missed over five months for his 
Flemish missionphe sat at 53% of the total meetings. Br3cher3 did even 
better, sitting at over 75% in seventeen years. 1le made only onegitinerantt 
attendance in 16011 and sat for only two mOAths in 1602. He then sat 
regularly for three years (78%)before leaving again on naval business, 
2 
and an his return in December 1606 began the most remarkable sequence 
1- See abovepp-145gand an appointment to councilgp. 186. 
2- Cabrera de Cýrdaba (1857), p. 266. 
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of attendance on any of the three 03uncilspsitting at over 75% of 
the meetings in each of the years to the end of 1621; 1623 would open 
with Don Diego having sat at 87-5% of the meetings of the previous 
sixteen years. 
1 
In 1605-69at the moment when State was beginning to fall 
apartythese men were reinforced by the first ancillary group of 
c3uncillorspof four men of varied and considerable experiencex - Tassis, 
Esteban de IbarraqMSjia and San German-Brought in in effect as 
replacements for ValenciapAcu'Aa. Vela and Pimentel - the first two 
having diedtand the third on service in Italy - they served adequately 
but without becoming major councillors. Tassis and Ibarra both sat once 
in 1604 before taking up regular service in 1606pand then served at 66 
and 67% respectively until their deaths in 161O. These performances 
were ceeditable enough in view of their advanced years - Tassis died 
magnificently ; bLt ninety through overeating at a banquety 
2 
while 
Ibarra suffered both from poor health and the demands made an him by 
his councillorship of Finance. 
3 MSjia and San German were less 
diligent. Mejia sat at only eighty six meetings in the twenty five 
months to March 1607 (49%) and San German at 58% of those between 
August 1605 and October 1609. B3th then departed on morisc3 serviceýý 
1- The figure excludes the meetings of the resident Council in 1619$ 
when he travelled with the Courtpsitting at 90.1% of the itinerant 
meetings. 
2- Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)PP. 401. 
3- Cabrera described him as Ida hart3s allfas' atthe time of his deaths 
but I have found no record of the date of his birthqazýibid-, p-418. On his c-Ouncillarship of Financegbelowpppifor 
4- On San Germdnts appointment to m3risco service 21bid. opp. 384P 386 9 391; see a-IsOoPP-409 and 431. 
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.0 Mejia returned briefly in 1610jand from 1611 attended as State 
c3uncillor. San Germain's, councillorshipph3weverpvirtually ended in 1607- 
He sat briefly in 1611-12 before being despatched to Milanpnow as 
Marquis of San Germian y do la Hin! xj3saj 
I but the humiliations he 
brought an his own and his King's head probably cost him a 
councillorship of Statevand when he resumed on War in 1616 he maintained 
only a dispirited 20% attendance until November 16201when Philip 
effectively exiled him. 
2 
In 1606-10 a second ancillary group j3inedglarger but less 
ýe fw diligent than the first - GuzmanjSot3mayorýGir3'n9Zuniga and LaB3 - and 
in 1612 they were further supplemented by Castrillo. All were 
distinguished soldierssbut only Sotomayor - appointed on his return 
from the IndieB3 _ made any immediate impression)sitting at 84% of 
the meetings between April 1607 and his retirement on the brink of 
4 death in February 1610 . Gir3n's service was twice interrupted by 
foreign service. He sat only briefly in 1608 on a short visit from 
Flanders9and did not resume until again returning from Flanders in 
1610.5 In June 16131having sat at 64% of the last three years' meetings, 
1 On title PLb--id- PP- 459 p and an departure PPP. 466 and 469. 
2 In October 1620 State suggested that a soldier of great experience 
be sent to deal with a possible Anglo-French campa; kgn against 
Navarre9but put forward no names; Philip chose Hinojosapenta. st. 10 
Oct. 16209A. G. S. E-2034pff. 60-2. He left in Novemberpand sat once 
again on Warvin April 1621. 
3- Cabrera do CSrdoba (1857)PP-101 
4- On death at turn of April-MaypEnta. Warp 7 MaY 16101A. G. S. G. A-7299 
f. 41. 
5- On service in FlanderspGonzLez D4vi a 523)28-513, and on return to Spain in 1610jCabrera de 0,4idoba 
ý18ý17 
9P. 4 5- 
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he returned yet again to Flanders, 
I 
and then went on to his French 
embassy. Returning in November 1620phe resumed at 70% to the end of 
1622. Castrillo, tooomade a false start; after only six months' service, 
he was appointed Viceroy of Navarrey 
2 
made occasional attendances in 
1615-17 and took up regular attendance again only in August 16189 
thereafter sitting to the end of 1622 at a low level (47%) 
commensurate perhaps with 4is extraordinary age. 
3 
The others made varyingly negligible impressions. Lasog 
appointed in 1609 to add hon3ur to a reforming mission in Plandersjsat 
Only four timespand his c3uncillorship was distinguished Only by his 
apparent confusion as to which half of the Council he belonged and as 
to whether he was tntitled to use his new title Of Count of Hanover. 
4 
Zu'*n'igaglike GirSn9sat only between missions abroadyand only tFLirty six 1 
times in all in 1609-11.5 Guzman sat at a not dissimilar level: F over 
the period 1606-22; well-qualified for a councillorshipýhe attended lessi 
than three hundred times in allphis time occupied by ambitions both 
1- ibid. op-525. 
2- No date is recorded for the Navarre aPPointmentgbut it seems 
certain from biographical information to have been in 1612 or 1613. 
3- If Gonzalez DSvila's biographical details are carrect9he would 
have been well over a hundred when he died; probably he was neartux. 
the mark when ascribing over sixty years' royal service to him 
than in having him fighting at Oranpel Pen'on and la Goletta. la 
Gonzglez Davila (1623)PP-516. See also Salazar y Castro (1688), p. 
230.11e died in 1629,1 
4- He used his name even after given the title (Pabrera de Co5rdabap 
1857tPP-3699373)ountil an 5 Julygusing the titleghe sat on the 
senior half of the Council; his next attendancetan 21 August9was on 
the junior halfyas Rodrigo Laso. 
5- No date is recorded for his appointment to Partugalgand I assume 
this to be the cause of his departure. 
courtly and maritaLl 
Castrillo was in effect the last councillor appointed. 
Belveder sat twice in 1619 before going to Flanders9and Mirabel thirty 
five times in 1620 while trying to delaylor more probably to wriggle 
out Ofthis appointment to the Paris embassy. 
2 
In 16109thengWar lost Pun'anrastragTassisgEsteban de Ibarra " 
and Satomayor to the grave and San Genn6i to the M3riSCO expulsiongand 
the new councillors largely failed to make good their 1OBS-1,14jiap 
Zaiga and Laso made little or no impression and Gir-Sn and Castrillo 
were of only limited value in the years 1610-13gwhile San German y de 
la HinojosapPobar and Gelves made only moderate contributions over the 
iI years to the end of the reign. Apart therefore from the two spells of 
service by Castrillo (161291618-22) and Giron. (1610-1321620-22) no 
Councillor other than the survivors of the generation of 1598-1601 was 
of any real importance after 1610. Thisphoweverpwas of hardly any 
consequence both because of that continuity and because of the 
transformation of the senior half of the C3uncil- 
*** *** 
On the comic failure of his attempt to win a Medina-Sidonia 
marriage in 16039Cabrera de Cordoba (1857)9pp. 165 and 168; on 
closeness to Philiptlbid. tpp. 6,39)66,89,187; on failure to secure 
the daughter of the Marquis of Malpica in 1610 tAbid. YPP. 411 and 4131ý 
on creation of Pobar marquisate by Philip to encourage the 
proJeoted marriage to do'n"a Juana Portocarrer3 in 1611tibid., P. 459; 
on career and Court positions ofpAppendix 111no. 63. 
2- Paz (1914)iPP-741-3. 
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The Councillors of State an War. 
Individuals' performance on War reflected almost exactly 
their attendance on State9with the proviso that the courtiers and 
certain of the mare important administrators tended to ignore the 
Cauncillat once less prestigious and important than State - thus Lermay 
for instancepeat only four times and Velada twenty three, while Idiaquez, 
too busy to attend9sat only 124 times in all after 1599pfailing to reach 
double figures in eight yearspand sitting not at all in 1610. 
The establishment proper of State in 1600 and the 
commensurate changes brought the senior half of War to collapse; against 
the 374 attendances by State councillors in 15999there were only 83 in 
16DOland the average State attendance fell to 0.721with a highest 
individual attendance of seventeen (out of 126) by ChinCh3n. In 1601 this 
fell even lower (0-5), but then picked up again in 1602 (1-9) as 
Chinch3n, the Constable and Olivares formed a cohesive care Olivaresto 
his death9maintaining an average of 76.5% attendance; Chinch3nitO 
December 160706.9%vand the Constablegfrom 1601 to October 161062.7%. 
These figures were again lower than those they maintained on Statebut 
were adequate and consistent enough to provide realistic liaison with 
the senior 03uncil. Idiaquez and Miranda alone of the major councillors 
of State in this period made no impression p presumably because of their 
---I, - 
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presidential and extra-c3noiliar w3rk, 
1 
while the ancillary 
c3uncillors sat with the same partial or occasional diligence they 
showed on Statelwith again the proviso that variations were 
invariably negative. Againptaogthe deaths of Chinchon and Olivures 
were criticalvand in 1607-9 the average fell once more between 2.00 
State c3uncillorsper meeting. 
.j In the second part of the reignvIdiaquez9M3ura, Albuquarque, 
Aliaga and Zapata all fell seriously below the levels they maintained 
on Statep 2 while Zu-niga served regularly only from July 1617 to the 
enA of 1619 ( 207t 289 excluding the 1619 itineracy) and then sat only 
twenty three times in 1621. The other major C3UnCillorsphowever, sat 
with the same consistency as an State - Infantado over fourteen years 
(1609-22) at 64.8-A; Meiial twelve (1611-22) at 80.10%jand la Laguna 
eleven (1612-22) at 68.9% - and were ably supparted by Spin3lap 
Villafranca and Benaventeleach again sitting with a consistency 
comparable to that they showed on State. 
*** *** *** 
1- The Constable phoweverpwas also a presidentv and 
for Chinchb'n War 
was 
## 
a fourth council-, 
2- Idiaquez sat only 16 times between 1610 and his death; Maura only 
12; Albuquerque 9 57; Aliagag4p and Zapata 
in effect only during 1619 
(43: 96)pwith a further 3 attendances in 1618 and 6 in 162o. 
3- Villafranca at 66% from 1612-22, excluding the itineracies and his 
absence of 1620-1; Benavente at 58-V from March 1619 to the end of 
the reign; SPinala at 9007 from April 1611 to May 1612. The figure, 
for Benavente allows for the 1619 itineracy. 
--o e 
C. The Council of FinanceP1597 - 1622. 
Thirty four men sat as councillors of Finance under Philip 
1119five of them inherited from Philip 119and both their appointments 
and c3uncillorships were largely governed by presidential leadership* 
Except briefly in 1607 - when three councillors died and a fourth left- 
Finance maintained an average attendance higher than that of State or 
War, and like those c3uncils9it expanded considerably in size over the 
reign9from 4.2 in 1597 to 9.1 in 1622. Until the Carrillo presidency, 
this was accompanied by a similar expansion in the frequency of 
convocation. 
The nature of the councillorship remained unaltered,, from thal 
of Philip 119a fine compound of financial fjudicial and military 
expertise. Eight men sat9with varying degrees of formalitypas ex-3fficia 
c3uncillaratcoming from Castile to sanction the Council's judicial 
activities. 
1 
Of the twenty one others for whom career details are 
availablep 
2 
sixteen came from within Pinanoe's offices - eleven as 
c3ntad3res93 three as Treasurers-General, 
4 
and two as secretaries. 
5 
More3vergthree of the councillors of Castile - Ramfrez do Prado. de la. 
M3ta and Corral - had served in the Finance fiscalfa. To a substantial 
AgredavL6pez de Ayalaqde la M3 tal Corral 9 Contreras 9 B3nal 9 Acun"'a and 
Ramfrez de Prad3. 
2- The exceptions being MenchazapPerngrdez Espin3sagBazangde la Serna 
and Hurtad3 do Mendoza. 
3- Gaitan de Ayal apSalablancal Cabala, Pons qHerreraq Gambo aq Soriaq 
I 
A 
BaffuelosqJuan de PedrosoqAyard and Alarcon. 
4- Mesia d2, TovarlMonray and Mazo de la Vega. 
5- The Ipen arrie ta Miguel al, sa having 30 years service as cantadar. 
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extent 9 therefore) Finance provided its own councillors. Two more - 
Pascual and Bernabe' de Pedrosa - brought experience of military 
financinggand the membership was rounded off by two former corregidares, 
Porres and Sarmiento de Acu; Iagand by the variegated experience of 
Esteban de Ibarra. 
*** *** 
l. Francisco do RajasýMarquis of Poza (1590 - 1602). 
I 
The structure of the Council of Finance under the Marquis of 
Poza has already been analysed in some detailpl and it remains to 
c3nsider the manner in which councillorships were exercised during his 
unfortunate presidenoy. 
The five councillors he brought with him into Philip: klllls 
reign were a nicely balanced group - Agredala senior councillor of 
Castile; Salablancalwith five decades' service in the Ministry; Gait; m de 
Ayalaswith ten years' such service and eleven as a Madrid carregidor, 
2 
and with experienceptoolof military affairs, andtuniquely among the 
councillors of Finance properta university graduate; and Ibarraja 
military administrator with service in Portugal in 1580jAragon in 
1591 and Flanders (1591 - ? 1595) .3 
All sat with professional c3necientiousness under Philip ll-. 
1- See ab3veppp. 31-5- 
2- Cnta. Fin. 12 Jan. 1607, A. G. S. C. J. H. 3459no fol-I 
3- No information is available on Menchaza other than that in Appendix 
119no. 41k lbelowsp. 431 9but the lack of such indicates that he had not graduated through the Finance offices* 
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Of the 132 meetings for which rubricas are recorded from January 1597 
to the death of the old KinggSalablanca missed onevAgreda threeg 
Menchaza ninevand Gaitan after his reilum in June 1597 ten (out of 79)9 
and Ibarravafter his in November 1597, seventeen (out of 64). They werep 
h3wevervold menjand as they aged and as some were employed on extra-- 
conciliar workqs3me of their performances would wane. Nevertheless they 
served until they were at death's door; Menchaza in August 160opGait; n 
in December 1606 and Ibarra in September 1610 were all still sitting in 
the month of their deaths; Agreda retired in August 1607 a month or so 
before dyingpand Salablanca left in March 1607 some six weeks before 
dyinggat eighty five years of age. 
' As was his practice2Philip was 
indeed foll6wing his father's advice and using his servants while they 
2 had 'health and strength to continue' . 
As has been remarkedghoweverpthey had little service left as 
4 graup by the beginning of the reign, Menchaza maintained an 88% 
attendance fmom, . 1anuary 1597 to August 1600 and Salablancapeven 
inclusive of an eight monthstabsence in 1600yBat at 87.1% of the 
meetings to March 1607. The three more widely-experienced men all 
declined in importance. Agreda and Ibarra travelled with the Court in 
15999and n-sither recaptured former consistency on returning. Agreda did 
1- Dates of death from Cabrera do Clrdoba (1857) - Menchazagp. 80; 
GaWn de Aval app. 297; Ibarra9p. 418; Agreda9pp. 313-4; Sal ablancagp. 306, 
2- See abovelp. 8. 
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the bettertat a respectable 48.9% from 1603 to 16079but Ibarra 
effectively retired until 1607 after a 57.8% attendance in 1600. 
0 Gaitan do Ayala continued at the highest level - over 90% in 1599- 
1601, and over 80% in 1603 - but after 1604 (48%)he effectively 
retiredpwith only a further nineteen appearances in 1605-6. 
It seems certain from deteriorating patterns of 
attendance that the declines of Agreda. and Gaita"n were commensurate 
on increasingly poor health rather than on any extra--c3nciliar 
duties. 1 Ibarra's was a special case. He had been appointed 
specifically on acc3unt of what Carrillo was to call Isus canFis 
esperiencias y bien parecer' and - again extraordinarily - was only 
required to sit at afterno3n sessions. 
2 It was precisely the demand 
made on th3se qualities that deprived Finance of his services between 
16ol and 1607? Even when he resumed regular membership of Finance in 
the autumn of 1607 he attended anly at a low level that contrasted 
with his diligence as a new councillor of War - sitting respectively 
at 35% and 67% to his death - and the difference was one of priority 
and not of conflicting timetable since he often attended both on the 
same day. N3t until the last fourteen months of his life did he 
recapture the consistency of 1598. 
- Cabrera do Cordoba (1857)tpp. 140 and 225 had Agreda appointed 
rePPectiv8lY to the presidency of the Audiencia Of Valladolid 
arid a councillarship of Indiespeither materialised. 
2 Carrillo to Lermaq19 Sept. 16109 A. G. S. C. j. 11.361 Yno fol. 
3 At the turn of 1601-2 he undertook the reform Of the militia 
against a Possible invasionventa. St. 22 Dec. 1601, A. G. S. E. 2511of-40 On other activities 9 bel3wvpp. Ib%x? 4jM 
I 
Of the three new councillors appointed in 1598-9 only 
Pascual made any continuous statistical impression upon the C3uncil, 
passing 801% in 1603-4 and with a lowest attendance of 66% in 1601 - 
cur13USjindeedjt3 notice how he increased his diligence from precisely 
the moment in 1602 when he lost the royal favour, 
1 
and found himself 
facedyt3ogwith an unsympathetic president. Conversely, Ramfrez de Prad3 
progressively abandoned his councillorship after the reorganisationvas 
other =interests consumed his time; he sat at 63% of the meetings 
between 1599 and 1601ýwith a highest attendance of 79% in that latter 
yearpbut by 1603-4 was down to 34%pand xtsat only a further seven 
times in the following two years. Acun"a sat only twenty six times before 
commencing his visita. 
2. Juan de AcuiYaý1602 - 1609). 
As has again been seenjAcu5a transformed Finance. 
2 The 
overall performance of his Council was marred by one extraoLrdinarily 
bad yearywhen in 1606 it met only 54 timealat nearly half its new 
frequency9but it still sat in all some 20% more frequently than Poza's 
1 On hid decliyýe of 1602pwhen he was all but posted to Naples, 
Cabrera de Cordoba (1857), PP. 1419148 and 151-Cabrera recorded that 
when he died he owed the King 16,009fOOO (maraved? s? ) and that all 
his verifiable estate was therefore sequestratedglbid. P. 236. 
2 See aboveoPP-34-5- 
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had d3nevand in 1603-5 the improvement was one of 37-5% and in 1607-8. 
of 72.6, %. In 16oglas crisis ebbed, the Council reverted to the exact 
level of 1603-5. Finance had caught up with resurgent War; in four of 
the seven years to 1609 it Bat more frequently andleven inclusive of 
1606, sat in all some forty three times more than War-In finewhat had 
been done for War in 1598 and State in 1600 was in 1602 done for 
Pinance; the Council was given full autonomy and - subject to the royal 
assent - responsibility for policymaking. The conclusion is quantifiablev 
and manifest in the correlation of the purformances of the three 
councils an the graph showing the frequency of conciliar meetings. 
Where, prior to 1602, Finance's performance had borne no relation to that 
of either State or War, there emerged a basic and continuing similarity 
after that year as all three councils - but particularly War and 
Finance - responded seismically to the exigencies of crisis. The 
patterns varied - each Council having its own modus operandipand each 
being concerned with different aspects of the overall problem - but 
the correlation was fundamental and would grow more pronounced as the 
reign proceeded. 
1 
Acu5a chanoged, t3o9the nature of the counoillorship. He 
appointed eleven counoillors, two - Lopez de Ayala and Contreras - as 
1- See bel3wgAppendix l9graph ltp. 4. od. For further development of this 
theme, belowppp. 113 
de tarde councillors of Castile. No information is available on the 
background of Ferna"ndez Espinosatbut of the other eight six came from 
within Finance's Own offices, 
1 
while Bernab'e' de Pedr3s3 br3ught a 
a training in military finances and Sarmiento de Acuna some twenty 
years' military and municipal experience. 
These men sat an the whole as diligentlypif not for quite 
as longgaB the new councillors of War of 1598-1601. Only in 1604-5 were 
there less than five men attending at least 80% of the annual meetings, 
and in 1604 four Bat at more than 90% while in 1605 three did so. The 
heart of Acun"a's Council was therefore thoroughly professionalpand 
seven of his councillors had records rivalling those of all but Diego 
de Ibarra and Br3chero on War; 
Mesia do Tovar - 83%, December 1604 - December 
1622 
Herrera - 75%, -Tune 1607 - December 
1622 ... 
Pons - 82%vJanuary 1603 - September 
1618. 
Lopez de Ayala - 84%, July 1607 - December 
1618. 
IpenarrietaqC. de - 83%, January 1603 
August 1612. 
Pedr3soqB. de - 76%, January 1605 
November 1613. 
Sarmiento de AcuXa - 70%, September 1604 - 
August 1613. 
The one structural weakness of AcAra's presidency - and 
de Ip F 
- ie. gCabalagPonslp, 7regalKerrara, 
Cristabal enarrietatliesia cle 
Tovar; see above pp. 262, nn. 4-6. This was a PGrhaPs 
significant 
increase an Pozats two out of five with such experience, 
2 6; 9ql, 
generally it was not a serious one - was his inability to impose 
himself on his secondary councillors. These fell into three categories; 
the seven inherited from P3zajthe three appointed by AcuKa himself as 
deputies for absenteasgand those'several councillors from whom at one 
time or another he did not demand consistently regular attendance. 
Of the old councillorspSalablanea sat at 87% of the meetings 
to March 1607 and Pascual at 89% to January 16059but Agreda did well 
only in spasmstwhich were generally separated by long absencespand 
Gaita'a de Ayala sat regularly to 1607 but only at a low level of 
*4 
consistency. Ramirez de Prado appeared on average at every third meeting 
in 1603-4 and was replacedgand Ibarra made no impact at all until 1609. 
In 1603-49the men inherited from Poza comprised approximately half of 
the Gouncil (1603,2x 3.7: 7.19; 1604,3.3: 7-58) but their consistency of 
attendance was low9and by 1605-6 they accounted for less than one fifth 
of the attendance (1605,1-5s7.95; 16o6li. 6: 7.41). Only Pascual was able to 
serve without interruption for convalescencegand it was ironically 
appropriate that three of them should have died in 1607 at the height 
of crisis. 
Such absences made it difficult for the President to replace 
councillors immediatelylbut Acu5a persistently aggravated his problem 
by his reluctance to retire such men; he clearly had a high regard for 
experience and repeatedly tolerated waning performances from the more 
distinguished elderly 03uncillors. Betteryin his viewjt3 have such men 
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available intermittently than not at all. Indeedpof the eight men he 
introduced after January 16039only Lopez de Ayala was nominated 
specifically as a replacementpand even then he had sat ten times in the 
previous three months. Perhaps Acuna was testing his appropriateness for 
the task; three others9two of them de facto replacementspalso sat before 
being formally app3intedg 
1 
while three had to wait for periods of 
between fourteen and eighteen months after appointment before taking 
up their c3uncillorshiPs. 
2 
Acuna's difficulties were most clearly evidenced by the 
tortuous process whereby Martin de Porres eventually took up his 
councillorship in 1604-In 15999Ramlrez de Prado had joined in effect 
as substitute first for Ibarra. and then for Salablancavbut with the 
latter's return in August 1600 coinciding with the death of Menchazathe 
then continued to sit in his place. He did so in preference to Porres 
who had -, at least reputedly - been appointed in Menchaza's place. 
3 But, 
when Ramirez himself began a six months absence in October 16039it was 
not Porres but Alonso FernLdez Espinosa who deputised; Fern&idez 
attended forty three meetings9only two of which were also attended 
by 
Ramfrezpand between them they missed only four meetings. What made this 
an exceptional substitutionghowevergwas the attendance at 
three of 
those meetings of Porres - that isqRamITe z, having come on to the 
1- ie. vIbarrapPernapndez Espinosa and PorrGs- ted '2 - OnTedroso and Herreratab3vegpp. 179 and 184-6. 
Herrera was appoin 
in 1605 and f irst sat in 1607 9 and Mesia 
in 1603 and f irst' sat - in 
1604. 
3- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)tpp. 117-8. 
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Council as a deputypnow had his own deputy in Femgndezpvho in turn 
was dePutised for by Forres. 1 But as Ramfrez had become a full! 
councillorpso too now did Porrespand Pernindez was further demoted. 
At the end of July 16049having already sat four timespPorres was 
formally appointed to the Counoilpbut as a general rather than 
specific replaoementpRamfrez still sitting regularly until the end of 
the year. Pernandez was restricted to a brief service in December 1604 
when four councillors were absentyand to a regular attendance in the 
second half of 1606twhen after the return to Madrid a badly faltering 
Council had to be restored to shape-But with two further appearances 
in 1607phis councillorship ended. 
Acuffals respect for age and distinction was in evidence in 
a number of cases - for examplegin those of AgredavGaitan do Ayala and 
Ibarra. - but was most clearly typified by his tolerance of the 
persistently poor performance, 'zof Contreras. His had been a 
distinguished oareergnot dissimilar indeed to Acuffals own, and he 
would yet riseýif reluotantly9to the heights of the Castile presidency 
under Philip lV. 
1 He first sat in Februaz7 1603 and took up a more or 
less regular attendance in Junegaveraging a 56% attendance over the 
next eighteen months9but declined to 29% over the years 
1605-9-Ibarral' 
afforded a similar indulgencepwas allowed in 1608-9 
to serve as 
something of an alternate councillor to Contreras; in 1608 one or the 
1- See above, pp. 86-7- 
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other of them was present at 54 of 122 meetingspand in 1609 at 53 of 
67, but in the two years they sat jointly at only twenty four, l 
Sarmiento do Acuna was indulged in slightly different 
circumstances. Appointed in September 1604 as supernumerary 
councillor to succeed to the first vacant Place9he commenced 
immediatelypperhaps as an overdue replacement for Cabalapand to the 
end of 1607 continued to deputise whenever occasion offered. He was 
never to become a full councillor9but, by 1608-9 he was almost sitting 
in his own right and by December 1609 had sat at nearly three-quarters 
of all meetings since his induction. 
Acu'nagthereforepwas clearly more concerned with the 
calibre of his councillors and with maintaining a sufficient rather 
then a strictly legal level of attendancegand by 1608-9 he had solved 
his most important problems with his councillors and brought the 
Council itself to a very high level of consistency; in both those 
years he had seven out of tenhimself of course 
included9sitting at 
more than 80% of the meetings9with 
in 1609 an eighth over 74lo-Only 
Ibarra, and Contreras were failing 
hime 
*** *** 
The significance of their performances is further analysedgbelowg 
PP. ; Ll S- 4- 1 .1 
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3-Fernanda Carrillo (1609 - 1617). 
No one failed CarrillO-More self-assuredpM3re ruthles, 3 
than Acunaghe drove his councillors harder while making his Council 
more compact. In the first four months of 1610pas he took stockvPinance 
sat even less frequently than did Stategand over that whole first year 
it sat only fifty two times in all - less even than under Poza. In 
1611-14 it then reverted to much the level of the Acun^a years before 
settling down to an average of sixty three meetings in the years 
1615-17-In allpthereforeyCarrillo convened Finance only six times a 
year More on average than Poza had done and some twenty less than 
Acun"a-But with this contraction went an expansion of authority which 
finds remarkable reflection in the graph recording frequency of 
convocationvStatepWar and Finance now reacting to and registering 
political pressures as if they were one barometer. 
1 
To make a council more compact was9of courselto make it 
more manageabloyand with the exception of Sarmiento do Acu'napwho was 
allowed. t3 continue much as beforepCarrillo's councillors sat with a 
consistently higher level of diligence than they had shown even under 
Acun'a. Despiteltheref3repthe reduction in the number of annual meetings, 
Contreras found himself sitting at More meetings in three and three- 
quarter years under Carrillo than he had in seven under AcuKagat ak 
1- See below, Appendix l9graph lgp. 4-" 
R 
2j-4' 
average now of 63% to his retirement in August 1613-Ibarra had n3t 
much life left in him but was allowed Only eight absences before 
retiring in September 1610 on the verge of, death.. 
In the years to 1613, Carrillo reduced the size of his 
Council by simply ign3ring a succession of deaths and departures; thus 
Ibarra was not replaced at allfwhile CristOýbal do Ipen2arrietals place 
remained unoccupied far twenty eight months after his death in August 
1612-In 1613 Sarmiento de Aculn"a left for England and Fabian do Monray 
was appointed supernumerary councillor to deputise for him during his 
absence; Carrillo did not like supernumerary cauncillorspand the 
unfortunate Monroy sat only seven times- 
1 Uhen Contreras retired in 
1613phoweverpCarrillo was obliged to replace him since he sat as do 
tarde membervand Dr. Antonio Bonal suoceeded himpand did so to some 
purposelsitting at 86% of the meetings t3 the end of the reign. 
Bernab; de Pedrosa saw 1613 out and promptly diedvand 
Carrillo was unable to delay longer; on 1 Febraary l6l4pGamboapSoria 
and Banluelos were brought in specifically as replacements for 
Ipe, 5arrietapSarmienta/Monroy and Pedroso. Gamboa had been appointed in 
March 1613 to succeed ipaifarrieta but had been working in Seville and 
immediately left againgreturning to commence regular service in 
Decomber; Garefa Mazo do la Vega was therefore introduced as a 
temporary substitute for him. Hegtoophowevergheld a OuPe=umerary title 
On Carrillo and supernumerary councillors pbelOwtpp. 275-6. 
2757 
and was accordingly restricted to fifteen attendaaces. All four came 
from the Council's own officesli and with the exception of Mazo each 
sat with the requisite diligence; Ba-auelos died on 21 October 1614pbut 
nonetheless sat at 93% of the meetings to 11 Ootaberlwhile Soria sat 
at 84% from February and Gamboa at 87% from Deoember 1613pboth to the 
and of 1622. 
The appointment of the supernumerary Monroy to deputise 
for the supernumerary Sarmiento do Acu5a heralded the commencement 
of Carrillo's difficulties with a King who at once wanted the number 
of councillors reduced)but who persisted in appointing supernumerary 
councillors of not always appropriate stature. Carrillo ignored them. 
Don Juan de la, Bernateaballerfzo of the Prince and infantasvwas 
appointed in March 16169but sat only ten times during Carrillo's 
presidency. 
2 The qualifications of Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza y 
Castilla for a councillorship are - significantly ?- not recorded; his 
servioaghowevervwas precise enoughplimited to six successive meetings 
3T 
0 in 1616 Oma3 de Ayardf was certainly qualified for a counoillorship-, 
1- Gamb3a and Ba]Yuelos having been contadorestBariatfiscalp and Mazop 
Treasurer General. 
2- Appointed 3 liar. 16169A. H. N., Cons. 9L. de P-P724Pf. 2lqv. 
3- Appointed to the first place to be vacated92O May 1615pA. G. S. Q. C 
27 and A. H. N. Cons., L. de P. P7249f. 230v- 
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but Philip's appointing him ad h3norem councillor in December 1616 
doubtless ruined him in Carrillo's eyesp and he was allowed only four 
attendances. 
1 Ke. Hurtado, and de la Sernaythereforepaggregated a mere 
eighteen attendances under Carrillo, Luis de AlarcOn was perhaps even 
more unfortunate; in 16121with already more than forty years' service 
in Finance's offices to his creditphe was strongly recommended by the 
Council itself as successor to Cristobal de Ipen'arrietapbut found his 
title of appointment accompanied by another ordering him not to take 
up the position until further notice. 
2 He would wait until 16209and 
then sit only tin times* 
In August 16179with the Duke sulking in LermapPhilip 
himself conferred on Carrillo the distinction GnJoyed otherwise only 
by Bautista Aceved03 of a joint presidencylprom3ting him to Indies 
with retention of Finance. 
4 He stayed with Finance until the end of 
the yearpand when he relinquished office he bequeathed to his 
successor a Council that had structurally reached perfection. The 
replacements of 1614 had made good the early lossespand by 1615 he 
had six councillors attending over 80% of the meetings and a further 
three over 70-In 1616-17 he improved even on thatland had in each 
1- Carrillo to Philip 111910 Dec. 1615pA. G. S. C-J-H-3919no fol. Ayardf 
was given a formal title on 29 Jan. 1617vA. H. N. Cons. 9L. do P-9724, 
f. 254v. 
2- Cnta. Fin. 929 Aug. 1612, A. G. S. C. J. H. 371tf. 
41; title of appointment, 
7 Jun. 1613, A. H. N. Cons. lL. de P-724tff-148V and 
150pthe second 
deferring the councillorship; dated 8 Jun. 1613 by A. G. S. Q-C-32. 
3- See aboveop-78-9. 
4- In letter Of 5 Aug. 1617, cited above9p. 56pn. l. 
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I 
year eight councillors attending more than 80% of the meetings. In 
1617 the average attendance for the first time passed 8.00preaching 
8.25; this represented a failure rate against both the legal and 
practical norms of 0.75 councillors per meetinggand was explained in 
large part by Herrera's three and a half months absence in the spring. 
He had brought the frequency of meetingz9to3jto a remarkably 
consistent level, with 63 in 1615,62 in 1616 and 64 in 1617*D3n 
Fernando turned now to Indies; bef3re long he would be accused of 
re-writing the laws governing those far-off lands, 
1 
*** *** 
4-3emadino de VelascopCount of Salazar (1618 - 1621). 
For his new President p Philip turned once again in an 
unexpected directionpbut again chose a distinguished administrator. Dan 
P 
Bernadino do Velasco y Aragon was descended fr3m an illegitimate 
branch of the House of Harofdukes of Frias and Constables of Castile* 
2 
He had served Philip 11 in Portugal in 1580 and again in 1585-6 as a 
captain of men-at-arms and then of cavalryýand in 2.1582 had 
been 
appointed yeddor y comisario general of the Infantry of 
Castilejand 
had occupied that post until retiring in 1608.3 For the last 
1 See Cnta. Lie. Garcea Perez de AraciolP4 May 1622tprinted by 
Gonzll-ez FOencia, (1932)oPP-338-341. 
2 Gonzilez Ddvila. (1623), PP. 98-99Marrades (1934)tp. 729n. lgand cnta. 
War 22 Aug. 1608 and copy of cnta. War 6 Jun. 1608jA. G. S. G. A. 6ZTqf-39- 
3 Cntas-as abavegn*2; on retirement 9 Cabrera do Cordoba 
(1857)vpp-323 1 
and 345- 
1 
2 797' 
seventeen years he had also served as one of the pillars of the 
professional half of War (1599-1617 at 65%). As Carrillo had proved his 
abilities in his great visitapso Salazar had proved his in 
SUp6rfiBing tile morisco expulsion; it was not only his victims who took 
note of his efficiency. 
1 
His leadership of Finance inevitably suffered in comparis3n 
with Carrillo's, but it was competent enoughpand differed substantially 
only in his toleration of an increase in the membership. Four of the 
inherited C3unoillors continued at their accustomed level to the end of 
1622 (Mesia de TovarpllerreragGamboa and BazZa)pwhile Banal did so to 
his dismissal in 1621pLopez de Ayala and P3nB to their retirements in 
December and September 1618. Only Lopez de Ayala was immediately and 
formally replacedpas Lic. Gilimon de la 140ta commenced as do tarde 
councillor at the beginning of 1619. Whan he in turn began a long 
absence in May 1620 he was deputised far first by Alarco'n - irregularly: 
since he was not a councillor of Car-tile - and then, mare permanentlyg 
by I! ic. ])iego de Oarral y Arellana. 
2 
Like Acu'RapSalazar preferred to use such experienced men 
as were availablep and unlike Carrillo phe had no strong antipathy to the 
supernumerary c3uncillor. Thus in April 1618 de la Serna was allowed to 
1- Far Cervantes' assessment, Don Quixote (Penguin Books, 1965), 894-5. 
2- de la Mota had been appointed to deputise for Banal (5 Mar. 1618, 
A. H. N. Cons. pL. de P. 97249f. 290-1)but had not sat and on 10 Jan. 1619 (ibid. pf-306v; but 16 Jan-ace3rding to A. G. S. Q. C. 9)was appointed 
to succeed Lopez de Ayala-On Alarcon, above pp. 276. No title is 
extant for Corral' s appointment; he first sat on 12 Jul. 1620. 
I 
280 
assume regular membership and secretary Miguel de IpeXarrieta was 
accorded a supernumerary councill3rship specifically S3 that he could 
register a vote at meetings which of course he invariably attended. 
1 
Similarly, when Sarmiento de AcuWaqn3w Count of Gondamarpreturned from 
England9he was allowed to resume his cauncillorship, while Juan de 
Pedr3sa was permitted to take up in 1620 his appointment of 1617-Only 
the two councillors of Castile of the seven men introduced or 
reintroduced by Salazar were not supernumerary councillorspand only 
they and Alarcon were brought in specifically as replacements. They 
weragnevetthelessvwith the possible exception of de la Sernapoareer- 
professionals; but but he had served for years in the Ministry. 
SalazarIB presidency effectively ended on 13 December 162O. He 
sat only once thereafter (10 January 1621) before dying9four days before 
his Kinglat the end of March 1621. He had found the burden of office 
increasingly heavy and had repeatedly asked leave to retirepbut was not 
formally allaed to do so until the beginning of March. 
2 For ten of the 
eleven meetings betteen 13 December 1620 and 7 March 16219thereforepthe 
Council operated without a president9but thereafter it worked under 
the supervision of a Govern3rpDr. Juan, Rococ ampof r: ro. Again OPhilip' s 
choice was an unorthodox one. Inquisitor of Vail adolidg Rococampof ri"o, 
1- Titles of 19 Mar. 16189A. H. N. Cons. 9L. de P-724off-291 and 293. 2- Title of Dr. D3n Juan Rocacampofrfo as Governor of the Council of Finance 92 Mar. 1621 qLbid. j. f f. 342-3. 
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had gone to Flanders in 1602 as Vicar General of the Armyland his 
conduct of asient3 negotiations in Flanders was apparently his only 
relevant qualification for the promotion to Finanaegsince on returning 
in 1605 he had resumed his Inquisitorshipvpr3c, eeding thence to a 
c3uncillarship of Inquisition. 
1 
Sensiblyphe continued to run the 
Council as Salazar had done. With the return of de la Mota in July he 
found it unnecessary to appoint a replacement for B3nal9and by the end 
of 1622 he had introduced only one new c3uncillorqLic. Garcýa Perez do 
I Araciel-Since9howeverpGarcia sat only seventeen times in allpthe 
composition of the Councilpas it entered 1623premained x1substantially 
unaltered. 
After four meetings as Governargone of them under Philip 1VI 
Bacocampofrio was formally appointed President on 17 April. 
2 As 
Finance entered 1623pit was staffed by thirteen oauncilloraleight of 
whom were attending more than 80% of the annual meetings. Three of 
these - Mesiade TovaryHerrera and Gondomar - had begun their service 
under AcuWaj another three. - GamboaqSoria and Bazan - had exercised full 
councillorships under Carrillotand five - do la, SernapJuan de Pedroso, 
Miguel do Ipe? farrietagdo la, Mota and Corral y Arellano - had been 
promoted by Salazar. As with State and WarPhilip 1V inherited a 
strongly resilient and prof essionally-staf fed Council. He was more 
fortunate than his father had been in 1598- 
1- Archduke Albert to Lerma925 Sept. 1605tprinted in Codoin U863), 
xliivP-543yand G3nzkez Dla"ýila (1623)PP. 498. 
2-A. G. S. Q-C-28* 
0 
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1V. The XachineX7 of Gover=ent. 
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Many of the most important features Of the machinery of 
g3vemament as it operated under Philip 111 have already been 
describedpand it remains to essay a more general discussion of how 
the machine worked in practice. The least disadvantageous approach 
appears to be to compartmentalise - to consider the significance 
of regal and ducal activity and then to look at the work of the 
councils in two different contextspinstitutional and personale 
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King. 
ýmwý 
Immaturity was the chief royal characteristic in the early 
years; alternately buoyant with idealism and unrealistic optimism or 
depressed by self-doubt and lethargypPhilip at the outset of his reign 
was a n3t-untypical adolescent - save that he was called upon to govern 
the largest empire the world had yet seen. A young man anxious to cut a 
figure in the world, he was both avid for greatness and yet cowed by 
the greatness thrust upon himland already by 1601 h: e had erected 
monuments to his adolescence in the form of a re-established Council of 
State and a re3rganised Council of Warvdesigned specifically to win him 
his great vict3ryqbut allowed to stand to save him from himself. 
Conscious at once therefore Of his xinadequacies and opportunities9he 
was deeply imbued also with a sense of divine mission; h3w could it be 
otherwise with a king of Spaingthe grandson of the legendaI7 Emperor 
and the son of el Prudente ? Philip himself indeed in 1603 perfectly 
summarised these different elements in his own character - 'It appears 
to me just that the expedition to Algeria should go aheadyand if God 
is pleased to dispose of it in such a manner as I have reason 
to hope 
for from such good ministers as those who have advised me ..... I Will 
follow the example of my grandfather. For this reason, preparations are 
to be made forthwithland so that everything necessary f3r this 
1- See ab3Ve, pp. 10-13,24yand 28-31. 
28 
expedition be provided you are to meet on at least one day a week in 
the house of the Count of Miranda to discuss thisgand are to advise 
me after every meeting so that I can make a decision on every matter 
and order it implemented'. 
' 
PhiliPls reliance on his 'goad ministers, was Virtually 
absolutelbut took of course different forms with different groups of 
them. We should begin with his relationship with the Council of State. 
From the firstlPhilip was quite content to simply agree to 
State's recommendations unless he found himself seized by his special 
enthusiasme. At such moments - as we have seen in a number of different 
contexts 
2_ kingship became truly inspirational; lhaving considered this 
with the attention that the matter demands9and having asked God to 
guide me to what is convenient to His purpose and to the universal 
good of Christendom9which is the chief end that I hold ... s. 
3 State 
soon learned to reply iA kindvand its consultas became in consequence 
at such moments documents of quite florid eloquence. Faced9for 
instancepwith Philip's resolve to break with France in 1600 it set out 
to satisfy his conscience and self-esteem; 'Your Majesty has met 
his 
obligations to Gods to men and to what he owes to his own greatness and 
nobility of spirit and to the flowering of his manh3od. 
Na one could 
attribute (failure to go to war) to anything other 
than the sacred 
11 J-. 1- Cnta. Jnta. of Three (Idiaque zvMirandap Cordoba) 99 Jul. 1603pA. G. S. E. 
20239f. 114. 
2- On the Irish expeditiongab3veppp. 28-9; on his intention to march 
(?. 
27 and 110-1; and on 
6p 
into Italy over the Saluzz3 crisis above, 
his determination to go to P3rtuga in 1 3vaboveq-132- 
3- Cnta. St. 12 Sept. 16009A. G. S. 
E. 2511, f. 67-lie was dealing with the 
pro lem of tae English succession. 
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zeal that Your Majesty has for the good of Christendom and its 
expansionvand if the King of France does not accom3date himself to 
your just demands it will only be because his sins blind him to the 
fav3ur that God has given and is giving him ... '. It then proceeded to 
argue on military and financial grounds against his policy. 
1 Similarlyp 
when confronted with his decision. to send the emprpsa to Ireland, it 
confessed itself unable to fully express its admiration for 'the sacred 
zeallgreat valour and prudence that Your Majesty has shown in this 
business9which9because of its quality and importance and on account of 
its being so worthy of the greatness of Your Majesty and so resoundingly I 
to the advantage of the Lord our God, to the stmngthening of the sacred 
Faithpthe universal good of Christendom and ... the reputation of Your 
Majesty at a time when so many think that your power has diminished 
It then again argued in minute detail against the royal policy. 
2 This 
technique served equally well to console Philip in moments of desolation 
- thus disaster at Nieuwpoort in 1600 should be an occasion for giving 
thanks to God for an admittedly inscrutable fav3ur93 while the Irish 
disaster was obviously a test from which a young king would emerge the 
stronger. 
4 
For all its condescension this approach was very nicely judged, 
1- Cnta-St-plg Aug-1600vA. G. S. K. 15939f. 6. 
2- Cnta. St. 923 Jul. 1600tA. G. S. E. 2511pf. 2. 
3- ý-n-ta-St-929 Jul. 1600p ibid. 9 f. g. 
4- Lnta. St-O Mar. 16029ibid. pf. 64. 
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and exactly suited to the needs of these extraordinary moments. It was 
not of course always successful; the royal determination held firm over 
Ireland in 1600 but wavered over the journey to Portugal in 1603pand 
on both occasions therefore disappointed the Council. Conversely, if 
Philip did not himself march against the French in 1600 or win his 
Charles-like victory in Africa in 1603 he relented perhaps more 
because his own determination failed him than because he allowed State 
to dissuade him. In the longer termlhoweverpthere was a more profound 
victory for State as Philip identified himself with a Council that so 
obviously spoke his own languag. egif only to oppose him. Thus it waspf3r 
instanoelthat he entrusted control over the Irish or Alp,,, erian 
expeditions to men who were at best lukewarm about them, but who were 
nonetheless his 'good ministers'. Thus it wasytoolthat he himself 
attended the Council's deliberations when it was dealing with 
matters in which he had a particular xinterest - in June 1600 over 
1i 
the Saluzzo crisis and again in September over the possibility of a 
peace with the Dutchq 
2 
and in March 1602 on the consequences of the 
failure in Ireland. 
3 
Philip's enthusiasms bound him to the Council. 
This was partioularly true of course of his involvement with 
Ireland; 
we have alreadv seen how that had quite incalculable political 
c3nsequences in that it led him t3 reorganise War and virtually t3 
See abovepp*27. 
2- Ln-ta- St. 13 Sept. 16009A. G. S. E. 25119 f. 17. 
3- 
. 
2nta. St. v3 Mar. 1602, ibid. 9 f. 64. 
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call State itself into existence. 
1 It hadpat the end of 16olpfurther 
and spectacular consequence. In those first two years of State's 
existence properpPhilip was quite content to simply agree with the 
minimum of effort - lesta bien, 191lo quo parecelplassil - with 
whatever the Council was recommendingpsave where Ireland was 
concerned; then his interest was informed and urgent. His attitude was 
illustrated in extreme form by the manner of his response to a 
c3nsulta of 11 July 1600 in which State dealt with the range of 
possibilities open to him in connection with the problem of the 
English succession. Among them was mentioned the expedition to 
Irelandjand by 23 July he had replied on this latter point9but on the 
remainderphe needed time to think; State received his reply - which 
merely affirmed the traditional policy of supporting the candidature 
2 
of Isabel - some six months later. On 22 December 1601, however, State 
presented him with a consulta of the greatest complexity and 
importance and the manner in which Philip dealt with each of fifteen 
separate recommendations both established himpfor virtually the first 
time in the reign, as a man intellectually capable of directing and 
ordering the conciliar system and marked a decisive break with the 
past. 
3 
It was of course a. consulta concerned primarily with the secon 
1- See above, pp*10-13924 and 28-31. 
2- Cntas St. 911 and 23 Jul. 1600 and 13 Jan. 160lyA. G. S. E-2511iff-489 
2 and 76. 
3- Cnta. St. 22 Dec. 1601 pj:. bid. 9 f. 40. 
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empresa do Irlandayand in the years to come Philip continued to apply 
himself most keenly to those consultas dealing with his special 
enthusiasms. But his treatment of other subjectsymost notably of 
affairs in the Notherlandspshowed the same awakening of interestya new 
sense of involvement. Failure in Ireland bound him even closer to the 
Councilvas from May 1602 it moved slowly but inevitably towards a 
rapprochement with James of Scotlandqn3w destined to be king of 
England* 1 Thus when in February 1603 his own confessor suggested that 
English affairs be in effect transferred from the jurisdiction of the 
Council into that of a JuntaqPhilip1B reply was definitive of the 
importance that he attached to State itself - 'one cannot entrust such 
a great matter to anything less than the whole Council and to such 
councillorspand I therefore charge'(the Council) to deal with it'. 
2 
When in May 1603 State acknowledged final failure in Englandý 
it satisfied the royal conscience with appropriate eloquence - 'the 
chief cause of (the war) has been that of religiongto help and 
liberate the Catholics of that kingdom from the tyranny and oppression 
of the heretics9and so that all be reduced to obedience to the 
Holy 
See..,. 3 Peace was now justified because it would enable Philip to 
help the English Catholics by means of negotiating with the new king. 
He was c3nvinced; his instructions to Juan Bautista de 
Tassis on his 
1- See particularly p. 2nta. St. 918 May 160211bid. of. 77- 
2- Cnta. St. 91 Feb. 1603pAbid- 9f. 88. 
3- Cnta. St. 911 May 16039Abid. 9f. 91 
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departure for England proclaimed that peace was 'equally necessary for 
the universal good of Christendom and for that of my kingdoms'& 1 
By Augustphe was looking forward to a new sort of greatness - 'my 
friendship iS M3re important to (James) than. that of anyone elsel. 2 
Beneath the verbiageph3wevergthere was new realism; in February 1604 he 
bluntly refused to aid the Scottish Catholics in rebellion on the 
pragmatic gr3unds that 'what is important to' those Catholics is that 
their King should not enter into suspicion of them'. 
3 
Philip was 
beg 
, 
inning to grow Up. 
There waslh3weverpstill a victory to be wonjand he turned his 
attention now, with his C3uncillto Flanders. His new cause was of course 
also the Almighty's; his reaction to the troop rebellions of the spring 
of 1604 was to express concern that the Pm3tinqd3s had, for the first 
time, expressed anti-Catholic Bentiments. Accordinglyhe overruled both 
State and Albert and ordered that they were not to be paid at the 
expense of loyalist tra3ps. 
4 
He did not persevere with that policy, 
but applied himself with relish to State's Flemish consultas, jand did 
so to same purpose. In 1605 he was able to inform the Council that he 
was making an extra 1,200,000 escudos available for the pursuit of the 
wargand took vast pride in the achievement; the amount was more 
than 
his exchequer could bear but was provided 'so that God and the world 
shall see that for my part I am doing what I can for the universal 
1 Copy of the InstructionslundatedpB. N. 2347of-70- 
2 Cnta. St. 121 Aug. 1603, A. G. S. E-2511tf-99- 
3 U-nt a. S t. o 17 Feb. 1604, A. G. S. E. 2512 1f. 26. 4- =nta. St. j8 May 16041A. G. S. X. 2023pf. 130- 
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good of Christendom and for that of my kingdoms'. I For a brief moment, 
the C3uncillwith the exception of Idia"quezp shared the royal optimism, 
but in August it moved decisively on to the road that would ultimately 
lead to truce and then peace with the Dutchladvising Philip that even 
more m3ney had to be found to continue the war and effectively 
therefore suggested that he would fail to subdue the rebels. He rounded 
an it as he had never doneynor would do again - 'it astonishes me 
that the Council9knowing what extraordinary provisions have been made 
this year and what the state of my exchequer ispshould press for new 
provisions to be made. The Councilpin which I trust so much9should 
properly do what it can ... and not content itself by proposing to me 
what it knows cannot be d3negfor such will not justify the confidence 
2 that I have in its help and advice' . Perhaps the most critical moment 
in State's fortunes had arrived. 
Over the next yearsqPhilip allowed the C3uncil to decayv 
neither replacing dying councillors3 nor paying any real attention to 
its c3nsultas. He simply lost interest in it and in his foreign 
policies; no victorypno King. NeverthelessyState's authority as such 
did not decline significantly. It remained in control of the Spanish 
foreign policy v unencumbered now by any appreciable royal 
interest. 
Bef3re proceeding further we might consider the nature of Philip's 
relationship with War and Finance. 
I- Cnta-St. 6 Jan-16059A. G. S. E. 20259f-1 
2- Cnt a. S to 9 23 Aug. 1605 , A. G-S. E. 20 24, f. 3- 73-ee above pp. 239 q 243-4. 
2927-1 
With War and Finance, Philip exercised a mechanical kingship. 
By far the greater part of his activity wit passive and desultory but 
was-yet surprisingly commendablelfor if his insipid agreements to 
recommendations manifested the low level of interest that he 
maintained in those c3uncils' staple affairs they yet allowed them 3n 
the whole to get on with their work. Such was the price they paid for 
getting tiaeir consultas returned fairly quicklypand although his 
activity was prone to the occasional eccentricity - he might take six 
days or six m3nths 
1- 
it appears that Finance's consultas were 
normally returned in about three weeks? In view of the amount of work 
on the royal shoulders this was a not-uncreditable perf3rmance. It was 
of course essentially a negative approach)and as we will see, it tended 
to break down on the more complex matters, and especially so when 
different councils offered different advice on a particular matter; in 
such eircumstancespPhilip's kingship virtually 0311apsed. 
3 Ordinarilyq 
howeverpit was equal to the demands that War and Finance made an it. 
Unlike StateWar and Finance generally sent consultas to the King 
that were basicallY verY BimPle in contentleach dealing n3t with the 
c3mplications of high diplomacy but with a single problemýsimply set 
out. In the majority of cases an I assit from Philip was all that was 
On 12 Jan1613, for instancepFinance sent Philip a cOnsulta and a 
cýdula which was to be signedgand on 13 July 1613 had to remind 
him that he had not returned thempcntas Fin. $12 Jan-and 13 Jul. 1613 
A. G. S. C. J. H. 3749f. 4. 
2- Finance's cinsuTtas normally give the date an which they were 
returned by the King on the darse; this figure is arrivq& at these and from calculations based on each consulta used in tMm 
study. 3- See belowqppe, 33v-3VjD 
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properly required9but again his kingship was often not equal to the 
exceptionalpt3 those c3nsultas that demanded an immediate answer. 
As again with Stateqtheref3reýr3yal indecisiveness or laziness 
basically served to compound conciliar importance9but at times also 
obstructed conciliar effectiveness. At such m3mentsgFinance was the 
better-equipped to deal with him since it had a president who was 
himself a man of authority and who could therefore remonstrate 
directly with either Philip or with Lerma-We have already seen Acu? ýa 
and Carrillo doing so in other c3ntezts and the point will be 
further developed. 2 War had no such immediate and direct possibility 
of redress9and chosellike Statelto appeal to the best side of the 
royal character. It did so by ingenuously and simply increasing the 
r3yr-l w3rk-load when it wanted a decision; thus, f3r instanoegin 1601 
'in fulfilling its duty and what it owes to Y3ur Majestyýthe C3uncil 
cannot refrain' from bringing the needs of the gente de guerra to the 
royal attent13nf 
25 
while in 1602 it found it 'unavoidably necessary' to 
4 
remind Philip of the problems of the guardas de Castilla. Againgin 
1604 it wasIcertain' that His Majesty was fully aware of the 
deplorable state 3f the French 'presidios' but'regrettablyl had to 
1- See, for instanci-, I below pand more generally ppp. $30 -5 S'CO 
2- See above PPP- 35 9 100-1029 158-160 and below, pp. 316-ILq-jS4-0-i 
3- Lnta. Warqll IVIV 16019A. G. S. G-A-580, f. 150- 
4- Lnta. 'Ifar, 8 Feb. 16029A. G. S. G. A-589, n3 f3l. 
ýR 
remind him. 
1 It couldphoweverlbe pungent enough when occasion 
demandedv insisting for example in 1600 on a reply to a consulta of 
2 only 'the other dey' . 
With both councils. Philip was prone to take up sudden and 
often inexplicable enthusiasmsvand especially so of course at the 
beginning of the reign. 11is interest in War's establishment of a 
milicia general in 1600 was doubtless connected with Le=als 
involvement in the project93 but the Council equally found him stirred 
into unlikely action by the problems of provisioning the Indies fleet 
in Tercera, 4 of putting the galeras do Esp9a into asiento, in 160195 
or even of housing government agents in Portugal in 1605- 
6 
Sogtoopit 
had inflicted upon it the sudden grand gestures - the capricious 
decision of 1605 to suddenly reduce the Galician presidiosJ7 the rage 
of 1602 that the non-payment of some monies could only be 'the 
manifest fault of ministersi. 
Such interests were occasional and not normally followed 
through too energetically. Philip didphoweverthave policies of his 
1- Cnta. Warpg Apr. 16049A. G. S. G. A. 6049f. 39. For a similar examplepin 
connection with some problems in Portugal pLnta. Wart 7 Jun. 1602, 
A. G. S. G. A-5899no fol. 
2- Cnta. Warpl Sept. 1600, A. Go So G-A-570vf-183- 
3- Cnta-Warp7 Jan. l6OOvA. G. So G-A-5699f-15-On Lermajaboveop, 75- 
no fol. 4- Enta. Wart3l -Tan. 16019A. G. S. G-A-580 
5- Cntas. jWar jntas. 9 22 Nov. and 30 Dec. 1601 oA. G. So Go A- 579 Inc) fols. 
6 Cný-a. Wart14 Oct. 1605pA. G. S. G-A-6409no fol. 
7 Lnta. Wart15 Jan. 1605jibid pf. 12, 8 Cnta. Wart3 Oct-1602IA. G. S. G-A-5899no fol. See alsotLnta. 11 Oct. 
JU2-jibid. 
own which he pursued with some consistency. lie did not9for instanceý 
like to alienate 3ffices. Thus at the beginning of the reign he 
ordered Finance not to sell any more rights of renunciation to 
municipal offices. 
1 
It waaltoogentirely due to him that the Crown 
retained control of a number of administrative offices which Finance 
variously advised him to sell or make renunciable - he overruled the 
Council over the Offices of contador de la gente de Ix guerra do 
2 
Perpignan (1599) 9 over those of the forty six alpuaciles de Corte 
01607) 3 of the. dep3sitari3 general de, la Corte and other similar 
offices (1607)9 
4 
and of its own tes3rer3 reneral and contad3r de 
rentas y quitaci3nes (1619 ). 
5 
Even when the circumstances were such 
that a sale might reasonably have been permitted he made his gesture; 
VY3ur 1.1 ai eStyt with sacred zeal2has stopped t--, a increase of 
renunciable officesvand ordered t-lat t-Lis (device) should not be 
used in futurelgivin6 as reason for tilis tdat experience -aas shown 
it to be of pr-, at inconvenience because it is tb. 3ugnt (by office- 
aolders) to be preferable to hold in perpetuity because they ca=3ý 
lose (the 3ffices). Everyone would taen acquire them for trading 
and profiteering and they wauld not be sold for t; ie well-deserving 
to hold, but to those whopbeing -, )ersz)ns of a low sort and having 
much property and money acquired in business and vile trading2 
would want to ennoble themselves with the offices and rule in t-he 
l3calitiosv&O that with the authority týaat they would acquire 
with tae offices9their trading and property would increaseyto the 
detriment of the poor peoplepas tLi3se who hold renunciable offices 
do even t3dsy.. -'. Cnta. Pin. 916 Oct. 160O. A. G. S. C. J. 9.2849n3 f3l. 
2- Enta. Fin. 926 Jun. 179-9, A. G. S. C. J. '. 1.274tf-121. 
3- Cntas., Jnta. de Hac. 914 May and 2 Jun. 16079A. G. S. C-J-11-3459ff. 
265 and 175- 
4- Enta. Fin. 9 13 Mar. 1607 iLbid. I f. 67. 
5- On theselsee above, pp. 203-6. 
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when the Junta de Hacienda suggested selling the relatively trivial 
office of pesad3r Mayor de 13s pescad3S frescos y escabechados de la 
c3rte for the apparently laudable purpose of repairing the Pardophe 
curtly refused. 
1 
On o0casionghe might proceed from the particular to 
the general; Finance' s suggestion that the alcaidia of Velez be sold 
elicited the retort that not only was it not to be Sold but that no 
alcaidia with any strategic importance was ever to be Sold again. 
2 
Similarly9when it came to his attention that9foll3wing the practice 
under his fathergFinance was not even advising him of sales of 
treasury, shipS of the royal rents9he ordered that he was henceforth to 
be consulted about each cas e. 
3 Paradoxicallyphis opposition to the sale 
of offices also manifested itself in his determination to secure the 
best possible priceýand he not infrequently insisted that a figure 
agreed upon by the Council and the purchaser be significantly 
increased; if he had to sell his principlesphe would drive a hard 
bargain. 4 
Philip therefore maintained a close interest in this branch of 
policy and aligned himself firmly on the side of administrative 
integrity*Neverthelessphis policy was riddled with inconsistencies. To 
order that no further renunciations be allowed in the municipalities 
1- Cnta. Jnte. de L'Iac. y24 Jul. 16079A., j... j. v'-J-ýi-345pf. 255- 
2- Cnta. Fin. ol3 Aug. 161ltA. G. 2. 'ý-J--1-365yf. 220. 
3- ýnta. Fin., 22 Jul-1607PA., J-3. ý-J, d-321, no f3l. 
4- Aspfo: r instancelwith the sale of the Antequera alcaidia; Finance Im 
nad a6reed a price of 4pOOO ducats9but PAilip insisted on an 
extra 500, cnta*Fin. 911 har. 1603PA-G-13- ý., -J--I-U3091 f-124. 
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was something less than the grand gesture it appeared, since there 
were hardly any offices left to which that right could be s3ldp 
1 
and 
the policy itself came somewhat ill from the man who granted whole 
towns to Lerma. and his criad3s. 
2 SimilarlygPhilip's grant to Tristan 
de Ciriza of his notorious licence to sell the office of contadar de 
mercedes contrasted rather sadly with his more general policy over 
the alienation of administrative offices. 
3 N3rpindeedpwas he even 
always able to hold to that latter; we have already seen how the 
Treasurer Generalýrefused the rigAt of renunciation in 16199was 
allowed it in 1621.4 Finallypas with all his assertive gesturesythere 
was the recurring failure to distinguish-m between the major and the 
min3r; in 1609 he endangered the negotiation of a major asient3 for 
Flanders as his indecisiveness left Finance with only two days to 
conduct the sale of an office in Seville worth over 98,000 ducats. 
5 
He pursued a similar idee fixee with War - that soldiers 
should not be allowed to pester him at C3urt. Thus in the 
first 
instance in order to discourage them he persistently cut d3wn on the 
mercedes suggested by Wargreduging a proposed grant of 
300 ducats to 
1 See abovegpp. 1889n. 3 and 195-6.2 - Aboveyespecially pp. 
3 On Cirizagab3vejPP-53 and 209-210.4 - Abovepp. 206. 
5 On 2o June 16099Finance, suggested that 989000 ducats could be 
taken from the proceeds of t, -ýe sale of 
tae, Seville House of Money's 
treasulyshiP for two asentistas; they had made the condition that 
such money as was not paid to them by 15 July would 
be deducted by 
them from an asiento they were providing in Flanders. A new and 
higher bid for tae, office was then made9but on condition that it 
would be withdrawn if not accepted within six dayagand on 4 July 
Finance informed Philip of this. On 5 Julyphe returned the first 
consulta9but did not return that of 4 July until the 8th., thuB 
leavl-n7zg-Finance two days to arrange tae sale. Cntas. Fin. 20. faJun. 
and 4 Jul. 16099A. G. S. O-J-H-356, ff. 172 and 397. 
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one of 2009 
1 
or refusing to pay the whole of an award made by the 
dead Adelantado. 2 More generallyvas has again been seenthe ordered in 
16ol and in 1607 that de parte awards made by the Council be 
drastically reduced9grand gestures tjiat both contrasted ill with his 
awn genera s ity. elsewhere and were largely ineffectual; in 1611 and yet 
3 again in 1615 he is found having to repeat them. 
Philip found great difficulty therefore in imposing himself 
positively upon his councils. He perceivedgand rightly, that the prime 
demand that a conciliar kingship made Of him was that he respond 
fairly quickly and decisively to cansultasgand this he didgif often 
insipidly. In a substantial senseqtheref3reýhe fulfilled his regal 
duty. The importance of this should not be understated; at even his 
worst moments9he kept the machine working. This in itself was a 
considerable achievement. Conciliar kingshipj3f courseoalso made a 
secandarygqualititative demandpand it was here that Philip's tended to 
break downpat those moments when he was required to impose himself 
upon the councils or perhaps to discipline them. We will shortly 
consider an example of this latter in another cantextq 
4 but should 
first leave Philip's relationship with War and Finance by appraising 
tne manner in which he actively co-operated. with the Councils. 
At about the time that he began to lose interest in State's 
1- Cnts. 'War, 20 Aug. 16009A. G. S. %z. A-570if-118- 
2- Cntn. `. Iarvl4 Jul. 1604YA. G. S. G. A. 626, no f3l. 
3- Tn-1601 and 16079above, pp. 168-g. on 1611 and 1615 pLnta. War, 25 1-1, 1615yA. G. S. G. A-7991f. 6. 
4 Bel3w9PP-310-'s9'0- 
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c3nsultasvPhilip found War concerning itself seri3uslv with the 
problem of naval reformsgand he took a keen interest in its 
deliberati3ns. Doubtlesslit was in part his Agrandeza that attracted 
him to the cause of naval reforms - in 1606 there was talk in the 
Council of State of war with Englandq 
1 
and of course the Dutch war was 
approaching its climax - but his activity was natural and unforced; he 
was merely fulfilling his kingly dutyptaking a major interest in a 
major pr3blem. In August 1606 he authorised a major ship-building 
programme - 'the most important matter for my service and for the 
good of these realms' 
2_ 
and three months later C3Mplemented this 1. -, 5r 
assenting to the introduction of a forced-apprenticeship scheme for 
poor youths of twelve to sixteen years of age who were to be taken off 
3 the streets and endowed with naval careers. Interest extended to 
more routine matters - the nature of naval salarieSP4 the movement of 
56 
squadrons Y the provision of infantry for the navy. Royal interest was 
compounded by royal authority - lit is important to japroperly reform 
this, 
7; ln3 time must be lost in despatching this squadron' 
8 
; 'in order 
to gain time9which is the most important consideration at tAe Moment, 
I have signed the patents'. 
9 
Againth3wevervthe uitimate beneficiary 
1- See bel3wqp. "54'S-q- 2- Cnta*Warg2l Aug-16o69A. G. S. G. A. b53nf. 
3- anta-WarglO Nov. 16o6gibid. Amm 
4- Enta. Wary22 Jul. 16079A. G. S. G. A. 669, no fal. 
5- ýnta-Warq, 14 I-lar. 1607, Lbid. 6 Cnta-Warv6 Yiar. 1607gibid. 
7- gnta. War 22 Jul. 160790P. Cit Lnta. War9l4 Mar. 1607,3p. Cit 
9- Lnta. War96 Mar. 160793P -cit 
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of royal interest was conciliar authority - 'I remain very satisfied 
with the care that the Council has taken over this mattervand charge 
it to continue doing so in future .... 11 ; '1 gre4tly thank you for the 
care that you have shown in treating of this, which was no lose than 
the importance of such a matter demanded .... All that you say on this 
appears satisfactO17 and I have ordered that all possible monies be 
provided, 
2; lthe Council has deliberated very well on this and 
therefore I have signed the despatches that came with this consulta 
and I charge the Council to ... continue to advise me on, what it is 
d3ing, 3;,, greatly regret seeing that things have *ome to this 
extremity ... advise me on what has been done about it .,,. j.. 
4 
A comparison of Philip's reactions here with his activity 
later in the reign as the long countdown to the resumption of 
hostilities began is in, ý70tive-In 1615 suoh was the state of the 
presidios and the navy that War considered their reinforcement to be 
5 , the most important business with which it is currently concerned' 9 
but it found that State had decided that priority of resource be given 
to Italy and Flanders. It chose therefore to make its case for extra 
money on a piece-meal basis; between February and July 1615 it sent 
seventeen separate consultas to Philip stressing that itxneeded money 
for different Purposes. 
6 
Philip simply referred all these problems to 
1 Enta. War92 Aug: 16069op. cit rl 1 
2 Cnta. Warol Jun 16071A. G. S. G. A. 6699no fol. 
3 Cnta. Warp30 Apr. 1607, Abid. 4- Cnta. Warp3O Jan. 1607gibid. 
5 -'cnta. Warpl6 Aug. 1615yA. G. S. G. A-799pf. 12. 
6- Cnta*Warp29 Deo. l6l5qLbid. pf-14)mentioning the seventeen 
conBultne, 
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Carrillogand liar had to send a secretary to negotiate with tne 
President9who as it happened was currently itinerant in Valladolid. 
Carrillo treated him to a lecture - lun largo discurso, - on what he 
had done and on why he could provide no more money. War therefore 
appealed in a major consulta to Philipýcertain ±As usual that His 
Majesty knew 'better than anyone' of the problems facing itgand 
complaining that 'all who are involved in government know how the 
President Conducts business'paccused Carrillo of not carrying out royal 
orders to provide extra money. Philip was unM3vedland left the matter in 
Carrillo's handsýreminding War that Carrillo had the order to pay what 
was possible. 
I 
By Septembe=, War was complaining that no more than five 
ships in tlie Atlantic Fleet were in fit condition to serve properly in 
1616, begged that m3ney be f3und to build m3repand c3mplained again that 
Carrillo was not co-3perating. 
2ýhilip 
merely ordered it to draw up an 
account of all available ships and men. 
2 In DecembergWar took advantage 
of the news that two Dutch ships were 103se in the Bay of Lagos to 
plead again for more M3neygand Philip with unconscious irony replied 
that the 300,000 ducats that Carrillo had allocated for the navy should 
be sufficient for the ships that War p3ssessed. 
3 
r 
i33th in 1606-7 and in 1615PPhilip's interest and activity in 
the problems of naval reform were close and basically c3mmendable. In 
1 Cnta. War, 16 Aug. 1615, A-G. 'S. G-A-799ff. 12. 
2 ýntq. 'Jarq 2 Sept. 1615 ibid. gno f3l. 
3 Lnta. 'Jarg2l Dac. 1615, lb-id. 
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1606-79howeverghe was still impressionable enough to give vent to his 
enthusiasm; he say the problemsphe thought he saw the solutions and he 
threw himself eagerly at b3th. What he did not see was the context of 
the problems. In 1615POn the other hand, he was no less personally 
involved but could see now the much more general context and could 
discipline himself - and the Council of War - accordingly. Resources 
were limited and priorities were allocated; War would have to wait its 
turn. The King had grown up. For all that he was dynamically involved in 
1606-7pit was in 1615 that he more properly and fully controlled 
conciliar government, harnessing the energies of three councils to a 
rationalised end, realising at last that problems required rather more 
than the royal wish to solve them, 
Within the framework of State's priorities p therefore 9 Philip was 
allowing Carrillo powers that were all but ministerial; he acknowledged 
fully the justice of War's demandspbut vould not interfere with 
Carrillo's allocation of money. But it was the councils and not just 
this one man of exceptional resource and character who exercised the 
plenitude of power. Philip pursued the same line with Carrillo' a 
sucogsoor. It may of course have been no coincidence that 
Salazarptwenty 
years a councillor of Wartallowed War an increase of 
60% in 16209to 
480,000 ducats9but, War still found it insufficient. With the Truce 
coming to an end, with the Dutch trespassing in both Indiespit again 
found PhiliP following his President of Finance and ordering it to do 
what it could with the monies he had allowed it. He himself could do 
'303-1 
nothing. 
Philip's application to State's papers sh3wed the same 
maturation over the last eight years of the reignvbut before it did it 
underwent9in the years 1606-129the most awful regression. Until the 
beginning of 1607 he continued to take some notice Of C3nsultas dealing 
with Flemish affairsp 
2 but did no m3re than the minimum of work with 
other papers; typical of such activity was his response to a major 
consulta 3f a State junta in April 1607, which c3nsisted merely of 
agreeing to each one of seventeen recommendations without taking a 
discernible interest in any one of them. 
3 TYPicalýtoojwas the note 
sounded by Idiaquez in May 1608 when he suggested that James of England 
would greatly rejoice if Philip deigned to reply to any one of the six 
or seven letters he had written him. 
4 By that time, Philip had lost even 
his interest in Flemish affairs - in Julyphis reaction to State's 
suggestion that at very best only a defensive war could be waged in 
Flanders was to have it ask the opinion of two soldiers who had 
recently served therepand he 'reserved the problem of Flanders for 
future (consideration) t 
5; in Septemberga major consulta concerning 
itself wit], the extent of the Trucelthe problems of the Indies 
navigation, freedom of exercise of religion in Flanders and the 
1 Cnta. Wart7 Feb. 1620)A. G. S. G. A. 853, no fol. See ala3fcntas-War 2:; 2xp±. ' 
2 and 11 Sept. 1620jibid- 
2 His interest really ended with attempts in January 1607 to find 
money for Flanders; see especially)cntas. Jnta. de Hac. 124 and 31 Jan- 
1607, A-G--3- C-J-H-3452no fol. and f. 230. 
3 Cnta-inta. de D3s, 13 Apr-16071A. G. S. F,. 2025pf-19- 
4 U-nta. ldiAquez, 24 May 1608pA. G. S. 3.2513ofno fol. 
5 =na. St. t26 Jul-160blA. U. S. -", j. 2025if-139. 
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responses to be made to any French activity elicited an 'esta bien' 
and a confirmation that some orders asked by the Council had been 
given' -1 Defeat was humiliating; Philip wanted nothing to do with it. 
2 
Since in the years t3 the end of 1612 Philip made abS3lUtely 
no positive impression upon State's c3nsultasln3 qualitative analysis 
of his decisions is possible. We may c3nfine ourselves therefore to the 
quantitative 9 remarking that on approximately kx4Výo of the C3nsultas of 
the years 1609-1612 he merely scribbled an 'esta bieniva '13 que 
parece en t3dol and the like. On the remainderginterest was barely 
more c3mprehensive; on roughly the same proportion again he agreed to 
what the Council had recommended and merely added tde rider that he 
should be given information on a further detailz - on the details of 
the instructions to be given to an ambassad3r; on the reply to be made 
to a foreign ambassador; on the historical precedents for the 
establishment of English consulates in Spaingor on the need to match 
the French gesture in sending anzx extraordinary ambassador to 
F, ngl and. Philip's constant referral 32 such back to the Council 
betakened a complete unwillingness to take even the smallest decision 
by himself and also therefore testified to the increased imp3rtance 
of the cou#cil. The roles of master and servant had become almost 
reversed; tAe royal development after a decade in power was in the 
1- Cntq 
, 
itin. St. ýlq Sept. 16089A. G. s. 12', '. 2025if-146. 
2- On State's policy in these years 9 below9ppoNot - 
(P 
- -jo-J---ý 1 
direction. not of a more independent and self-confident judgement but 
of a greater and more consistent reliance upon the advice of his 
councillors. 
In 1613 Philip worked hard enough to have put his father to 
shame. The transformationp, astonishing and absolute, is inexplicable- 
Doubtless it had much to do with the ending of the great annual 
itineracies, 1 and doubtless it equally had much to do with the 
grandeza to be won in the great project undertaken that yeartof 
reforming the royal domain and army in Manders. Cartainlypthe 
I 
resurgent interest manifested itself most dramatically in the papeM 
dealing with this latter problem* 
2 Probably9the most important 
factors were three - the realisation that Spain was once againqafterý 
the death of Henry 1V and the diplomatic revolution that that 
involved9the greatest power in Europe; the interest aroused by the 
reformed and largely re-staffed Council itselfpnow more self- 
confident than it had ever beenIthe long. last illness of Idi9quezq 
who in the previous five or six years had virtually been the Council 
of Statejaýid upon whom Philip had almost absolutely depended. 
3 
perhapsttoothaving won his great victory by expelling the m3riscas, 
Philip had f3und fulfilment in his kingship. 
In 1615 he flirted briefly with the idea of an3ther AlgerjaIg i 
1- See ab3voypp. 148-9. 
2- See especially the great c3nsulta of Idiaquez and la Olivap16 
jan. 16139A. G. S. E-20279no fol. 
3- On these factors, belowopp. 369-375- 
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expediti3n, 
1 
but otherwise entertained no hopes of an easy greatness. 
State followed a policy of limited involvement in the successive crises 
in central Europe while trying to isolate James of England by holding 
out to him the prospect - more apparent than real - of a Spanish 
marriagevand Philip followed it closely and with quite remarkable 
diligence. Indeedgat m3ments, the level of his interest was quite 
phenomenal; the Cleves-JUlich crisis of 1614 and the great problem of 
the Bohemian successionx - wherepadmittedly9there was a throne to be 
won - found Philip quite ýxhaustively inv3lved. 
2 His pOliCy, h3weverp 
was Viat of the Council; he fully realised the weakness of Spanish 
power behind the great faqade and determined resolutely that he should 
3 
become involved in no wars. For the first time in the reign he fully 
adopted that apparent pacifism generally held so typical of him. 
From the end of 16169howeverlopinion in Madrid began to move, 
slowly but inex3rablylin the direction of a more assertive foreign 
policyg and Philip moved with it. Frustration with a Dutch peace that was 
1 Cnta. St. 12 Jan. 16159A. G. S. 25149ff. 37-8.1n t: ie event he did no 
more than provide 12,000 ducats for the King of Algeriaowith whom 
Ae was allied. His interest here was perhaps a natural extension 
of that in a n3w-completed morisca expulsion; on his interest in the 
1 atterp see particul arly . 
anta. 6, t. , 
ý6 Feb. 1614 9 A. '- S. E. 2644 no f 31. 
2 See, for examplep3n ClevesqAis response to cntas. St. 929 Jul. and 14 
Sept. 16149A. G. S. E-20282no fz)ls.; the most remarkable example of 
his involvement in the Bohemian succession p cnta. St. 1 Jun. 1616, 
A. G. S. 1133.23269f. 
19-bee also pcnts. St. 930 Apr. 1616 ibid f. 15. _ 3 See especially his replies fo-cntas. St., 27 May OýOiýýun. 71614, 
A. G. S. E. 20301no fOls-gand to 127 -Feb. 1616, A. G. S. E. 20309n3 f3l.; in 
each of these he specifically ruled out war as being anything but a last resort. 
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proving, as fractious and as expensive as a war was the catalyst. 
Philip's interest in his governmental duties took anew and singular 
form as fr-jm 1616 he began working closely with the conciliar 
secretaries; he now gradually assumed the responsibility that had long 
been Lermals9and issued orders in his own name. Generallypthe 
secretaries wrote the notes and he initialled them but increasingly 
he began to write his own. His interest ranged comprehensively from the 
small to the large9from whether contador Juan de, San Martin be given 
a merced 
I 
to the nature of army reforms in Italy. 
2 His major interests9 
howeverywere two - with money and with Flanders. Uniquelyphe began to 
3 
involve himself in asiento negotiationsp and did so with one end in 
view. By November 1619 he was making specific plans for the renewal of 
the Dutch Warg3rdering the establishment immediately of a new fleet in 
I- To President of Finance (Salazar)913 Dec. 16209A. G. S. C. J. H. 410pn3 fX 
fol. Similarlypsee notes to same of 18 Jan. 1619 dealing with a 
request by the Count of FuensalidayA. G. S. C-J-H-405, no fol. and of 
18 Sept. 1619 an a present for a bishop,.,,. G. S. C-J--q-566, n3 fol. See 
also9on similar levels a note to Aliaga of 13 Mar. 1620 on the 
jurtidtotion of the Church in Cambrai; one of 6 Jun. 1619 to Juan de 
Ciriza ordering him to find pilots experienced in the passage of 
the Cape of Good Hopepne of 22 Mar. 1619 to Martin de, Arostegulf 
ordering some naval reinforcements to be sent to the Philippines. 
Respectively p A. G. S. E. 2035pf. 101)E. 2033if-131gand G. A. 940Pf-163. 
2- To Carrilloý? ), 30 Sept. 16179A. G. S. C-J-H-395, no fol. 9dealing with 
the provision of money for Italy. 
3- See for examplevn3tes to Carrillop23 Apr. 1616, A. G.. S. C. J. H. 391, no 
fol. pordering 
the payment of 5009000 ducats for Milaný3r that of 
30 Sept. 1617 informing him that 3009000 ducats were to be provided 
in 1-iiiangA. G. S. G-J-1f. 3959no fol-See also note to Juan de Ciriza of 
23 Feb. 1619 informing him9and therefore Statelof the progress of 
negotiations for an asientp for Flanders9B. G. S. E. 20339f. 119. 
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Flanders - fit is iMp3rtant not to lose an hour of time in this' 
1- 
and thraugh3ut 1620 he maintained a remarkable interest in the 
Flemish consultas9not infrequently indeed writing comments on them 
2 longer than those of the Council itself- With a dramatic sense of 
theatrevPhilip brought his reign to a close. On 12 and 13 March 1621 
he auth3rised an asient3 of 195OOyOOO ducats for use in Flandersq 
Germany and Ital. YY3 and set the stage forthe lastýand greatest2of his 
gestures. 1le made it from his death-bed. On 29 March 1621 he ordered 
that hostilities with the Dutch were to be renewed. 
4 Two days later 
he diedlat peace with his conscience. 
*** *** 
1- To President Salassur of FinanceY28 Nov. 16199A. G. S. C. J. H. 4059f. 235. 
2- Seeqf3r exampleyontas. stia95 Mav and 1 Aug. 1620, A. G. S. E-20349ff-17- 
18 and 8-16. 
3- Notes to President Salazar of Financeq12 and 13 Mar-1621f. A. G. S. 
C. J. H. 414, no fols. 
4- I'llis Majesty . 1-las decided tdat from the completion of 
the Truce, 
w! 3. ich is 3nq April next ... the Dutch ... will 
be treated ... as 
enemies ... in thLe form and the manner 
that obtained before the 
Trucezl. )Juan de Ciriza to Martin de Arosteguiq29 
liar. 1621 9A. G. S. 
G.. A, 865, no f3l. 
Duke. 
dwý M&M 
As the King's c3nfidant, Lerma naturally assumed an 
administrative rolevassisting Philip in a number of wVs but 
fundamentally as an aide helping him deal with mountains of paper. 
Novel as it often waspthis role should not be seen as quasi prime- 
ministerial; as alwayspLermals interest was fitfulphis lethargy 
constantphis opportunism occasionalphis conservatism extraordinary. 
Government and its problems were too complex for a dilettante to 
controlpand Lerma usually knew better than to try.. 
He hadleertainlypaccess to all governmental papers. In the 
first instancepthis was a natural consequence of administrative 
r3utinevas despatches and correspondence addressed directly to the 
King were sent to himvand of course during an itineracy Lerma's 
access to these papers would be compounded. Philip then had either to 
make a decision or circulate the papers to the appropriate councilt 
Junta or administrator. He allowed Lerma to read such of these papers 
as he cared togdoubtless discussed them with himpand then usually 
had him send them to the COUnOils - thusvfor instanoepletters from 
12 
the P3pev cousin Philibert, and the Archdukes in FlanderS3 were 
read by Lerma before being passed on to State. Foreign ambassadors 
1- Lorma to Antonio do Arosteguý, 17 Jan. 16189forwarding the letter 
and ordering State to consider it, A. G. S. E. 1866pf. l. Ses similarly 
cnta. St. pl3 Sept. 1618pibid. pf-51 dealing with affairs in R3me broUght to the CounciiTs attention by Lerma. 
2- Same to same, 3 Sept-1618gibid. pf. 49. 3- Same to Juan do Cirizapl4-rla-, y 1616, A. G. S. E. 20301no fol. 
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similarly merited ducal attention. On Occasion he negotiated directly 
with t1lem and was often more formally involved; as mayordamo may3rpit 
fell to him to keep a supervisory eye upon thempand it was therefore he 
who dealt with their housing problems 
2 
or with complaints made by them 
3 against Spaniards... 
Of coursaymatters involving ambassad3rs tended to be of the 
first importance. but unless he was particularly interested in the 
matter at hand Lerma did little more than keep a watching briefgand 
even when he was so interested he kept State informed of what he was 
doing and passed an any relevant papers to it. 
4 For himpthe appearance 
of greatness was more important than the substance. Similarlyphe looked 
at the newly-arrived c3rreas as they were brought to the King. This was 
a rather more irregular practice since he had no formal administrative 
position9but again special circumstances obtained; he was effective, 
although not titularphead of the spy service. 11en wishing employment in 
Thus9for instancepwith Digbyof Britain in 1615; he then informed 
State of what had been said and it then formulated a reactiazipanta. 
St. 926 Mar. 16159A. G. S. E-2514vf. 49. 
2- On housing of the English ambassadortLerma to Arostegd29 Jul. 16119 
A. G. S. E. 2513pno fol. See also examples cited above 1p. 159 ýn. '2' and 
1641n. l. 
3- Seelfor instancepthe complaint made by the Florentine ambassador 
in 1618 about an alleged libel on his madtor-Lormi forwarded the 
matter to*State, Rnt-a-St-929 Mar. 1618; A. G. S E. 18669f. 32. 
4- His most activi involvement with a foroign ambassador was with 
Cornwallis 6f Britain in 16059and much of his correspondence with 
Prada has survived ihlAndroi do Uztarroz's copiespB. N. 1492. On his 
reference ofmaterial to Stategparticularlyllettersto Prada'of 
19 May and 1 Jun. (ff. 219 - and '22) ., and Prada to Lermay 24 May 1605 (f. 2370-Sai'alsolPrada to Ler'maq16 Mar. 16051A. G. S. E. 2512, f. 40. 
3: 11 
that service 
1 
or with information real or imaginary to impart to it 
2 
approached him. Sottoolthe secretaries were careful to keep him 
informed of what was happening - Prada in 1605ýfor instance, is found 
3 
telling him 'what is new in intelligence' . Againgh3weverghis interest 
was fitful and we should no more take it seriously than did the 
secretaries themselves who generally merely kept him informed and who 
often used him to hurry up their business - Anaya of War9for instancev 
in 1611 'in order to tire Your Excellency as little as possiblel9sent 
a summary of his despatchespand received a prompt reply ordering War 
to consider them. 
4 
Lermals commission of papers and information to the 
councils was pedantic in the extremetand at the highest level - with 
State - only a few instances have survived of any behaviour on 
his 
part that was anything less than quite correct. On two occasions 
he ordered secretaries to retain some papers until such a time as 
Philip made a policy decisionpbut in both cases the issues involved 
1- Thus Juan do Medicis to Lerma924 Apr. 1610, offering to spy on 
VenicalA. G. S. K. 14279f. 19. 
informationphe 2- When two Dutchmen approached him in 1617 with some 
wrote to Juan do Ciriza ordering him to investigate its 
reliability 9 letter of 17 Oot. 1617, A. G. S. E. 20289no 
fol. See alsog 
cnta. St. 916 Jun. 1609 dealing with a paper forwarded 
by Lerma from 
a man who had a plan for conquering the Dutch with 
6pOOO 
Spaniards: A. G. S. E-20259f. 211. 
3- Prada to Lermay2O Aug-16059B. N, 1492, f. 2319a copy- 
4- Anaya to LermaP5 Mar. 1611jand reply98 Mar. 9A. G. S. G. A. 744pf. 10. 
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were relatively minor. 
1 
Oncephe dealt in a half-truthlin ordering 
that some papers from Baltasar de ZIAga were to be considered by State 
without the Council being info=ed of the identity of their author, 
but such was probably nothing more than an expedient designed to make 
for more judicious debatepsince the Council tended to follow Zuffiga 
closely. 2 Similarlyl, there was a practical enough reason for his only 
recorded attempt to influence the composition of the Council itselfp 
when in 1604 he stipulated that the Milan correa was not to be 
discussed unless the Constable was present3 _ the Constable having 
served as Governor of Milan was clearly entitled to be heard on such 
a matter. We are left with only one of Lermals hundreds of notes to 
State which was in any substantial way sinister, and even thengin 
attempting to influence the views of members of the Councilpit was not 
his own but the King's views that he impressed. In May 16079dealing 
with the truce negotiations with the DutchpPrada took it upon himself 
to ask Lerma whether 'because the matter is so important and sensitive 
it ought to pass before the censure of the Council' - proofgperhapstof 
1- in 1607 he ordered Prada to retain some papers from the Netherlands 
until such a time as Philip made a decision on them9letter of 22 
Jul. 16079B. N. 14929f. 269vpa c3py; in 1612, he similarly ordered 
Antonio do Arosteguf to retain a consulta (sio)9again until Philip 
made a docisionyon the payment ofppensio in Flandersyletter of 
16 Feb. 16129A. G. S. E-2026, n3 fol. 
2- Lerma to Prada926 Feb. l605tB-X-l4929f. 268v9a 03Pve 
3- Same to same928 Oct-16049A. G. S. E. 841, f. 180. The Constable's 
advice on military matters was accorded an equally singular 
distinction when in 1606 he was shown a War consulta on which 
there had been some small disagreement among the c3uncillors; he 
thus acted as arbiter and Philip followed his advicelcnta. War, 8 
xay 1606vA. G. S. G. A. 6539no fol, 
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the C3uncil's prestige even in its worst decline ?- and Lerma decided 
upon a most curious c3mpromisepordering that Prada 'before the Council 
inform Miranda and (Idiaquez) of all this .. - and 
tell them that His 
Majesty is inclined to the following 
Once information reached a councilvit consulted the King and 
he then took a decision. Doubtless Lerma offered advice at this state at 
least on occasionpbut there is no evidence whatsoever for the often- 
propagated view that Lerma actually made those decisions himself and 
in effect therefore used the King as his secretary. The areas of 
responsibility between King and Duke were far too clearly defined for 
thatpas indeed was the King's own political philosophy9which consisted 
more or loss in toto of a reliance upon the councils -a reliance 
vhich was ultimately of course to prove more enduring than that an 
Lerma-MOst obviouslygPhilip himself replied to the c3nsultas -a simple 
enough observationgperhapopbut one of some significance when we 
consider the view that posterity has normally held of his kingship; his 
wardBglike his writing9were his own. Of c3ursegin the nature of things, 
explicit evidence on this 
(alleged) problem offers itself only on the 
rarest occasions. In 1605pwhen State was dealing with a particularly 
urgent matterqPrada forwarded the relevant documents to Philip with an 
accompanying note to Lerma asking himIto ensure that the consulta now 
being despatchedpwhich is easy to resolvegraturns answered at once and 
1- Prada to Lermap6 May 1607 and reply of same datepB. N. 14929f. 305pa 
COPY6 
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(with the enclosed) letter signed'vand Lema replied that 'I will ask 
His Majesty to give a decision on the c3nsulta and (to send) the 
letter ... returned and signed'. 
1 
More explicitly. in 1608 he wrote to 
Prada promising to advise him when Philip had made a decision an some 
papers for which he was waiting. 
2 It would have been easy enough - and i 
probably more convenient - for Lerma himself to give decisions in such 
cases, but he was not the King of Spain and did not pretend to be. What 
was happening in practice was that once again administrators were using"; 
3 him in order to secure rapid decisions from the King. I 
Lerma did indeed have authority from Philip to give orders in 
i 
his namegand much of the confusion as to the reality of his 
administrative role has stemmed from misinterpretation of the famous 
phrase with which he prefaced virtually all such orders - 'His Majesty 
has commanded me It meant what it said it meant; nothing m3re*In 
manner and content9such notes were secretarial rather than exeuutive; 
the administrative context was again more important than the ducal. The 
immense amount of business coming to the King had to be rationalisea; 
petitionersyinformantspoorrespandentspeven councils and 
their 
secretariespwere not necessarily the best judges of 
the overall 
degrees of importanoe and urgency of their businessland these 
1 Prada to LermavlO Oct. 1605 and reply of 12 Oct. qjbid-vf-236,, copies- 
2 Lerma to Pradav23 Nov. 1608, A. G. S. E. 2025tf-85- 
3 This was a standard technique; for other examples, bel3wvp. 3M-3 
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inevitably had to be gauged at the King's desk-A decision once reached 
might thenphowever simplepinvolve communication with a number of 
different agencies or individuals. Lermal s normal role was to assist in 
these tasks as a part-timegif occasionally exaltedpsecretary; on 
Philip's behalfphe passed an to the councils memoranda from supplicants, 
correspondence from interested partiespand c3nsultas from other 
councils and Juntaspordering them to consider a particular matter and 
advise the King9and after a decision was made he might inform the 
different parties and perhaps order the drawing-up of the relevant 
executive documents. Characteristicallypthe great maj3rity of his notes 
were not even written Join his own hand but in those of a personal 
secretary and were only initialled by him. 
1 
Since most governmental decisions in one form or another 
involved the provision of moneygLermals role might best be examined 
through his relationship with the Council of Pinancepand especially so 
since the largest single part of his extant correspondence relates to 
2 
that Council's work. In turngthe greater part of that correspondence 
considtad of orders auth3rising the payment of small amounts of money. 
Most grantspof course9vere made after a council had consulted the King, 
and Lerma ordinarily only involved himself in these if a problem 
arose - shou3Ld monies that State had agreed were owing 
to Martin de la 
on the identification of these secretariespabovelp-94. 
They are dolleoted in A. G. S. C. J. H. leRaJos 311,35393610660719377- 
3i1 
Cerda be paid in Spain or in Flanders.? 
1 Similarly9he interoeded 
regularly in favour of man not paid monies granted them - General 
Cubiaur in 1608 died before State's award to him was paidjand Larma 
urged Finance to pay it to his family. 
2 Certainly9there was nothing 
irregular in such notes9but it is probably not fanciful to see behind 
most of them a personal appeal made directly to Philip or Lerma - to 
see this in a sensepthereforegalmost as a courtly rather than an 
administrative activity by the Duke. Such was undoubtedly the case in 
the majority of instances where he ordered the payment of monies not 
specifically agreed to by a council9for these almost invariably 
concerned the payment of courtly expenses -a subject in whichlas we 
have seenphe retained the closest and m3st natural of interests. 
3 
Again9thers was nothing irregular herepsave perhaps the Judgement; the 
royal authority with which Lerma acted was sufficient. Such were not 
normally considered to be negotiable orders althoughgas has again been 
seen, Finance often did make an issue of them an the grounds of 
feasibility. 
4 
At the other end of the spectrum lay the greatest affairs of 
statetbut again when Lerma involved himself he did so in thoroughly 
1- Le=a to Acu'n"'a926 Mar. 16089A. G. S. G. J. H. 3539no fole 
2- Same to samG914 Jun. 1608, lbid. 
3- See exaMP16B cited abovsgpp. 158-9 and 164. 
4- See above 9ppe 158-9 9 and more generallygon Finance's OPPosition to 
Lermap belowqpp. lxo-'5, l 4&0-7 
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conservative and legitimist spirit. This may beat be illustrated as it 
were in extremis from the terrible days of I§ril 1610 whenpit will be 
recalled, the Government was concerned with the apparently imminent 
launching of Henry IV's 'Grand Design' while King and Duke were driven 
to distraction by their inability to pay for their tour of Old Castile. 
On 22 April Lerma wrote to Carrillo perhaps the most unique of all his 
extant conciliar notesland proclaimed the importance he attached to it 
by scribbling it furiously and entirely in his own hand. The expulsion x 
I of the m3risc3s of Aragon could not proceed because the money for the 
galleys had not been pr3videdgand the morise3s themselves were on the 
point of rising in revolt with French help; unless 200pOOO 3f'the 
million ducats assigned for the purpose were forwarded 'without a day 
of delay' Spain herself would be put daily in greater peril. It was a 
matter 'of the very greatest importance and one justifiably causing His 
Majesty great concern'. 
1 
On the same day the Madrid Council of State 
advised Philip that the morisc3s were so restive that 'some disorder 
may be feared' and that 'many most damaging troubles' would ensue 
if 
the money were not immediately made available. 
2 On the following day 
this consulta was already an its way back to Madrid after having 
been 
read by the King and with another note from Lerma 
to Carrillo; fearing 
now an 'irreparable damagepwith the French so close 
(to the border) and' 
1- Lerma to Carrilloy22 Apr. 16101from VentosillapA. G. S. C-J-H-361, no f. 
2. - Lnta. St. 922 Apr. 1610, ibid. 
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on the point of declaring warlghe out his demands to 100vOOO ducats* 1 
In a second note an the same dV he further stressed that with French 
aggression imminent $the situation is worsening daily in such a way' 
2 that without immediate remedy 'some great disaster mV be feared' . 
As it happenadvit was largely a false alarm; on the following day the 
Court heard of the death of Henry. 
3 Howerergsupported as he had been 
an 23 April by the fullest authority of the King and of the Council of 
StatepLerma would surely have by-passed Finance if he could have done 
so; he did not because he had neither the determination nor the 
expertise to do s3. In what he certainly thought was the gravest crisis 
of his period in power and in the matter that probably above all 
others was closest to the King's heartpLerma threw himself into the 
a=s of the Council of Finance. The policy was fixed9the moment of 
prime urgency9but he knew no other way of getting things done. 
This hold true more gonerally; indeedpthe more important the 
matter and the more imperious the tone of command the more in fact he 
was led to acknowledge his dependence upon the Council. Thusqfor 
instance. when in 1608 all attempts by Council and Junta to raise money 
for Flanders and Portugal had failedyLermarfar from doing anything 
himself9threw the matter back to Aculfa. and his Council - 'the 
1- Lerma to Carrillop23 Apr. 1610, ibid. 
2- Same 'to -samey 23 Apr. 1610vibLd. 
3- Sed ab6vepp. 142. 
I 
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necessities being so great and the lack of resources so complete, the 
Council caanot be excused from re-applying itself to the problem ... 
and His Majesty hopes that (YOU) will find some way of making good 
the money that is needed'. 
1 
Sogtoopin 1617 Carrillo was first ordered 
'not to rest' until the Piedmont Provisions were made, 
2 
and vhen his 
energy and will failed to provide a solution Lerma could do no more 
than place' the authority and reputation! of Spain in his hands in the 
form of an order to find what he Could. 
3 
Traumas of course 'were rarepbut such correspondence of Lermals 
was extraordinary only in dogree. Between the two ends of the spectrum 
Jay a broad mass of unspectacular material forming the staple diet of 
the Counciltand here too Lerma's activity was normally quite legitimist., 
Normally it took the form of ordering the payment of monies in 
implementation of decisions reached after other councils had consulted 
the King - thu. 99for instance91509000 ducats for LarachOp 
4 10,000 for 
5 
some ships going to FlandeZsp 8,500 for some Ruardas despatched to 
6 
Catalonia* The very fact of giving an arderphoweverpnecessarily 
allowed Finance to involve itself in matters of which it might 
hitherto have known nothinggand after Poza's dismissalpit was only too 
ready to do so. This was especially true with asiento business9which 
1 Lerma to Acu7daY30 Aug-1608 in reply to a letter Of 16 Aug. pA. G. S. 
C. J. H. 3532116 Tolý .I, I. 
2 Lerma to Cartillopll Jun. 16179A. G. S. CJ, H. 401 no fol. 
3 Same to same, 3 Oct. 16179A. G. S. C-J-H-395 no fol. 
4 Same to sameP15 Oct. 16119A. G. S. C. J. H. 361no fol. 
5- Same to same930 Apr. 16109A. G. S. C, J. H*3929no fol. 
6- Same to same, 3 Dec. (? ) 1616jibid. 
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lay in the shaded areas just beyond Finance's control - necessarily so 
since the establishment of a need for an asiento lay often if not 
usually with the local agent of the Crown. In rare instances that agent 
might even conduct the negotiations himself; Albert in 1608 thus 
arranged for the provision of 100,000 escudos in Flanders,, and Lerma 
therefore simply ordered Finance to reserve that amount from the 
Indies income and to make up the despatches. 
1 Normally ghoweverl the 
negotiations would involve the central government and the President of 
Finance would either sit himself on the juntas which usually dealt 
with the matter or appoint a councillor or secretary to represent him. 
Thus Finance itselfgalthough not directly involvedpwas normally 
represented in these discussions. But even if it had no such 
representation it became involved in the next stage whenvan agreement 
madepLerma himself would often inform it of the terms of agreement or 
encharge it with refining the detailaysometimes giving specific ordarsl 
*0 
as to which resources were to be used. 
2 In such circumstancespAcuna 
Carrillo adopted different approaches9but to the same end. AcUA`a in 
1604 was blunt enough to inf3rm Philip that. an agreement approved by 
X 1- Same to Acunapl Jan. 16089A. G. S. C. J. H. 353tn3 fOl- 
2- Seepfor instancephis notes to Acu'na of 31 Jan. 1603 or 3 Feb. 1608 i! 
A. G. S. C. -T-H-311ino fol-jand 353tno fol. Lerma's mOst interested 
asiento involvement was that of 1603; see particularly his letter Fo) Acunwa of 12 Jul-1603 ordering him to make a new agreement for 
an asiento for Flanders - Perhaps the longest of all his 
conciliar letterspA. G. S. C--T-H-311, no fol. 
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Lerma was at a 'very exassaive pricelpbut supple enough to do so in 
such a way as to have the matter transferred to Finance and then to 
improve the terms himself. 1 The following year he repeated the trick, 
2 over two clauses of another agreement he found unsatisfactory. Carrillo 
was more forthright; his comment an Lerma's suggestion in 1613 that an 
agreement be cancelled was to have him ask Philip 'not to take a final 
decision in this case without hearing the Council9since thesel matters 
are such that its view will always be the most healthy (I san3l ). He 
then gave his own advice. P3 and found Lerma replying that what he had 
really meant was that no decision had been intended 'without your 
first consulting' an it. 
4 Dan Fernando then obligingly did soJ5 and 
found Lerma duly grateful .5 
When Rinance's interests proper were concerned, Lerma was of 
course normally even more deferential. Several instances of the 
treatment meted out to him by both Acu5a and Carrillo when he did 
stray or trespass have already been consideredgand another will be 
shortly examined in a wider context. 
6 Lerma liked to be helpful; 
uafortunately for him, Acu'na and Carrillo attached little value to his 
1- Lerma t3 AcZa917 Oct. 1604 and cnta., Fin., 16 Nov. 16049A. G. S. C. J. 11. 
321, no f3ls. 
2- Cnta*Fin. p2 Jul. 1605yA. G. S. C-J. H. 3339no fol%-ý 
3- Carrillo to LermaqlS Mar. 1613yA. G. S. C. J. H-5209f. 13- 
4- Lerma to CarrilloplS Mar. 1613, ibid. 
5- Carrillo to Lermap2 Apr. 1613gibid. 
6- Sao ab3ve9pp. 35t97-BY101-39158-1609209-109 and belowppp*A*-*jO%"-? 
wisdom. For present purpasespan example of the reaction of each to his 
assistance may suffice. In 1608 Acu'na was; informed by him that the King 
.. I had made an award from some vellon proceeds to a friarpand duly 
informed him that Philip had thereby acted illegally - 'it is 
contrary to what His Majesty has ordered and to his promises to the 
Kingdom'. 1 His Majesty took the point; he ordered Lerma to give Acuna 
thanks 'for the warning which has appeared to him very good' and to 
inform him that he was 'pleased' to order that the manufacture of 
vellon ceas e. 
2 Six months earlierphowevervAculla and his Council had 
themselves suggested that 150POOO cruzados-worth of vellSn be minted 
to meet a crisis that was holding up the sailing of the Indies flee 
- if illegalities had to be practicedfbetter on a large scale by 
responsible council than an a minor by the King of Spain himself-At 
the other end of the scale, we may rest with Carrillo's not untypical, 
outburst when Lerma proposed raising money by selling a major office 
in Seville an acrid thing ..., not a matter which can even be 
considered but a most dangerous expedient King and Duke gave wayý' 
It should not of course be imagined that the initiative lay 
I 
1- AcurTa to Lerma, 8 Jul. 1608pA. G. S. C. J. H. 3539no fol- 
2- Lerma to Acu'Aa926 Jul. 1608gibid. 
3- AcuTa to Lermap24 Jan. 1608 ana reply of 28 Jan. vibid. 
4- The office was that of guardamayor in the Customs HousepLnta-Fin. , 
21 May 16111A. G. S. C-J-H-365, f, 145. For a similar reactionpto 
Lerma's suggestion that the Customs House alguacilazgo be soldq 
cnta. Fin. 9 28 May 1611 91bid. if- 155- 
- ---1 11 
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ordinarily with Lerma-Most of Finance's business was conducted quite 
independently of him and9like the rest of the Administrationgit used 
him as much if not more than he used it. We might conclude by looking 
at two of the lighter moments in the Cariillo carrespandence. In 1613, 
Carrillo forbore to inform Philip and Lerma of the anticipated income 
from the flotapas he deigned to assure Lerma in. order not to repeat 
risking pairt Overestimates; His Majesty would be saved from 
miscalculations and from their consequences if Finance itself drew up 
the accounts far the coming year. 
' Lerma thought this a very good idea 
andpconfessing himself satisfied with the 'zeal and care' 3f the 
Counoilpmerely urged that some money be made available for Larache, He 
2 
went so far as to apologise for thereby inconveniencing Carrillop and 
in his good-mannered deference quite missed the point of the intrigue - 
that Carrillo and his Council intended to work out all the incomes and 
then let Philip know precisely what he would have to spend in that year3 
and how he could best spend it. 
There were of c3urse times Vaen Carrillo was only too pleased 
to let Lerma know what he and his Council were doing, for he consistentl3 
used the Duke to speed up the Council' s business. Even a week could be 
t oo long for him to have to wait for a reply to a consultap and Xing 
1 Carrillo to Lerma, 26 Oct. 1613, A. G. S C. J. H. 3779no fol. 
2 Lerma t6 Carrilloj27 Oct. 1613IFuentidu4navibide 
3 See for instancelletter to Lerma of 19 Jan. 1610 v complaining that a 
consulta of 12 Jan. of the junta do'guerra do hacienda had not been 
answeredpA. G. S. Co'J. H. 361 9no fol. 
324P 
and Duke developed something of a propensity for being ill at 
moments when Presidential wrath was aroused. In 16139for instancep 
Lerma is found apologising through Juan de Ciriza for the fatigue 
that prevented him giving Carrillo an immediate and direct replypand 
having Ciriza give it in his stead. 
1 The next dayqCiriza was 
informing Carrillo that he would have regrettably to delay overnight 
presenting some of his letters to the Duke on account of Lerma's 
$serious' illness. 2 It was not surprising that in June 1613 King and 
Duke were weary; Carrillo had been virtually at war with them in May 
and when on the last day of that month he von his inevitable victoryg 
Lerma himself yielded in a note remarkable not merely for its 
abjectness but also because it represents his only extant attempt at 
humour - His Majesty had been unable to attend to business at once 
because he had a sore gum and had had to have a tooth extracted (sun 
carrillol). 
3 For the King of Spain and his best friend such was 
indeed a genuflection. 
*** *** 
1- Note of 6 Jun. 1613vA. G. S. C-J. H. 377pno fol. The dorse dates this 
6 may 1613. 
2- Same to same97 Jun. 1613jin reply to Carrillo's letter of same 
daypAbid. 
3- Lerma to Carrillov3l Mav 16139A. G. S. C, J. H. 376pno fol. For the 
context Of this remaxkable note, below, p.. 346. 
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NatesThe Duke of Uceda. 
The man who 'rose late and did little' need not detain use 
I 
Uceda's political activity - if thus it may be dignified - was 
confined to sending a few notes annually to different councils in 
which he circulated consultas, forwarded memoranda or informed the 
councils of small mercedes granted by the King. Only one has survived 
in which he even dealt with a large sum of money; in 1611 he informed 
Finance that some 1329000 ducats should be given to the Swiss. He did 
not know how the money was to be raised9but he knew that it should be 
given them because the Constable had told him so.. 
2 Othervisephe 
confined himself to triviapand the only pattern worth recording was 
that he stepped up his activity at moments when his father was in 
trouble - thus9for instance, in August 1611 he interceded with 
Carrillo on behalf of the organists of the royal chapelq 
3 
ordered 
him to send two jewels to Parma and MantuaY4 and asked him for 
5 
advice about the problems of veedor Xauregui. Againpin the late 
summer of 1617 he roused himself to see that Andres do Colmenares 
was paid a merced owing to him, 
6 
that Lemos was given the 
1- See also abovepPP-52-3 and 62-3. 
2- SntaFinv24 Sept. 1611 vA. G. S. O. J. H. 3659f-294. 
3- Uoeda to Carrilloq2O Aug. 16119A. G. S. C. J. H-361pno fol. 
4- Same to sameq2l Aug. 16111A. G. S. C. J. H. 366, no fol. 
5- gnta. Fin. p3O Aug. 161lpA. G. S. C. J. H. 3659f. 255- 
6- Uceda to Carri113929 Jul. 16171A. G. S. G. J. H. 4019no fols, 
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perpetuation of an office, 
1 
and that, an important consulta from 
S2 Arag3n reached War. Such was Ucedals impact upon the machinery of 
governmento 
*** *** *** 
1- Same to sameP17 Jul. 1617pA. G. S. C. J. H-395of-43. 
2- Enta. War97 Oct. 16179A. G. S. G. A. 8171f-16. 
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Councils. 
Goa graphically t the scope of the councils was wide. State dealt 
with everything happening diplomatically in the European and 
Mediterranean worlds and with any impingement such made on the Indies; 
War with everything military within the peninsulagits adjacent 
islands and the north African coast and with the appointment of 
soldiers abroad; and Finance with the administration of all Castilian 
rants and incomes 9 including those arriving annually from the Indies* 
Their business divided formally into two parts 9 pal icymaking and 
administrative 9 with the control of personnel - their appointment and 
supervision - encroaching upon both. Whilegh3weverg State dealt ordinarily 
and chiefly in the firstgWar and Finance were thus concerned with the 
sec3nd. but such was the area of competence allowed them that they 
became in effect policymaking bo die a. Warg primarily concerned with the 
maintenance of the presidios and the armed forcesthad weekly to appoint 
men to every type of military post or deal with the provisioning of 
fortressespand in aggregate such activity formed a substantial 
contribution to policymaking. Such was only its routine activitygand, of 
course it was directly and obviously involved in the great matters of 
the day; it did diSCUSBgand inevitablypthe question of whether there 
3 28ý 
should be war or peacepand indeed was vexy probably initially 
responsible far the shift in emphasis towards a more belligerent 
foreign policy in the last years of the reign. 
' Finance's concern with 
policy was generally even more apparent. Its formal raison dletre was 
to prepare annual accounts of the state of the exchequer and to project 
that forward for the next yearv 
2 
and its staple role was therefore to 
administer the royal income with a view to making money available in 
both long and short term. Its role as Policymaker at this level need 
hardly be stressed. Even its more prosaic activities may in aggregate 
be thus classified. In 16039f3r instancepit was ordered to find 240vOOO 
ducats for Guipuzoaa and another 12,000 for el Pen'an and Melillapand 
decided that the greater part be filched from the servicio. It then had 
to consider the problems thereby caused with the asentistasvto whom that 
money was pledged9but went ahead, pr3viding the remainder from alcabalasq 
juras already assigned for the Tagus navigation and the conciliar 
account. Later of course it would have to rejuggle those accounts; for 
the m3mentlin administering a routine royal command it had made policy 
of its own. 
3 
Their agenda reflected their different r'63les. State dealt 
ordinarily with ambassadorial despatches and other information 
1- See below, p-32"? -Vo Ictl- 
2 _10rdenanzal of 26 Oct. 1602 re-establishing the CounciloB. M. Add. 
99329f. 42bpa copy. 
3- Enta. Fin. 922 Feb. 16039A. G. S. C-J-11-308, no fol. 
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pertinent to foreign policy andpwith occasional exceptions - as for 
instance with the Expulsion or the royal itineracy - with little 
domestic material. This was referred to it by the King and the 
frequency of convocation of the Council might therefore vary with his 
diligenceppartioularlypas has been seengover the first half of the 
reign. 
1 
The other two councils were more aut3nom3us, Finance also found 
much of its business coming to it in the form of a royal command to 
consider or implement the suggestion of another councilxor Juntapbut 
its conv3cation reflected x3mvirtually absolutely the wishes of its 
presidentlandpas has again been seenpeach had his own m3dus operandi. 
2 
War was on occasion subject to royal direction pparticularly in respect 
of those more important matters that the King saw fit to reserve for, 
the canseJo pleno2the Council at which the attendance of the 
3 
councillors of State was specifically required. Such was exceptionalg 
and the greater part of its activity consisted in dealing with the 
despatches from its own agents. Thesegunlike State's ambassadorial 
despatchesicame directly to it without - save again in exceptional 
circumstances - having been read by the King. The Council itself 
therefore ordinarily drew up its own agenda-Incoming papers were of 
course read by a secretarypand the Council tended on the whole to ask 
1- See aboveglip. 239zUi. 2- See above, pp-31-59266-7p27392789279- 
3- In practice these'meetings were not always attended by all 
councillors of State; am rather mutable concept of a quorum 
prevailed on such occasions9but consistently fundamental to it was 
the attendance of the important councillors of State. 
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for further information or await supplementary correspondence before 
considering a problem; thus whengfor instancevin 1603 it considered 
some problems in Cadiz it concerned itself with letters that were 
variouslY 49921 and 15 days old, now clearly considering that it had 
enough information to justify a consulta. 
1 Of coursepif the 
importance of the matter in hand warranted itgWar turned to it at 
once; in 1606 it considered a number of letters from leading ministers 
i 
and agents in Portugal all irithin seven days of their being written. 
2 
The machine was lubricated by the secretal7lwho had to both 
ensure that his council had information appropriate to its needs and 
then execute decisions made after consultation with the King. His firstýý 
task therefore was to sift through the vast correspondence directed 
to his council9gauge its importance - probablygin the case of Stateytoý 
I. 
translate or decode it - and present it for discussion when it had 
been decided that it, was to be dealt with. He then wrote up a 
consulta in draft formycirculated it for ratification to the 
councillors in the cases of State and War and to the president 
in 
that of Financepwrote UP the final copy with any necessary 
emendationso circulated it againgnow for initiallingyand then sent 
it 
to the King. On receiving it backphe would draw up the despatches and 
other orders implementing a decisionloften after reintroducing it to 
1- Snta. War928 Apr. 1603yA. G. S. G. A. 604, na fol. 
2- Rnta-Warq2q Apr. 1606pA. G. S. G. A. 654qn3 fol. 
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council or president for detailed instructions. He was therefore the 
servant of his council and his importance reflected that of the council; 
indeed, much of his more important activity consisted in keeping his 
eyes open for the interests of his council9particularly when he sat as 
its representative on extra-conciliar juntas 
1 Although some of his 
business was conducted orallypin the true spirit of this Administration 
he committed everything to paper and maintained a vast correspondence - 
with his president or councilpits agents9correspondents and 
supplicants, the secretaries of other councils and juntaspwith Lerma 
himself or perhaps even with the Kingland with the other secretaries in 
his own office. 
The juntapas has been seenywas used extensively both to deal 
with the shaded areas of responsibility between councils or as a 
specialised sub-committee of a council looking at problems which it 
itself was unable to deal withpusually for reasons of timegand might 
therefore be an occasional or for. mally-established body and either 
intra- or extrw-conciliar in composition, 
3 But - and it can hardly be 
1- See aboveppp-113-8. 
2- On this latterlsee particularly the correspondence of Antonio do 
Arostegul and Juan de Ciriza of Statepexamples of which survive in 
any State legaJ3 after 1614pand in which Arosteguf as senior 
secretary ordered Ciriza to draw up despatches or letters or to 
find information -a correspondence which 9 indident ally establishes 
that the distinction between the State secretaries was one of 
seniority rather than of concernpas it had been under Philip 11 
and was again to be under Philip lVqfor certain geographic areas. 
Secretaries of course couldttak. 0 some papers with them when they 
retired and the most important of their extant correspondence is 
therefore that of Pradagcopied from the original by Andr6s do Uztarroz and preserved in B-N-1492- 
3- Abovegpp. 113-8. 
overstressed - it was an inferior body in all but the most 
exceptional of circumstances9such as for instance those variously 
obtaining with the Junta de Hacienda. 
1 Thus while the occasional Junta 
was often given conciliar c3nsultas as its brief its own report would 
in turn be n3rrAally discussed and ratified by the full council or 
councils c3neerned. Only rarelyptoogdid such a Junta achieve any 
significant status. An exception here was the Junta de Galerasqwhich 
was established in 1601 to consider whether the galleys should best be 
put into asiento or into administrationjand which managed to stay 
alive to administer galley affairs on a semi-permanent basis. 
2 It may 
be presumed to have survived precisely because it was c3nvenient for 
War to allow it to do so; with a membership including only one non- 
councillor of War - and helindeedge, man with strong connections with 
the Council - it was a useful and not-resented tool. 
3 Statevfree of 
the czushing volume of business facing War and Financevand 
prestigiously far beyond the ambitions of any juntaphad little need of 
juntas - save to dabble in others' affairs - and had only one of any 
significancev that de dos or de tresqdepdnUng usually on whether Lerma 
1 See aboveyPP-31-5 and 113-4. 
2 Its establishment vents. Jnta. de Galeras922 Nov. 160lvA. G. S. G-A-579, 
no fol.; for its more general activity see especially the consultas 
preserved in A. G. S. G. A. 688junfoliated. 
3 Its staple membership; Miranda, the Constable pIdiaquezrVelasco 9 
Esteban do Ibarrajand briefly in 1608, Javierre. Bernabs' do Pedr3so 
was the non-councillorp; on his career, above jPP- 184-5- 
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or Cordoba joined Idiaquez and Miranda. Established in 1600pit was 
allowed two brief spells of activitypin 1602-3 and 1607-8,2 and ranged 
over a curiously vague spectr= of problemspfrom whether the Marquis of 
Comares should be allowed to marry3 to the nature of the Organisation 
of the gente de, guerra df Galicia-p 
4 but it was an occasional body and 
Imew better than to encroach on the fall Council's domain. 
5 L 
The formal Junta had an existence of its own and functioned 
mechanically much as a council-in-miniature. But although it had its 
own rights and obligations2composition and frequency of convocation 
legally defined it suffered by comparison with a council in terms of 
powergauth3rity and - especially - in the loyalty of itsxmembers. If 
its preserve was unexceptional and if if kept within them it was 
allowed by the councils to quietly pursue its work, but iftit offended 
either prescription it drew upon itself the most violent of onslaughtsý- 
Where honaur and self-importance were concerned seventeenth century 
Spaniards were not inclined to gentleness. 
VeladapFranqueza dnd Esteban do Ibarra also sat occasionallY; thQ 
latter was not of course a member of State and his attendance was 
testimony to the value that Philip set upon his advice. 
2 The first extant consulta datespin draft formpfrom September 1600p I 
A. G. S. E. 1288, pf. 159-ConsulLas from 1602-3 are collected in A. G. S. E, 
20239and see especially ff-F2'-4,87-8,114-5; on 1607-8 see especially! 
A. G. S. E-20259ff-56p69975-7,78-9. 
3 Cnta. Jnta*gl Jan. 16039A. G. S. E. 2023yf. 87. 
4 Cnta 
, 
sameplS Sept. 16079A. G. S. E. 2637, no fol. ý 
5 Thus in 1607 it refused to take any responsibility for the peace 
negotiations with the Dutch because such 'properly' belonged to 
the full Councill. 2nta. 16 Nov. 1607, A. G. S. B. 20259f-56. See similarly, 
cnta. 17 Feb. 1608gibid. pff-78-9. 6 See examples cited belowqp. 334-'55V., 3U-3TO 
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Intei--conciliar rivalry was the price Philip paid for 
conciliar autonomy and it waslin equally substantial measurespa curse 
and a blessing on his government. The range of the rivalries may be 
illustrated, perhaps most appropriately9from the records of War. 
Probably it relished its c3mbatsjcertainly it engaged regularly and 
ferociously in them - with Castile over jurisdiction over soldiers 
accused and/or found guilty of civilian offencesq 
1 
or over precedence 
on a junta 
2 
; with Indies over a whale gamut of problems from the right 
3 to appoint the Governor and Captain General of Chile or the flota 
captains4 to the control over the armada de Barlovent05 or the seating 
and voting arrangements in the Junta de Guerra de Indias 
6; 
with 
Finance over the appointment of contadores for the 
. 
galeras de Espana7 
18 
or a mayo am3 of artillery or again over representation on a juntay 
I- Seelfor examplelcntas. Warv22 Dec. 15999A. G. S. G. A-5539f. 76; 20 Deco 
16019G. A-580of-14; 7 Oct. 160310. A. 6059f. 6; 24 Mar. 16059'G. A. 6409f-39; 
20 Jul-913 Sept. and 28 Oct. 1612ýG. A-764qno fols. 
2- Cntas. Warq28 Aug. 16189A. G. S. G. A. 826, no fol. jand 27 Oct. 1616pG. A. 8089f 44. 
3- Enta. Warj26 Nov. 16109A. G. S. G. A. 7299f. 47. 
4- 
. 
2nta. War95 Dec. 16061A. G. S. G. A. 640pna fol. 
5- Enta-'War, 4 May 16019A. G. S. G. A-5799no fol. 
6- Cntas-War., 26 May 1602pA. G. S. G. A-589pf. 47; 14 Oct. l6l6pG. A. 799 pf-54; 
23 Aug. and 7 Oct. 1617pG. A. 817ýno fols. On policy disputes arising 
from the Juntals, workvcntas. War, 24 May 1613, G. A. 799pf-54929 Mar* 
25 Jun. and 30 Sept. 1618, G. A. 826vf. 7 and 8291no fols, See alS09 
Schgferlippp. 209-212p and on Indies' disputes with FinancelAbid., 
pp-204-5- 
7- Lnta. Warpl3 Mar. 16019A. G. S. G. A-5799no folo 
8- Cnta. War96 May 1615yA. G. S. G. A. 7999f-32* 
3ý5-j 
1 #4 de Hacienda de Guerra ; with Aragon over the control of the gente de 
, guerra de Aragon. 
2 
Only with Statepwith which of course it had a 
direct relationship9was War at all t3lerant; all other councils it 
clearly regarded as inferior. 
There were of course severe disadvantages in thispbut they 
were largely counterbalanced by the generosity with which each council 
br3UgIIt its rivals' mistakes to the royal attention - thus War had 
Castile Persistently disobeying decisions givenInaturally enoughpin 
its Own fav3ur by Philip 11 and Philip ill 
4 
and seriously delving 
the conduct of business by its fractiousness95 and it had Indies 
woefully ill-qualified for the task of appointing soldiers. 
6 
Rivalry 
brought out much of the beat as well as of the worst in conciliar 
government and in examining one aspect of one such rivalry in detail 
we may assess rather more than the nature and importance of the 
rivalry itself9the very nature - in its strengths and weaknesses - of 
conciliar government. 
1- Lnta. War9l2 Feb. 1610pA. G. S. G. A-729, f. 40. 
2- Rnta. WarplB Jun. 16039A. G. S. G. 'A. 6049no fol. 
3- Thus even when the c3uncill: )rs of State were absentgWar was fully 
prepared to cede State sway over matters to which it might not 
unreasonably have laid claim itself; seegover mercedes for ooldiere 
going to Italypcnta Warq22 Dec. 1600, A. G. S. G. A. 570pf. 269or over 
provisioning such troops 12. nta. Warp 13 Jul. 1604tA. G. S. G. A. 6269f-15- 
4- Rnta. Warp22 Dec. 1599pA. G. S. G-A-5539f. 76. 
5- Thus over a contraband case which had dragged on for seven years 
as the two councils foughtqcnta. Warq7 Oct. 1603jA. G. S- G. A. 605pf. 6. 
6- 'Because the councillors of Indies are of such a different 
profession they are not obliged to know which persons are Most 
appropriate fot these positionsl; the dispute was over the right 
of appointment to the Governorship of Chile qLnta. Warp 26 Nov. 16109 A. G. S. G-A-7299f-47- 
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FinanceýCastile and the Sale of Offices, 
The tension between Castile and Finance was that between the 
council responsible for the control of local government and that 
concerned withvinter aliapthe municipalities as a primary financial 
resourceland. the sale of municipal officesptouching as it did upon 
matters of policy and prestige to which both were particularly 
sensitivegbrought this tension into the open andyfinally9ta breaking- 
point. That it did so was largely due in the event to the factiousness 
of the Camara de Castilla 
1 
against a Finance temporarily weakened at 
the beginning of the reign9but the collision was inevitable in a 
situation in which the Camara was responsible for the sale of 
renunciable offices 
2while Finance controlled a considerable number of 
municipal offices. This entanglement was nowhere more in evidence than 
in Sevillepwhere Finance controlled the Customs HousepHouse of Money 
and almajarifazgo rents while the C(unara was responsible for the 
Audiencialwhich in turn claimed some jurisdiction over financial bodie 
and it was no accident that Sevillepat once the focal-p3int of the 
Indies trade and the wealthiest municipality in Spaingwas to be the 
1- The Council of Castile supervised local government in Castilej 
Navarre and the Canariespand the Camara was set up in 1588 as a 
separate department dealing 8pecifically with matters of patronage; 
it supervised all ecclesiastical and judicial appointments and 
those to all local offices in the gift if thoe Crownpincluding 
those of the Chancillerfas and Audiencias-Cedula establishing the 
CSmara, 6 Jan. 1588 PB--N---205)119 ff- 157-167 p-a 00py. 2- Enta-Fin. 916 Oct. 1600, A. G. S. C. J. H. 2849f. 31. 
--ýT 
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ground over which the conflict came to a head. 
Jurisdictional difficulties were compounded by administrative 
procedures which necessarily involved each council in the other's 
I 
affairalsinoo Finance had to keep a rec3rd of all offices sold while 
Castile despatched all municipal titles. Thus, for instanoevwhen the 
depositarfa general of Seville was renounced, the C6nara despatched 
1 the title and then passed the matter over to Pinanoeqwhile when 
Finance itself sold an Oviedo regimientogit took the razo'n and then 
transferred the documents to the Camara which dreW up and despatched 
the title. 2 
Relations were further strained by virtue of Castile's 
extraordinary powers as the highest court in Spain. It thereby had the 
right to pass judgement on any of Finance's actions against which an 
appeal was enteredgand since Finance's functions necessarily did not 
make it a pipular body there was no shortage of such appellants. This 
was particularly true in matters relating to the sale Of Offices since 
all sales were legally allowed only after any contradichas had been 
heard9and these of course were Judged by Castile; thus v for instancepit 
questioned the sale of the treasuryship of Seville's House of Money 
not because Finance did not have the right to sell or give the Office 
to whomsoever it chosepbut because the city itself questioned One 
1 Cnta. Jnta. de llac*v26 Jan. 16079A. G. S. C-TJ-H- 3459f. 16. 
2 Cedula of renunciation and perpetuation of the regimientogto Juan 
do Santisso AlvearIll Feb. 1615, A. G. S. C. J. H. 356 tno fol. 
3iI, 
aspect of the transactionpthe sale of Vag Y Votot 
I Equallygit could 
become involved through subsidiary bodies; at the beginning of the 
reignpFinance sold the lanchadoria do pescados in Seville, but when a 
dozen years later the holder tried to extend the scope of the office to 
cover all ships using the port, the city had sufficient cause to appeal 
to the Audiencia to judge the legitimacy of his actions and9by 
implication, that of the original sale. 
2 Castile's arm was long, 
It was especially so because it had ended the reign of Philip 11- 
firmly in the ascendant9daring even to secretly 'amend' or openly 
refuse to sign Finance's titles to the staple minor municipal officesq 
and easily winning a favourable verdict from the Princepdealing with 
the FInance papers* 
3 Doubtless encouraged by this verdict and by 
pinance's own weakness under Pozagit c3ntinued its arrogant waygin 
1599 obstructing Finance's almajarifazgo reforms4 and in 1600 winning I 
a remarkable Judgement from Philip allowing it to supervise the 
abolition of the six: tY two escribanlas mayares de rentaslaffices 'Which 
only too obviously belonged to Finance. 
5 
With the Castile supremacy thus c3nfirmed and with Aouf5a soft- 
1 Cnta. Fin. p23 Dec. 1609, A. G. S. C., T. H. 3569f. 387- 
2 Enta. Fin. 921 May 1611., A. G. S. C-J. H. 3651f-146. 
3 The offices involved beinR alferazgosdepositarraspre! Simientasp 
venticuatrfasgJuradur: fas jý-dthe notarIes of escribanfaspenta-Fin. j_ 
23 Jul-15989A. G. S. C. J. 11.264, no f3l. 
4 enta. rin. 92 Oct-: L599vA-G-3- C. J*H. 2749f. 231- 
5 Z-4dula of the Camara of 7 Sept. 1600, summarised in enta-Fin. p2O Sept, f-6O89A. G. S. C-J-H-T52ýf-40- 
pedallingvthe dispute lay dormant during the AcuVa Presidency although 
the councils did quarrel over other matters, 
1 
But as that Presidency 
ended the dispute flared againgand it found Castile still very much in 
the aseendant. In 1609 the CiGarals grant of the office of tesorero de 
las rentas reales y receptor de penas de Ca"mara of the city and 
district of Cartagena found Finance objecting on proprietorialglegal 
and practical grounds9and asking Philip to restate the traditional 
embargo on the C&arals, granting or selling such officesvand especially 
so in view of its proclaimed intention of alienating the Segovia 
office. The judgement was again unfavourablegPhilip wanly attempting to 
palliate Finance by ordering that it should take charge of the greater 
offices 'from which some considerable profit can be derived!. 
2 An ad 
hoc reply vexing Finance and leaving the basic problem unsolvedvit was 
typical of Philip. but in seeking the easy life he made an uncomfortable 
bed for himself; office sales were shortly to take a new and more 
important form9and Finance was about to come under the trenchant 
presidency of Carrillo, The case that signalled the end of Castile's 
supremacy and the beginning of Finance's lasted for two years and 
justifies close attention v defining as it doesImost of the balances 
positive and negative of conciliar government. 
1- See above ypp. 140-141 on the Casa de aposento V arrel that began in 
1606; on Castile' s interf erence over some vellon mintingy cnta. Fin. 
31 Jan. 16059A. G. S. C-J-H-3339no folo 
2- Lnta. Fin. 9 28 Mar. 1609 fA. G*S. C--T-H- 356vf. 185- 
3-4-01ý 
The office in questionyof escribano or secretary of the Seville 
Customs Houselwas one of those given to Lerma as a merced in 1599, then 
renounced in the Crown and sold to the CitY itself9for 1739000 ducats! 
At Lerma's direction pFinance began in May 1611 a review of a number 
2 of offices in Seville with the purpose ultimately of selling themt 
and in that month was told by Lerma that the King had decided to sell, 
the escribanfa with the right of renunciation for some lOtOOO ducats, 
The Council patiently replied by advising King and Duke that the 
office was already held with a royal title3; nat for the last time in 
this case had Lerma made only too obvious the level of his involvement 
in governmental affairs. A second such example followed shortly; in 
August he asked Finance whether it had dealt with the office and it 
had - again not for the last time - to despatch a consulta merely 
See abovepp-46. 
The escribanfa originally dealt with all autos touching on the 
almajarifazga rents and formed the basis of the escriban: fa de 
sacas, diezm3a Z aduanas y c3sas vedadas created in 1510 to Super- 
vise the affairs of all parts from Gibrale5n to Cartagena. A second 
eacribarda was added, apparently toward the end of Philip 11's 
reign for the Seville Oustoms House to deal with the caugas de 
visitas of the district of the alm3jarifazgos Both were given to 
Lerma in 1599sand on their sale to Seville they were sold to Diega, 
do Yanguas and Francisco Armeno Araque9but Finance refused to 
ratify these sales and put the offices into administratiOnoCntas 
Fin. 21 May xx&1611 and 30 Jun. 1612, A. G. S. C. J. H. 3651f-148 and 371, 
f-371- 
2- Among themythe lanchadarfa de pescadosqcnta* Fin. v 21 May 16119A. G. S, 
C. J. H. 365of-146; that of s3breA-uarda mayor de las aduanasvcnta. Fin. 
same date, Lbid-if-145; the escribania de segurospenta. Fine OF-Ma 
1611gibid. of-153; the alguacilazgo do la aduanacnta*Fin, q8ame date 
ibid. Pf- 155; in Novemberg the escribania de las -jue 
zes de comi sidn 
was addedgenta. Pin. 913 Nov. 1611, ibid. f. 291. 
3- Enta. Fine t2-lMay 16111A. G. S. C*ý-. H. 360, f. 296. 
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summarising a previous consulta. The office was not for sale. Philip's 
reply was hardly illuminating9but interpreted by Finance as meaning 
that he had agreed that the matter was at an end; he would bear it in 
mind. 
1 
Nothing more was heard of the office until April 1612 when 
Domingo de, Cabalapadministrad3r igeneral de las rentas realesvinf3rmed 
a startled Finance that the Ctmara had obtained permission to sell the 
office for 109500 ducats to pay for teertain necessary and importantIq 
although unspecifiedpexpenses. The challenge Castile had thrown dawn 
was unequivocal; CabalapPinancets chief agent in Sevillephad been 
ordered to advise Castile in absolute secrecy as to the duties of the 
officevand Finance xxitself was merely told that its own official 
administering the office was to be dismissed. Showing a weakness that 
was probably to result in his own dismissal vCabala, meekly gave Castile 
the information it soughtgand to his own Council gave a copy, Finance's 
response was immediate and pointedvand if the language in which it 
addressed itself to the King was muted by later standards it was yet 
strong; the sale would lead to 'the very greatest of dangers' and to 
'irremediable difficulties'. The office itself was second in importance 
only to that Of the administrador peneral, himself and Finance9having 
refused to allow Seville to even appoint a nominee to administer the 
office could not countenance a salegand especially not for the paltry 
Cnta. Fin. p2O Aug. 16119ibid f-241- 
3-4 ýTj 
sum of 109500 ducats - withallan 'insupportable' transaction; 
administered by Financelthe office was of 'the very greatest benefit 
to the r3yal exchequer and a hundred times more profitable' than any 
sale could be. Philiplimpressedprelented and abandoned xthoughts of 
sale. 
1 
Finance was therefore d3ubly astonished to receive a note from 
Lerma two months later asking what the office of escribana of the 
Seville Customs House was and what it would be worth if sold with 
right of renunciation to a ifell-qualified person with the same 
conditions as those enjoyed by Villalonga. It dutifully sent Philip 
copies of the c3naultas of May and August 1611 and of April 1612 and 
tactfully pointed outgnot that Lerma himself had once held the office 
of which he was so iggorant9but that Villalonga had hold an office not 
in Seville but in Murcia. 
2 
In the summer of 1612, thenpthe decision of April remained 
valid as far as Finance was concerned. Philipyhoweverphad deferred not 
simply to it but also to Castile; caught in a cleft between 
the 
councils hevas it werepabdicated and left them to resolve 
the issue 
by themselves. 
This of course they could not dotand with Finance regarding 
1- Enta. Fin. 918 Apr. 1612p contained inzente. Fin-30 Jun. 
16129A. G. S. 
C. J. H. 371P f. 49. 
2- Snta. Fin. j3O Jun. 16129ibid. Finance was so astonished at 
Lermals 
forgetfulness that it took the unique step of reproducing his note 
at the beginning of the consulta. Normally it would summarise such 
notes in indirect speachland thereby avoided giving the offence 
that Would be implicit if it attempted to comment on the note. 
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the matter as closed, the Camara in the spring of 1613 proceeded with 
the salovdispossessing Finance's administrator and replacing him with 
0 
the purchaserpFernando do la Bastida. Finance exploded. Allowing Philip, 
that 'perhaps' the Camara had not reminded him of the decision he had 
made not to sell the officepit turned on the Camara and the 
consequences of its actions - to sell this office is to Isell the 
government of the (almoiarifazgo) rents1tand such administrative 
dislocation would be compounded by the loss of some 2OtOOO ducats 
annually merely from the Juras located in the rents. In allpit fell to 
Financevas Philip's 'minister in justice and rightful conscience' to 
advise him of the disastrous consequences ('lesion enormissimal) that 
would result to the rents and-from the 'spoliation' of the ju The 
construction it placed on Bastida's motives was simplevungenerous and 
well-informed. He had recently been dismissed from office in the 
Customs House after a visita and was clearly prepared to Pay 1OP500 
ducats simply to regain office. Moreaverghis vested interest as one of 
the largest shippers in the Indies trade and his intimacy with many 
substantial foreign merchants should necessarily have debarred him 
from such an office. Thesephoweverlwere merely personal 
disqualifications and the Council turned on its real adversary: 
The Council does not put (these objections) forvard SiMplY 83 
that Your Majesty might remove them by aismissing the 
individual9but so that Your Majesty shall realise and pers3nally 
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acknowledge the offence and damage that the royal exchequer of 
Tour Majesty and his service receive (when) such matters are 
dealt with by persons and a Council who do not supervise such 
matters as a duty of officegand who do not have experience of 
them as does this Councilvand whi are seen to have failed both 
as regards the principle and (the choice of)individual in such 
an important matter'. 
Proceeding thence to the generallit impressed the logical conclusion 
upon the Kings 
l It has appearecl to the Counoil that it is in no way 
aPPropriate Aar is it practicable that this sale should 
proceedpn3r should other similar sales relating to the 
administration of the royal rents be undertaken by the CImara, 
and it is very necessary that Your Majesty should so command 
it'. 1 
philiplh3weverlwas still unable to decidepand six weeks laterpon 27 
Aprilpthe Council had to send yet another consulta stressing both the 
damage resulting from the delay and his decision of April 1612.2 
It was at this juncturelwhile it awaited the decisions on these. 
two conBultaspthat Finance obtained its first important success. It did 
so in Seville. Cabala was replaced by Alons: ) do CarcamOvand the strong 
1- Cnta. Fin. 16 Mar. 1613P contained in cnta-Fin. v27 Apr. 16139A. G. S. 
C. J. H. 376, no fol. 
2- Cnta. Fin. 927 Apr. 1613gibid. 
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implication that his weakness had cost him his position was 
reinforced by Careamols resolute defiance of the Camara. His refusal 
in the face of a royal title to allow Bastida to enter his office was 
strictly treasonablepbut Finance supported him resolutely in yet 
another 23naultapon 4 May. Three days lateryPhilip at last returned the 
consulta of 16 March together with that of 27 April and attempted once 
again to c3mpromise; Bastida's money was to be returned and the office 
was to be given for four years to a qualified and capable manpand at 
the end of that period Finance was to consult him again on the future 
of the office. 
1 
Neither council would be satisfied with that. 
On 23 MaYpthe consulta of 4th. was returned with the decision; 
'I have already ordered in this what you will seepand it is to be 
2 
executed' . Finance's mystification at this veritable inscrutability 
was soon dispelled; the decision was once again given in favour of 
Castile. Carrillo descended upon his King and had him promise him that 
the sale was canc ell ed. Philip gave the promise, and the Council 
triumphantly thanked him forlas it put it, thelmerced'he had thus 
given his exchequer. On 28 MaygfiarcaM3 reported from Seville that the 
.0 Camara had given Bastida yet another royal title to officepand. that he 
had again refused to admit him. The report was sent by extraordinary 
1- Cntas. Fin. 916 Mar-and 27 Apr. 1613top. cit. land 4 MaY 1613yA. G. S. C. J. li - 37 61f. 17. 
2- Ln_ta; 
iýý-, 4 May 1613sibid. 
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messenger and was discussed by Finance on 31 May. It spoke briefly of 
the 'absolutely irreparable' damage to the royal rents and the decline 
in royal prestige 'in a place like Seville' that was full of 
foreigners9but otherwise eschewed rhatorio. It merely refused clearance' 
for the sailing of the Indies fleet. 
1 As the. consulta was being drawn 
up Carrillo scribbled a note to Lerma: I have need of a word with Your 
Excellency' 2 It was the day of the celebrated royal toothache . 
3and 
while the lw3rd' itself is not recorded the capitulation of Castile 
is; some time that dV its President wrote to Seville cancelling 
Bastida's title on his own and immediate au: bhority. 
4 
The bitterness engendered by this dispute had been compounded 
as it reached its climax early in 1613 by two other cases of major 
importancepand Finance's success in those and the Seville case 
signalled the decisive shift in supremacy., 
The first concerned Finance's sale of the alguacilaz9o maYor 
of Tenerifeytogether with some adjacent alcaidias do las carceles and 
aiguacilazg3s to Gaspar de Alvear for 12pOOO ducats. It was a case in 
which Carrillo himself was particularly involved; the proceeds were to 
supply the needs of the royal householdland since Alvear refused to 
make the down-payment of 109000 ducats until he had received the royal, 
titlepCarrillo himself advanced 79000 ducats for the royal expenses ou 
condition that he be repaid within two days of Alvear's paymenteIle was 
1- Enta. Fin. 31 May 161391bid. 9no fol. 
2- Note written len el ConBejoIjA. G. S. C. J. H. 377)no fol. 
3- See abov*oP. 324.4 Mar uis of d 1ZýW to F nando Pizarro do Arellano, 31 May 6135-G. S. no io 
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therefore less than usually inclined to tolerance when the Ca*'mara 
sought to delay the sale by claiming that over 2OpOOO ducats could be 
obtained for the office and declaring that in any event it proposed to 
grant the proceeds to Tomas de Angulo and Juan do Ciriza. Both these men 
had of course the very closest relationships with Lerma. Claiming that 
Tenerife lay beyond the Camarals, jurisdiction because it did not 
contribute to the millonesIpPinance turned on it and Philip with the 
usual asperity: 
It is the custom of the Council of Pinancelby virtue of 
its lava and ordinancespta sell and dispose of ... offices and 
other resources for as much as can be obtained, in order to 
supply what is so necessary-If it ... is to be restrained 
by such cedulas de diligencias the royal service will never 
be accomplished ..., and it would be necessary for the Camara 
to supply the public needs and those of. Your Majestypand not 
this Council'. 
Philip took the hint. In a judgement reminiscent of that in the 
Cartagena case of 1609 he attempted a compromise, but one that now 
favoured Finance rather than the CiGara; the office was to be sold for 
as much as possiblepbut only for six or eight years as against the 
sixteen favoured by Finance and that of a life by the Ca"maraland the 
proceeds were to V not to the secretaries but for the payment of 
royal household expen3es. Finance' s victory was virtually completeland 
i4 a 
its Judgement was shortly vindicated when it managed to get 12,000 
ducats for the office. 
1 
In the spring of 1613pPhilip decided to raise some money for 
the impending French marriages by creating and selling a hundred- 
escribanfas and receptorfas de la corte and awarded jurisdiction over 
the project to the Cbara. Finance received his decision ill, but took 
advantage of the occasion to claim not merely that it should be given 
control of these offices but that it should take over from Castile the 
supervision of the sales of all newly-created offices. Philip referred 
the matter to a Junta on which the two presidents were joined by 
It Idiaquez and Velada. The two councillors of State wisely refrained from 
expressing views on the matter and left their colleagues to fight their 
own battle. Del Valle offered little fight; he declared himself firmly 
against the sales in principle but did not press the point and 
deferred Judgement as to whether his Council should be deprived of its 
wider rights over now offices. He was clearly tired of fighting. Carrillo 
was not; the marriage sales were necessary and they belonged, with all 
2 
others9by right9tradition and law to Finance. He won. In 1614 agents 
were sent out through all Spain to sell all outstanding municipal 
1 Cntse. Fin. 112 Jan-and 13 Jul. 1613, both, A. G. S. C. J. H-3761f-4. 
On the Cartagena case 9 abovePP- 339. 
2 Cnta.. untitled junta917 Apr. 16139summarising the Finance consulta, 
ibid. if. 12. 
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offices to which no title could be establishedgand they reported to 
Finance. 
With Finance's advantage thus emphatically confirmed the 
dispute declined in importance to a squabbling over detaile. Finance's 
attitude to what was still the most prestigious of the councils 
became rather condescendingly magisterial. We have already seen how in 
1615 and 1616 it more or less slapped Castile's wrists over the 
2 
alienation of two conciliar receptorGs, q and it continued on its curt 
way - brusquely dealing with the Camara's accusation of under-pricing 
3 the tesoreria del senareaje of the Madrid House of Moneyy while 
admonishing it on similar grounds over its own sale of the escribanfa 
4 
do la Justicia of Sevillep and simply cancelling its sale of the post, 
of correo mayor of Toledo precisely because the price was not 
adequate. 
5 
This latter was Carrillo's final gesturepand he left his 
successor untroubled by Castile's ambitions until the last months of 
the reign; indeed Salazar's positionvas so strong that in 1619 he was , ýI 
1 Much of the documentation for these sales is c3lleoted in A. G. S. 
C. J. H- 383punfoliatedp and see also A. G. S. D. G. T. 243249passim 
2 Abovespp. 211-212. 
3 Castile claimed that this could be sold for 15pooo-169000 ducats, 
Finance that it was worth lt838. Finance eventuallY sold it for 
less than 390002cnta Fin. 912 jun. 16159A. G. S. C. J. H. 387of-75- 
4- Cnta-Fin-929 Jan. 16179A. G. S. C-J-H-3952f-148- 
5- Cnta. Fin. 920 Sept. 161791,. bid. no fol. 
able to make the remarkable - not to say ridiculous - claim that 
Castile's jurisdiction was no superior to Financels. 
1 In June 1620 he 
had to remonstrate with Castile Over its attempts to sell some quite 
.121 insignificant alm3tacenes and c3rrecluriasp but in October of that 
year had to take sterner action when Castile sold two offices in 
Seville and extended the rights of the escribanos del numero of 
Madrid; he allied himself with Indies over the Seville offices and won 
an easy verdict. 
3 With a new Kinghoweverpthe contest began anew as in 
I-lay 1621 Castile sought to re-establish its former eminence; the dispute 
that had so tested PhiliP 1119and indeed his fatheryw3uld now test his 
4 
son, 
*** *** 
1- Cnta. Fin., 10 Feb. 16199A. G. S. C-J-H-405of-30- 
2- Rnta. Fin. p2l Jun. 162OpA. G. S. C. J. H. 4109f-79- 
3- The Seville offices fishing and loading rights. Cnta. Fin. 911 Oct. 
1620, jýbid- of. 165- 
4- The dispute arose over control of the sales of the Offices of 
correos mayoresj2nta. Fin. 9 30 May 1621yA-G-S . C-J-H-414yf-105pand 
isPhilip 1V appointed Francisco do Contreras to investigate the 
more general dispute; his report9in a consulta of 25 MaY 16219B. M. 
Add-14PO17of-78. 
Councillors. 
The external prablems facing the Spain of Philip 111 may be 
stated simply enough with Idi9quez in his consideration of a suspension 
of arms with the Dutch in 1608 - 'in substance everything is a dream' 
1 
at war or notSpain could never be at peace. Over the reign of course 
the form if not the substance of the problem changedgand as it did 
the Cou. #cil of State had to adjust its policies. But the Council also 
changed. We have seen how its membership was made up by two separate 
generations - h3wpaB the first began to die off, the Council itself 
progressively disintegrated between 1607-10phesitantly improved its 
mechanical performance as new councillors were appointedyand then 
reached a pea)c of professionalism over the last years of the reign. 
2 
The personality of the Council changed in both reflection of these 
structural changes and the shifts in Spain's external polition; 
diffident and often unsure of itself at the beginning of the reign9it 
began to pick up confidence after the English Peacelbut progressively 
lost it again in the crises of 1607-10 as Idiaquez alone hold 
it 
together. After the reorganisation and as the external situation 
improvedlit slowly but surely grew in assertiveness over the 
remainder of the reiga, until in the end it became perhaps Over- 
1- Cnta. itin. St. 919 Sept. 16081A. G. S. E. 2025of-146. 
2- See abovelp. 2399 
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confident. In its early yearsvit had dreamed of peace after years of 
war; in its laterlafter years of peacevit dreamed of war. 
The nature of conciliar debate has not alwvs been understood. 
Most obviously, there was no vote taken as such. Councillors spoke in 
strict order of precedence based upon seniority of appointmentland in 
in practice the first two or three speakers usually spoke in sufficient 
detail as to have their Juniors simply recording agreement with them. A 
typical c3nsulta listing pareceres would therefore record separately 
the views of the two or three senior councillors and simply record 
the others as being in agreement. Such was more than mare procedural 
conveniencelfor throughout the reign discussions were conducted 
within a broad consensus of agreement as to aims and policy. The rke J 
of the Council therefore c3naisted largely in advising on adjustments 
to be made in view of particular events or information; each councillor 
was entitled to have his parecer listed separately if he wishedgand 
junior councillors often did so in lengthy detail9but normally9being 
in agreement9they were content to agree. If they had specialist 
information or expertise available they readily used ittand the 
Council was only too pleased to take advantage of it, It was not Just a 
platform for the senior c3uncillors; as it happened indeed the only two 
man to suffer unduly from modesty were two of the most seniorgVelada 
and Mouragnow Castel Rodrigovwhile some of the most valuable 
suggestions came from the most juniorvand especially so in the cases of 
--jKlill 
the Constable and Olivares. 
1 
Any councillor could impress himself 
upon the Council if he wanted tolbut in practice only those who took 
their duties seriously - with the possible exception of Lerma 
himself - actually did so. Policies were not made or unmade lightly or 
quickly; what was important in the final analysis was the mood of the 
Council as a corporate entity2the atmosphere at council tablepand men 
did not affect that with sudden or dramatic intrusions; they contributed 
to it by attending and speaking regularly. The most formative and 
determinative factor in the evolution of policy was the character of 
the men who sat regularlv*Policymaking was the sum of routine 
responses to routine problems.. 
Discussions were led in the early years by IdiaquezpChinchSn 
and Itiranda. CouncillOrs under Philip 119they brought the stolido 
conscientious virtues of his government to that of his son9but they 
brought also a lack of imagination and assurance that often suggested 
that they were themselves now to the actual policymaking process. The 
view they took of European politics was unrelievedly and determinedly 
gloomy -I because all other states 
(both Catholic and heretic) are as 
one in their determination to oppose Your Majesty and 
his Monarchy, we 
may always fear the worst 
(of their intentions) .. * and 
look only to 
ourselves for solutions'. 
2 Fearful of the resource3i and confidence of 
Om Veladajbelowjpp-U'; 114, S1-2- Ion Castel Rodrigo qpp-1,? 4--1r ; on 
the Constable ypp. 3'r7pts SIX-); and an Olivares9pp-l"-1 
2 Cnta. St. 95 Dec. 16029A. G. S. E. 25119f. 82. 
I 
jýý4 
each of their three northern enemies9they had little real belief in 
the power of Spain herself. By 1600pthey were prepared for negotiations 
with the Dutch in which it would be Spain who would be the supplicant' 
and they looked wanfully to the likelihood of the succession to the 
English throne of a man whose intentions and powers they feared more 
than those of the dying Jezebel. 
2 Their greatest fearsphoweverpeentred 
upon the Most Christian King with whom they were nominally at peace - 
'we cannot have confidence in the peace with France9because after she 
has aided the rebels publiclypit cannot be doubted that she will 
break (with Spain) ... when (she feels) most damage can be done to 
Tour Majesty ... .3 Time and againpthereforepthey prepared for war 
456 
with France - in 16009 1602p 1603. 
11 More flexible than Chinchonpmore assured than Mirandapit was 
IdiaquGz who was the real leaderpand he led the Council to cope as 
best it could with successive crises while attempting to break the 
circle in England. The policy of securing the succession for a clienty 
or at the least for a favourably-disposed monzrch was hopelessly 
midjudgedland it was so because in the first instance the 
Council did 
1- See especially an--ta-St. 913 sept. 16oo, lbid. f. 17. 
2 -'On this c0Mm0ri'th6m6qcritas-St. 23 M6Y 160291 Feb. p1l and 
22 Jul. 
16039A-b-id- vff. tOq88p489_q. 102,. *' 
3 -m- Cnta. St. j 22 No. 16019 ibid. 9 f- 40. 
4 _'Cnta. qLnta-'of Threeýjý_ept.! 
ýi* l600vA. G*S. E. 12889f-159parough draft. ' 
"Vie concern was with the Saluzzo crisis. 
5 Cnta. -St. pl2 Sept. 1602pA. U. S_ Y-1426vf-38; again the concern was 
with the security of the overland'routes to Flanders., 
6 Cnta. St. 922 Jul. 16039A. G. S. E. 25119f. 102. See also cnta-WarplO Dec. 
1603, AX-S. G. A. 604if. 10. 
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not have the expertise to compensate for the lack of reliable 
information from England itself. It thus compounded its miscalculation 
of James' character and ambitions by believing that England's 
Catholicism was strong while its protestantism was of a political 
nature-' It therefore ditheredfadhering to Philip 11's policy of 
supporting the candidature of Isabel until overtaken by eventspand 
then looked for a heretical candidate until that policy also 
foundered. Lack of ambassadorial information was of course a major 
handicap9but a man who had already been at the centre of Spanish 
government since 1579 should have understood English politics rather 
better than Idia"quez did; as late as July 1603 he still thought that 
English protestantism was purchasable - 'the practice in England has 
t2 always been to sell oneself for money ... . Shrewd and thoraugh as he 
waslhe was still Philip 11's man$imprisoned by the old King's 
philosophy and strategypas he perhaps unconsciously acknowledged when 
in 1602 observing that 'the French are following ., their ancient 
custom, which is to wish that peace and war depend upon them,. 
3 In the 
old days it had depended on Spainjand he occasionally sailght to 
return to them - thus in 1600 his championship of the empresa. 
do 
Irlanda 
4 
or in 1602 his longing to have I the world see that deeds 
1- For instancovin cnta. 3t. 91 Feb. 1603pA. G. S. E. 2511pf-88- 
2- Cnta. St. 9 22 Jul. 16039j_b_id. q f. 102. 
3- Cnta. St. 912 Sept. 1602pA. G. S. K-1426, f-38- 
4- SOO a 3vepp. 28. - 
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correspond to wardstel 
In the early years conciliar discussions rarely became more 
than a commentary upon the views of these three men. Toledo and the 
fifth count of Alva gave the m3st eloquent and forceful support to 
them, but it was always thoroughly orthodox. 2 Poza exhibited a 
refreshing cynicism but little elseý while NiXo de Guevara and Borja 
made little positive impression4 and Velada determinedly failed to 
show any character at allA5 
More highly personalised contributions were made by CS`rdobap 
the Constable and Olivares. Coordaba was nothing if not an individualist, 
campaigning on behalf of the Almighty and himself. Thusgill-equipped by 
experience to offer any military or political advice on the disaster 
in Irelandphe contented himself with a more fundamental analysis of 
1- Cnt St. 912 Sept. 1602ýA- G. S. K-1426tf. 38- 
2- Toledo much favoured a policy of a mailed fistland the fullest 
statement of his attitudes was revealed at the meeting of 22 Jul. 
1603. He did disagree with his colleagues on one occasion9but since 
they were discussing whether or not England should be united to 
Spain after the death of Elizabeth - lie thought not - the matter 
proved of little c3noequence. CntasoSt. 922 Jul. 1603 and 11 Jul. 16009 
AoG. S. E. 251lyff. 102 and 48-On Alvagseeking to teach the 
'diabolical' James a less3npcnta. St. 922 Julo1603yop-c pand 
for a 
similar parecergcnta. St. o3l May l603j. Lbid. ffo9O- 
3 Thus he was prepared to tolerate a non-Catholic King of England in 
preference to James Vl and was forthright enough to suggest a 
ruthless disengagement from Ireland in 1602tleaving the 
Irish to 
make what terms they could with Englandp. 2nta-St-91 Feb. 1603 and 
2 Nov. l602yLbid. 9ff. 88 and 83, 
4- The only notable parecer offered by either being 130rjals Opposing 
the royal journey to Valencia and favourifig one to P3rtugaltab3ve, 
p-133. 
5- See particularly his quite remarkablv abnegation of responsibility 
at the meeting of 22 Jul-tl603tcnta. cited ab3ve2n. 2levery other 
councilIV dealt in great detai =9ut Velada merely agreed entirely 
with Id aquez. 
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the national sPiritual malaise that was the true cause of the delbAcle. 
1 
Appropriately9he saved his most astonishing outburst for the great 
meeting of July 1603 considering the accession of James to the 
English throne. Lifted to the heights of religious exaltation by the 
abomination of James he launched himself with all the dreadful majesty 
of an Olt Testament prophet into the most complete statement of the 
religious duties of Spanish kingship9but having purged himself then 
came down in favour of negotiating with England - probably the m3st 
remarkable piece of intellectual elasticity of the reign. 
2 EVen, he'9 
thereforepwas in the conciliar mainstream9and between the apocalyptic 
outbursts he was quietly orthodox9save for an unsuccessful advocacy of 
of policy of stripping the Council of more important business in 
3 favour of Juntas an which he sat. 
The C3nstable and Olivares were in their different ways as 
Lntq. 3t. 922 Deet. 16010A. G. S. E. 25119f-40- 
2 it is not possible that Your Majesty should not help the 
Catholic causelbecause the greatness that God has given Your 
Majesty obliged him to do so .... The King of England has made a 
profession of faith that is so abominable and wishes his subjects 
to make it ... and if Your Majesty does not oppose himself to such 
rebels, t3 such impertinent heretics - to their words and deeds 
and if he does not defend the honour of GodpHe will not defend 
that of Your Majesty... One wonders how friendship with such a 
heretic is even to be considered ... One reads in the 
Scriptures 
of such a kinggand should with reason fear to make friendship with 
so bad a hereticisuch an enemy of Catholicism Cnta. St. y22 Jul., 
l603P3P-cit 
3 Thus his attempt to have the junta do Tres deal with the English 
successionlEnta. St. 91 Feb. 1603, ibid. f. 66-More generallypon his 
attempt to double its weekly meetingsqcnta-Jnta. de Tres, 12 Jul, 
16039A. G. S. E. 20239f. 115- 
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experienced as the three leaders but were unversed in the governmental 
ways of. Philip 11 and brought, a freshness of vision to the Council that 
they9for the momentIC3uld not. Resentful of Vervins and suspici3us of I 
,1 
allowing its architect, Albertpta negotiate with Englandpl the 
Constable was second to none in his insistence on the preservation of , 
Spanish greatness. But it was he t3a wh3 m3st res3lutely opp3sed the 
empresa de Irlandagstanding alone in telling the King that it was 
headed for certain didaster92 and proven right he took an equally 
res3lute stand against further involvementýfinding n3w a m3re general 
following. 
3 
Nor was it simply on military ihatters that he sternly 
instructed the Council; it was he who stripped away much of its w3olly 
thinking in reminding it of the ramifications of pursuing religious 
freedom for the English Catholics as against the Spanish position in 
the Netherlandspand who warned it that regardless of any c3nvenient 
promises he might make James would be obliged to continue to support 
the Dutch after he had made peace with Spain*4 The precision and 
c3olness of his views found echo in those of Olivaresythe most junior 
but intellectually the m3st able of the councillors. Prom December 1602 
he beganjif cauti3usly9to make the first of several suggestions that 
1- Cnta. St-931 MaY 16039A. G. S. E-25119f. 90. 
2- Cnta-St-94 Aug. 1601gibid. pf-43. 
3- Enta. St. 92 Nov. 1602libid. pf-83. 4- Cnta. St. p22 Jul. 16039! bid.., f. 102. 
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were to alter the attitude to the English succession. The first to 
abandon Isabel's claimsphe initiated the search for an English 
candidatep 
1 
and then abandoned that Position, but if like the others he 
was still misled as to the real internal condition Of England he was 
more completely aware than they of the true diplomatic balances in 
Europe and stood out as a man apart9with his finger on pulses they 
never thought of examining*2 
Failure in England proved of paradoxical advantage to the 
C3uncilvand it was with some relief that it ceased to entertain 
unrealisable hopes and accepted political realities north of the 
Channel. There was some initial pessimism as to dhe ambitions of the 
new King and the residuum of defensiveness among the servants of 
Philip 11 - ChinchSn in 1604 feared that 'the peace of Europe depends 
upon the King of England. 
3 There was2too2c3ntinuing resentment over 
English activities in the Indies and even a dudden preparedness on 
the part of some councillors for war with James in 1606.4 But in 
essence his succession removed much of the frenetic apprehensiveness 
from the Council's deliberations; faced with reality and finding it 
less traumatic than it had feared it developed a policy of carefully- 
calculated tolerance towards Jamesland in doing so became itself more 
1- Enta-St-95 Dec. 16029j,, bid., f. 82. 
2- The fullest statements of his attitudespcntas St. 91 Feb. and 22 Jul. 
1603PLb-. id- qff. 88 and 102; the latter in particular includes some 
very significant observations on military realities in the 
Netherlands as well as an the diplomatic possibilities Open to 
Spain in connection with the new England. 
3- Cnta. St. 2 20 Jan. 1604, A. G. S. E. 25120 f. 27. 
4- Cnta. St. 912 Aug-1606 ibid. pf. 121 I the Council was chiefly concerned vT! %1T persecutions in ýWZA and English activities in the Indies. 
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reasonable. It continued to fear French ambition in Flanders and Italyq 
but even here a greater realism prevailed as it came to appreciate 
that Henry 1V was no leviathan. Indeedpit often even apPeared to 
forget about Henry as it concentrated its attention on one enemypin 
Flanders. It was able to do so not only because of the improvement 
brought about by the English peace -I 
ihie remedy for Flanders' as 
Sesa called it' - but because it was itself now more maturely 
conditioned to its responsibilities. 
In January 1604 James suggested that Spain might make an 
exploratory trace of three or four months with the Datch. State 
rejected the idea out of hand, but with brilliant insight began to 
consider the possibility of encouraging James to think about a 
Spanish marriagepa prospect that would hold him enthralled into the 
1620s* 2 Some profit could be derived in its view from a suspension of 
hostilities for some yearstbut the only result of a short and 
3 
i=ediate cessation would be to allow the Dutch to save Ostend. The 
war was to be pursued. Flanders remained as always 
basically a simple 
problempcapable Of solution if only enough money could 
be found and 
viewed therefore in financial rather than in military or 
diplomatic 
1- Cnta. St-922 Jun. 1604, A. G. S. E-2024of-84. 
2 Cnta. St. p2O Tan. 1604pA. G. S. E. 2512, f. 27-PhiliP was at 
first less 
than enthralled; on 26 Oct. 1604qLerma wrote to Prada telling him 
that 'for the momentIthe Council was not to pursue the ideal 
A. G. S. E. 841tf. 180. 
3 Cnta. St. v2O Jan. 1604, op-cit 
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te=s - as Olivares put itpvict3ry in Flanders would go to 'whoever 
is left with the last escudol. 
1 The premise as such was not debated; 
Chinchon even calculated that the war had cost some 2009000,000 of 
them and was able to foresee the defeat of the Dutch by commercial 
sanctions. Indeed, Dutch incursions into the Indies appeared to him a 
manifestation of the degree to which they were themselves under 
pressure, 
2 but then in the nightmare that was Flanders rebel strength 
or weakness at any one moment always provided a convincing argument 
for stepping up the scale of the war. 
In 1604, howeverpmoney was not available in any viable quantity, 
and the troops inevitably mutinied. The Council's concern throughout 
the year therefore became to decide whether to reward mutiny or 
exacerbate it by allocating priority of resource to loyalist troopsq 
and it debated the matter at painful length9deciding eventually to 
pay the mutineers first. 
3 In fact Albert reached the same decision 
independently and earlier and offended the Council by first 
negotiating and then agreeing terms with the rebel soldiers. 
4 In the 
face of the dilemmapeven Spinola'B militaxy successes seemed Of 
secondary importancepand the Council spent 1604 grimly determined 
merely to pursue the war and hope for a financial miracle. 
At the turn of the year the miracle happenedgand 1605 opened 
1 Cnta*St. 96 Jan. 16059A. G. S. E-20239f-134- 
2 Cnta- St. 914 Sept. 16049A. G. S. E. 20249f. 61. 
3 See especiallypLnta. St. 9 21 Mar. 1605 t ibid. f f. 21. 4 Cnt a. St. j 22 Jun. 1604 qjýbid. tf. 84. 
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with marvellous optimism as Acuna's reforms made more money available 
and as the galleons for once exceeded expectations; by March a 
provision of 690009000 ducats was being discussed. 
1 
The Constable 
looked forward to 'making war in the house of the enemylgand if he 
retained his distrust of the general who would have to wage his 
campaigag 
2 brusquely dismissed any question of a truce - 'a very ill- 
founded' consideration in his view. Idiaquez alone of his colleagues 
was not at one with him in this new mood. At the end of January he 
permitted himself to wonder aloud whether there should be peace if the 
Dutch refused to acknowledge archducal sovereignty. 
4 
He thus intimated 
that the provision of the money and the successes past and future of 
Spinala only brought Spain back to something of the position she had 
occupied in 1600pif without the humiliation of that year. He did not 
yet put it thus openlypbut he was the first to suggest that 
anticipated military success would only prepare a stroyq negotiating 
position. Within a couple of months the Constable himself was 
pandering the point. Granting that a long suspension could be usefulphe 
found Idiaquez nudging him a stage further, in doubting whether the 
rebels could actually be brought to the table while suggesting that 
exploratory approaches be made them. 
5Growing in stature and 
1- Enta. St. p 21 Mar. 1605 9 ibid. 9 f. 42. 
2- Lnta. St. 96 Jan-16059A'G. S. E-2023pf. 133. 
3- Rnta-St- 929 Jan. 16059ý. G. S. E. 2024of-45- 
4- ibid. 
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judgementpIdiaquez was becoming quite serpentine. 
Despite his cautionpeuphoria reigned until August. Albert then 
reported that the reinforcements from Italy were both fewer in 
number and less capable than he had h3pedyand pressed for more money. 
The Council drew backiwaiting to see positive results from the money 
it had made availablejand provoked its King to fury by doing so., 
1 By 
Novemborpwith Spin3la successful in Prisiapand with Albert still asking 
for More m3neypthe decisive moment had arrived. Idiaquez's mind was 
made uptand although he still moved cautiously he more or less 
2 determined that there would have to be a truce. The mutinies of the 
following year confirmed his fearspand at meeting after meeting he 
insisted that more money had to be found for Flanderspknowing fully 
wall that it could not be. It was not to his colleagaes2who reluctantly 
followed his leadtthat he addressed himself but to his King; ta stateg 
as he did in October 1606pthat 'the letters of the Archduke always 
conclude with a request for money' was his way of telling Philip that 
3 
the war could not be continued. 
Juan do Idi6quez. 
When, in discussing the crisis with England in 1606 that might 
1- See abovapp. 291. 
2- Cnta. St.; 22 Nov. 16059A. G. S. E-2024if -53. 
3 -; Cnta-St. t2l Oct. 1606111, bid. gf-15- See also cnta. St. 99 Nov. 
1606vLbid. 
fo 12o 
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easily have led to warpChinchan averred that Idiaquez 'has discussed 
(these affairs) in a manner that leaves little to be said! q 
1 he 
formally acknowledged the growing ascendancy of the comendador mayor 
over himself and his colleagues-As State declined9the most important 
and professional of its councillors became even more openly what he 
had long been to those colleagues - the most important maker of 
foreign policy in Spain. It was he who led a reluctant Council and King 
to agree to the Truce - 'the most convenient thing that can be 
desired in this wargand that most desired in years past'jas he put it 
in January 1607.2 Over the next two years he guided them patiently 
but firmly to his goal. The initiative of course came from Albert 
himself and throughout 1607-8 Madrid broadly if resentfully foll=-ed 
his policy. The matter was dealt with by occasional juntas as well as 
tI by State itselftbut both were dominated by Idi quezpand the policy 
they pursued was best summarised. by a Junta of February 1607 on which 
he sat with Miranda - 'the best way to make (the Dutch) come to their 
senses is through war and to continue what has been accomplished in 
these last two years' Idiaquez talked of war but thought of peac 
and the real purpose of the policy pursued from 1607 was 
best 
summarised bypof all people, Villalongagin the very last of his 
I- Rnta. St. 112 Aug. 16069A. G. S. B-25129f. 121. 
2- Cnta. Jnta. de Treqq16 Tan. 16079A. G. S. B. 2025of-5- 
3- Cnta-inta. de Dos, 20 Feb. 1607, ibid. 9f. 12. 
3 
governmental activities - 'it is certain that when peace or a trace is 
considered in any war forces ought to be doubled so that such might 
bw enjoyed advantageously'. 
1 
By thatpno more was meant than that the 
enemy was to be confronted with an apparent determination on Spain's 
part to continue the war vigorously; the increase in forcewas little 
more than a negotiating ploy and a guarantee in case negotiations 
failed. The chief concern of Idia**quez and his colleagues was therefore 
to present a fagadepand its chief manifestation increasingly became to 
exercise the optimum control over the Archduke Albert9whom they 
distrusted with a fine consistency - were they nottafter all9told in 
September 1607 that he was determined on a peace simply to facilitate 
his own election as King of the Romans., 
2 For all thatIthey followed 
him;: ' Idiaquez himself9for instancepwas in February 1608 still irate 
at Albert's do facto acknowledgement of rebel sovereignty9but could do 
little more than insist that Albert himself make it clear to the Dutch ýj 
that His Majestyk (sic) had granted them this only an the understanding, ý 
that free and public exercise of religion be granted to Catholics in 
their territories. 
3 This latter and the rights of navigation in 1he 
Indies both East and West remained the chief obstacles to agreement 
but provided also the pretext for the ostensible determination to 
1- Cnta-Jnta. de Tres 116 Jan. 1607,012 -cit. 
2- Such was the view of Diego do Ibarragreported in cnta. St. p6 Sept. 
16079A. G. S. E-20259f-40- 
3- Cnta. St. 928 Feb. 1608vIbid. pf-87-On distrust of Albert and 
reluctant following of his advicepsee also cnta. St. pl2 May 1607Y 
ibid. 9fo3O* 
continue the war. Indeedlin July 1608 State actually commissioned 
estimates of the cost of pursuing offensive or defensive war in 
Flanders9but its real cýtncern was to convince Philip that even the 
latter was hardly possible rather than to convince the Dutch that it 
might actually do either. 
I 
To the very endphoweverpit continued its 
ambivalent approach; Idiaquez himself9for instanceýwhile advising in 
2 September 1608 that the truce be extended, was as late as 7 April 
1609 talking of strengthening the Atlantic fleet in case the Peace did 
not materialis 8.3 
Frustrated imperialist that he waspit was thus Idiaquez who in J! 
Madrid was most responsible for the Peacegand by the time it was 
signed he occupied a quite unique position in governmental circles; his 
word was almost law. In 1608-99by virtue of the importance that Philip 
attached to his advice - and by virtue of the itineracy that both 
reflected and compounded that importance - he became a one-man juntag 
entrusted wiih a mass of occasional problems from every part of the 
administrative spectrum. At de parte levelgf3r instancegit was he who 
4 
decided to what salary an oidor in Valladolid was entitled, or 
5 
whether a diplomat deserved the tuson or a soldier a c; ouncillarship 
1 Enta-St-926 Jul. 1608, ibid., f. 139. 
2 Cnta. St. 919 Sept. 1608, ibid. if-146. 
3 Cnta. St. 97 Apr. 1609, A. G. S. E-2513, no fol. 
4 Cnta-Idia"quez925 Oct. 16089A. G. S. E. 20259f. 164. 
5 Enta. same96 Dec. 1608, lbid., f. 175- 
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of War. 
1 His terms of referencelthereforelware -supracanciliar --it 
was he who decided whether an arbitri3, placed before Finance was 
practicablef who advised an whether social reforms in the manning of 
the galeras de Espana were Justified3 or whether those de Sicilia 
were best repaired in Denia. 
4 
He dealtptoopwith a wide range of 
State's materialpespecially an M3: risco affairs - should an offer from 
the nuevas c3nvertidos of AragSn and Valencia be accepted,? 
5; 
what 
should be done about the flights to France ?6 
That such problems should have been referred to a senior 
councillor was in itself unusual rather than extra3rdinary; normally a 
junta of two or three men would be convened for such purposes. It wast 
howeveryquite extraordinary that matters of policymaking should have 
been thus referred - how were negotiations with the Dutch to be 
conducted? 
7; 
should a Catholic League be actively Supported by 
Ii 
Spain ?8 It was D3n Juan who decided. His prestige transcended even 
this honour as he was afforded a distinction unique within the reign 
and in all probability unparalleled in the whole of Spanish 
Hapsburg 
history - in 1608-9 he formally and explicitly sat on occasions as 
1- ýLnta. samep24 Sept. 1608. ibid. sf-150- 
2- Rnta. same92 Dec. 16089Abid. 9f-172. 
3- Cntas. samep23 May and 2 Jul. 16089Lbid. gff. 112-3 and 
120-1- 
4- Cnta. same96 Nov. 16089jbid., f. 169. ' 
5- Enta. same924 Sept. 1608gibid. pf-152. 
6 Cnta-same924 Jun. 16089ibid.., f. 119; see also cnta. same98 Apr. 16089 
ibid. 9f. 98. 
7 Cntas. same924 May and 13 Sept. l6o8 qLbid. off. 
173 and 144. 
8 Cnta. same ? Oct. 16089ibid. gf-1599' 
- 
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'The Council of State', formulating Spanish policy toward England andp 
to a lesser extent, toward Sav3y. 
1 His status - as Carrillo's would 
shortly be - was now ministerial. 
The accolade reflected his greater maturity as much as the 
decline of the Council itself. Acutely c3nsciouslas alwayslof Spanish 
weaknessesphe had come to appreciate those of other powers. He had 
learnedlabove all, how to properly evaluate intelligence; as the 
Franc3-Italian crisis welledghe stressed those items in Cardenas's 
reports which dwelt an the internal and foreign digficultiOS of 
Henry 1V and he followed the ambassador in advocating a determined 
resistance in the belief that Henry would desist if opposedo 
2 Indeedp 
his confidence in himself and in his country was such that he felt 
that he could laugh at the King of Francepand he did so repeatedly in 
quite sardonic vein. His touch9howeverywas sure. Harder nowphe was 
swayed little by emotional appeals for Spanish help and the 
few 
frenetic tears he shed - unlike those of the earlier years - were 
3 
mostly crocodilian. The years had tempered the romantic element 
in 
1- See for inatancegentas St. P31 Mar. and 30 Apr. 1608 and 
9 May 1609, 
A. G. S. E. 25139no fols. 
2- Thus, for instancepa parecer of February 1610; he, did not 
believe 
that flenry 1V seriously intended warpbelieving that he was 
attempting to get his wishes by simply cawing Spain. 
Threatened war 
was also part of his attempt to win the sympathy of his own 
dissident subjects 9 Onta. St. P13 Feb. 1610yA. G-S. 
K. 14279f. 4 
3- Before Henry's deathqIdi *# ez thus pTrtrayed the Prince 3ý 
Cando 
aqu 
as an innocent waa had only fled France in order to defend 
his 
hon3ur in the only way open to himywhile after Henry's death he saw! 
Ia man to by phyfitially secured les I the Prince as a dangerganc t he 
I 
embarrass the envisaged rappr: )ChementýLbid. p and enta. 
3t. 29 May 1 10ý 
A. G. S. K. 159 3, f. 24. 
his nature and he dreamed now of no empresas 
1 His mastery of both 
foreign affairs and of Philip is perhaps best illustrated by his 
reaction to the assassination of Henry. Firstvhe looked to satisfy his 
King - 'such a great action as the expulsion of the m3ciso3s and the 
preparation of arms so that (Tour Majesty) could oppose the injustice 
of the King of France in all parts with the firmness of spirit and 
courage (has been repaid by the Almighty) ... who has been pleased to 
help the sacred and Just intentions of Your Majesty by taking Henry 1V 
from the world by the means we have just seen. This is His justice and 
it has caused great admiration and fear in everyone ... I. Thengwith the 
usual sarcasm at the expense of the Bourb3n9he turned to the now 
France - 'Your Majesties should make the appropriate demonstrations 
of griefpnot because Henry 1V deserved itpbut because the Queen of 
France has always shown a desire for friendship ... I. Thus9with Godpthe 
King of Spain and the Queen of France as allies the Basque ex-secretary, 
led the grandees of the Council into a rapprochement with France. 
2 The 
new golden age had at last dawned and Idiaquez9having waited long 
enough for it9seized the opportunities it presented. 
As Idiaquez had immediately recognisedpRavaillac's mad dagger 
On advice against an African expeditian, Enta. Idiaquezy25 Oct. 1608p 
A. G. S. E. 20259f. 165- 
2 Cnta. itin. St- 924 May 16101A. G. S. K. 1593pf. 22- 
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virtually removed France from the European political scenario; the 
sickly Louis X111's lack of an heir and the proclivities of the Queen 
Mother - compounded by the failure of the Austrian Hapsburgs to 
provide the traditional spouse - re-routed all diplomatic roads once 
again to Madrid. Neg3tiati3n for the FrancO-Spanish marital alliance 
thus formed the centrepiece of the Council's new policiespand although 
both governments maintained the habitual suspicion of each other's 
intentions9probably through force of habitpthe Council entertained no 
serious reservations as to the desirability of the alliance. In 
consequencegFranco-Spanish relations at least as far as Madrid was 
concerned became largely relegated to discussions of detailspand the 
Council' s main concern became not to embarrass the Regent by allowing 
the Hughen3ts any possible leverage over her. 
1 
Relations with England were equally dominated by marital 
considerations. Janes would move dangerously close in 1612-13 to 
assuming the active championship of protestant Germany and would 
continue to aggrieve Spain by martyring priests and colonising 
Virginialand he would continuegtoopto scheme with the Dutch and make 
angrily anti-Spanish noises. 
2 But Anglo-Spanish relations moved 
progressively to a reasoned tolerance as Madrid and London realisecl 
the various usefulnesses of James' search of a bride for his son and 
By for instance abandoning Cond4pontas St. p24)26p29 MaY 
1610, 
A. G. S. 4.15931ff. 22-4 and by not all3wing the Huguenots to hear 
of agreements milreached with the Regent 9. anta- St-94 Aug. 
1611p 
A. G. S E 2513, no fol- 
2 See e; pe; iallylcntas St. p 2120 and 27 Sept. 1612jibid. qn3 
fOls- 
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the apparent availability of Philip's daughter. She was not of course 
availablelbut determined to keep relations with England off the boil 
the Council resolutely refused to give or take offence; it realised 
fully well that in order to practice the old trick of the donkey's 
carrot it had to be very tactful and patient with the donkey lest his 
interest be diverted elsewherepand so it assidu3usly enc3uraged James' 
wooing. 
1 
With the ambivalent exception of the Du, 7ce of Lerma 
2 the 
councillors united behind Idiaquez in these last years of his life 
with a remarkable if often faceless consistency. Velada had developed 
no greater facility for self-expression and contrived with his 
accustomed resolution to say nothing of any C3nsequence-A few 
suggestions may be generously characterised as being vaguely novel - 
that the Pope ought to be informed of the progress of the French 
marriage negotiations 
3; 
that C6cil and Rochester in England were not 
very friendly towards each other4 - but he never strayed fargand his 
only distinction was that he once contrived to record specific 
agreement with Idiaquez - el C3Mendador mayor de L83n' - no fewer 
than six times within a Parecer of only 230 W3rds. 
5Toledo had 
1 See especially cntas St. 93 Mar. 1611 and 3 Jan. and 15 May 
16129 
ibid. no false 2- See below, pp. 
3 Cnta. St. 93 Jan. 1612tA. G. S. K. 16159f. 45- 
, 
2nta-St-O Jan. 1612jA. G. S. 49E. 2513, no fol. 
5 Cnta. St. 929 May 16109A. G. S. K-1593tf. 24. 
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developed more positively into one of the shrewdest of the councillors. 
Generally content with the complementary suggestion or advice as to 
detailphe was at one with Idiaquez on all essentials save where 
religious considerations were inv3lved. At such moments he tended to 
the extreme; in 16111, f3r instanceplinspired by the great zeal that he 
has for the service of God and Your Majesty and the good of these 
realmsland in keeping with his obligations as ... Inquisitor Generallp 
he demanded that the scandals caused by the British ambassador in 
Madrid be brought to an end by forcing James to withdraw him. The 
Spanish ambassador in London was ill, and if he were brought home James 
would eventually have to follow suit. 
1 
Similarlylit was rather better 
theology than it was policymaking to envy the fate of some English 
martyrsý 
2 but for the Most part he was restrained if not secular and it 
was perhaps more characteristic of him that it was heqCardinal 
Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of All Spain9who stressed the 
untrustw3rthiness of the Curia to the Council. 
3 The Constable had 
little interest in theology but tended in his last months on the 
Council in 1610 to reveal something of a predeliction for history. 
Snta. st.. 18 Aug. 16111A. G. S. E. 25139no fol. 
2 Enta. St. 925 Jul. 1612gibid. gno fol. He naturally 
took the lead on 
matters religious; thus for instance an cnta. St. pq Dec. 
16089A. G. S. K, 
1426, f. 108 on the flight of many religious to France9where they 
tended to marry - 'Our Lord is very offended and the reputation of 
the Spanish nation much damnedI. See similarl. Ypcnta. St. 27 Sept. 1612 
A. G. S. E. 25139no fol., on the apparently impending departure of a 
religious for England. 
3- Cnta. St. 913 Feb, 16109A. G. S. K-1427vf. 4. 
3iP 
Content to follow the consensusphe took milita37 affairs for his own 
and dealt with them with his accustomed shrewdnesspbut he did tead 
latterly to expatiate on historical themes - thus his treatment of 
the military possibilities open to Spain in February 1610 was 
1 
prefaced by a rationale of the history of French aggression in Italyp 
while his consideration of the same crisis in April came within the 
purview of an analysis of recent Italian diplomatic hist337*2 He had 
always had this tendenoyland had at times used it to remarkable 
effectV 
3 but it now perhaps served him ill; in August he was appointed 
to Italy. 4 The Council would miss himppr3fessionally and personallyoý 
Perhaps in those last months he had seen himself as something, 
I 
of an older statesman-He would have had reason enoughfor only 
AO, 
Idiaquez and Toledo of his colleagues were men of real stature. 
Infantado and Albuquerque sat regularly enough9but made no positive 
impression, although in 1611 the former began to develop confidence in 
1- Cnta. Stotl3 Feb. 1610vibide 
2- Cnta. St., 14 Apr. 16109A. G. S. E. 2513pno fol. See Bimilarlyvsnta-Sts 
18 Sept. 1610, lbid-vin which he analysed the character of an 
Englishman by going back not merely to his own dealings with him 
as Ambassador to James for the peace negotiations'pbut by looking 
too at his behaviour when he had visited the Court of Philip 11. 
3 See Particularly his dispassionate analysis of English Catholicisa 
and the difference between James and Elizabeth; he observed 
for 
instance that Elizabeth's persecution had started from the moment 
that Philip 11 had begun to actively support them and that she 
had thus attacked them for rebellion and not for religiontand he 
concluded that 'Your Majesty is not obliged to ensure that France 
and England shall be made Catholic if they do not wish 
it'. Cnta. 
St. 916 Jun. 1605vA. G. S. E-2512pf. 30. 
4- Cabrera de CSrdoba (1857)PP-414. 
his own judgement. 
1 
The new councillors initially shared this 
deference; Villafraneagla LagunagSpinola and Me'jia were content to fill 
the traditional ro"'le of the junior councillorflistening but speaking 
little and generally simply assenting in block votes. One mangh3wevert 
made no greater contributionjand he spoke at the beginning of the 
meetings before even Idiaquez. 14ouragnow Castel R3drigograrely expressed 
a forcible opinion and was found thoroughly inadequate as the new 
leader of the Council. At no time in 1612-13 did he provide any actual 
leadership and only rarely indeed did he even touch upon all the 
aspects of the problems being discussed. On for instance the second 
consulta. after his return he is found commenting briefly upon some of 
the questions raised by Velasco's despatches from London but excusing 
himself from any detailed discussion of the whole matter of English 
2 
policy 'because he was inexperienced in these matters' . Such modesty 
was perhaps not unbecoming in a man returning to the centre of 
government from virtual exile2but he never improved upon it. His 
inadequacy was the more puzzling because he was clearly a man Of 
intelligence and resource and one who exhibited the characteristics of 
a long familiarity with the business of p3licymalcing - an almost 
absolute concern for the reliability of information and a determination 
See particularly . 
2. nta. St* , P7 Jan. 16119A-G-3. K. 1611, f-15 
in which he 
dealt with some lucidity with the nature 3f the divisions in French 
political circles. 
2_nta-St- 99 Mar. 16129A. G. S. E. 2513, no fol. 
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to pursue diplomacy as far as possible in every situation. But the 
astonishing reluctant continued to Velada-like proportions and to 
the end of his life. Doubtless he was cowed after his exilepbut it is 
fascinating to speculate how far his inhibitions were those of the 
supremely successful servant of Philip llpcapable enough but 
unequipped psychologically for decision-making itself. 
1 
The Duke of Lerma. 
Lerma's councillorship had begun casually enough, In the first 
years of State's existence proper he only very occasionally deigned 
to call in to the Council or to sit on a juntagalmost as if indeed 
he was dropping in to see what happened on such occasions. His first 
attendancegin 16011was exceptional in that it saw him dissentingywith 
WilTo do Guevarapfrom the majority view - of IdiaqueztMirandapCOrdoba 
and the Constable - over the projected release of the young Richard 
Hawkins. 2 Otherviselattendance reflected hisgand the King'spspecial 
interests - in March 1602 at the Council on the consequences Of 
failure in Irelandq 
3 
and in 1602-3 on State juntas considering the 
projected royal journey to Portuga, 
4 
and the projected royal 
JL - Something of the same was in evidence with the early Idiacluezo 
although of course to nothing like the same degree; he matured 
significantly under Philip 111 and it is surprising to see this 
having to happen to one S3 apparently expurienced in the use of 
power* 
2- Cnta. St. 921 Jul-1601ýA. G. S. E-26369no fol. 
3- Cnta. Stqý93 Mar* 16021A. G. S. E-25111f. 64- 
4- C-ntas- ,j ntas. 26 Jun. and 9 Sept. 16021A. G. S. E. 20239ff-82 and 
83. 
3761' 
involvement in Afrioa, 1 He then attended the extraordinary meeting of 
the Council in July 1603 reviewing the situation created by James' 
2 
succession in England. It was a somewhat modest c3ntributiongand 
having made it he retired, sitting not at all in the years 1604-7. 
From 1608 until his dismissal he contrived to sit at least 
once annuallylsave in 1615. Attendancogh3weverlstill reflected special 
interests; of the nineteen meetingS3 he attended in the years 1608-14, 
six were concerned with African and morisca affairs4and another six 
5 with the Frenchz marriages) while a further one was concerned with 
both. 6 M3re3verleven when he sat to discuss the great matters of 
foreign affairs exceptional circumstances obtained; attending the 
great meeting of February 1610 on the Pranco-Italian crisis he showed 
himself to be concerned in substantial part with arguing the need to 
7 
accelerate the Expulsion. Similarly9vhen he sat at the two meetings 
of the itinerant Counoil discussing the death of Henry IV he did so as 
1- Cnta. Jnta. de Tresq12 Jul. 16039A. G. S. E. 20239f-115- 
2- Cnta. 3t., 22 Jul. 16039A. G. S. E. 2511pf. 102. 
3- The following consultaspeited in this paragraphyare not included 
in the Attendance Register; 1 Sept. 1608; 26 Dec. 1609P15 Feb. and 27 
Nov. 1610; 4 Jul. 1613- 
4- Cntas St-yl Sept. 1608jA. G. S. B-2638vf. 36; 26 Dec. 1609,. Ibid. 9f. 1; 
15 Feb. 16109A. G. S. E-26409no fol.; 27 Nov. 1610pibid.; 4 Jul. 1613, 
E. 2643tno fol.; 20 Feb. 16149E. 2644, no folý 
5- Cntas; St. 930 Mar. 16039A. G. S. K-1593, f. 18; 7 Jan. 16119K. 161itf-15; 
3 Jan. 1612pK. 1615 pf-45 and E. 2513, no fol.; 24 MV 1612, K. 16159f. 791, 
a copy; 2 Sept. 16129K. 1427vf. 87; 31 Aug. 1612pK. 15939f. 34. 
6- Cntas. 3t. 126 Mar. 161lyA. G. S. E-2643, n3 fol. pon Africapand K-1427, 
f-55 on the marriages. 
7- Cnt-as. St. 913 Feb. 16109A. G. S. K-14279ff-4 and 5- 
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the C3urt expert an etiquettevadvising Philip chiefly an the nature 
of the mourning that was appropriate rather than on the diplomatic 
revolution that had thereby been brought about. 
1 
One other attendance 
may also be ascribed to a special interest - that in 1608 when the 
Council was dealing with the flight of religious to France. 2 of the 
nineteen attendancesvthereforevbetween 1608 and 1614 no fewer than 
seventeen were accounted for by special interests or occasioned by 
exceptional eircumstance; indeed, since the attendances of 1602 and 1603 
May also reasonably be described as extraordinaryland since he did not 
attend at all in 1615ywe are left with Lerma havingtas 1616 3pened9sat 
at only three meetings that were neither i# themselves extraordinary 
nor concerned with matters in which he had a particular interest. 
3 The 
contribution was still a modest one. 
His statusphoweverphad changed, for in the years from 1608 he 
had only to open his mouth at council table to have his colleagues 
competing with their eulOgies; it was as if he now dropped in to have 
his morale boosted. Indeed, the view of him as the true heir of Philip 11 
found rhetorical expression in the adjective consistently used by his 
c3lleagues to describe the quality of his views - 'prudent'. Thus the 
1- Cntns. itin. St. 924 and 29 May 1610yA. G. S. L15939ff-22 and 24- 
2- Enta. St. 99 Dec. 16081A. G. S. K-14269f. 108. 
3- The excepti3ns being tile meetings of July 1601 (abovepp-375) and 
those of May and August 1614 (belowqpp3SIj'&S7 
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itinerant Council, for instancegin September 1608 thought that his views 
1 4f 
were 'very prudently considered'. Even Idiaquez was afflicted by the 
diseaselbut of course it was the Councillors Who spoke after Lerma 
who suffered most. Infantadovhimself about to assume a maj3r Ale on 
the Councilpmay be taken as an examplegif an extreme one. In 1608von a 
matter of the very greatest imp3rtanceghe recorded merely that 'he 
agrees with all that the Duke of Lerma has saidpbecause it appears to 
2 him that he has left nothing untouched', and went only from bad to 
worse. In 1610 he had to look hard9but found a minor point an which to 
agreep 
3 
and in 16111having dared to make exactly the same points as 
Lerma he obligingly recorded his admiration for what he had 'so 
prudently said1jonly to find that he had not finished; thus when Lerma 
offered his supplemental parecergInfantado too returned9to say nothing 
m3re than that he agreed with this second view. 
4 
It was of course normal for later speakers to record simple 
agreement with earlier. but -the pattern of voting when Lerma attended 
wasgafter 16089in every degree exceptional, and the awe in waich he 
was held by his colleagues was most perfectly expressed in September 
1612. Lerma had opened the discussion by giving an account of his 
1 Cnta. itin. 3t. 91 Sept. 16089A. G. S. E-2638pf-36. 
2 ! In--ta-St- 930 Xar. 1608, A. -G. S. ý--15939f-18- 3 E-nta-St- P13 Feb. 16109A. G. S. -K-14279f. 4. 4 Rn--ta- St- 97 Jan. 16119 A. G. S. K. 16119 f. 15- 
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dealings with some French noblemen: 
I Marquis 3f Castel-Rodrigot "That the action of the Duke of 
Lerma. was very christian and prudent9so admirable and 
w3rth. v of such a great minister of Your Majesty 11; 
(Idia'quez)t "That it has greatly pleased him to have heard 
what .... Lerma, has saidybecause it was so convenient f3r 
the service of God and for the good of Christianity and 
so w3rthy of such a great minister of Your Majesty ... ". 
Marquis of Velada: "He agrees with what has been said "ZI . 
Lerma then returned and added a minor detail. 
Cardinal Toledo: "That it has greatly pleased him to hear what 
the Duke of Lerma has said9because all of it has been so 
W3rthy of admirationland thus he agrees with him". 
The same is offered by the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque, 
the Marquis of Villafranca, and D3n Agustin MSjia- 
All the Council agrees with 'what the Duke of Lerma has said (on 
this latter point)', 
1 
The pattern of subservience was complete. It was, howevergjust that - 
a pattern. Even at such meetings as thisIducal dominance was more 
apparent than real. The views that he propounded were hardly w3rthy of 
such acclamation; although they were intelligent and preCiseýthey were 
1- RntA. St. p2 Sept. 16129A. G. S. K-1427, f. 87- 
in no substantial sense novel. Like any other councillor, #e worked 
within the c3nsensus, merely adding the occasional suggestion that was 
new. It was his practice to speak at some length - indeed his pareceres 
were as a rule impressively comprehensive in their scope - but he 
consistently made the same points as Idiaquez had done. He was generally 
loth to adkn3wledge his debt but, like the gentleman he was9felt 
obliged to do so an occasionsland indeed did so more frequently than 
Idigquez acknowledged any debt to him. 
1 Heyand with him the other 
c3uncillors, knew who the real leader was. 
After Idiaquez's deathpLerma made no attempt to seize the 
leadershippand indeed gave the Council even less of his timagsitting 
only six times after October 1614.2 The Council abased itself before 
him in December 16149 
3 
and generally followed him in debates in 1616 
4 
and 1617, but only two mengboth related by marriagelnow practiced an 
actiV6 : )beisance-Infantado and la Laguna b3th humiliated themselvest 
1 For an example Of his making exactly the same points as Idieqýezq 
but without acknowledgement y. 2ntA. StoO Tanol6l2q'AoG. S- E. 2513, n3 
fol. He recorded specific agreement with Idiaquez in qntas. 24 and 29 
May 1610pop. cit P13 Feb. 1610pA. G. S. K. 1427, f-4 and' 2 sept. 
16129 
01 A-GoS. Eo25139no fol.,, and with Chinch3a in cnta-30 Mar-1608pap-cit 
2- The consulta of 12 Deco16141A. G. S. E. 20289rý37UOI-is not included in 
the Attendance Register. 
3- IFirstlygit should praise - and with reason - all that the Duke Of 
Lerma has said with his accustomed prudence and xxxtgreat zeal for 
the service of Your MaJesty ... I vcntaoSt. 'l2qDeb. 
'l6l4, jNLft OP--Cit 
4- On l6l6qbelowqpX"-$, and in 1617, c7ntaso18 Feb. and 9 APr-, A: -G-So E- 
2031, no fol. and 2326, f. 27. 
.I 
381 
m3st awfully in 1614 and 1618 respectively, 
1 
and were generally only 
too prepared to follow where he led. 
2 Of the new councilloreph3weverg 
only Aliagapin 1616 and twice in 16179went out of his way to agree 
with him. 
3 
These men were n3 syc3phants. Thus, for instancepas early as 
1613 Villafranca and Meo'jialjoined indeed by even la Lagunalrather 
conspicu3usly failed t3 ackn3wledge their agreement with him94 and when 
in 1616 Mejia failed to make the slightest of b3wa in his direction 
Lerma felt obliged to return with a supplemental statement agreeing 
5 
with him. There was deep significance in that little incident. 
The two most senior of Lermals co-survivors from the first 
generation were no more covetous than he of the leadership. Velada 
generally solved the problem of his embarrassment at having to lead 
the C3UnCi1 by staying away9but when attendance was unavoidable - he 
still had his grandeeship to earn - t3ok refuge in polite self- 
depreciation. Thus after some sixteen years as a councillorlhe was able 
on Infantadapsee particularly p cnta. St. 9 27 May 16140A. G. S. E'. 2030V 
no fol. La Laguna in 1618 'was the other day of the view that the 
galleons of Naples should not leave the Adriatic Sea9but having 
heard what the Duke of Lerma now saysohe changes his mind and is 
of his view in everything' qcnta. St. P14 Feb. 1618pA. G. S. 
B. 18819no f. 
2 See for examplegentas St-915 Dec. 1616 and 18 Peb. and 9 Apr, 1617P 
A. G. S. K. l5939f-54qE. 203lqn3 fal. and $. 2326vf. 27. 
3 lie did so in the consultas cited ab3veln. 2. 
4 Cnt%i. 3t. v4 Jul. 16131A. G. S. E-2643, n3 fol. 
5 E-nta-St-P15 Dec. 1616, op. cit 
I 
to defer uncritically to MejiapVillafranca and la. Laguna as those 
'most experienced' in Flemish affairsp 
1 
and it was a reaction utterly 
typical of him. 
2 His c3uncillorship was buried in 1615 when Sarmiento 
de Acunýals reports from England left him with 'little to say' on 
matters French and Savoyard; whengsince matters German were in ZuEga's 
hands 'he does not say more than that he (ZI!; iiga) will have Your 
Majesty's orders on what he is to do in everything1jand whenpsince the 
despatches from Juliers brought nothing new 'he does not offer any more 
advice far the moment. 
3 Velada need detain us no more than he did the 
Council. Ifvon the other handgToledo's failure to seize the leadership 
comes as no surprisephis new-found diffidence certainly does. It may 
have been acedia that acc3unted for his deference t3 his oolleagueB 
on matters seculary 
4 but what had happened to the old Cardinal when he 
was prepared to waive his objections to an English marriage merely 
because a majoritY of a junta of theologians were prepared to sanction 
it ?5 Toledo's decline was Puzzling and saddening. 
10 There was thus a very real vacuum after the death 3f Id aquezq 
and it was filled by a collective leadership. With the exceptions of 
1- ýLnta. St. 916 Jan. l6l4pA*G. S- E. 20279no fal. 
2- See also his parecares on cntas. 3t. 229 Aug. 1615 and 11 Feb. 
1615P 
A. G. S. E-2514pf. 57 and 2326, f. ý8 
3- Rnta. St. pl8 Jul. 1615tA. G. S. E-2514pff-52-3- 
4- Thus to Mejiap2. nta. Stq14 Feb. 1613, A. G. S. E. 20271no fol.; to Lermay 
cnta*St-915 Dec. 16169A. G. S. K-1593, f-54; to InfantadopLn_. ta. St-928 
Jan. 16169A. G. S. E-23269f. 18. 
5- 
. 
2nta-St. 912 Jan. 1615jA. G. S. h. 2514off-37-8- 
la LagunapZapata and Benaventepwho tended to follow rather than to 
lead9the councillors of the second generation were remarkable meng 
hardened and thar3ughly realisticland they warked within an equally 
remarkable consensas-At the care of that consensus were two men. The 
Marquis of Villafranca was m#ch given to rhetoric - so much so indeed 
that the Council had to set something of a time-limit upon him and 
was9mare perhaps than any other councillorga man passionately 
determined to strike at the enemies of his country. His first instinct L 
was far actiongspeady and docisivelbut his second - and it was this 
that ruled him - was for caution. Eloquentgforceful and imaginativaphe 
soared on occasion to remarkable heights, 
2 
and his pareceres werepon 
the whole, mare consistently interesting than those of any other 
cauncillor. The Marquis was never dull, Don Agustfn MIjia by comparison 
said littleeDour and concisaghe was perhaps the mast brilliant of 
Philip 111's soldierejand in his own quiet way guided the Council on 
all military affairs, 
3 His King, like his colleagues on the Councilp 
4 hung an every one of his words. M6jiaIs influence an the course of 
In enta. St. 927 May 16149A. G. S. E. 20289no fol., he regretted that he 
would have to confine himself because of this time-limit. 
2- See espedially his parecor an the cosmic danger$ of the situation in 
Gormanypin cnta. 3t. 119 Apr. 16191A. G. S. E. 23269ff. 65-6. 
3- See for instancepcntas. St. 127 May and 30 Jun. 16149A. G. S. E. 2028, n3 
fols.; q Jan. 16169F. 20309n3 fol.; 18 Jul. 16159E. 2514ýff-52-3- 
4- Thus when in 1615 he was unable ta afford to travel with the Court, 
Lorma wrote twice to Carrillo 9 firstly that 'His Majesty has ordered. (Maiia) to come herefor he in so distinguished and so valuable 
that the service of His Majesty suffers from his not being 
availablel. He therefore ordered Carrillo to give him an allowance. 
Foar days laterpLerma wrote that Me*jia was to come to Valladolid 
even if the money was not paid. Notes to Carrilloq2O and 24 Jun. 1615, 
A. G. S. C. J. H. 3879na fols. 
3 
Spanish hist3ry was profound. 
Three other men - InfantadopZu-niga and Aliaga - made varyingly 
major contributionB. Infantado had begun to emerge as a councillor of 
real significance from about the end of 1612 and by the time oT the 
French marriages wangafter a dozen years an the Council9quite as self- 
confident as any of his calleagueepsaving of course when Lerria attended. 
His particular interest was in central Europegand although he had never 
served there he had made something of a special study of the problems 
of the area. It served him well, for in 1616-17 the Council temporarily 
lost Villafranca and was left therefore with only Me"jia as a major 
figure. Infantado took advantage of the momentgand did so with a 
vangeance. In January 1616 he offered the Council perhaps the most 
extraordinary Parecer of the reign and seized the initiative on German 
policy; having laboriously studied all relevant governmental 
docusentationleven, taking his terms of reference back as far as 1348P 
lie in an immense statement persuaded his staggered colleagues and 
admiring King to cede Spanish claims to the Bohemian throne in favour 
of the Archduke perdinand. 
I Infantado had arrivedfand for fifteen 
months Spain's central European Policy was his; thus in June 1616 his 
colleagues had him prepare a statement on their position on the 
problems of that area since he was I the best informed and able of them' 
.1- 
Cnta. St. 928 Jan. 16169A. G. S. E-23269f. 18. 
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on the mattero 
1 
while in March 16179having listened to his views9the 
Council simply recorded agreement 'with all he has said' .2 
lasic to Infantado's viewsland indeed to the whole Councillso 
was an abiding deference to the advice of ambassadors Zi%iga and 
Sarmiento do Acui; ap3 and it was therefore inevitable that when ZI%i9a 
commenced regular attendance at the Council he should have proceeded - 
like Olivares before him - to wag it by its tail*Only on Germany was 
his sway ever as complete as Idiaquez's had beenvand it was established 
spectacularly and iamediately; having made an isolated first appearance 
in 1616, he assumed regular attendance an 9 July 1617 and was at that 
meeting accorded the extraordinary distinction of being allowed to 
lead the discussion. He did sapand his colleagues merely deferred to 
him. 4 Voluble but precisephe dealt in grand analyses but brought too 
a comprehensive knowledge of the minutiae of European affairs to the 
Council; he knew the men and had been to the places that the COuncil 
had to talk about. 
5 
Aliaga. began unexceptionally and modestly anough. Indepandent 
1- Rnta. St. 91 Jun. 161691: bid. 9f. 19. 
2- Enta. St. 916 Mar. 1617vibid. iff-30-1-See also cnta. 1 Jun. 1616,. ibid.. 
ff. 19-20pand 'Advertancias del Duque del Infantad* sobre el 
negicio do la succession do las Reynos do Ungria y ]Bohemia' gibidg 
f. 20. 
3- Thus on Zt%igalsee cntas. St. 930 Jun. 1614tA. G. So E. 20289no fol-gand 11 Feb. 16159E. 2326vf. 68. on Sarmiento do Acul5agbelowpp. 
4- Enta-St. 99 Jul. 16179Lbid. 9f. 38. Similarlyp see cnta,. St. 96 Aug. 16179 ibid. 9f. 60. 
5- Soo especially his Parecer on Flanders in cnta. St. 97 Apr. 16189 
A. G. S. E-20349f. 4. 
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from the first, he was yet always part of the mainstream; thus p for 
instance9he was emphatically against the English marriage on grounds 
of 'good 03nsciencel but wasylike Toled3vprepared to follow the 
majority of theologians in sanctioning it. 
1 
He paraded himself Most 
forcefully indeed as the guardian of the national consciencepbut knew 
when to bond with the wind; shrowd and craftyýhe was a realist and in 
1617 rather beautifully justified the dissimulation he not infrequently 
advocated: on grounds of 'public hanesty'. 
2 
These five menps* different in personality 9 were united on a 
common aim; they wanted war. In a broad senselof course9that was the aim 
of all Philip Ill's councillors of Statepas it was of Philip himself- 
They had made peace with England in 1604 and with the Dutch in 1609 
less because they wanted peace than because war itself had failedvand 
because they recognised the need for a breathine-space. Peacelso-calledo 
became in fact a nightmareva bewildering succession of crises in Italyp 
central and northern Europe and across the seas. Idiaquez had foreseen 
this in 1608 when he had wondered whether for Spain there could ever 
be a difference between peace and warvand the dilemma haunted the 
Council for the remainder of the reign. It did so of course against the 
backcloth of the countdown to April 1621, but more importantly perhaps 
1- Cnta. St. 918 Jul. 16151A. G. S. E-25149ff-52-3. 
2- Cnta. St. 922 Aug. 16179A. G. S. E. 188otno fol. On his consciancelsee 
also entas. St*97 Dec. 1617 and 26 May 16209A. G. S. E. 2514)f. 
84 and 
25159f. 37. 
Wfýiii` 
it did so against the backoloth of a succession of crisespeach one of 
which left the C3uncil more frustrated at its inability to act 
decisivel. v to resolve its problems; ultimatelygforce was the answer and 
that the Council could not employ it immediately only made its eventual 
use all the more inevitable. 
In 1612pthe Duke of Lerma himself had acknowledged the 
limitations placed on Spain's freedo* of action by financial necessity; 
'if the royal exchequer of Your Majesty were less s3rely-pressed, he 
would recommend breaking the peace with England and helping in 
Ireland .... butjseeing that affairs are in the condition that they 
aretit is better to wait until we can (properly) help 
1 That was 
the spirit of the years to 1621pand Lerma himself echoed it faithfully 
and repeatedly. In August 16141for instancephe confessed that 'if 
affairs in Italy were not in the state that they are ... he would 
be 
moved to give very terrible advice in connection with France because 
2 
(French activities in Italy) have made him so indignant'. Similarly, 
when in 1616 Savoy was xiimoured to be on the point of involving 
the 
Dutch in Italy Lerma took the extraordinary step of attending the 
Council of War's debate on the crisispthus making only his third 
appearance on that Council and the first since 1599; he then gave 
it 
1- Cnta. St. 12 Sept. 16122A. G. S. E-2513, no fol. 
2- Cnta. St. 912 Aug. 16149A. G. S. E-2514 9 f. 28. 
as his view that the preservation of the Catholicism of Italy might 
have to be considered as more important than the preservation of the 
Truce with the Dutch. 
1 
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Lerma of course was all for the easy lifevabroad as at homepand 
for him to speak in such terms was the more significant of the mood of 
the Council as a whole. With a vengeful patience it waited for the day 
when it would be able to deal with its enemiestand. its attitude was 
informed by men who were rather more active by temperament than the 
Duke himself. Villafranca. and Xejia were soldiers9and so toolfor all his 
diplomatic experience was Zu5igatand they - the three mast important 
councillors after Idia'quez's - death - created the mood. As earlyyf; Dr 
instancepas the middle of 1614 Villafranca and Xhia turned a 
discussion of the JUich crisis into one of whether the Truce with the 
Dutch should be broken. They impressed upon Philip the weakness of his 
position as against the Dutch on land and seagand concluded that the 
time was n3t yet for war - unless there was no other way to baulk the 
Dutch. 2 They were strongly supported in May 1614 by Lerma himself9who 
stressed the need for financial reform at home and in Flanders and who 
suggested that Philip send a Precautionary sum of at least 
3009000 
3 W1 
escudos to Flanders* Such restraint did not come easily to 
the two 
1- Cnta. War926 Dec. 16169A. G. S. G. A. 808, no fOl- 
2- Gntas. St. 927 Maygll Junoand 30 Jun. 1614tA. G . S. E. 20289no 
false 
3- Enta. Sto 927 MaY 16149Lbid. 
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soldiers; thus Villafrancaqwhile arguing the need for caution in June 
had not been able to resist pointing out that help could be sent north 
from Italy since there was no probability of any significant Turkish 
naval activity that year. 
1 Similarlypin January 16152dealing with that 
'declared enemy' Savaythe toyed with the idea of putting the affairs of 
Italy into quick order by sending a fleet to take Nice. 
2 
Diplomacy of course won 'what arms could notprobably Spanish 
power in Europe had never appeared as dominant as it did in 1615. The 
marriages of that year not only confirmed the neutralisation of Francep 
but had a salivating offect on James of England - so much solindeodp 
that by July he was already concerning himself with the problems of 
g3 etiquette involved in the very ceremony of Charles' Spanish marria, e, 
Nor was it only the King who was so preoccupied; the Queen herself by 
February 1616 was looking forward to an extra marriagepfor the Prince 
of Denmarkland obligingly offered Philip some of her own jewels to 
compensate him for his expenses in celebrating the French marriages. 
4 At. 
every levelpthe triumph in England seemed complete; the fall of Somerset 
was of little consequence since Villiers was reported by Sarmiento do 
5 Acuna. to be 'firm' in the Spanish service, and if the current English 
1- Cnta. St. jll Jun. 1614POP-cit 
2- Cnta. St. 112 Jan. 1615pA. G. S. E-25149ff-37-8- 
3- Cnta. itin. St. 918 Jul. 16151 ibid. off-52-3. 
4- Cnta. St. tl3 Feb. 1616gibid. if-73. 
gand on Villi Sn 5- Ua-Somersetý. Snta. St. v12 Jan. 1615POP-cit ers , ntt, a. S t. 
23 jul. 1616, ibid. 9f. 78. 
ambassador conducted himself in the Council's view very agreeably 'in 
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all touching SpainIq 
I his predecessor was fond enough of the country not 
only to want to become a Catholic but to retire to a m3nastery in Spain 
itself. 2 
The Council was neither fooled nor distracted by its triumphsy 
appreciating - perhaps more than did its enemies - that they were merely 
tempa: rarypthat France in particular would not remain weak indefinitely 
and that the central problempin Planderagremained unsolved. It was thus 
for reasons Flemish that the Council in March 1615 moved tentatively to 
a commitment to the principle of an English marriage - 'the most 
convenient thinggand the only remedy for Christianity and for the 
security and quietude of everything in Flanders'. 
3 In July, Meiia 
I 
finally persuaded it to take the marriage seriously precisely because an 
alliance with England would largely guarantee the safety of the 
Indies 
and perhaps even lead to the cession by James of the places he 
held in 
Flanders. 
4 Time was getting short. 
S3, too, in 1616 was patience. In FebruarytState considered 80MO 
letters from Albert and Spinola in which they assumed that Philip would 
not want to break the Truce; Mgjia took offence at their presumption. 
5 
1- jo. jambassador Digbysanta-St-923 Jul. 1616gibid. 
2- ie-vCornwajlis, Lnta. St-v4 Mar. 1617gibid-ii-95- 
3- Cnta. St. 9 26 Mar. 1615 pj; bid. , f. 49. 
4- Cnta. St-918 Jul. 1615PA-b-id- off- 52-3- 
5- Cnta-St-928 Feb. 16169A. G. S* E. 20309no fole 
_T9 -, -I 
Similarly9when Albert gave some orders in the royal name Aliagapin 
August9thought his actions highly significant of his wish to be 
independent of Madrid and sternly advised Philip that this the more 
obliged him 'to consider the state of affairs in Flanders'-' Eyes were 
turning north. In 1615jWar had begun that review of naval weakness that 
was to lead to the great reforms of 1620-21jand it had done so because 
it was alarmed by the increase in Dutch naval activity. 
2 On 26 December 
1616 it met in emergency session to discuss the news that the Dutch 
were reportedly about to help the Duke of Savoyland it was at this 
meeting that Lerma pondered aloud the possibility of breaking the 
3 Truce with the Dutch. His colleagues nseded no prompting. Their 
concerns were of course less with religious than with military mattersq 
and they seized the apportunity; Mgjia thought that 'it would not be a 
bad thing' to break the Truce 'because war could be made with little 
more than the current expenselgand Diego do Ibarra led the professional 
councillors in arguing that open war could be renewed because prolonging 
the peace served only Dutch interests. 
4 The die was cas+.; eleven days 
previously Stategled Iq Lermaghad debated the Italian crisis and had 
concluded that the peace of Italy had to be preserved. At that meetingg 
1- Cnta*St. 96 Aug. 1616, ibid. 
2- Be* abovegpp. 161 and 300-301. 
3- Sao abovegpp. 387-8. 
4- Cnta. War926 Dec. 16169A. G. S. G-A. 808, no fol. 
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howeverpthere had been no mention of any Dutch activity in Italy. 
1 
That was the catalyst. For the butch to increase their naval activities 
in bath the Indies and off Africa was bad enough; that they should even 
appear to be thinking about involving themselves in Italy was 
inSUpp3rtable. There could be no peace with them; it remained to decide 
how and when to renew the war. 
There were now dust over four years to go before the Truce 
formally expiredpand everything that happened in Europe in those years 
waspto the C3uncilpsubardinate to that one consideration. It followed 
resolutely a policy of minimal involvement in the crises of those 
years9determined that it would not be dragged into war before it was 
ready. Thusgfor instancepin 1618 Zaiga and Aligga led it in its 
determination not to go to war in Italy, 
2 
while in 1619 it was 
Villafranca who took the lead in arguing that because the 'war-machine' 
was not yet ready the Bohemian problem should be solved rather by 
negotiation than by 'ill-made war'. 
3 
The breathine-space was nearly lost in 1619jas relations with 
England deteriorated critically. The possibility that James would 
involve himself actively in the Palatinate appeared in the late 
I- Enta. St. 915 Dec. 16169A. G. S. K-15939f-54ja copy. 
2- En_ta. St*910 Feb. 1618, A. G. S. E. 18809n3 fol* 
3- Rn--ta-St-plS Jun. 16199A. G. S. E. 25159f. 21. 
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autumn of that year to presage the collapse of the whole English 
policy. In December 1618 Villafranca had observed that the time was 
'one for dealing and uniting with the King of England in all possible 
wayelp 
1 but by the summer of 1619 the Council was beginning to fear 
that such was becoming impossiblepthat it was being systematically 
deceived by James. In JunelZun-iga irately noted that it was 'the 
traditional practice of heretics to tell liesl9but yet advised that a 
last diplomatic effort be made - by telling him all sorts of 
flattering lies. ' - to dissuade James from actively supporting his 
son-in-law in Bohemia. 
2 The time and the place were not yet. By 
Octabarphoweverga breach appeared imminent-On 27th. vthe Council 
considered a report that James was to ally himself with the Dutch 
in action against the East Indies and that he had asked for Dutch 
help over Bohemia-He was now an enemy. But still the time was not yet 
- 'in any other circumstances we would already have arms in our 
hands' - and still the Council hoped that the prospect of the 
marriage would work its spell, 
3 Gondamar had been in Spain throughout 
1619 and on 27 November he presented a report to the Council in 
which he argued that circumstances had changed greatly since he had 
left England; that there was no longer any purpose in trying to win 
1- Lnta. St. p25 Dec. 161891bid. 9f. 11. 
2- Ln. 
-ta- 
St. P 18 Jun. 1619 qLbid. y f. 21. 3- Inta. St, 9 27 Oct. 1619 qjbid. 9 f. 33- 
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over a king who himself had no intention of going through with the 
marriagevand that arms - andsmore particularlypthe fleet - be prepared 
far action. 
I For years the Council had done little more than follow 
Gandomar's advice on matters Englishq considering himpas Infantado had 
put it in 1614,1the best informed and shrewdest' of all Philip's 
ambassadors. 
2 But there was special pleading here of a rather 
unsavoury kind; the Ambassador's statement concluded by asking that he 
should not be sent back to England. 
3 The Council was sympathetic to 
him but still prepared to stretch to the limit to conciliate James 
even th3ugh it doubted whether such was really possible. 
4 
Gandomar 
went back to England. 
As it happened9the crisis then resolved itself with the election 
of the Archduke Ferdinand to the imperial throne and with the 
clarification of James, real intentions once Gondomar had returned. 
5 
Now the Council could concentrate on the Dutch. It did not debate 
whether the war was to be renewed. Policies were not made 
thus; there 
were no climactic discussions at which great decisions were reached. 
policy was the expression of an attitudevand the attitude of 
the 
Council of State was nowpas it had been for yearspresolute and 
fixed; 
1- Cnta- St. 9 27 Nov. 1619 p ibid. 9 f- 34. 
2- Cnta. St-918 Apr. 16149A. G. S. E*25149f. 16. 
3 Cnta. St. 9 27 Nov. 1619 9 op. ci t' 
4 See ibid. and cnta. St. '28 Nov. 1619, ibid.. f. 47. 
5 Relations with England continued of course to be under strain; see 
especiallyl. 2nta. St. 926 May 16201A. G. S. E. 2515, f. '37 in which Aliaga 
and Zilifi& began to doubt whether the marriage should in fact go 
throu, jýqand on the Palatinategenta. War 9 Oct. 16209A. G*So G. A. Z5539 
no fa . land cnta. St. 910 Oct. 16; eu, . 20349ff. 60-2. 
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the Dutch had to be fought. That promise as such was not dobated; it 
evolved. Discussions took place on details, and only one of those really 
mattered - the question of timing. The Council did not at the end of 
the reign suddenly decide to renew the war; it decided merely that the 
circumstances were then as propitious as they were ever likely to be. 
There was thus no contradiction as against the determination not to 
become involved earlier in central or southern Europe; the armygas 
Villafranca had pointed out as late as 16191was not then readygand 
was not to be used and wasted on any other than the Dutch. By 1621 
Villafranca, thought it not only readypbut so ready that it had to be 
used; among the reasons he propounded for resuming the war was the 
highly significant one that 'an army that is unoccupied causes 
apprehension to allpwhereas one that is occupied causes dread only in 
the area where it operates'. For himpthose two years had been vital; 
the time was now. 
Villafranca himself had not changed in those two years any 
r more than had the COUnOil itself9or indeed the King. The egime of 
Philip 111 has been maligned on most counts, but the chief accusations 
have been two - that it was pacificland that it was dominated by 
the royal favourites. It was neither. It was aggressive and it was 
dominated by the c3uncils. Spain neither assumed a passive and pacific 
2nta. St. 930 Jul. 16219A. G. S. E-2035, f-94-On thingsee below, PP-396-7. 
On Villafranca's view of 1619pabovegp. 392. 
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stance because Lerma was in favour nor a more belligerent one because 
he had gone. Nor of course was he removed by any 'war-f action' ; he 
resigned. His chief relevance in this context was that he wasted 
monies that could have gone to the armies. The renewal of the war was 
consistent with everything that Philip and State had done throughout 
the reign; it was no mare an aberration that his last decision had 
been to renew it than it had been in effect his first to send an 
armada to Ireland. He had established War and State to give him his 
vict3ryvand he left them with what they wanted most, the decision to 
make war again. 
I The decision was probably unvisegand opposition to it was ledy 
not by a faction, but by another council; ]Finance argued on grounds of 
practicality that with the 1620 flota. having brought less than 
3009000 ducats for the Crown the war could not be properly supported* 
State's hope was that the war would be localiBed9short and 
successful. It hadpof coursepalways been thuspyet beneath any 
rationalisationgany race against time before France and England 
intervened, there was an inevitability about the decisiongand it came 
from within the very fibre of the Council itself. We should leave 
The Council argued that Spain and Flanders could not be 
provisioned - Ian impossible thing in view of the straitened 
condition of the royal exchequer and the lack of money ... I senta. 
Fin. 928 jan. 16219A. G. S. C-J-H-410, no fol. On the flota, cnta. 
Pkn., 
22 Nov. 1620libid. if- 185- See alsapentas 16 Jun. an-d--1-4, Tul. 1'619, 
C. J. H. 405, no fol-and f-155- 
State arguing its case before Philip 1V and with in particular the 
advice offered the new king by men appointed to the Council in 1603 
and 1610 respectively. Infantado believed that Albert's death was a 
manifestation of the divine favourysince it would allow Spain to 
exercise a more direct control over its army in Flanders. State had 'so 
many times' advised Philip 111 that the Truce should not be prolonged 
if its terms could not be improvedgand he reiterated that advice. The 
moment was right for war; a, large and vell-provisioned army was ready 
to fightland the states bordering on Flanders were each distracted by 
their own problems - France by its heretics, England with the 
Palatinate and Germany with the imperial struggle. His advice was 
therefore not to waste the advantages of the moment. -, to do SO would be 
a grievous blow to the royal reputat13n. MeJia thought that the army 
in 
Flanders vasgin both quantity and quality, the best he had ever known 
Spain to have there and that 'time should not be lost, f3r the summer 
is already vall-advancedl. Neither Philip 11 nor Philip 
Ill had ever 
had an opportunity like thisllf3r according to intelligence .. 
the 
rebels are extremely weakland their divisions over 
the matter of 
religion (are) as great as they could be ... 
The army should take 
advantage Of this occasion, for it will 
be SO superior to that Of the 
enemytand the expense that 
(has been incurred) ... should not 
be 
wasted'. 
1 The time was now. 
1- inta. St. v 30 Jul. 
16219 A. G. S. E- 2035 vf . 94. 
